15-006009RP W. D., C. V., K. E. And K. M. vs. Department Of Health Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Wednesday, December 16, 2015.

Summary: Petitioners lack standing to challenge the proposed repeal of a rule that would deregulate certain cardiac facilities, because no real or immediate injury was shown, and because a common good such as quality health care is not within the zone of interest.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

W. D., C. V., K. E. AND K. M.,

Petitioners,

vs. Case No. 15 - 6009RP

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

FINAL ORDER

Administrative Law Judge John G. Van Laningham conducted

the final hearing in this rule challenge, which was brought

pursuant to section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes, at the Division

of Administrative Hearings in Talla hassee on November 2 0, 201 5 .

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner s : Karen A. Putnal, Esquire

Robert A. Weiss, Esquire

Jon C. Moyle, Esquire

Moyle Law Firm

118 North Gadsden Street

Tallahassee , Florida 32 301

For Respondent : Jay Patrick Reynolds , Esquire

Nichole C. Geary , General Counsel

Department of Health

Prosecution Services Unit

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A - 02

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The ultimate issue in this case is whether Respondent ' s

proposed repeal of Florida Administrative Code Rule 64C - 4.003 ,

which would deregulate certain pediatric cardiac facilities,

constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative

authority. Before that issue may be reached, however, it is

necessary to determine whether Petitioners have standing to

challenge the proposed rule.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On October 22 , 201 5 , Petit ioners filed with the Division of

Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") a Petition for Determination of

Invalidity of Proposed Rule pursuant to section 120.56(2) .

Petitioners alleged that Respondent ' s proposed repeal of Florida

Administrative Code Rule 64C - 4.0 03 is an invalid exercise of

delegated legislative authority.

The final hearing was held on November 2 0, 201 5 , as

scheduled, with both parties present. Petitioners called as

witnesses Doctors Louis B. St. Petery, Jr., and Ira H. Gessner .

Petitioners offered, in addition, ten exhibits, namely

Petitioners' Exhibits 4 through 13A - E , which were received in

evidence without objection . Respondent 's Exhibits 1 through 6

were admitted as well, with no objections, and Respondent rested

without cal ling any witnesses .

Before adjourning the final hearing, and with the agreement

of the parties, the undersigned established the deadline for

filing proposed final orders, which was December 11, 2015 . The

final hearing transcript was filed on November 30 , 201 5 . Each

party filed a proposed final order.

Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the official

statute law of the state of Florida refer to Florida

Statutes 2015.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent Department of Health (the "Department")

administers the state of Florida's Children's Medical Services

("CMS") program , whic h provides financial assistance for

medically necessary services , similar to the benefits available

under Medicaid , to c hildren with special health care needs who

meet the program's eligibility requirements . The Department

reimburses health care providers for services rendered through

the CMS network, a statewide managed system of care in which

providers may participate under contract with the program.

2. The Department is responsible for establishing the

criteria for selecting health care providers , including both

individuals and facilities, to participate in the CMS network.

To that end, the Department has adopted Florida Administrative

Code Chapter 64C - 4, which comprises rule 64C - 4.001 , entitled

"CMS Physician and Non - Physician Providers"; rule 64C - 4.002,

entitled "Diagnostic and Treatment Facilities or Services Î

General" ; and rule 64C - 4.003, entitled " Diagnostic and Treatment

Facilities or Services Î Specific."

3. Rule 64C - 4.003, whose proposed repeal is the subject of

this challenge, provides as follows:

(1) CMS Pediatric Cardiac Facilities. CMS

Headquarters approves pediatric cardiac

facilities for the CMS Network on a

statewide basis upon conside ration of the

recommendation of the Cardiac Subcommittee

of the CMS Network Advisory Council. CMS

approved pediatric cardiac facilities must

comply with the CMS Pediatric Cardiac

Facilities Standards, October 2012 . . . .

CMS approved pediatric cardiac f acilities

must collect and submit quality assurance

data annually [using the prescribed forms ] .

(2) C MS Cardiac Regional and Satellite

Clinics. CMS Headquarters approves regional

and satellite cardiac clinics for the CMS

Network on a statewide basis upo n

consideration of the recommendation of the

Cardiac Subcommittee of the CMS Network

Advisory Council. CMS regional and

satellite clinics must comply with the CMS

Cardiac Regional and Satellite Clinic

Standards, October 2012. . . .

(3) The standards and forms are

incorporated herein by reference and are

available from CMS Headquarters, 4052 Bald

Cypress Way, Bin A06, Tallahassee, FL 32399 -

1707.

(Emphasis added) . The CMS Pediatric Cardiac Facilities

Standards and the CMS Cardiac Regiona l and Satellite Clinic

Standards are referred to herein after , collectively, as the

"Standards." For simplicity's sake, as well, the terms

"facility," "clinic," and "hospital" are used interchangeably

herein as inclusive of all such places within the purview of

r ule 64C - 4.003.

4. On July 29, 2015, a Notice of Proposed Rule was

published in volume 41, number 146, of the Florida

Administrative Register. The full text of proposed rule 6 4C -

4.003, as set forth in this notice , is as follows:

64 C - 4.003 Diagnostic and Treatment

Facilities or Services Î Specific.

Rulemaking Authority 391.026(18), 391.035(1)

FS. Law Implemented 391.026(10), 391.035(1)

FS. History Î New 1 - 1 - 77, Amended 2 - 11 - 85,

Formerly 10J - 5.09, 10J - 5.009, Amended

12 - 20 - 05, 2 - 12 - 13 , R epealed .

The stated purpose of the proposed repeal of rule 64C - 4.003 is

to " eliminate imposed regulation of pediatric cardiac

facilities, which extends beyond the Department ' s statutory

authority. "

5. Each Petitioner is a CMS beneficiary who suffers from a

serious heart condition requiring pediatric cardiac services.

Each Petitioner has received such services through the CMS

program from participating CMS providers, including CMS approved

pediatric cardiac facilities that currently must c omply with the

Standards and report quality assurance data annually to the

Department in accordance with existing r ule 64C - 4.003. Each

Petitioner's special health care needs make it likely that he or

she will require ongoing pediatric cardiac care in the future

from CMS approved providers , including the facilities regulated

by r ule 64C - 4.003.

6. Petitioners are concerned that the repeal of rule 64C -

4.003 would reduce the quality of care available within the CMS

program and thereby deprive them of a benefit (high quality

pediatric cardiac services) to which they , as enrolled CMS

beneficiaries, are entitled . Petitioners have failed to prove ,

however, that the proposed deregulation of CMS approved

pediatric cardiac facili ties would , in fact, have a real or

immediate effect on the quality of care available through the

CMS network.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

7 . DOAH has personal jurisdiction in this proceeding

pursuant to sections 120.56, 120.569, and 120.57(1), Florida

Statutes.

8 . In administrative proceedings, standing is a matter of

subject matter jurisdiction. Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharms.,

Inc. , 15 So. 3d 642, 651 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). To have

standing to challenge the validity of an administrative rule in

a proceeding before an administrative law judge, a person must

be "substantially affected" by the rule in question.

§ 120.56(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

9 . As the First D istrict C ourt of A ppeal has observed ,

[t] o establish standing under the

"substantially affected" test, a party must

show: (1) that the rule or policy will

result in a real or immediate injury in

fact; and (2) that the alleged interest is

within the zone of interest to be protected

or regulated. Jacoby v. Fla. Bd. of Med . ,

917 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Off . of Ins . Reg . v. Secure Enters . , LLC. , 124 So. 3d 332 , 336

(Fla. 1st DCA 2013) ; s ee also , e.g. , Fla. Medical Ass'n, Inc. v.

Dep't of Prof'l Reg. , 426 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

To satisfy the immediacy of injury requirement, the rule's

harmful effect cannot be purely speculative or conjectural.

Lanoue v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enf. , 751 So. 2d 94, 9 7 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1999) .

10 . The petitioner need not actually have realized the

injury, however, to have standing. In NAACP, Inc. v. Florida

Board of Regents , 863 So. 2d 294, 300 (Fla. 2003), for example,

the Florida Supreme Court held that student members of the NAACP

who were genui ne prospective candidates for admission to a state

university were , as African - Americans, substantially affected by

the proposed repeal of rules which authorized certain

affirmative action policies for which only minority applicants

were eligible ; thus, th ey had standing to challenge these

proposed rules without showing "immediate and actual harm" such

as the rejection of an application for admission.

11 . NAACP is potentially instructive here because, as in

the instant case, the petitioners claimed that they would be

negatively affected by the repeal of a rule whose implementation

worked to their benefit. I n NAACP , moreover, the rules targeted

for repe al did not directly regulate , control , or govern the

conduct of the petitioners, who were not required to attend

state universities or forbidden from enrolling in other schools,

and neither would the proposed rules have done so, if adopted. 1 /

Rather, the rules at issue there r egulated the state

universities , whose compliance with them was mandatory ÏÏ

although , to be sure, applicants were subject to the admission

standards, which affected the likelihood of their being

accepted . Similarly, the Standards directly regulate pediatric

cardiac facilities and clinics, not patients such as

Petitioners , and the regulatory scheme that would exist in the

absence of the Standards would do likewise . At bottom, t he

petitioners in NAACP were protesting the planned replacement of

a policy they viewed as advantageous to them by an other that

might prove disadvantageous ; so, too, are Petitioners . A closer

look at NAACP is warranted, therefore, to see whether the

principles announced in that case give Petitioners grounds to

maintain this proceeding.

12 . The question of standing in NAACP divided the judicial

panel at the First DCA , which first reviewed the case, where a

majority found that the petitioners lacked standing to proceed .

NAACP, Inc. v. Fla. Bd. of Regents , 822 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2002), rev'd , 863 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2003) . One of the

individual petitioners was an African - American high school

student, then in the tenth grade, who planned to attend a state

university. The court held that this student ÏÏ whose situation

most resembles that of the present Petitioners as far as the

issue of standing is concerned ÏÏ had failed to establish a real

or immediate injury in fact because he (i) had yet to ap ply for

admission and would not be in a position to do so for a couple

of years and (ii) was doing so well in school that he likely

would be accepted at the university of his choice even without

the benefit of affirmative action. Id. Thus, in the court's

view, this student's claimed injury rested upon speculation.

Id.

13 . In a dissenting opinion, Judge Browning sharply

disagreed with the majority's reasoning , explaining at length

his reasons for concluding that "African - American students'

admission to the [state universities] under legally established

affirmative action programs cannot be repealed by agency rules

without giving those covered by such programs the right to

challenge the repeal[.]" Id. at 14 (Browning, J., dissenting).

The district court certified the question of standing to be o ne

of great public importance.

14 . The Supreme Court o f Florida agreed with Judge

Browning's conclusion and adopted substantial portions of his

dissenting opinion. 2 / The Supreme Court focused on the effect

that the proposed rules would have on admission standards for

black applicants and observed that the repeal of affirmative

action policies would raise the bar for all African - American

applicants because , without the "boost" available only to

minority students, they would all be subject to the same

admission standards as non - minority students. NAACP , 863 So. 2d

at 299. For that reason, it was irrelevant for standing

purposes that a given black student might meet the higher

standards and hence be admitted regardless of affirmative

action ; the relevant point was that after repeal, to be

accepted, he (and every other African - American applicant) would

have to meet the same admission standards as non - minority

students , whereas under affirmative action, no African - American

applicant necessarily had to satisfy the identical admission

standards as non - m inority students ( even though undoubtedly many

would) .

15 . As the First DCA had recognized, the possibility

exists that a tenth - grade student might not apply to a state

university when the time comes . On the question of whether this

possibility renders the student's claimed injury from changed

admission standards too speculative to be con sidered real or

immediate, the Supreme C ourt found that students who were

"genuine prospective candidates for admission to" a state

university were sufficiently affected by the proposed repeal of

affirmative action to maintain a rule challenge. Id. at 300.

16 . The undersigned has no difficulty concluding that

Petitioners here are at least as likely to require future

treatment at a pediatric car diac facility or clinic as the

African - American high school students in NAACP were to apply for

admission to one of the state universities. In short,

Petitioners are "genuine prospective" patients of CMS approved

facilities or clinics regulated by the Standards being

considered for repeal. Their claimed injury is not too remote

or speculative, therefore, on the grounds that they might not

need or seek treatment at such a facility or clinic after the

Standards have been repealed , if the proposed rule is adopted .

17 . In NAACP , however, it was readily apparent that the

repeal of the state universities' affirmative action policies

would "drastically change the admission standards that apply to

Af rican - Americans. " I d. at 299 . Because that was , in fact, one

of the purposes of the proposed rules , no speculation or

conjecture was required to determine whether the elimination of

affirmative action from university admission policies would work

such a change. The only uncertainties were as to whether a

particular studen t would apply, and, if he applied, whether he

would be denied admission without affirmative action.

18. Here, in contrast, it is clearly not the purpose of

the Standards' proposed repeal to lower the quality of cardiac

care provided to CMS recipients or other patients. Nor is it

readily apparent that, in the absence of the Standards , CMS

approved facilities and clinics will stop providing quality

cardiac services. Therefore, even accepting that (i) each of

the Petitioners will need future care in a CMS approved facility

or clinic and that (ii) without quality cardiac services

Petitioners are more likely to have adverse outcomes, this case

is distinguishable from NAACP because the repeal of the

Standards does not by itself take away the benefit (quality

cardiac care) whose prospective loss Petitioners claim as the

injury in fact for standing purposes.

19 . To have standing, therefore, Petitioners needed to

prove that repeal of the Standards would be the proximate cause

of a real or immediate diminution in the quality of cardiac care

provided to CMS recipients. They did not succeed in carrying

this burden but can hardly be faulted for the failure.

Predicting the effects of the repeal of the Standards is an

inherently speculative enterprise, as it would be practically

impossible to establish, through conventional methods of proof,

such things as the myriad incentives and disincentives that

motivate the operators of individual hospitals, which compete

for business in a r elatively free (albeit heavily regulated)

market , where a reputation for quality (good or bad) is likely

to matter ; the personal dedication, diligence, and professional

pride of the ind ividual health care provider s on the hospitals'

staffs, men and women s uch as Petitioners' doctors whose

internal desire s to deliver quality care are probably driven by

many factors besides (and more important than) regulatory

compliance; even the efficacy of the Standards themselves, whose

unintended consequences might inclu de adverse effects on the

quality of care.

20. It should not and cannot reasonably be assumed that

people do what's right in their private conduct, whether at

work, in their homes, or out in public, only because the

government has ordered them to behave i n a particular fashion .

Many people derive personal satisfaction from doing a job well,

whether the job is, e.g., painting a house or performing open -

heart surgery, an d they strive to deliver a quality product, not

in obedience to the superintending guidance of the

administrative state , but because they want to . The notion ,

therefore, that every facility in the CMS network would suddenly

stop providing quality pediatric cardiac services immediately

upon the repeal of the Standards res ts on pure speculation ÏÏ and

is a little insulting to the health care professionals who

personally deliver those services . 3 / Such an imagined across -

the - board loss of quality care is not reasonably foreseeable and

can not qualify as a real or immediate inju ry in fact for

purposes of standing.

21. To elaborate, further discussion of NAACP , or rather

its unexamined implications, will be helpful. Although the

Supreme Court did not explore the ways in which its decision

might be used in other contexts, the proposition that African -

American students have standing to challenge the repeal of rules

authorizing affirmative action polic ies leads logically to the

conclusion that those same students would have standing to

challenge any proposed amendment to such rules that would weaken

the advantage that affirmative action affords. Thus, for

example, if the proposed rules in NAACP had sou ght, instead of

repealing affirmative action, to reduce the percentage of

students who could be admitted under such polices from

10 percent to, say, five percent, the students who had standing

to challenge the actual proposed repeal would have had standing ,

surely, to challenge the hypothetical proposed amendment. The

harm (loss of advantage) is the same in either case, the only

difference being a matter of degree. For standing purposes, the

question is whether the party is substantially affected by the

r ule, not whether he is substantially affected enough .

22. Of course, if a party has standing to challenge the

proposed repeal or amendment of a rule on the grounds that he

faces the prospect of receiving a smaller advantage if the

propos ed rule is adopted, then logically he must also have

standing to challenge the existing rule, on the grounds that it

does not provide a sufficient advantage . Thus, for example, the

students in NAACP should have been able to challenge the

previously existing affirmat ive action policies whose proposed

repeal substantially affected them, on the theory that the

existing affirmative action policies failed to affo rd African -

American students enough of a boost ÏÏ that, e.g., the percentage

of students admitted under affirmati ve action should be, say,

25 percent instead of 10 percent.

23. I f affirmative action were not controversial for

reasons having nothing to do with administrative rule

challenges, perhaps the court w ould have held , simply, that

genuine prospective applicants to state universities (regardless

of race ) are substantially affected by rules which establish

admission standards and hence have standing to challenge them.

For the reasons stated above, this is arguably the rule of NA ACP

anyway, once the baggage that attaches to disputes over

preferential treatment is carted off . Seen in this light, NAACP

is of a piece with cases holding that potential applicants for

licensure in the state of Florida have standing to challenge the

rul es governing licensing procedures. See, e.g. , Jacoby v. Fla.

Bd. of Med. , 917 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Prof'l

Firefighters of Fla. v. Dep't of HRS , 396 So. 2d 1194, 1196

(Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Genuine prospective applicants to a state

university are , after all, subject to the admission standards in

much the same way that potential applicants for state licensure

are subject to the licensing requirements , and the impact that

such rules have on a prospective applicant's ability to a ttend

school or work in Florida, as the case may be, is analogous.

24. Petitioners here , however, are not directly affected

by the Standards in the way that a would - be applicant for

licensure or admission to a universi ty is affected by the rules

governing acceptance . T he repeal of the Standards will not

affect Petitioners' eligibility for CMS benefits , restrict their

access to ( or choice of ) providers or facilities, or place new

limitations or conditions on coverage. Petitioners , in short,

are not analogous to applicants for licensure or admission to a

state university, but rather more resemble genuine prospective

patrons of those who , out of all such applicants, succeed in

obtaining licensure or a degree . Indeed, when it comes to it,

Petitioners are not unlike any prospective customer, client, or

patient of a licensee who desires a quality service from the

regulated provider. 4 /

25. And that, ultimately, is the irreducible problem with

Petitioners' standing position. If these Petitioners have

standing, then there would be no intellectually ho nest limiting

principle by which to deny standing to the person who routinely

gets his teeth cleaned and wants to challeng e the rules

regulating dental hygienists on the grounds that they are

insufficient ly stringent to ensure quality care; or to the man

who needs regular haircuts when he challenges the rules

regulating barbers for not doing enough to guarantee his safety ;

or to anyone else who benefits from similar rules protecting the

health, safety, or welfare of the public once he or she

inevitably brings a rule challenge alleging that some such rule

does too little (or too much) to achieve its goals.

26. Such an expansive view of standing might be consistent

with the original understanding of the term "substantially

affected," but it seems untenable in the light of several

decades' worth of judicial interpretations of the concept , which

teach that a claimed injury to a com mon good such a s quality

health care is too abstract to confer standing, because at that

level of generality pract ically everyone has an interest in the

subject matter . E.g. Sch. Bd. v. Blackford , 369 So. 2d 689, 691

(Fla. 1st DCA 1979)( parents and children lack standing to

challenge rules adopting school attendance zones). A zone of

interest comprising such a universal interest would be, in

effect , no " zone " at all. 5 / While the undersigned is personally

receptive to the idea that the "substantially affected" test

should not be applied with over zealous strictness ( unnecessarily

allowing potentially unlawful rules to evade review) , neither

should it be applied with excessive leniency ( unnecessarily

exposing the agencies to potentially burdensome litigation) . T o

open the door to these Petitioners would relax the test to an

unprecedented degree. If that is to be done, it is a job for

the appellate court.

2 7. It is concluded, therefore, that Petitioners do not

have standing to challenge the proposed rule.

2 8. Because Petitioners lack standing to maintain this

proceeding, the undersigned is without jurisdiction to rule on

the merits of the rule challenge. See Abbott Labs. v. Mylan

Pharms., Inc. , 15 So. 3d 642, 651 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 20 09).

ORDER

Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, it is

ORDERED that this case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

DONE AND ORDERED this 16th day of December , 201 5 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Divisi on of Administrative Hearings

this 16th day of December , 2015 .

ENDNOTES

1 / In other words, these were not generally applicable rules of

private conduct for prospective students of state universities.

2 / The three dissenting justices would not have answered the

certified question on the grounds that the case might have

become moot. NAACP , 863 So. 2d at 301 (Wells, J., dissenting).

3 / If, in fact, compliance with the Standards is necessary for

the provision of quality care, it is at least as reasonable to

assume that, following repeal, facilities will continue

voluntarily to comply with the Standards, or their equivalent,

as it is to imagine facilities seizing the "opportunity" to

deliver substandard care.

4 / Designation as a CMS approved network provider of cardiac

care is a "license" as defined in section 120.52(10), Florida

Statutes. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Brooks , 799 So. 2d 280, 281

(Fla. 1st DCA 2001). These CMS "licensed" hospitals do not

treat C MS patients only , of course, and so if the proposed

deregulation were to lower the quality of care available from

CMS approved providers, all pediatric cardiac patients would be

similarly affected. Petitioners contend nevertheless that, as

CMS beneficiari es, they are uniquely entitled to quality

pediatric cardiac services. The undersigned rejects this

contention as unfounded and unpersuasive. What Petitioners

might be "entitled" to, unlike all pediatric cardiac patients,

is public financial assistance to pay for their medical

treatment (which the proposed rule does not reduce, restrict, or

retract). As for having an interest in quality health care ,

however, Petitioners are no different from other pediatric

cardiac patients in this state and are surely no more entitled

to quality care than those who do not receive subsidized medical

treatment. Simply put, everyone who needs pediatric cardiac

care has the same interest in receiving quality treatment,

regardless of the funding source for the treatment.

5 / To be fair, the qualifiers "pediatric" and "cardiac" reduce

the level of generality in this case somewhat ÏÏ but not so much

as to be material. Every concerned parent has an interest in

the availability of quality pediatric health care, including

cardiac c are should that be necessary. And parents are not the

only adults who have such an interest, for most adults have

children in their extended families or in their circle of

friends. The ready availability of quality pediatric cardiac

care contributes to t he commonweal and as such constitutes a

shared interest of concern to practically everyone.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Karen A. Putnal, Esquire

Robert A. Weiss, Esquire

Jon C. Moyle, Esquire

Moyle Law Firm

118 North Gadsden Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

( eServed)

Jay Patrick Reynolds, Esquire

Nichole C. Geary , General Counsel

Department of Health

Prosecution Services Unit

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A - 02

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Shannon Revels, Agency Clerk

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A - 02

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1703

(eServed)

John H. Armstrong, M.D., F.A.C.S.

State Surgeon General

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A - 00

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1701

(eServed)

Ernest Reddick, Chief

Department of State

R. A. Gray Building

500 South Bronough Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0250

(eServed)

Alexandra Nam

Department of State

R. A. Gray Building

500 South Bronough Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0250

(eServed)

Ken Plante, Coordinator

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee

Room 680, Pepper Building

111 West Madison Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1400

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicial review purs uant to Section 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing the original notice of appeal with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by

filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of

Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in

the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of

appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition o f the order to

be reviewed.