14-004994 Theresa Williams vs. Florida Department Of Corrections Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, June 30, 2015.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent discriminated against her in retaliation for Petitioner's participation in protected activity.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

THERESA WILLIAMS ,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 14 - 4994

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS ,

Respondent.

/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

An administrative hearing was conducted in this case on

March 24 , 2015, in Bushnell , Florida, before James H. Peterson,

III, Administrative Law Judge with the Division of

Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Carlos V. Leach, Esquire

Morgan & Morgan, P.A.

20 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1600

Post Office Box 4979

Orlando , Florida 32802 - 4979

For Respondent: Sena M. Bailes , Esquire

Florida Department of Corrections

5 01 South Calhoun Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2500

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respondent Department of Corrections (Respondent or

the Department) violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992,

sections 760.01 Î 760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes , 1/ by

discharging Petitioner Theresa Williams (Petition er ) in

retaliation for her participation as a witness during the

investigation of a n alleged discrimination claim brought by

another employee .

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On April 14 , 2014 , Petitioner filed a complaint of

discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

( Ð FCHR Ñ or Ð the Commission Ñ ), which was assigned FCHR No.

201 400621 ( Ð Complaint of Discrimination Ñ ). The Complaint of

Discrimination alleges that the Department discriminated against

Petitioner in employment by unfairly disciplining and

discharging her in retaliation for participating in a

discrimination investigation. Aft er investigating PetitionerÓs

allegations, the Commission's executive director issued a

Determination of Cause on Sept ember 19, 2014, finding Ðthat

there is reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment

di scrimination practice occurred.Ñ An acco mpanying Notice of

Determination notified Petitioner of her right to file a

Petition for Relief for an administrative proceeding within 35

days of the Notice. On October 22 , 2014, Petitioner timely

filed a Petition for Relief and, on October 22 , 2014, the

Commission forwarded the petition to the Division of

Administrative Hearings for the assignment of an administrative

law judge to condu ct an administrative hearing. The case was

assigned to the undersigned and this case was initiall y

scheduled for a hearing to begin on January 29, 2015. Following

Petitioner's written requ est for a continuance, the final

hearing was rescheduled for March 24, 2015.

During the administrative hearing, Petitioner testified,

called three witnesses, and in troduced six exhibits received

into evidence as Exhibits P - 1, P - 2, and P - 4 through P - 7.

Respondent presented the testimony of two witness es and

introduced four exhibits into evidence as Exhibits R - A through

R - D .

The p roceedings were recorded and a t ranscr ipt was ordered.

The parties a greed to file their respective proposed recommended

o rders within 1 0 days from the filing of the t ranscript . The

two - volume Transcript of the hearing was filed on May 1 , 2015.

T he parties filed their Proposed Recommended Or ders prior to the

filing of the Transcript. B oth Proposed Recommended Orders were

considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Department of Corrections is a state agency as

defined in chapter 110, Florida Statutes, and an employer as

that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes.

2. At all times material, Petitioner was employed as a

nurse at the Department's Lake Correctional Institution ( Ð the

Institution Ñ ) in Clermont, Florida. She was hired by the

Department as a Licensed Practical Nurse effective July 12,

2007 .

3. Petitioner was terminated from her position with th e

Ins titution in May 2013. At the time of Petitioner's

termination, her official title was ÐSenior Licensed Practical

Nurse.Ñ

4. Prior to her termination, the Department provided

Petitioner with a letter dated April 16, 2013, advising her of

her proposed dismissal and scheduling a meeting ( Ð termination

conference Ñ ) with the Institution's Warden to discuss the

reasons why Petitioner was being considered for termination .

The letter was excluded from evidence because it was not timely

disclosed as an exhibit by the Department as required in the

Order of Prehearing Instructions in this case . Nevertheless,

Respondent testified that she attended the termination

conference and that, during the termination conference, she was

provided, and they discussed, three incident reports against her

that she had previously seen.

5. The termination conference was attended by the

Institution's W arden, the Assistant Warden, and Dr. Virginia

Mesa, the Institution's Chief Health Operator . The incident

reports discussed at Petitioner's termination conference

included Petitioner's alleged violation on February 8, 2013, of

the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

of 1996 ( HIPAA ) for which Dr. Mesa recommended PetitionerÓs

dismissal ; Petitioner's alleg ed failure on February 8, 2013, to

carry out an assignment to log w alking canes provided to

inmates ; and an alleged argument on February 18, 2013, with a

supervisor regarding Petitioner's reassignment to process

transferred inmates know n as "new gains."

6. There is no indication that the termination conference

changed the Department's proposed decision to terminate

Petitioner.

7. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified and

presented evidence designed to prove that the incidents outlined

above did not occur. However, following her termination in

2013, Petitioner timely filed a career service system appeal

with the State of Florida, Public Employees Relations Commission

(PERC) , contesting her termination. Following an evidentiary

hearing and a PERC hearing officer's recommended order in that

proceeding, PERC entered a final order on November 6, 2013,

providing in its pertinent part:

The relevant facts found by the hearing

officer relate three separate incidents that

led to [Theresa] Williams' dismissal. On

February 8, 2013, Dr. Virginia Mesa observed

Williams showing Captain Reed, who was the

securi ty officer - in - charge of the shift,

something in a green file. A green file is

the type of medical file kept for each

inmate. The green file was open in

Williams' hand and Reed and Williams were

looking into it. Mesa observed Williams

flipping through th e file with Reed in the

public hallway. The Agency's policy and

federal law strictly prohibit prison medical

personnel from allowing non - medical staff to

see inmate medical records.

That same day, Debra Elder, who was a

senior health services administrat or and new

manager, asked Williams to record various

information about canes that were issued to

inmates and to label each cane with an

identifying mark. Williams turned to a co -

worker and told her to do it. Elder

considered Williams' attitude insubordin ate

and wrote an incident report as soon as she

returned to her office.

On February 18, Williams was assigned

to be the "sick call" nurse when she

reported for her shift at 6:45 a.m.

However, she was informed that, if the

prison received a significant number of "new

gains," she would be re - assigned to assist

the two nurses do ing that work. "New gains"

is the Agency's term for the processing of

inmates transferred to the institution from

another facility. Around 8:00 a.m.,

Williams' supervisor, Joyce Isagba, arrived

at work. Isagba reviewed the assignments

and directed a sub ordinate to assign

Williams to new gains that day. Williams

believed Isagba, a relatively new

supervisor, had a pattern of changing her

assignment from sick call nurse to new gains

and did not like it. Williams approached

Isagba and questioned why she wa s being

reassigned. Williams and Isagba became loud

and argumentative. Other nurses were

present in the room. The conversation

lasted some time and Williams repeatedly

stated that the change of her assignment was

unfair and repeatedly wanted to know why she

was being reassigned. Isagba told her she

was more qualified to do that work and that

she did not have to give her reason for her

decisions. The dispute lasted several

minutes and Williams reluctantly assisted

with new gains. Later that day, Willia ms

was sent to sick call to finish that duty.

Isagba considered Williams to have been

insubordinate and wrote an incident report.

Based on these factual findings, the

hearing officer concluded that the Agency

had grounds to discipline Williams for poor

p erformance, violating the Agency's medical

information privacy, and insubordination in

violation of Florida Administrative Code

Rule 60L - 36.005. He recommended that [PERC]

adopt his recommended order and dismiss

Williams' appeal.

* * *

Upon review of t he complete record,

including the transcript, we conclude that

all of the hearing officer's facts are

supported by competent substantial evidence

received in a proceeding that satisfied the

essential requirements of law. Therefore,

we adopt the hearing of ficer's findings.

§ 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. Furthermore, we

agree with the hearing officer's legal

analysis of the disputed legal issues, his

conclusions of law, and his recommendation.

Accordingly, the hearing officer's

recommendation is incorporated herein and

Williams' appeal is DISMISSED.

8. The hearing officer's Recommendation and PE RC's Final

Order in the PERC Proceeding , Williams v. DOC , 28 FCSR 284

(2013), were submitted by both parties and received into

evidence without objection in this case as Exhibits P - 4 and P - 5,

respectively, and Exhibit s R - B and R - C , respectively . The PERC

Proceeding involved the same parties as in this case and the

allegations in the incident reports discussed at Petitioner's

termination conference were actually litiga ted and determined in

the PERC Proceeding. In other words, whether the incidents

outlined in those incident report s occurred and are sufficient

to support the Department's decision to termin ate Petitioner's

employment has already been determined. 2/

9. Mo reover, Petitioner failed to show , in this case, that

the incidents did not occur. Although Petitioner testified that

she did not show Captain Reed the inmate's medical chart in

violation of HIPAA and introduced Captain Reed's written

statement stating th at Petitioner did not show him the chart,

the evidence adduced at the final hearing showed that when she

met with Captain Reed during the incident , she was flipping

through papers with the medical chart in her hand . As found in

the PERC hearing officer's Recommended Order:

Williams violated the Agency's privacy

policy when she held an open inmate medical

file so a security staff officer could see

the inmate's writing and signature. This

was not a reasonable procedure to accomplish

the task of notifying the officer of a

potential security threat to other inmates.

There was a real possibility that the sick

call slip had been forged. It was

unnecessary to show Captain Reed an inmate's

medical file to determin e if the slip was

forged. Williams coul d have don e that

herself with the same accuracy as Reed,

since neither is a handwriting expert.

Williams v. DOC , 28 FCSR 284 (Recommended Order, 08/26/13).

10. Dr. Mesa's testimony in this case was consistent with

the hearing officer's finding and is credited .

11. Regarding the other two incident reports , while

Petitioner denied asking another to perform her assigned task of

logging inmates' canes, she admitted that she delayed performing

the task. Petitioner also admitted that she questioned her

supervisor, Ms. Insagba, as to why she was being assigned "new

gains," that during the incident Ms. Insagba raised her voice,

and that they " were both talking at the same time and I guess

she was trying to get a point across and I was just trying to

ask her why."

12. In addition to the incidents addressed in the three

incident reports, during cross examination in this case,

Petitioner revealed that she was also disciplined twice in 2012.

In August 2012, Petitioner received a record of couns eling for

insubordination. And in December 2012, Petitioner received a

written reprimand for failure to follow instructions.

13. In sum, the record supports a finding that , by May

2013, the Department had cause to terminate Petitioner .

14. Although it has been determined that the Department

had cause to terminate Petitioner's employment at the

Institution, in this case Petitioner asserts that the real

reason for her dismissal was her participation as a witness in a

discrimination charge brought by another employee against the

Depa rtment and Dr. Mesa.

15. The disciplin ary incidents supporting Petitioner's

dismissal occurred in February 2013, and before. The

investigation in which Petitioner participated began in March of

2013 and Petitioner provided testimony in that investigation on

April 23, 2013 , after Dr. Mesa had already recommended

PetitionerÓs dismissal and after Petitioner had been notified by

the Department that she was being considered for dismissal .

Petitioner was dismissed in May 2013.

16. In finding pro bable cause, the Commission stated in

its summary of the Investigative Memorandum:

Complainant did not demonstrate that she was

harassed or disciplined because of

participation in the internal investigation.

Complainant provided no evidence of

harassment, and she was not disciplined

after her protected activity occurred.

Respondent admitted that Complainant was

disciplined for the alleged HIPAA violation,

but this occurred prior to her protected

activity.

Based on the information received during the

inve stigation, it does appear that

Complainant was terminated in retaliation

for her participation in the internal

investigation. If the alleged HIPAA

violation was a true terminable offense,

Complainant should have been terminated in

February of 2013 when it occurred. Instead,

Respondent waited nearly three months to

terminate her, which was about three weeks

after her protected activity. Additionally,

Respondent has a progressive disciplinary

policy which it did not follow. The alleged

HIPAA violation is Complainant's only

documented incident. Respondent also

claimed that Complainant was terminated

after she was disciplined several times

prior to the HIPAA event, yet it could

provide no evidence that she had a

disciplinary record prior to February of

2013.

17. Unlike the limited information available to the

Commission in its probable cause determination, the evidence in

the de novo proceeding conducted in this case demonstrated that

Petitioner had a number of disciplinary offenses in February

that we re found by PERC to support her dismissal, and that

Petitioner had been written up for two other disciplinary

infractions in 2012.

18. Moreover, the showing necessary for a probable cause

determination is less than Petitioner's burden to prove

discriminat ion.

19. While there was a delay in Petitioner's termination ,

the evidence showed that Dr. Mesa recommended Petitioner for

dismissal when she wrote up the incident report for the HIPAA

violation in February 2013.

20. Although it is evident that management, including the

Warden and Dr. Mesa , was generally aware that Petitioner had

participated as a witness in another employee's discrimination

claim in April of 2013 , Petitioner did not show that she was

terminated because of that participation.

2 1. And, w hile the Department's delay in dismissing

Petitioner remained unexplained at the final hearing , 3/ that

delay , in light of the other facts and circumstances of this

case, including Petitioner's numerous disciplinary infractions

ou tlined above, is an insufficient basis to support a finding

that Petitioner was terminated i n retaliation for her

participation in a protected activity.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

22. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this

proceeding pursuant to section s 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida

Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60Y - 4.016(1).

23. The State of Florida, under the legislative scheme

contained in sections 760.01 Î 760.11 and 509.092, Florida

Statutes, known as the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the

Act), incorporates and adopts the legal principles and

precedents established in the fe deral anti - discrimination laws

specifically set forth under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq .

24. The Florida law prohibiting unlawful employment

practices is found in section 760.10. Section 760.10(7)

provides:

It is an unlawful employment practice for an

employer . . . to discriminate against any

person because that person has opposed any

practice which is an unlawful employment

practice under this section, or because that

person has made a charge, tes tified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing

under this section.

25. Florida courts have held that because the Act is

patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, federal case law dealing with Title VII is applicable.

See , e.g. , Fla. Dep't of Cmty . Aff. v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205,

1209 (Fla. 1st D CA 1991).

26. As developed in federal cases, a prima facie case of

discrimination under Title VII may be established by statistical

proof of a pattern of discrimination, or on the basis of direct

evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of

d iscrimination without inference or presumption. 4/ Usually,

however, as in this case, direct evidence is lacking and one

seeking to prove discrimination must rely on circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory intent, using the shifting burden of

proof patte rn established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555, 1562

(11th Cir. 1997).

27. Under the shifting burden pattern developed in

McDonnell Douglas :

First, [Petitioner] has the burden of

proving a prima facie case of discrimination

by a preponderance of the evidence. Second,

if [Petitioner] sufficiently establishes a

prima facie case, the burden shifts to

[Respondent] to Ðarticulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasonÑ for its action.

Third, if [Respondent] satisfies this

burden, [Petitioner] has the opportunity to

prove by a preponderance that the legitimate

reasons asserted by [Respondent] are in fact

mere pretext. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban

Dev. v. Blackwell , 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th

Ci r. 1990)(housing discrimination claim);

accord Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am.,

LLC , 18 So. 3d 17, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA

2009)(gender discrimination claim)("Under

the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff

must first establish, by a preponderance of

the evidence, a prima facie case of

discrimination.").

28. Therefore, in order to prevail in her claim against

the Department , Petitioner must first establish a prima facie

case by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. ; § 120.57(1)(j),

Fla. Stat. ("Findings of fact shall be based upon a

preponderance of the evidence, except in penal or licensure

proceedings or except as otherwise provided by statute and shall

be based exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters

officially recognized.").

29. "Demonst rating a prima facie case is not onerous; it

requires only that the plaintiff establish facts adequate to

permit an inference of discrimination." Holifield , 115 F.3d at

1562; cf. , Gross v. Lyons , 763 So. 2d 276, 280 n.1 (Fla. 2000)

("A preponderance of th e evidence is 'the greater weight of the

evidence,' [citation omitted] or evidence that 'more likely than

not' tends to prove a certain proposition.") .

30. Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination against the

Department alleges that the Department termina ted her employment

in retaliation for her participation as a witness during the

investigation of an alleged discrimination claim brought by

another employee.

31. I n order to prove a prima facie case of retaliation

prohibited by Title VII, the plaintiff must show "( 1) that there

was a statutorily protected participation; (2) that an adverse

employment action occurred; and (3) that there was a causal link

between the participation and the adverse employment action."

Fleming v. Boeing Co. , 120 F.3d 242, 24 8 (11th Cir. 1997).

32. Petitioner successfully showed that , by virtue of her

participation as witness in an investigation of another

employee's discrimination claim, she participated in a protected

activity. See § 760.10(7), Fla. Stat. (prohibits discri mination

because a person has "testified, assisted, or participated in

investigation, proceeding, or hearing" involving a claim of

discrimination).

33. The evidence also demonstrat ed an adverse employment

action ; namely, Petitioner's dismissal.

34. Petit ioner, however, failed to show, by a

preponderance of the evidence, a causal link between her

participation in a protected activity and her discharge. While

the burden of causation can be met by showing close proximity

between the time of the protected ac tivity and adverse

employment action, 5/ the evidence in this case does not satisfy

that burden. PetitionerÓs protected activity occurred after she

had been recommended for dismissal and notified of a meeting

with the Warden to discuss her proposed dismissal.

35. Therefore , Petitioner failed to carry her burden of

persuasion necessary to state a prima facie case for her claim

of a retaliatory discharge because of her participation in a

protected activity .

36. Even if Petitioner had demonstrated a p rima facie

case, t he Department successfully offered and proved legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason s supporting Petitioner's dismissal , and

Petitioner failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that those legitimate reasons were not the real reasons for her

termination.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of

Discrimination and Petiti on for Relief consistent with the terms

of this Recommended Order .

DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June , 2015 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

JAMES H. PETERSON, III

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida32399 - 3060

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 30th day of June , 201 5 .

ENDNOTES

1/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Florida

St atutes, Florida Administrative Code, and federal laws are to

the current versions which have not substantively changed since

the time of the alleged discrimination.

2/ Although Petitioner also attempted to disprove the

allegations in the same incident reports in this case, the

legitimacy of those allegations has already been determined in

the PERC proceeding prior to this case. As t he PERC Proceeding

involved the same parties and same inci dent reports discussed at

Petitioner's termination conference, principles of collateral

estoppel, also referred to as estoppel by judgment, prevent

Petitioner from re - litigating those matters. While the previous

litigation before PERC should bar Petitione r's re - litigation of

the issues involving Petitioner's HIPAA violation and

insubordination or rule violations set forth in the incident

reports discussed at Petitioner's termination conference, it

does not bar Petitioner's claim of retaliation. As explain ed in

City of Bartow v. Public Employees Relations Commission , 382 So.

2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979):

The City raises several points on appeal,

but we need discuss only two. We first

address its contention that PERC was without

jurisdiction to make a det ermination in this

cause because of the prior adjudication of

the Bartow Civil Service Board. The City

contends that the Board's action barred the

Commission from even considering whether

Ott's discharge resulted from an unfair

labor practice on the groun d that the

Board's adjudication was res judicata. We

disagree. The issue before the Civil

Service Board was whether Ott was

insubordinate and not whether the City was

guilty of an unfair labor practice in

terminating his employment. Therefore,

while the principle of estoppel by judgment

applied to the Board's determination that

Ott was insubordinate, it did not apply to

PERC's contention that the City had

committed an unfair labor practice.

Estoppel by judgment bars only those matters

actually litigated and determined in an

initial action. Gordon v. Gordon , 59 So. 2d

40 (Fla. 1952) ; see also Jet Air Freight v.

Jet Air Freight Delivery, Inc. , 264 So. 2d

35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) ; Board of County

Commissioners v. Rockmatt Corp. , 231 So. 2d

41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) . Accordingly, while

the Commission was estopped from rehearing

the issue of Ott's insubordination, it had

jurisdiction to determine whether the City

had committed an unfair labor practice. See

PERC v. Fraternal Order of Police, Local

Lodge , No. 38 , 327 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA

1976) .

Therefore, although Petitioner is barred from re - litigating the

incidents addressed in the PERC order, because Petitioner's

claim of retaliation was not previously determined in the PERC

proceeding, it is appropriate to determine that issue in this

case.

3/ It is likely that an explanation of the delay could have been

provided by the InstitutionÓs Warden. The Warden was not called

as a witness in this case. The Warden was reportedly

unavailable during the final hearing because of a family medical

emergency which occurred the night before. Although offered the

opportunity to present the WardenÓs testimony by telephone or at

a later date, the Department chose not to call the Warden as a

witness. As seen in the rest of t he analysis, an explanation of

the delay was not critical to the DepartmentÓs defense.

4 / For instance, an example of direct evidence in an age

discrimination case would be the employer's memorandum stating,

ÐFire [petitioner] Î he is too old,Ñ clearly an d directly

evincing that the plaintiff was terminated based on his age.

See Early v. Champion Int'l Corp. , 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th

Cir. 1990).

5/ As explained in Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc. , 506 F.3d

1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2001):

The burden of causation can be met by

showing close temporal proximity between the

statutorily protected activity and the

adverse employment action. See Brungart v.

BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791,

798 - 99 (11th Cir. 2000) . But mere temporal

proximity, without more, must be "very

close ." Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden ,

532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S. Ct. 1508, 1511,

149 L. Ed. 2d 509 (2001) (internal citations

omitted). A three to four month disparity

between the statutorily protected expression

and the adverse employment action is not

enough. See id. (citing Richmond v. ONEOK ,

120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997) (3 month

period insufficient) and Hughes v.

Derwinski , 967 F.2d 1168, 1174 - 75 (7th Cir.

1992) (4 month period insufficient)). Thus,

in the absence of other evidence tending to

show causation, if there is a substantial

delay between the protected expression and

the adverse action, the complaint of

retaliation fails as a matter of law. See

Higdon v. Jackson , 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th

Cir. 2004) (citing [**6] Wascura v. City of

South Miami , 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir.

2001)) .

COPIES FURNISHED :

Sena M. Bailes , Esquire

Todd Studley, Esquire

Florida Department of Corrections

501 South Calhoun Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2500

(eServed)

Carlos V. Leach, Esquire

Morgan & Morgan, P.A.

20 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1600

Post Office Box 4979

Orlando , Florida 32802 - 4979

( eServed)

Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.