15-004817 Stacey Jern vs. Camelot Residence's Association, Inc.; Charles Kane, Property Manager; And Greg Hunnicutt, President Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, January 12, 2016.

Summary: Petitioner had no standing to bring an action under the Fair Housing Act because she had no legally-protected interest thereunder. Assuming Petitioner had standing, she failed to prove her discrimination charge against Respondents.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

STACEY JERN ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 15 - 4817

CAMELOT RESIDENCE ÓS

ASSOCIATION, INC. ; CHARLES

KANE, PROPERTY MANAGER; AND

GREG HUNNICUTT, PRESIDENT,

Respondent s .

/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case was heard on December 1, 2015 , via video

teleconference in Tallahassee and Sebastia n , Florida, before

Suzanne Van Wyk , a designated Administrative Law Judge of the

Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Stacey Leigh Jern, pro se

Post Office Box 352

Kirkwood, Illinois 61447

For Respondent s: Nicholas A. Vidoni , Esquire

Watson, Soileau, DeLeo, Burgett ,

and Pickles, P.A.

3490 North U.S. Highway 1

Cocoa , Florida 32923

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Petitioner was subject to unlawful discrimination

by Respondent s in retaliation for exercising her rights under

the Fair Housing Act, c hapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes

(2015) . 1 /

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On June 5, 2015 , Petitioner dual - filed a Complaint of

Discrimination with the Department of Housing and Urban

Devel opment (HUD) and the Florida Commission on Human Relations

(FCHR), alleging that Respondent s discriminated against her in

violation of the Fair Housing Act by retaliati n g against

Petitioner for filing a prior complaint with FCHR.

An investigation of the complaint was made by FCH R. On

August 3, 2015 , FCHR issued its Determination of No Cause and

Notice of Determination of No Cause , conclud ing that there was

no reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing

practice had occurred.

Petitioner dis agreed with FCHRÓs determination and , on

August 20, 2015 , filed a Petition for Relief. The petition was

forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a

formal hearing.

The final hearing was scheduled for December 1, 2015 , via

video teleconferen ce in Sebastian and Tallahassee , Florida, and

commenced as scheduled.

At the hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf , and

presented the testimony of Marcus Mu rillo and Brittany Walker.

Petitioner introduced no exhibits in evidence. Respondent s

offered the testimony o f Gerry Britton and Charlie Kane.

Respondent s introduced no exhibits in evidence.

The proceedings were recorded, but the parties did not

order a transcript thereof. The parties timely filed Proposed

Recommended Orders which have been considered by the undersigned

in preparing this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1 . Petitioner , Stacey Jern , is a former resident of a

condominium development located in Titusville, Florida, which

will be referred to herein as Camelot. At the time of the final

hearing, Petitioner identified herself as residing in Kirkwood,

Illinois.

2 . Respondent , Camelot ResidenceÓs Association, Inc. (the

Association) , is an entity created by the developer and/or

owners of property in Camelot. The Associatio n is governed by a

Board of Directors (Board) and has recorded covenants governing

use of the property by current and future residents .

3 . Respondent, Charlie Kane, was at all times relevant

hereto , the Association manager.

4 . Respondent, Greg Hunnicutt , was at all times relevant

hereto, President of the Association.

5 . In 2013, while a tenant in Camelot , Petitioner filed a

complaint with the FCHR alleging the Association discriminated

against her on the basis of her disability in violation of the

Fair Housing Act (2013 Complaint) . As to her disability,

Pet itioner testified that she has post - traumatic stress s yndrome

and anxiety disorder. 2 /

6 . The 2013 C ompla int was resolved by a No Cause

determination issued by the FCHR in 2014. Petitioner did not

exercise her right to an administrative hearing following the

No Cause determination on the 2013 Complaint.

7 . S hortly after issuance of the No Cause determination ,

Pet itioner left Camelot and moved out of state.

8 . While out of state, Petitioner reconnected with a

friend, Brittany Walker, who was living with her grandfather in

Melbourne, Florida. Ms. Walker was expecting a baby and wished

to move out of her grandfatherÓs house . Petitioner and

Ms. Walker planned to find a place to live together in Florida .

Petitioner was going to provide child care for Ms. WalkerÓs

baby.

9 . In 2015, Petitioner returned to Titusville, Florida .

Petitioner needed a place to stay while searching for a rental

to accommodate herself, Ms. Walker, and the baby.

10 . On or about January 5, 2015, Petitioner came to visit

her friend Marcus Murillo, who was a tenant in Camelot.

Mr. Murillo leased a o ne - bedroom unit.

11 . Petitioner brought very little personal property other

than clothing with her to Mr. MurilloÓs unit. Petitioner

intended to stay only briefly.

12 . Petitioner did not apply to rent any property in

Camelot, and upon questioning by t he undersigned, emphatically

denied any intent to lease property or reside in Camelot.

Petitioner was not a resident of Camelot and did not intend to

become a resident of Camelot.

13 . At all times perti nent hereto, Petitioner was

Mr. MurilloÓs guest. Mr. MurilloÓs unit was not PetitionerÓs

residence.

14 . Mr. MurilloÓs one - bedroom condominium unit was owned

by Respondent, Greg Hunnicutt .

15 . Mr. Hunnicutt had knowledge of PetitionerÓs 2013

Complaint against the Association . By all accounts, Petitio ner

had a hostile relationship with Mr. Hunnicutt when she was a

tenant in Camelot. No details regarding the nature of the

hostility were introduced in evidence.

16 . Mr. Kane became aware of PetitionerÓs presence in

Camelot by an unidentified Ðneighborhood watch volunteerÑ who so

informed Mr. Kane. Mr. Kane contacted Mr. Hunnicutt and

informed him that Petitioner was staying in Mr. MurilloÓs unit.

17 . Shortly thereafter , Mr. Hunnicutt called Mr. Murillo .

Mr. Murillo testified that Mr. Hunnicutt inquired whether

Petitioner was staying with him, and , when Mr. Murillo confirmed

that fact, Mr. Hunnicutt told hi m Petitioner had to leave.

Mr. Murillo testified that Mr. Hunnicutt stated something to the

effect that Petitioner was Ðn ot the kind of person we need in

Camelot.Ñ Further, Mr. Murillo testified that Mr. Hunnicutt

said to him Ðif you donÓt like it, you can leave with her.Ñ

18 . Petitioner left Camelot short ly thereafter.

19 . The Association did not hold a Board meeting in

January 2015. No evidence was introduced to support a finding

that Mr. Hunnicutt Ós actions were taken at the direction of the

Association, or that any member of the Board was aware of

Mr. Hunnicutt Ós request that Petitioner leave Camelot.

20 . Petitioner alleges that she incurred monetary damages

because she was asked to leave Camelot before she had secured

another place to rent. Petitioner seeks $15,432.00 in Ðactual

monetar y damages.Ñ 3 /

21 . PetitionerÓs mother is a resident of Camelot.

Petitioner also seeks an order prohibiting Respondents from

harassing her should Petitioner visit her mother in the future.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

22 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this

proceeding . § 120.57(1), Fla. Stat . (201 5 ) . 4 /

23 . PetitionerÓs complaint alleges Respondent violated

section 760.37, which reads as follows:

760.37 Interference, coercion, or

intimidation; enforcement by administrative

or civil action. Ï It is unlawful to coerce,

intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any

person in the exercise of, or on account of

her or his having exercised, or on account

of her or his having aided or encourag ed any

other person in the exercise of any right

granted under ss. 760.20 - 760.37. This

section may be enforced by appropriate

administrative or civil action.

24 . Section 760.37 is patterned after 42 U.S.C. § 3617,

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 968, as amended by the

Fair Housing Act of 1988 . D iscrimination covered under the

Florida Fair Housing Act is the same discrimination prohibited

under the Federal Fair Housing Act (referred to hereafter

collectively as the FHA) . Savanna h Club Worship Serv. v.

Savanna h Club Homeowners Ó AssÓn , 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1224

(S.D. Fla. 2005) ; see also Loren v. Sasser , 309 F.3d 1296, 1300

(11th Cir. 2002) . When Ða Florida statute is modeled after a

federal law on the same subject, the Florida st atute will take

on the same constructions as placed on its federal prototype.Ñ

Brand v. Fla. Power Corp. , 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA

1994) ; see also Mil sap v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt. ,

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8031 (S.D. Fla. 2010) ; Dornbach v. Holley ,

854 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; Fla. Dep't of Cmty. Aff.

v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) .

Standing

25 . Standing to bring a claim under the FHA is broad.

Ð[ T ] he only requirement for standing to sue under the [FHA] is

the Art. III requirement of an injury in fact.Ñ Telesca v.

Kings Creek Condo. AssÓn , 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16167 at *6 (11th

Cir. 2010)(quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , 455 U.S. 363,

376 (19 82)).

26 . While the standing requirement is broad, is it not

limitless. There are three elements to Article III standing,

succinctly stated by the Supreme Court as follows:

ÒFirst, the plaintiff must have suffered an

injury in fact Ï an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,

the re must be a causal connection between

the injury and the conduct complained of Ï the

injury has to be fairly tracea ble to the

challenged action of the defendant, and not

the result of the independent action of some

third party not before the court. Third, it

must be likely as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision.Ó

I d. at 880 - 81 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S.

555, 560 - 61 (1992)).

27 . Petitioner alleges she was injured by Mr. Hunnicutt Ós

threatening phone call to Mr. Murillo, which caused her to

prematurely terminate her visitation with Mr. Murillo and seek

shelter on short notice, thus incurring monetary damages.

28 . Petitioner has not established standing to bring the

instant action, even under the broad ambit of the FHA. Based on

the particular facts herein, Petitioner has not proven that sh e

suffered an injury in fact.

29 . Petitioner has not identified any legally - protected

interest which was allegedly invaded by Respondents. Section

760.37 regulates discriminatory conduct Ðbefore, during, or

after a sale or rental of a dwelling .Ñ Del a w ter - Gourlay v.

Forest Lake Estates Civic AssÓn of Port Richey, Inc. , 276 F.

Supp. 2d 1222, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 2003)( vacated after settlement ,

2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26080 (M.D. Fla. 2003) ) . Under the FHA , a

ÐdwellingÑ is defined, in pertinent part , as Ðany bu ilding or

structure, or portion thereof, which is occupied as, or designed

o r intended for occupancy as, a residenc e by one or more

families.Ñ § 760.22(4), Fla. Stat .

30 . The term ÐresidenceÑ is not defined by the FHA, but

courts have held that Ðthe ordinary meaning of the word

ÒresidenceÓ in [the FHA] is Ò a temporary or permanent dwelling

place, abode, or habitation to which one intends to return as

distinguished from a pl ace of temporary sojourn or transient

visit .ÓÑ Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island , 544 F.3d 1201,

1214 (1 1th Cir. 2008)( holding that half - way house is a dwelling

for purposes of the FHA where residents treat the facility as

their home and the average stay is six to ten weeks). Other

temporary residences have been found to qualify as dwellings

under the FHA where the occupants Ó lifestyles and intentions

reflect the plain and ordinary meaning of the word residence.

See Lakeside Resort Enters. , L.P. v. Bd. o f Supervisors of

Palmyra Tw p . , 455 F.3d 154 (3d. Cir. 2006)(drug - and alcohol -

treatment centers are dwellings for purposes of the FHA where

they were Ð intended to accommodate 30 - day stays as a matter of

courseÑ and in which patients ate their meals toget her, received

mail, hung pictures on their walls, and had visitors in their

rooms).

31 . In contrast, Camelot was to Petitioner but a temporary

stop on her way to a more permanent living arrangement with

Ms. Walker as her roommate . Petitioner treated Mr. MurilloÓs

unit as transient lodging, albeit a very affordable option. She

did not bring personal belongings to Mr. MurilloÓs unit, did not

occupy her own bedroom, and did not personalize her space.

Petitioner was, by her own adm ission, only a visitor in Camelot.

Petitioner plainly did not plan on Ðhapp ily - ever - aftering Ñ in

Camelot.

32 . PetitionerÓs claim under the FHA invokes no interest

protected thereunder. Petitioner was not attempting to either

lease or purchase any property therein, and did not occupy any

unit as a dwelling subject to the protections of the FHA.

Petitioner had no legally - cognizable interest in her transient

visitation to Mr. MurilloÓs unit. C f . , Walker v. Pointer , 304

F. Supp. 56 (N .D. Tex. 1969)(h olding that white Plaintiffs had

standing to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 when evicted

for hosting black guests because black guests Ó enjoyment of

implied easement of ingress and egress over the common area s was

destroyed when white tenants Ó leaseh old interest was destroyed.

ÐIt is reasonable to characterize the freedom of Negro persons

to come and go at the invitation of one lawfully in control of

the premises as sufficiently pertaining to a condition of

property to be a right to ÒholdÓ under section 1982.Ñ).

33 . Because PetitionerÓs allegations do not constitute

interference with any legally - recognized statutory interest,

Petitioner failed to establish an injury in fact which would

afford her standing under the FHA. PetitionerÓs Petition f or

Relief should be dismissed.

Merits of the Claim

34 . Assuming, arguendo , Petitioner has standing to bring

the subject challenge, the undersigned examines the merits of

PetitionerÓs claim.

35 . The burden is on Petitioner to prove her claim under

the FHA . See § 760.34(5), Fla. Stat . Petitioner must establish

her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Fla. DepÓt of

Transp. v. J.W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

36 . In order to recover on a claim under section 760.37 ,

Petitioner must demonstrate that Respondents :

coerced, intimidated, threatened, or

interfered with (a) [PetitionerÓs] exercise

of a right under the FHA; (b) [PetitionerÓs]

enjoyment of a housing right after exercise

of that right; or (c) [PetitionerÓs] aid or

encouragemen t to a protected person to

exercise or enjoy a housing right.

Klei nschmidt v. Three Horizons North Condo. , Inc. , Case No. 06 -

2251 ( Fla. DOAH Nov. 21, 2006; Fla. FCHR Feb. 15, 2007)(quoting

De law ter - Gourlay , 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1235).

37 . P etitionerÓs claim most closely resembles option (b)

above, that Respondents coerced, intimidated, threatened, or

interfered with PetitionerÓs enjoyment of a housing right after

exercise of her right under the FHA to file the 2013 Complaint . 5 /

38 . Petit ionerÓs claim fails primarily because , as

discussed above, she was not exercising any housing right

protected under the FHA when the alleged act of coercion,

intimidation, threat, or interference occurred. Because

Petitioner had no housing right , Respondents could not have

interfered with said right .

39 . Assuming, again arguendo , that PetitionerÓs visitation

with Mr. Murillo constituted the exercise of a housing right,

Petitioner failed to prove her claim.

40 . First, a s to Respondent Hunnicutt , Petitioner failed

to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he

threatened, intimidated, or coerced Petitioner . Mr. Hunnicutt Ós

threat was directed (and pointedly so) at Mr. Murillo.

Mr. Hunnicutt threatened Mr. Murillo with eviction if Petitioner

did not leave. Petitioner was neither directly n or indirectly

threatened. No adverse consequence was to befall her if she did

not leave Camelot.

41 . Second , Petitioner did not prove that Mr. Hunnicutt Ós

alleged discriminatory actions amo unted to conduct actionable as

interference under the FHA. For discriminatory conduct to be

actionable under section 760.37, it must be Ð so severe or

pervasive that it will have the effect of causing a protected

person to abandon the exercise of his or her housing rights.Ñ

Delawter - Gourlay , 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 .

42. Courts considering the issue have consistently

required this level of conduct in order to be actionable under

the FHA. S ee Sofarelli , 931 F.2d at 722 (Ðleaving a note

threatening to Ò break [Sofarelli] in halfÓ if he did not get out

of the neighborhood and running up to one of SofarelliÓs trucks,

hitting it, shouting obscenities and spitting at SofarelliÑ

along with making racial slurs in a newspaper); United States v.

Pospisil , 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1062 - 63 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (cross -

burning on lawn of non - whiteÓs residence) ; Stackhouse v.

DeSitter , 620 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ( firebombing

black plaintiffÓs car ) . But c f . , Lachira v. Sutton , 2007 U.S.

Di st. LEXIS 33250 (D. Conn. 2007) (kicking Hispanic tenantÓs

plants out of her apartment, stating Ðit has been a mistake to

rent to you with a child,Ñ refusing to perform repairs, and

other conduct, if proven, is not egregious or severe enough to

give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 3617 claim) ; United States v. Weisz ,

914 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Jewish defendantÓs

listing, in The Jewish Press , Roman Catholic neighborÓs home as

for sale and Ðopen for four days including Christmas Eve and

Christmas DayÑ causing neighbors to suffer unw elcome intruders

during the Christmas holidays , among other Ðskirmishes between

neighbors,Ñ were insufficient to allege a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 3617); L awrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood AssÓn , 318 F. Supp.

2d 1133 , 1144 ( S.D. Fla. 2004) (failure of Association to

intervene in neighborÓs discriminatory actions against neighbor

was not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 3617).

43 . In addition, Petitioner must prove that RespondentsÓ

actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Sofarelli ,

931 F.2d at 722 . As applied to the instant case, Petitioner

must demonstrate that Mr. Hunnicutt Ós action was motivated by

PetitionerÓs having filed the 2013 Complaint.

44 . A s to Respondent Hunnicutt , Petitioner failed to

demonstrate discrimin atory animus. Petitioner introduced no

evidence to support a conclusion that Mr. Hunnicutt Ós effort to

remove Petitioner from Camelot was motivated by her 2013

Complaint. Petitioner relie d upon Mr. Hunnicutt Ós reference to

her as Ðnot the type of personÑ for Camelot as evidence of

discriminatory animus . That broad brush terminology could just

as easily refer to any of PetitionerÓs personal attributes as to

her prior exercise of her right to file the 2013 Complaint. The

record is devoid of evidence regarding the nature of the former

Ðhostile relationshipÑ between Petitioner and Mr. Hunnicutt .

The undersigned cannot conclude that Mr. Hunnicutt Ós actions

were in retaliation for her 2013 Complaint. Th e sole reference

to Petitioner as Ðnot the type of personÑ is insufficient to

establish discriminatory animus under the preponderance

standard.

45 . In sum, Petitioner failed to prove her section 760.37

claim against Respondent Hunnicutt .

46 . As to Respondent, Association, Petitioner likewise

f ailed to establish any act of coercion, intimidation, threat ,

or interference . Petitioner attributes Mr. Hunnicutt Ós

statement to the Association , but because Mr. Hunnicutt Ós

actions did not violate the FHA, there is no violation to be

attributed to the Association .

47 . Assuming, yet again, arguendo , that Mr. Hunnicutt Ós

statement constituted a violation of section 760.37, Petitioner

must prove that Mr. Hunnicutt was acting on behalf of the

Association in order to establish that the Association was

liable for Mr. Hunnicutt Ós actions. As a matter of Florida

general law, a not - for - profit corporation Ðis managed by its

board of directors or by its officers acting un der the direction

and control of the board.Ñ Fla. State Oriental Med. AssÓn v.

Slepin , 971 So. 2d 141, 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); see § 617.0801,

Fla. Stat. For the Assoc iation to be held liable by

Mr. Hunnicutt Ós alleged unlawful act , Petitioner must

demo nstrate that Mr. Hunnicutt had either actual or apparent

authority for his action.

48 . ÐA finding of actual authority would require evidence

that the principal acknowledged the agentÓs power, that the

agent accepted the responsibility of representing t he principal,

and that the principal retained control over the agentÓs

actions.Ñ Slepin , 971 So. 2d at 145 (citing Villazon v.

Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. , 843 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2003);

Goldschmidt v. Holman , 571 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1990); and

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1957)). The record is

devoid of any such evidence. The Board did not meet , and took

no official action of any kind , in January 2015. Mr. Hunnicutt

was not acting under the direction and control of the Board.

49 . The party alleging the agency relationship bears the

burden of proof. See Robbins v. Hess , 659 So. 2d 424, 427 (Fla.

1st DCA 1995). Petitioner offer ed only her assumption that

Mr. Hunnicutt Ós use of the word ÐweÑ (Ðshe is not the type of

person we need Ñ in Camelot) as proof that his statement is

attributable to the Association. It is axiomatic that the

extent of an agentÓs authority cannot be established merely by

proof of the agentÓs own out - of - court statements made to a third

party. Orange Belt Ry. Co. v. Cox , 33 So. 403 (1902).

Petitioner would have to have shown that Mr. Hunnicutt Ós

statement was known and acquiesced to , or ratified by, the

Association. See Deutsche Credit Corp. v. Gale Group, Inc. , 616

So. 2d 469 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) . Petitioner offered no such

evidence. As such, Petitioner failed to prove Mr. Hunnicutt was

acting on actual authority from the Association.

50 . Petitioner likewise failed to prove the Association

was liable for Mr. Hunnicutt Ós action (again, assuming said

action w as unlawful discrimination) under a theory of apparent

authority .

Apparent authority arises under Florida law

only when the principal creates the

appearance of an agency relationship. It

does not depend on representations by the

person claiming to be an agent or on the

subjective belief of the person dealing with

the pu rported agent. Rather it is based

entirely on the acts or omissions of the

principal.

Slepin , 971 So. 2d at 144 (internal citations omitted).

PetitionerÓs subjective belief that Mr. Hunnicutt was acting on

behalf of the Association is insufficient proof . Petitioner

offered no proof that the Association held its p resident out as

having authority to remove tenants from Camelot. The

Association did not cloak Mr. Hunnicutt with Ðindicia of its

authorityÑ to take such action. See Gale Group , 616 So. 2d at

472.

51 . Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent,

Association, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner in

violation of the FHA.

52 . Finally, as to R espondent, Charlie Kane, Petitioner

did not demonstrate any element of her claim. The only evidence

regarding Mr. KaneÓs involvement in the alleged discrimination

is that he reported Petition erÓs presence in Camelot to

Mr. Hunnicutt . There is no evidence, much less a preponderance

of evidence , to establish that Mr. Kane violated the FHA with

re spect to Petitioner .

53 . Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that any of the three Respondents unlawfully

discriminated against her in violation of section 760.37.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief

filed in FCHR No. 2015H0270 .

DONE AND ENT ERED this 1 2 th day of January , 201 6 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

Suzanne Van Wyk

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSotoBuilding

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

t his 1 2 th day of January, 2016 .

ENDNOTE S

1 / All citations herein to the Florida Statutes are to the 2015

version, unless otherwise noted.

2 / Neither the details concerning the 2013 Complaint, nor the

record of said compl ai nt, was introduced into evidence.

3 / In her Complaint of Discrimination, Petitioner alleged

monetary damages in the amount of $9,036.00. At hearing,

Petitioner testified that she was seeking damages in the amount

of $20,103.00. Petitioner revised that amount to $15,432.00 in

a post - hearing filing.

4 / In addition to a violation of the FHA, Petitioner alleges a

cause of action pursuant to 760.51, Florida Statutes, invoking

the Attorney GeneralÓs jurisdiction to bring a civil or

administrative action for damages. In PetitionerÓs Proposed

Recommended Order, she further alleges violations of section

718. 303 , Florida Statutes (relating to obligations of

condominium owners and associations) and section 83.64 , Florida

Statutes (prohibiting retaliatory conduct by landlord against

tenant). The Division has no jurisdiction over PetitionerÓs

claims under the ci ted statutes.

5 / Petitioner does not claim, and it cannot be found, that she

was aiding or encouraging any protected person in his or her

exercise or enjoyment of a housing right (option (c)). That

option might have been appropriate for Mr. Murillo had he filed

a Petition under the instant facts. Despite PetitionerÓs

references, both in her Petiti on and at final hearing, to

Mr. Murillo as an Ðaggravated party,Ñ Mr. Murillo is not a

petitioner in this case.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Stacey Leigh Jern

Post Office Box 352

Kirkwood, Illinois 61447

(eServed)

Nicholas A. Vidoni, Esquire

Watson, Soileau, DeL eo, Burge tt ,

and Pickles, P.A.

3490 North U . S . Highway 1

Cocoa, Florida 32923

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.