16-000345 Stephen Brooks vs. Walmart Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, December 30, 2016.

Summary: Petitioner did not prove his employment charge of discrimination based upon gender, or that Walmart retaliated against him for filing the charge.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

STEPHEN BROOKS ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 1 6 - 0345

WALMART ,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice , a formal hearing was held in

Tallaha ssee , Florida , on October 12 , 201 6 , before W. David

Watkins , the duly - designated Administrative Law Judge of the

Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Stephen Brooks , pro se

Apartment 325

3000 South Adams Street

Tallahassee , Florida 32 301

For Respondent: Grissel Seijo , Esquire

Littler Mendelson , P.C.

Wells Fargo Center

333 Southeast 2 nd Avenue , Suite 2700

Miami , Florida 33131

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Did Respondent , Walmart , discriminate agai nst Petitioner on

account of his sex or retaliate against Petitioner in violation

of chapter 760 , Florida Statutes?

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Pe titioner filed an Employment Complaint of Discrimination

(Complaint) with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR)

on April 20 , 201 5 , claiming that Walmart had disc riminated

against him on the basis of his sex (male) and had retaliated

against him for engaging in a protected activity. Following its

investigation of the allegation , the FCHR rendered a Ð No C ause Ñ

determination on December 17 , 2015 .

On January 21 , 2016 , Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief

requesting an administrative hearing rega rding the FCHR Ó s Ð No

Cause Ñ determination pursuant to section 760.11(7).

The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative

Hearings on January 2 2 , 201 6 , and on February 1 , 201 6 , the

undersigned issued a Notice of Hearing , setting the final hearin g

for April 17 , 201 6 . However , at the request of the parties , the

final hearing was twice continued , and ultimately scheduled to

commence on October 12 , 201 6 .

The final hearing was convened as noticed on October 12 ,

2016 . At hearing , Petitioner testifie d on his own behalf and

called one other witness , Cusheena Brown , his girlfriend and the

mother of his child . Petitioner did not offer any exhibits in

evidence. 1/

Respondent offered the testimony of John H. Williams ,

Walmart market resources m anager; Wi lliam Harrell , former m anager

of Walmart Store No. 1077; Gregory Bontz , m anager of Walmart

Store No. 1077; and Ternessia N icole Nelson , assistant m anager of

Walmart Store No. 1077. Walmart offered two exhibits in

evidence , both of which were received.

A T ranscript of the final hearing was filed on October 26 ,

2016 . Thereafter , b oth parties filed Propo sed Recommended

Orders , which have been carefully considered in the preparation

of this Recommended Order.

All statutory citations are to Florida Statut es (201 6 ) ,

unless otherwise indicated.

FINDING S OF FACT

Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and

other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire

record of this proceeding , the following findings of fact are

made:

1 . P etitioner , Stephen L. Brooks , has worked as an

a ssociate in the electronics department at Walmart in Store 1077

located in Tallahassee , Florida , since July 3 , 2013. Mr. Brooks

is an articulate and hardworking individual , working a second job

and helping t o care for his daughter. In addition , Mr. Brooks

attends college.

2 . Petitioner received training about Walmart Ó s core

beliefs and open - door policies. Additionally , Petitioner

received training and was aware of posters in the employee areas

regarding Walmart Ó s anti - discrimination and anti - harassment

policies.

3 . On March 23 , 2015 , Plaintiff received a written warning

from his direct line manager , Tarnessia Nelson , for absenteeism.

Subsequent to receiving this warning , Mr. Brooks approached

m arket hu man r elations ( HR ) m anager , John Williams , and store

m anager , William S. Harrell , and complained that he did not like

how Ms. Nelson was treating him (being nasty and mean) and that

he was not being scheduled for enough hours.

4 . Both managers separately explained to Mr. Brooks that

Ms. Nelson did not control Mr. Brooks Ó s chedule . Rather , Walmart

uses scheduling software , called Client Service Scheduling (CSS ) ,

to schedule associates.

5 . CSS considers multiple variables when scheduling

associates , incl uding historic sales records for the department ,

forecasted budgeting , and employee availability . CSS gives

scheduling preference to an associate that is available to work

the entire shift or , if the employee is an afternoon or evening

employee , preferenc e goes to an employee that can wo rk through

the end of the shift Î - specifically close of business.

6 . In light of how CSS works , M r . Williams and Mr . Harrell

discussed with Petitioner , on multiple occasions , that his

Customer Service Scheduling Availabili ty f orm reflected a limited

availability. CSS , therefore , scheduled him for limited hours

because the electronics d epartment needed an associate who could

work until 10:00 p . m. Since Petitioner Ó s availability form

specified that he was not available afte r 9:30 p . m . , CSS gave

priority to associates with availability to work through the

entire shift . Indeed , very shortly before transferring to

another store , Mr. Harrell again reminded Petitioner that if he

was seeking more hours , he needed to change his av ailability.

7 . The Customer Service Scheduling Availability form

expressly states that Ð Changing your availability could affect

the number of hours you receive. Ñ Petitioner last changed his

availability form o n April 11 , 2015 , which reflected his

unavai lability past 9:30 p.m .

8 . Petitioner was well aware of how CSS worked and

acknowledged that CSS assigned shifts three weeks in advance and

that the computer - generated schedules are not altered Ð unless you

negotiate with another associate Ñ for a schedule change.

9 . During the final h earing , Petitioner argued that two

other employees , Ms. Kaye and Mr. Johnny (one female , and one

male) , with limited availabilities , were regularly scheduled to

work by CSS. Yet , neither Ms. Kaye nor Mr. Johnny worked in th e

same department as Petitioner. Mo re importantly , Ms. Kaye and

Mr. Johnny were available after 10:00 p.m. , which meant that CSS

would give them scheduling preference since they were available

through the end of the shift .

10 . Mr. Brooks also complaine d to Mr. William s that

Ms. Nelson was discriminating against him because of his gender.

In accordance with Walmart an ti - discrimination policies ,

Mr. Williams investigated whether Ms. Nelson treated Mr. Brooks

differently because of his gender.

11 . Mr. W illiams interviewed Ms. Nelson and a few other

employees who worked in the same department to see if they had

any firsthand information to support the allegation that

Ms. Nelson was treating Mr. Brooks differently. Mr. Williams was

unable to uncover any e vidence establishing that Ms. Nelson was

singling out Mr. Brooks for any reason. Mr. Williams testified

that he could not substantiate Petitioner Ó s gender discrimination

allegations because Ð there were other male individuals in the

area , and I could not s ee Î I didn Ó t have any data to support

that she [Ms. Nelson] was treating him differently because of his

gender . I could not confirm that. Ñ

12 . In his deposition , which he reaffirmed at hearing ,

Petitioner stated that Ms. Nelson was mean to him Ð and to the

other men and female in the (electronics) department. Ñ

13 . Nonetheless , on April 20 , 2015 , Petitioner filed a

Charge of Discrimination (Charge) claiming that he was being

discriminated against because of his gender by his manager ,

Ms. Nelson . Mr. Br ooks alleged that Ms. Nelson spoke to him in a

disrespectful , demeaning , and hostile manner and that he had been

unfairly written up for unexcused absences . Petitioner also

claimed that his work hours had been reduced . Finally , he

claimed that he was ret aliated against for comp laining about

Ms. Nelson Ó s treatment of him. The retaliation was manifested by

a reduction in Mr. Brook Ó s scheduled hours , and not being

scheduled for any shifts for a period of three and a half months .

14. On December 17 , 2015 , the Florida Commission on Human

Relations issued a no cause determination.

15 . During the investigation , and again at the final

hearing , Ms. Nelson admitted to being a hard - line supervisor who

is tough on all of her subordinates. Nevertheless , she

unequ ivocally denied discriminating against Petitioner because of

his gender. She also denied retaliating against him for

complaining about her when she held him accountable for missing

shifts in late April 2015. 2/

16 . At hearing , Petitioner affirmed that Ð M s. Nelson was

actually equally nasty to every person on her staff. Ñ More

importantly , at hearing Petitioner admitted that he ha d no proof

that Ms. Nelson treated him differently because of his gender.

17 . Subsequent to the April 29 , 2015 , warning , CSS

c ontinued to schedule all associates , including Mr. Brooks , based

on availability and the needs of each department.

18 . In September 2015 , despite being encouraged by multiple

members of management to either increase his availability or

consider changing depart ments , Petitioner began a three - and - a -

half - month period in which CSS did not schedule him for any

shifts due to his lack of availability.

19 . As noted earlier , CSS scheduled associates based on

multiple factors , including historic sales records for the

department , forecasted budgeting , and employee availability .

Thus , during the holiday season of 2015 , when the historic sales

records and forecasted budgeting required more associates to be

scheduled in the electronic s department , CSS scheduled Petit ioner

for shifts in the electronics department.

20 . On or about June 2016 , Ms. Nelson was transferred to

another department and no longer supervised Petitioner . Yet ,

Petitioner continue d to be scheduled for limited shifts due to

his stated unavailabilit y.

21 . The persuasive and credible evidence of record

established that Petitioner last changed his availability in

April 2015 , which has since affected how Walmart Ó s scheduling

software , CSS , selects him for shifts.

C ONCLUSIONS OF LAW

22 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

cause pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1) , Florida

Statutes.

23 . The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ( Ð FCRA Ñ ) prohibits

discrimination in the workplace. A mong other things , FCRA makes

it unlawful for an employer:

To limit , segregate , or classify employees or

applicants for employment in any way which

would deprive or tend to deprive any

individual of employment opportunities , or

adversely affect any indivi dual Ó s status as

an employee , because of such individual Ó s

race , color , religion , sex , pregnancy ,

national origin , age , handicap , or marital

status.

§ 760.10(1)(b) , Fla. Stat.

24 . Florida Ó s chapter 760 is patterned after Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , as amended. Consequently , Florida

courts look to federal case law when interpreting chapter 760.

Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am. , LLC , 18 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 3rd

DCA 2009).

Sex Discrimination Claim

25 . Petitioner claims he was discriminated aga inst by

Walmart because of his sex (male) in violation of FCRA.

Specifically , Petitioner alleges that Ms. Nelson repeatedly spoke

to him in a disrespectful , demeaning and hostile manner , and

assigned tasks involving heavy lifting to him . P etitioner also

allege s that he was retaliated ag ainst for complaining about

Ms. Nelson Ó s treatment of him by being taken off the Walmart work

schedule for a period of three and a half months .

26 . Section 760.11(7) permits a party who receives a no

cause determination t o request a formal administrative hearing

before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Ð If the

administrative law judge finds that a violation of the Florida

Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred , he or she shall issue an

appropriate recommended order to the commission prohibiting the

practice and recommending affirmative relief from the effects of

the practice , including back pay. Ñ Id.

27 . Petitioner claims disparate treatment (as opposed to

disparate impact) under the FCRA; in other words , he clai ms he

was treated differently because of h is gender. Petitioner has

the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

Respondent discriminated ag ainst him . See Fla. Dep Ó t of Transp.

v. J.W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A party may

prove unlawful sex discrimination by direct or circumstantial

evidence. Smith v. Fla. Dep Ó t of Corr. , Case No. 2:07 - cv - 631 ,

(M.D. Fla. May 27 , 2009); 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44885 (M.D. Fla.

2009).

28 . Direct evidence is evidence that , Ð if believed , proves

[the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or

presumption. Ñ Burrell v. Bd. of Tr. of Ga. Military College ,

125 F.3d 1390 , 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). Direct evidence consists

of Ð only the most blatant remarks , whose intent could be nothing

other than to discriminate Ñ on the basis of an impermissible

factor. Carter v. City of Miami , 870 F.2d 578 , 582 (11th Cir.

1989).

29 . The record in this case did not establish unlawful

gender discrimination by direct evidence.

30 . To prove unlawful discrimination by circumstantial

evidence , a party must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. If

successful , this creates a presumption of discrimination. Then

the burden shifts to the employer to offer a leg itimate , non -

discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the

employer meets that burden , the presumption disappears and the

employee must prove that the legitimate reasons were a pretext.

Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am. , LLC , supra . Fac ts that are

sufficient to establish a prima facie case must be adequate to

permit an inference of discrimination. Id.

31 . Accordingly , Petitioner must prove discrimination by

indirect or circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas

framework. P etitioner must first establish a prima facie case

by showing: (1) he is a me mber of a protected class; (2) he was

qua lified for the position held ; (3) he was subjected to an

adverse employment action; and (4) other similarly - situated

employees , who are no t members of the protected group , were

treated more favorably than Petitioner. See McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802 (1973). Ð When comparing

similarly situated individuals to raise an inference of

discriminatory motivation , these indivi duals must be similarly

situated in all relevant respects. Ñ Jackson v. BellSouth

Telecomm. , 372 F.3d 1250 , 1273 (l1th Cir. 2004).

32 . Thus , in order to establish a prima facie case of

disparate treatment based on gender , Petitioner must show that

Walmar t treated similarly - situated fe male employees differently

or less severely. Valdes v. Miami - Dade Coll. , 463 Fed. Appx.

843 , 845 (11th Cir. 2012); Camara v. Brinker Int Ó l , 161 Fed.

Appx. 893 (11th Cir. 2006). See also Longariello v. Sch. Bd. o f

Monroe Cnt y. , Fla. , 987 F. Supp. 1440 , 1449 (S.D. Fla. 1997)

(quoting Coleman v. B - G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo. , Inc. , 108 F.3d

1199 , 1204 (10th Cir. 1997)) ( Ð Gender - plus plaintiffs can never

be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members

of the opposite g ender. Such plaintiffs cannot make the

requisite showing that they were treated differently from

similarly - situated members of the opposite gender. Ñ ).

33 . The findings of fact here are not sufficient to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination b ased on gender.

34 . Outside of his own beliefs , Petitioner cannot point to

any similarly - situated employee outside of his protected class

that was t reated more favorably than him. Indeed , at hearing

Petitioner admitted to having no proof to substantiate his

discrimination allegations.

35 . Although Petitioner alluded to Ms. Kaye and Mr. Johnny

as potential comparators , neither employee worked in the

e lectronics d epartment . Further , both Ms. Kaye and Mr. Johnny

had greater availability and worked until 10:00 p . m. More

importantly , if Mr. Johnny w as treated more favorably than

Petitioner , it also defeats his claim of gender discrimination as

Mr. Johnny is male . Therefore , Ms. Kaye and Mr. Johnny are

invalid comparators.

36 . Since Petitioner cannot est ablish that anyone outside

of his protected category was treated more favorably , his claim

of gender discrimination fails as a matter of law.

37 . Even had Petitioner establish ed a prima facie claim of

gender discrimination , Respondent credibly proved that

Petitioner Ó s hours were reduced by the CSS from April 2015 onward

based on his limited availability and the needs of the business.

Petitioner was counseled on multiple occasions , and by multiple

managers , that his availability was not consistent with the

Walmart scheduling shifts in the e lectronics d epartment , and

therefore , he would not be assigned to those shifts. Petitioner

was specifically advised by Store Manager Harrell that , despite

Mr. Brooks Ó personal expectation that the availabl e Walmart shift

allocation should be molded to fit his limited schedule ,

Petitioner needed to conform to Walmart Ó s business needs .

F urther , Petitioner failed to demonstrate how Walmart Ó s

scheduling software , CSS , discriminated against him based on his

gender , even after Ms. Nelson no longer supervised him.

38 . It has been consistently held that the court Ó s role is

to prevent unlawful employment practices and Ð not to act as a

super personnel department that second - guesses employers Ó

business judgments. Ñ Wilson v. B/E A erospace , Inc. , 376 F.3d

1079 , 1092 (11th Cir. 2004). An employee cannot succeed by

simply quarreling with the wisdom of the employer Ó s reason.

Chapman v. AI Transp. , 229 F.3d 1012 (l1th Cir. 2000); see also

Alexander v. Fulton Cnty. , Ga. , 207 F.3d 1303 , 1341 (l1 th Cir .

2000) ( Ð [I]t is not the court Ó s role to second - guess the wisdom of

an employer Ó s decisions as long as the decisions are not racially

motivated. Ñ ).

39 . Since Petitioner failed to demonstrate Ð such

weaknesses , implausibilities , inconsistenc ies , incoherencies , or

contradictions in the employer Ó s proffered legitimate reasons for

its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy

of credence ,Ñ his claims must fail as a matter of law . Combs v.

Plantation Patterns , Meadowcraft , I nc. , 106 F.3d 1519 , 2538 (11th

Cir. 1997).

Retaliation Claim

40 . Petitioner also asserts a claim of unlawful retaliation

based upon the reduced number of hours he was assigned following

the filing of his Charge of Discrimination in April 2015 .

41 . Ð It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer

. . . to discriminate against any person because the person has

opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice

under this section , or because that person has made a charge ,

testified , assis ted , or participated in any manner in an

investigation , proceeding , or hearing under this section. Ñ

§ 760.10(7) , Fla. Stat.

42 . Section 760.10(7) is identical to the language found at

42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 3(a) , with the exception that the paragraph

begins , Ð It is Ñ in the Florida version and begins , Ð It shall be Ñ

in the Federal version. The difference in the first few words

has no effect on the meaning of the statutes.

43 . Ð Under the opposition clause , an employer may not

retaliate against an employee bec ause the employee Ò has opposed

any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this

subchapter. Ó 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 3(a). And , under the

participation clause , an employer may not retaliate against an

employee because the employee Ò has made a charge , testified ,

assisted , or participated in any manner in an investigation ,

proceeding , or h earing under this subchapter. ÓÑ EEOC v. Total

Sys. Servs. , Inc. , 221 F.3d 1171 , 1174 (11th Cir. 2000).

44 . Ð The statute Ó s participation clause Ò protects

proceedings and activities which occur in conjunction with or

after the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC. Ó . . . The

opposition clause , on the other hand , protects activity that

occurs before the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC , such

as submitting an internal complaint of discrimination to an

employer , or informally complaining of discrimination to a

supervisor. Ñ Muhammad v. Audio Visual Servs. Grp. , 380 Fed.

Appx. 864 , 872 (11th Cir. Ga. 2010) (quoting Total Sys. Servs. ,

221 F.3 d at 1174) ; see also R ollins v. State of Fla. Dep Ó t of Law

Enf. , 868 F.2d 397 , 400 (11th Cir. 1989).

45 . Ð To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

Title VII , Plaintiff Ò must show that: ( 1) [he] engaged in

statutorily protect ed activity; (2) [ he] suffered a materi ally

adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the

protected activity and the adverse action. ÓÑ Root v. Miami - Dade

Cnty. , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117811 at *11 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 6 ,

2010) (quoting Howard v. Walgreen Co. , 605 F.3d 1239 , 2010 WL

1904966 , at *5 (11th Cir. 2010)); see also Goldsmith v. Bagby

Elevator Co. , 513 F.3d 1261 , 1277 (11th Cir. 2008).

46 . The first element of Petitioner Ó s prima facie case of

retaliation under the opposition clause requires him to establish

that he enga ged in statuto rily - protected opposition conduct. To

do so , Petitioner must show that he opposed conduct by the

employer based upon an objectively reasonable belief that the

employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices. See ,

e .g. , Harper v. Block buster Ent. Corp. , 139 F.3d 1385 , 1388 (llth

Cir. 1998); Brown v . Sybase , Inc. , 287 F. Supp 2d 1330 , 1346 - 47

(S.D. Fla. 200 3 ).

47 . In addition , Petitioner must show that the decision -

maker responsible for the adverse action was actually aware of

the empl oyee Ó s protected opposition at the time the decision

maker took the adverse action. See Brown , 287 F. Supp . 2d at

1347; see also Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomm . , Inc. , 231 F.3d

791 , 799 (11th Cir. 2000); Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555 , 1566

(11th Cir. 1 997). A court w ill not presume that a decision - maker

was motivated to retaliate by something unknown to him or her.

See Brungart , 231 F.3d at 799. Thus , i n order to constitute

protected opposition activity , Petitioner must , at the very

least , communicat e his belief that illegal discrimination is

occurring. See Webb v. R & B Holding Co. , 992 F. Supp. 1382 ,

1389 (S.D. Fla. 1998) ( Ð It is not enough for the employee merely

to complain about a certain policy or certain behavior . . . and

rely on the employer to infer that discrimination has

occurred. Ñ ); see also Johnson v. Fla. , 2010 U.S. Dist. L EXIS

42784 , 4 - 5 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 30 , 2010).

48 . Petitioner alleges that he was not sch eduled for work

from September through November 2015 , because he complained a bout

Ms. Nelson and how she treated him. Yet , it w as established

through multiple witnesses that Walmart associates Ó schedules are

generated by the computer software , CSS. The evidence

established that Ms. Nelson did not reduce Petitioner Ó s hours

because of his gender or because of retaliation.

49 . Moreover , t here is no evidence of a causal connection

between Mr. Brooks complaining about Ms. Nelson , his reduced

hours in April 2015 , and his continued reduced hours after filing

his Charge of Discriminatio n. Even after Ms. Nelson no longer

supervised Petitioner , he continued to experience the same

problems with scheduling as he did while she supervised him ,

because CSS creates the schedules based on associate availability

and Walmart needs.

50 . Petitione r did not establish that his reduced hours

since April 2015 were caused by his filing a Charge of

Discrimination. Since he did n ot establish that Ð but for Ñ his

complaint , he would have been assigned increased hours , his

claims fail as a matter of law.

RE COMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law , it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful

Employment Practice filed against Respondent.

DONE AND ENTERED th is 30th day of December , 2016 , in

Tallahassee , Leon County , Florida.

S

W. DAVID WATKINS

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee , Florida 32399 - 3 060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 30th day of December , 2016 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ Several documents were attached to Petitioner Ó s Proposed

Findings of Fact. Those documents consist of three letters , as

well as various shift schedules. While these documents are

accompanied by a Certificate of Authenticity of Documents from

the Senior Clerk of the FCHR , they were not offered by Petitioner

at the final hearing , and accordingly , are not received in

evidence.

2/ On April 29 , 2015 , in accordance with Wal mart policies ,

Petitioner received another written warning for unexcused

absences on April 24 , 25 , and 27 , 2015. This warning , however ,

was removed from his perfo rmance record once Mr. Brooks provided

medical documentation justifying his absences.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Tammy S. Barton , Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee , Florida 32399

(eServed)

Stephen Brook s

Apartment 325

3000 South Adams Street

Tallahassee , Florida 32301

Lisa Kathumbi , Esquire

Littler Mendelson , P.C.

Suite 2700

333 Southeastern 2nd Avenue

Miami , Florida 33131

Jonathan A. Beckerman , Esquire

Littler Mendelson , PC

Suite 2700

333 Southeast 2nd Avenue

Miami , Florida 33131 - 2187

(eServed)

Grissel T. Seijo , Esquire

Littler Mendelson , P.C.

Wells Fargo Center

333 Southeast 2nd Avenue , Suite 2700

Miami , Florida 33131

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla , General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relat ions

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Tallahassee , Florida 32399

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommend ed Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.