15-003941
Dave Harvey vs.
Meal On Wheels Etc., Inc.
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Tuesday, November 24, 2015.
Recommended Order on Tuesday, November 24, 2015.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8DAVE HARVEY,
10Petitioner ,
11vs. Case No. 1 5 - 3941
18MEAL S ON WHEELS, ETC., INC.,
24Respondent .
26_______________________________/
27RECOMMENDED ORDER
29On October 15, 2015, this case was heard at videoconferenc e
40sites in Orlando and Tallahassee, Florida, by D . R. Alexander,
51the assigned Administrative Law Judge of the Division of
60Administrative Hearings (DOAH ) .
65APPEARANCES
66For Petitioner : Dave Harvey , pro se
731224 Cathcart Circle
76Sanford , Florida 32771 - 5406
81For Respondent : Richard V. Blystone, Esquire
88Garganese, Weiss & D'Agresta, P.A.
93Suite 2000
95111 North Orange Avenue
99Orlando, F lorida 32801 - 23 2 7
107STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
111The issue is whether Petitioner was subject to an unlawful
121employment practice by Respondent, Meals on Wheels, Etc., Inc.,
130on account of his race and disability , as a resul t of
142Respondent's maintenance of a hostile work environment , or as
151retaliation to his opposition to an unlawful employment
159practice, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
167PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
169On November 25 , 201 4 , Petitioner filed an Employmen t C harge
181of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations
190(FCHR) alleging that he was subjected to an unlawful employment
200practice by his employer, Meals on Wheels, Etc., Inc., on
210account of his race and disability , as a result of a hostile
222working environment , and in retaliation for protesting these
230discriminatory actions. After the FCHR determined th ere was no
240reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice
249occurred , Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief . The matter
259w as then referred by the FCHR to DOAH to resolve the dispute.
272At the hearing, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and
282presented two witness es . Also, he pre - filed 141 pages of
295documents relating to a variety of topics. A ruling on their
306admissibility was reserved. To the very limited extent they are
316reasonably authentic and are relevant, and the hearsay
324statements therein corroborate other competent testimony, the
331documents have been c onsidered . 1/ Respondent presented the
341testimony of two witnesses. Respondent's E xhibits 1 through 25
351were accepted in evidence.
355There is no tr anscript of the hearing . Respondent filed a
367p roposed r ecommended o rder (PRO) , wh ile Petitioner filed a two -
381page letter, with 18 pages of attachments . The PRO and letter
393(but n ot the attachments) ha ve been considered in the
404preparation of this Recommended Order.
409FINDINGS OF FACT
4121. As its name implies, Respondent is a non - profit
423charitable organization engaged in the business of providing
431free meals, transportation services , an d related assistance to
440senior citizens in the Sanford, Florida, area. Petitioner is a
4506 4 - year - old black male of Jamaican origin . He worked as a
466driver for Respondent from August 13, 2012 , until October 23,
4762014, when he was discharged for violating a co mpany policy.
4872. As a condition of employment as a driver , P etitioner
498was required to submit a medical fitness form regarding his
508current medical condition. In the form filed on July 30, 2012 ,
519he denied having any medical issues except non - insulin depe ndent
531diabetes, which is controlled by diet. See Ex. 21. An updated
542form was submitted on August 25, 2014, r eflecting no change in
554his medical condition. Id. No other medical records were
563submitted to substantiate any other medical condition. When he
572interviewed for the position, Petitioner did not tell Respondent
581that he needed an accommodation for his diabetes or that he had
593any work restrictions . As such, management never considered
602Petitioner to have a disability.
6073. Petitioner also provided a p ost - employment medical
617questionnaire on August 8, 2012, which stated that he had
627diabetes but t hat it was controlled by diet. Id. No other
639injuries, illnesses, or health abnormalities were reported.
6464. As a driver, Petitioner was expected to adhere to
656R espondent's safety rules. To ensure compliance with the rules,
666s hortly after being hired, Pet itioner was required to read , and
678then sign a statement acknowledging that he understood, the
687organization's General Policies . See Ex. 1, p. 4. He was also
699requ ired to ackn owledge receipt of its Employee Handbook
709containing the Safety Policies and Procedures. See Ex. 3. In
719addition, Respondent's Transportation Coordinator, Mark Taylor,
725condu cted periodic refresher training sessions with all drivers,
734including R espondent.
7375. One of Respondent's most significant safety rules, if
746not the most significant, is a rule that requires drive r s to
759provide door - to - door service. It provides in relevant part that
"772[u] pon arrival at a client's home, [a driver must] go to [th e]
786door and knock. If the client needs help, you will be right
798there to assist." Ex. 1, p. 1, ¶ 6. This rule is intended to
812promote client safety and to ensure, to the extent possible,
822that Respondent will not face legal exposure because , for
831example, a client falls down while walking un assisted to or from
843the vehicle.
8456. To comply with the above rule, drivers are required to
856get out of the van, go to the front door, knock, and then assist
870the client walking to the van . This is because the clients ar e
884elderly, some use walkers, and they need assistance from the
894driver while getting to and from the van. On August 21, 2014,
906Petitioner signed a nother statement acknowledging that he
914understood the policy, he agreed to follow it at all times, and
926he under stood that "[t]ermination will result in not following
936this important safety rule." Ex. 7.
9427. As a corollary to the above safety rule, drivers are
953instructed that they should never honk the vehicle's horn when
963they arrive at a client's home. Instead, th ey should get out of
976the vehicle and go to the front door of the residence.
987Petitioner was specifically told about the no - honking rule at
998two safety meetings.
10018 . The incident underlying Petitioner's discharge occurred
1009on the morning of October 23, 2014. Petitioner was told to pick
1021up Angelo Rosario and transport him to an appointment. The
1031client is in his 80s, suffers from Alz h eimer's disease, and uses
1044a walker. He resides in a mobile home - type community with his
1057daughter; and the driveway in front of the mobile home is
1068unpaved with exposed roots making it easy to trip or fall.
1079Although Mr. Rosario was not one of his regular clients,
1089Petitioner had picked him up at least 12 times in the previous
110130 days and was familiar with his condition and the area in
1113which he lived.
11169 . The testimony describing the incident is conflicting .
1126However , the accepted testimony shows that Petitioner arrived at
1135the Rosario residence while Petitioner was on a personal cell
1145phone call to his sister . When he finished the c all, Petitioner
1158blew the horn to alert the client that he was there. The
1170honking was loud enough to annoy Rosario's neighbor who
1179approached Petitioner 's vehicle complaining about the noise.
1187Suspecting th at the neighbor's concern might cause a problem,
1197Pe titioner immediately telephoned M r. T aylor and told him that
1209he had blown the horn and anticipated that someone might be
1220calling him with a complaint . Mr. Taylor told Petitioner that
1231honking the horn was inappropriate , it violated an important
1240safety rule , and he could not just sit in the van waiting for
1253the client . Petitioner admits that during the telephone call,
1263he shouted at Mr. Taylor and claimed he was unaware of the rule.
1276After M r. Taylor instructed Petitioner to go to the front door
1288to pick up th e client , Petitioner exited the vehicle and
1299escort ed the client to the van.
130610 . A fter speaking with Petitioner, Mr. Taylor immediately
1316telephoned the client's daughter to get her version of events.
1326Mr. Taylor learned that honking had recently occurred r ather
1336frequently at the client's home , and he believed that Petitioner
1346was the responsible driver , as Petitioner had transported the
1355client at least 12 times during the previous 30 days.
13651 1 . Mr. Taylor immediately reported the incident to the
1376Executive Director, Sherry Fincher, who evaluated the matter,
1384and then decided to terminate Petitioner for violating the
1393organization's most important safety rule. Notwithstanding
1399Petitioner's claim to the contrary, it is the Executive Director
1409alone , and not Mr. T aylor, who makes the decision to terminate
1421an employee. A memorandum was prepared by Ms. Fincher that day
1432indicating that Petitioner was being terminated "due to not
1441following agency policies regarding door - to - door pick up of
1453clients[,] . . . one of the m ost important policies to ensure
1467the safety of all clients." Ex. 20. This was consistent with
1478Respondent's policy, and one that Petitioner clearly understood.
1486Petitioner's race and di abetic condition played no role in the
1497decision.
149812. Petitioner's E mployment C harge of Discrimination was
1507filed one month later. Prior to that time, there is no
1518competent evidence that Petitioner had ever complained to Taylor
1527or Fincher about any discriminatory practices by the
1535organization.
15361 3 . Since the inception of t his case, Petitioner has
1548contend ed that he has a disability within the meaning of the
1560law. At hearing, however, he acknowledged that his diabetic
1569condition d oes not affect any major life activity. To support
1580his disability discrimination claim, h e testif ied that on an
1591undisclosed date in 2014 , he asked Mr. Taylor if he could eat
1603meals or snacks at designated times because of his diabetic
1613condition but was told he could not. The accepted testimony
1623shows, however, that Mr. Taylor advised him that he could eat
1634whenever necessary, as lunch and break hours are not set in
1645stone . To avoid a drop in his blood sugar, Petitioner was told
1658that he was free to eat or drink something at any time , or even
1672bring a bag lunch with him while driving his routes . Even
1684assum ing arguendo that Petitioner had a disability, which he
1694does not, the contention that a disability formed the basis for
1705an unlawful employment practice must fail.
17111 4 . Petitioner also contended that Belinda S t um, a white
1724female lead driver , was treated dif ferently than he and was
1735given more "leeway" when she violated a rule. However, the only
1746evidence concerning a rule violation by Ms. Stum involved a
1756different rule . After a client accidentally slipped while being
1766assisted out of the van, M s. Stum immedia tely reported t he
1779incident to Mr. Taylor and then filed a completed incident
1789report. Other than Ms. Stum, Petitioner was unable to
1798specifically identify any other similarly - situated employees
1806outside his protected class (or even ones within his own class)
1817who were allegedly treated differently than he.
18241 5 . Although a client testified at hearing that on several
1836occasions she had observed Ms. Stum sitting in her van when
1847picking up clients, even if this is true, the client admitted
1858that she never reported t his to anyone at Respondent's
1868organization so that the alleged violation could be investigated
1877and disciplinary action taken, if appropriate .
18841 6 . Petitioner also contends he was subjected to a hostile
1896work ing environment due to his race and disability . He claimed
1908that Mr. Taylor , a white male, called him "boy , " required him to
1920answer "yes sir , " and would gest ure a "cut throat" sign towards
1932him, threatening him to keep his mouth shut . This assertion was
1944not corroborated by any other evidence, and Mr. Ta ylor denied
1955th e charge. The testimony of Mr. Tayl or is accepted as being
1968more credible on this issue. Assuming arguendo that he had a
1979disability, t here is no evidence whatsoever that Petitioner was
1989subjected to a hostile work ing environment due to his di abetic
2001condition .
20031 7 . Finally, t here is no evidence regarding the charge
2015that Petitioner was terminated in retaliation for engaging in a
2025protected activity. Indeed, Petitioner submitted no credible
2032proof that he complained to management regarding any
2040dis criminatory practices that precipitated the alleged
2047retaliation , other than "standing up for his rights" on the day
2058he was term inated, and Taylor and Fincher credibly testified
2068that they were unaware of any such complaints . Complaints made
2079at hearing that he is still owed money and was never paid for
2092training are not germane to this dispute.
20991 8 . Petitioner is now working part - time as a driver for a
2114retirement center in the Sanford area. He says he is also
2125employed as a substitute teacher for the Seminole County School
2135Board. Both jobs equate to full - time employment. According to
2146evaluations and testimony at hearing, Petitioner was considered
2154a "good worker," "likeable," and someone who "did a pretty good
2165job." While h is evaluations showed he met expect ations, h is
2177last evaluation noted that he needed improvement in following
2186orders. Except for being "written up" one time for being late
2197to work, Petitioner had no other disciplinary action.
2205CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
22081 9 . Petitioner has the burden of proving by a
2219preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed an
2227unlawful employment practice. See § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.
2235In his Employment Charge of Discrimination, Petitioner alleges
2243that as a black male with a disability, he "was discriminated
2254against on the bases or [sic] race, disability and retaliation
2264by [his] former employer. "
226820 . Discrimination by an employer against an individual
2277because of race or disability, or in retaliation for engaging in
2288a protected activity , are unlawful employment practi ces under
2297the law. See § § 760.10(1)(a) and (7) , Fla. Stat.
23072 1 . Petitioner can establish a prima facie case for
2318discrimination based on race or disability through the use of
2328direct evidence, which requires actual proof that the employer
2337acted with a dis criminatory motive when making the employment
2347decision in question, or by circumstantial evidence, which
2355typically requires a plaintiff to satisfy the four - prong test
2366established in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green , 411 U.S.
2375792 (1973). Here, becaus e no direct proof was shown,
2385Petitioner's claim is based solely on circumstantial evidence.
2393Johnson v. Great Expressions Dental C trs. of Fla. , 132 So. 3d
24051174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). Under this burden - shifting framework,
2416once a plaintiff makes out a prima fa cie case, the burden shifts
2429to the defendant to articulate a non - discriminatory explanation
2439for the employment action, and if the defendant does so, the
2450burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the
2460defendant's explanation is pretextual.
24642 2 . Petit ioner seeks to prove race discrimination
2474circumstantially through a disparate treatment theory.
2480Accordingly, Petitioner must prove the following to establish a
2489prima facie case: (1) Petitioner is a member of a protected
2500group; (2) Petitioner was subjecte d to adverse employment
2509action; (3) Respondent treated similarly - situated employees
2517outside of the protected class more favorably than Petitioner;
2526and (4) Petitioner was qualified for the position. City of West
2537Palm Bch. v . McCray , 91 So. 3d 165, 171 (Fla . 4th DCA 2012).
25522 3 . Petitioner has failed to prove discrimination by
2562indirect or circumstantial evidence. More specifically, he
2569failed to provide sufficient evidence that any other similarly -
2579situated employees outside his protected group were treated mo re
2589favorably than he. Even if a prima facie case w ere made, there
2602is evidence to show that Petitioner's termination was due solely
2612to his violating an established work rule.
26192 4 . Petitioner also alleges that he was subject to
2630discrimination on account of his disability. As a threshold
2639issue to substantiate this charge , Petitioner must first prove
2648that he has a disability.
265325. An impairment's minor interference in major life
2661activities does not quality as a disability. Toyota Motor Mfg.,
2671Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams , 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). An
2681impairment's impact must be permanent or long - term. Id. If an
2693impairment is readily corrected by medication or other measures
2702such as a diet, it is not an impairment that substantially
2713limits a major life activ ity. Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep't of
2725Admin. , 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995). On this issue, the
2737evidence shows clearly that Petitioner's impairment was not
2745permanent, and that it could be controlled by medication or
2755diet. Accordingly, Petitioner has fai led to prove that he has a
2767physical impairment that substantially limits a major life
2775activity. The disability complaint must fail.
27812 6 . Finally, to establish a prima facie case of
2792retaliation, Petitioner must show that : (1) he was engaged in
2803an activity protected by chapter 760; (2) he suffered an adverse
2814employment action by his employer; and (3) there was a causal
2825connection between the protected activity and the adverse
2833employment action. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville , 261
2842F.3d 1262, 1266 (11t h Cir. 2001).
28492 7 . Petitioner has failed to satisfy the first prong of
2861the test. His Employment C harge of Discrimination was not filed
2872until one month after he was discharged. Though he asserts in
2883that document that he was terminated for protesting Res pondent's
"2893discriminatory employment practices," no record evidence was
2900submitted to support this c laim . Indeed, there is no evidence
2912whatsoever that Petitioner engaged in a protected activity
2920within the meaning of the law , or that Respondent had any
2931know ledge of such an activity. Accordingly, the charge of
2941retaliation must fail.
2944RECOMMENDATION
2945Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
2955Law, it is
2958RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations
2966enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief , with
2976prejudice .
2978DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November , 2015, in
2988T alla hassee, Leon County, Florida.
2994S
2995D . R. ALEXANDER
2999Administrative Law Judge
3002Division of Administrative Hearings
3006The DeSoto Building
30091230 Apalachee Parkway
3012Tallaha ssee, Florida 32399 - 3060
3018(850) 488 - 9675
3022Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
3028www.doah.state.fl.us
3029Filed with the Clerk of the
3035Division of Administrative Hearings
3039this 24th day of November , 201 5 .
3047ENDNOTE
30481/ For purposes of the record, the undersigned has designa ted the
3060141 pages as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1.
3067C OPIES FURNISHED:
3070Tammy Barton , Agency Clerk
3074Florida Commission on Human Relations
30794075 Esplanade Way , Suite 110
3084Tallahassee, Florida 323 99 - 7020
3090(eServed)
3091Dave Harvey
30931224 Cathcart Circle
3096Sanford , Florida 32771 - 5406
3101Richard V. Blystone, Esquire
3105Garganese, Weiss & D'Agresta, P.A.
3110Suite 2000
3112111 North Orange Avenue
3116Orlando, Florida 32 8 01 - 2327
3123(eServed)
3124Cheyanne M. Costill a , General Counsel
3130Florida Commission on Human Relations
31354075 Esplanade Way , Suite 110
3140Tallahassee, Florida 323 99 - 7020
3146(eServed)
3147NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
3153All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
31631 5 days of the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to
3176this Recommended Order should b e filed with the agency that will
3188render a final order in this matter.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 02/17/2016
- Proceedings: Agency Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 11/24/2015
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- Date: 11/17/2015
- Proceedings: Letter to Judge Alexander from Dave Harvey in response to hearing held on October 15, 2015; Medical Records filed (not available for viewing).
- Date: 10/15/2015
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- Date: 10/12/2015
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 10/09/2015
- Proceedings: (Petitioner's) Prospective Witnesses with attached (Proposed) Exhibits filed (not available for viewing).
- Date: 10/09/2015
- Proceedings: Respondent's (Proposed) Exhibit List filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 09/04/2015
- Proceedings: Respondent's Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Petitioner, Dave Harvey filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 08/18/2015
- Proceedings: Notice of Service of Interrogatories to Petitioner David Harvey filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 08/18/2015
- Proceedings: Respondent's Request for Admissions to Petitioner Dave Harvey filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 07/28/2015
- Proceedings: Notice of Hearing by Video Teleconference (hearing set for October 15 and 16, 2015; 9:30 a.m.; Orlando and Tallahassee, FL).
- PDF:
- Date: 07/21/2015
- Proceedings: Letter to Tammy Barton from Dave Harvey regarding Absence due to Vacation filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 07/20/2015
- Proceedings: Letter to Judge Alexander from Dave Harvey regarding Absence due to Vacation filed.
- Date: 07/15/2015
- Proceedings: Employment Charge of Discrimination filed.
Case Information
- Judge:
- D. R. ALEXANDER
- Date Filed:
- 07/15/2015
- Date Assignment:
- 07/16/2015
- Last Docket Entry:
- 02/17/2016
- Location:
- Orlando, Florida
- District:
- Middle
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO
Counsels
-
Tammy S Barton, Agency Clerk
Address of Record -
Richard V. Blystone, Esquire
Address of Record -
Dave Harvey
Address of Record