16-000378
Cordelia Brown vs.
Sarasota County School Board
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, June 13, 2016.
Recommended Order on Monday, June 13, 2016.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8CORDELIA BROWN,
10Petitioner,
11vs. Case No. 16 - 0378
17SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
21Respondent,
22and
23DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
26Intervenor.
27_______________________________/
28RECOM MENDED ORDER
31The final hearing in this matter was conducted before
40J. Bruce Culpepper, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of
50Administrative Hearings, pursuant to sections 120.569 and
57120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2015), 1/ on March 31, 2016, in
67Saras ota, Florida.
70APPEARANCES
71For Petitioner: Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire
77Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A.
83Post Office Box 1547
87131 North Gadsden Street (32301)
92Tallahassee, Florida 32302
95For Respondent: Margaret R. Good, Esquire
101Matthews Eastmoore
103Suite 300
1051626 Ringling Boulevard
108Sarasota, Florida 34236
111For Intervenor : David L. Jordan, Esquire
118Departm ent of Education
122Suite 1244
124325 West Gaines Street
128Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400
133STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
137Whether Petitioner, Cordelia Brown, is eligible to receive a
146scholarship offered by the 2015 Flor ida Best and Brightest
156Teacher Scholarship Program.
159PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
161On September 3 , 2015, Petitioner, Cordelia Brown
168(ÐPetitionerÑ), applied to the School Board of Sarasota County,
177Florida (the ÐSchool BoardÑ), for a scholarship under the 2015
187Florid a Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Progr am (the
197ÐScholarship ProgramÑ).
199On November 11, 2015, the School Board notified Petitioner
208that it had determined that she was not eligible for the
219scholarship.
220On January 13, 2015, Petitioner timely requested an
228administrative hearing to contest the School BoardÓs denial of
237her application. On January 22, 2016, the School Board referred
247the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings (ÐDOAHÑ)
256and requested assignment to an Administrative Law Judge (ÐALJÑ )
266to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
271On January 26, 2016, the Florida Department of Education
280(the ÐDepartmentÑ) filed a Motion to Intervene. The DepartmentÓs
289motion was granted by Order, dated January 27, 2016.
298The final hearing was held on March 31, 201 6. At the
310hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf. The School
319Board presented the testimony of Sonia Figaredo - Alberts,
328e xecutive d irector of p upil s upport s ervices, and Al Harayda,
342e mployee r elations and equity a dministrator. The Department
352pres ented t he testimony of Brian Dassler, d eputy chancellor of
364educator q uality. The parties stipulated to the introduction of
374Exhibits 1 through 14 , which were received into evidence.
383A one - volume T ranscript of the final hearing was filed with
396DOAH on April 21, 2016. At the close of the hearing, the parties
409were advised of the ten - day timeframe following DOAHÓs receipt of
421the transcript to file post - hearing submittals. Following the
431DepartmentÓs Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File
440Proposed Recomm ended Order , filed on April 26, 2016, the parties
451were given until May 12, 2016, to file proposed recommend ed
462orders. Each party filed a P roposed R ecommended O rder that was
475duly - considered in preparing this Recommended Order.
483FINDING S OF FACT
4871. The Flor ida Legislature created the Scholarship Program
496during its 2015 Session. Through the 2015 General Appropriations
505Act, the Legislature adopted proviso language in Specific
513Appropriation 99A (ÐAppropriation 99AÑ) allocating $44,022,483.00
521to Ðaward a maximu m of 4,402 teachers with a $10,000 scholarship
535based on high academic achievement on the SAT or ACT.Ñ See
546C h. 2015 - 232, § 2, 9 9A, at 27, Laws of Fla.
5602. To be eligible to receive the scholarship, Appropriation
56999A stated that, Ða teacher must have score d at or above the 80th
583percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile
595ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment.Ñ 2/
6053. Appropriation 99A further provided that an Ðeligible
613teacherÑ was to apply to the employing school distri ct no later
625than October 1, 2015. Thereafter, each school district was to
635submit to the Department the number of eligible teachers who
645qualified for the scholarship by December 1, 2015. By
654February 1, 2016, the Department was to disburse scholarship
663fun ds to each school district for each teacher who was to receive
676the scholarship. By April 1, 2016, each school district was to
687pay the scholarship award to each eligible teacher.
695Appropriation 99A further stated that if the number of eligible
705teachers exc eeded the total appropriated amount ($44,022,483.00),
715the Department was to prorate the per teacher scholarship amount.
7254. On September 3, 2015, Petitioner timely applied to the
735School Board to receive the scholarship award under the
744Scholarship Program.
7465. On November 11, 2015, the School Board notified
755Petitioner that it had been determined that she did not qualify
766for the Scholarship Program. The School Board explained that
775Petitioner was not a Ðclassroom teacher.Ñ Therefore, she was not
785eligib le to receive the scholarship.
7916. Petitioner is a first - year employee with the School
802Board. The School Board hired her at the start of the 2015 - 2016
816school year. The School Board hired Petitioner as a speech -
827language pathologist.
8297. Prior to working for the School Board, Petition er taught
840in Fulton County, Georgia. One factor in her decision to accept
851the School BoardÓs offer of employment and relocate to Florid a
862was the Scholarship Program.
8668. For the 2015 - 2016 school year, Petitioner entered into a
878ÐProb ationary Contract of Employment for Instructional Personnel
886of the Public SchoolsÑ with the School Board. 3/ Petitioner holds
897a two - year, temporary teaching certificate issued by the
907Department in the ar ea of Speech - Language Impaired.
9179. For the 2015 - 2016 school year, the School Board assigned
929Petitioner to work as a speech language pathologist at Brentwood
939Elementary. All of PetitionerÓ s students were identified as
948e xceptional s tudent e ducation or ÐESEÑ students.
95710. At Brentwood Elementary, Petitioner led two class
965subjects, Speech Therapy and Language Therapy. In her Speech
974Therapy class, Petitioner addressed her studentsÓ problems with
982speech and fluency ( e.g. , stuttering). PetitionerÓs Language
990Therapy class focused on the content of what is being said ( i.e. ,
1003expressive and receptive language). Petitioner instructed
1009students in areas including reading, reading alo ud, and analysis.
101911. Petitioner instructed a total of 25 students over six
1029class periods. Her classes consisted of small groups of two - to -
1042four students. PetitionerÓs students ranged in age from pre -
1052kin dergarten through fifth - grade.
105812. For her six classes, Petitioner prepared daily lesson
1067plans. Her lesson plans targeted the goals and objectives on
1077each of her studentsÓ individualized education plans. She
1085aligned her lesson plans with Florida state standards. Some of
1095the state standa rds are general education grade - level standards,
1106and some are specific to speech or language therapy. Each lesson
1117plan included sections addressing ÐSet ting the Purpose for
1126Learning,Ñ ÐInstruction and Assessment,Ñ ÐTeacher Supported
1134Guided Instruction,Ñ and ÐApplication.Ñ Petitioner submitted her
1142lesson plans to her assistant principal for a quarterly review.
1152Petitioner was observed and evaluated by her assistant principal
1161using the same form used for evaluating other teachers at
1171Brentwood Elementary. Petitioner was observed and evaluated on
1179criteria related to the instruction she provided to her students
1189as well as the culture of her classroom.
119713. Th e School Board reported that Petitioner is
1206ÐoutstandingÑ in her role and was doing Ða great jobÑ according
1217to the Brentwood Elementary administration. The School Board
1225further relayed that Ðthere is no question that [Petitioner] is
1235an up - and - coming great professional.Ñ
124314. The School Board denied PetitionerÓs application
1250because it did not consider a speech language pathologist to be
1261eligible for the Scholarship Program. The School Board explained
1270that it understood the term ÐteacherÑ as used in Appropri ation
128199A to mean a Ðclassroom teacherÑ as that term is defined in
1293section 1012.01(2)(a). The School Board did not believe that
1302Petitioner fit into the definition of a Ðclassroom teacher.Ñ The
1312School Board described a Ðclassroom teacherÑ as a Ðperson who is
1323in charge of the whole classroom who is doing the daily
1334instr uctional services to the kids.Ñ
134015. In contrast to a Ðclassroom teacher,Ñ the School Board
1351considers speech - language pathology as a type of Ðrelated
1361service.Ñ Related services are services provided to exceptional -
1370education students to assist them in accessing and benefiting
1379from classroom instruction. The School Board considers its
1387Ðclassroom teachersÑ and speech language pathologists to possess
1395different skill - sets, bases of knowledge, and job goals and
1406responsibilities. Speech - language pathologists have a specific
1414role to support other teachers by helping student s meet their
1425educational goals.
142716. The School Board described PetitionerÓs job duties as
1436Ðtherapeutic services.Ñ In general, speech - language pathologists
1444are professionals who assess, diagnose, and provide therapeutic
1452treatment for various speech, language, and hearing disorders.
1460In her role at Brentwood Elementary, Petitioner provided a
1469comprehensive program to her ESE student s to treat those
1479studentsÓ specific speech or language impairments. PetitionerÓs
1486Speech Therapy and Language Therapy classes were provided to two -
1497to - four students at a time who were evaluated and deemed to have
1511a disability that impacted their educational classroom
1518performance. Petitioner taught her selected students specific
1525skills or coping mechanisms that would allow them to overcome
1535their impairments in order to better access instruction and
1544curriculum. In other words, PetitionerÓs focus was to give her
1554students the ability to learn.
155917. The School Board further explained that PetitionerÓs
1567Ðlesson plansÑ are referred to in the therapy setting as Ðplans
1578of care.Ñ Plans of care are similar in form to lesson plans
1590created by classroom teachers, but the y differ in substance.
1600Classroom teachersÓ lesson plans set forth strategies for an
1609educator to deliver instruction to an entire classroom. Speech -
1619language pathologistsÓ plans of care, on the other hand, set
1629forth tailored therapy plans that address an individual studentÓs
1638specific impairment. In addition, PetitionerÓs class roster is
1646referred to as a Ðcaseload.Ñ Furthermore, while the PetitionerÓs
1655Speech Therapy and Language Therapy classes were assigned course
1664codes similar to general education cours e codes, her two classes
1675were specially coded. PetitionerÓs students did not receive
1683course credit for attending her classes with the t herapy course
1694code designation.
169618. Testimony at the final hearing, however, revealed that
1705in an academic setting the g oals and responsibilities of a
1716speech - language pathologist have objectives similar to a
1725Ðclassroom teacher Ós .Ñ Sonia Figare do - Alberts, the School
1736BoardÓs e xecutive director of pupil support s ervices, who is also
1748a speech - language pathologist, recognized t hat Petitioner Ðis
1758instructing students with communication disorders.Ñ
1763Ms. Figaredo - Alberts explained that Ðwe, as speech and language
1774pathologists assist with very specific targeted areas . . . we do
1786a very therapeutic intervention. WeÓre teaching [our students].
1794ThereÓs no question that our therapy is about teaching that
1804student specific skills . . . in a very thorough and specialized
1816area.Ñ
181719. According to Appropriation 99A, the Legislature gave
1825the decision regarding a ÐteacherÓsÑ eligibility to r eceive a
1835scholarship to the school districts. Appropriation 99A directed
1843each Florida school district to receive teacher applications for
1852the Scholarship Program and to submit the number of eligible
1862teachers who qualified for the scholarship to the Depart ment.
187220. While processing applications, several school districts
1879sent questions to the Department regarding the implementation of
1888the Scholarship Program. In particular, the Department received
1896inquiries regarding who should be considered a ÐteacherÑ fo r
1906purposes of the scholarship. Although the Department
1913administered the Scholarship Program, Appropriation 99A did not
1921grant the Department rulemaking authority. Therefore, the
1928Department did not adopt rules regarding what teachers were
1937eligible for the scholarship. The Department, however, did
1945prepare and issue a memorandum addressing school districtsÓ
1953commonly asked questions.
195621. On July 27, 2015, Hershel Lyons, c hancellor of the
1967Division of Public Schools for the Department, issued a
1976memorandum enti tled ÐGuidance on Best and Brightest Teacher
1985ScholarshipÑ (the ÐMemorandumÑ) to the Florida School District
1993Superintendents. The Memorandum provided that Ð[t]eachers
1999eligible for the Best and Brightest Teachers Scholarship Program
2008are classroom teachers a s defined in [section] 1012.01(2)(a),
2017F.S., who are employed by Florida school districts, charter
2026schools, or the [Florida S chool for the Deaf and Blind].Ñ
203722. The Department based its interpretation of the term
2046ÐteacherÑ on the various classes of employe es set forth in
2057section 1012.01(2)(a). The Department determined that the term
2065Ðclassroom teacherÑ in section 1012.01(2)(a) provided the best
2073definition of the word ÐteacherÑ for purposes of the Scholarship
2083Program.
208423. On September 4, 2015, Chancellor L yons issued a second
2095memorandum to School District Superintendents with an attached
2103Frequently Asked Questions document. The Frequently Asked
2110Questions provided, in relevant part:
21151. What are the eligibility criteria for the
2123Best and Brightest Teacher Sc holarship
2129Program?
2130In order to meet eligibility requirements for
2137the scholarship, the individual must:
2142a. Be a classroom teacher as defined in
2150section 1012.01(2)(a), Florida Statutes . . .
2157* * *
21602. According to section 1012.01(2)(a), F.S.,
2166w hat is the definition of a classroom
2174teacher?
2175Classroom teachers are staff members assigned
2181the professional activity of instructing
2186students in co urses in classroom situations,
2193including basic instruction, exceptional
2197student education, career educatio n and adult
2204education, including substitute teachers.
220824. Upon reviewing the Memorandum, the School Board
2216believed the Department confirmed its view that Ðclassroom
2224teachersÑ were the only individuals eligib le for the Scholarship
2234Program.
223525. The Depart ment did not follow up to determine whether
2246any school district followed its guidance. The Department did
2255not believe that Appropriat ion 99A gave it that authority.
226526. The Department received the names of 5,332 teachers
2275that the school districts determi ned were eligible for the
2285scholarship awards. Appropriation 99A directed the Department to
2293act as the fiscal agent for the Scholarship Program. As
2303Appropriation 99A directed, the Department disbursed scholarship
2310funds by February 1, 2016. 4/ The Departme nt prorated the
2321scholarship funds so that each eligible teacher received
2329approximately $8, 300.
233227. Based on the evidence and testimony presented during
2341the final hearing, Petitioner proved, by a preponderance of the
2351evidence that she qualifies for the Sch olarship Program.
2360Accordingly, the School Board should take the necessary steps to
2370ensure that Petitioner receives the appropriate scholarship award
2378contained in Appropriations 99A.
2382CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
238528. The Division of Administrative Hearings has
2392juris diction over the subject matter and parties pursuant to
2402sections 120.569 and 120.57(1) .
240729. The School Board is a duly - constituted governing body
2418charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise public
2428schools within Sarasota County, Florida. See Art. IX, § 4(b),
2438Fla. Const.; and §§ 1001.30 and 1001.33, Fla. Stat.
244730. The Department acts as the administrative and
2455supervisory education agency under the direction of the State
2464Board of Education. See § 1001.20(1), Fla. Stat. The Department
2474is requ ired to Ðassist in providing professional leadership and
2484guidance and in carrying out the policies, procedures, and duties
2494authorized by law.Ñ £ 1001.20(2), Fla. Stat.
250131. Petitioner challenges the School BoardÓs denial of her
2510application for a financial award under the Scholarship Program.
2519Absent specific statutory authority, the burden of proof is on
2529the party asserting the affirmative of an issue in an
2539administrative proceeding. See Antel v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg. ,
2548522 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); and Dep't of Transp. v.
2561J. W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1s t DCA 1981).
257332. The preponderance of the evidence standard is
2581applicable to this case. See § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.;
2590Dep't of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. & Investor Prot. v. Osborne
2603Stern & Co. , 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996). Preponderance of the
2615evidence is defined as Ðthe greater weight of the evidence,Ñ or
2627evidence that Ðmore likely than notÑ tends to prove a certain
2638proposition. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC ,
2648139 So. 3d 869, 872 (Fla. 2014); see also Dufour v. State , 69 So.
26623d 235, 252 (Fla. 2011) (ÐPreponderance of evidence is defined as
2673evidence Òwhich as a whole shows that the fact sought to be
2685proved is more probable than not.ÓÑ) . Accordingly, Petitioner
2694carries the ultimate burden to prove, by a preponderance of the
2705evidence, that she is entitled to receive an award under the
2716Scholarship Program.
271833. The Florida L egislature, through the 2015 General
2727Appropriations Act, created the Scholarship Program. See
2734Ch. 2015 - 232, § 2, 99A, at 27, Laws of Fla. The proviso language
2749in Appropriation 99A established the eligibility prerequisites
2756for the Scholarship Program. Appropriation 99A states:
276399A SPECIAL CATEGORIES GRANTS AND AIDS -
2770THE FLORIDA BEST AND BRIGHTEST TEACHER
2776SCHOL ARSHIP PROGRAM
2779FRO M GENERAL REVENUE FUND . . .
278744,022,483
2790Funds in Specific Appropriation 99A are
2796provided to implement Florida's Best and
2802Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. The
2807funds shall be used to award a maximum of
28164,402 teachers with a $10,000 scholarship
2824based on high academic achievement on the SAT
2832or ACT. To be eligible for a scholarship, a
2841teacher must have scored at or above the 80th
2850percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based
2859upon the percentile ranks in effect when the
2867teacher took th e assessment and have been
2875evaluated as highly effective pursuant to
2881section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, or if the
2888teacher is a first - year teacher who has not
2898been evaluated pursuant to section 1012.34,
2904Florida Statutes, must have scored at or
2911above the 80t h percentile on either the SAT
2920or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in
2929effect when the teacher took the assessment.
2936In order to demonstrate eligibility for an
2943award, an eligible teacher must submit to the
2951school district, no later than October 1,
295820 15, an official record of his or her SAT or
2969ACT score demonstrating that the teacher
2975scored at or above the 80th percentile based
2983upon the percentile ranks in effect when the
2991teacher took the assessment. By December 1,
29982015, each school district, charter school
3004governing board, and the Florida School for
3011the Deaf and the Blind shall submit to the
3020department the n umber of eligible teachers
3027who qualify for the scholarship. By
3033February 1, 2016, the department shall
3039disburse scholarship funds to each school
3045district for each eligible teacher to receive
3052a scholarship. By April 1, 2016, each school
3060district, charter school governing board, and
3066the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind
3075shall provide payment of the scholarship to
3082each eligible teacher. If t he number of
3090eligible teachers exceeds the total the
3096department shall prorate the per teacher
3102scholarship amount.
310434. The parties agree that, except for the issue of
3114PetitionerÓs status as a Ðteacher,Ñ Petitioner is otherwise
3123eligible for a scholarship. Accordingly, the legal issue to
3132determine in this matter is whether Petitioner qualifies as a
3142ÐteacherÑ as the L egislature used the term in Appropriation 99A.
315335. The facts establish that Petitioner, a speech - language
3163pathologist, is not a Ðclassroom tea cherÑ as defined by the
3174School Board. She does not teach a subject for which her
3185students receive academic credit. She does not teach a full
3195classroom. PetitionerÓs les son plans differ from those of
3204Ðclassroom teachers.Ñ PetitionerÓs Ðplans of careÑ ar e
3212individualized to treat a single studentÓs specific speech or
3221language impairment while Ðc lassroom teachersÓÑ lesson plans set
3230forth strategies to deliver instruction to an entire classroom.
323936. However, the facts also establish that Petitioner does
3248ins truct students in a classroom setting at Brentwood Elementary.
3258She is assigned 25 students. Petitioner teaches two class
3267subjects. She is assigned six class periods. She prepares
3276lesson plans (Ðplans of careÑ) for each subject in accordance
3286with Florid a state standards. Petitioner inculcates her students
3295in certain academic skills including reading, reading
3302comprehension, and speech. Petitioner also holds a (temporary)
3310teaching certifi cate issued by the Department.
331737. In reviewing Appropriation 99A, the undersigned
3324concludes that the term ÐteacherÑ is broad enough to encompass
3334Petitioner in her role at Brentwood Elementary. The Legislature
3343specifically used the term ÐteacherÑ to describe the individuals
3352it desired to be eligible for the Scholarship Program. The term
3363ÐteacherÑ means Ðteacher.Ñ The Legislature did not limit the
3372scholarship to just Ðclassroom teachers.Ñ Consequently, as
3379explained below, the undersigned determines that the School Board
3388should not restrict its employeesÓ eligibility fo r a scholarship
3398award to just Ð classroom teachers.Ñ
340438. The resolution of this matter centers on statutory
3413interpretation. The interpretation of Appropriation 99A begins
3420with the question of whether the proviso language is clear and
3431unambiguous. ÐWhen c onstruing a statute, the court must first
3441look to the plain meaning of the words used by the Legislature.Ñ
3453Brandy's Prods. v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg . , Div. of Alcoholic
3466Bev . & Tobacco , 188 So. 3d 130 , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5244, *4
3480(Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC v. Dep't
3491of Revenue , 164 So. 3d 806, 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)); see also
3504W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See , 79 So. 3d 1, 9 (Fla. 2012).
3519ÐWhen a statute is clear, a court may not look behind the
3531statute's plain langu age or resort to rules of statutory
3541construction to determine legislative intent.Ñ Dep't of High .
3550Saf . & Motor Veh . v. Peacock , 185 So. 3d 632, 633 (Fla. 1st DCA
35662016) (citing State, Dep't of Rev . v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 905
3578So. 2d 1017, 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 20 05)).
358739. ÐTo discern legislative intent, a court must look first
3597and foremost at the actual language used in the statute.Ñ
3607Larimore v. State , 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008) . ÐThe
3619Legislature is assumed to know the meaning of the words used in a
3632st atute and to have expressed its intent through the use of the
3645words.Ñ Peacock , s upra , at 633. The actual language the
3655Legislature used in Appropriation 99A is clear and unambiguous.
366440. Appropriation 99A does not define the term Ðteacher.Ñ
3673Where the L e gislature has not specifically defined the words used
3685in a statute, Ðthe language should be given its plain and
3696ordinary meaning.Ñ Greenfield v. Daniels , 51 So. 3d 421, 426
3706(Fla. 2010) (citing Sch . Bd. of Palm Beach C n ty . v. Survivors
3721Charter Schs . , Inc. , 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009) (quoting
3733Fla. Birth - Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v. Fla. Div.
3744of Admin. Hr g s . , 686 So. 2d 1349, 1354 (Fla. 1997)). It is
3759appropriate to refer to a dictionary definition to ascertain the
3769plain and ordinary meanin g of a word used in a statute.
3781Survivors Charter Sch s . , s upra , at 1233.
379041. The word ÐteacherÑ has a plain and ordinary meaning.
3800ÐTeacherÑ is defined as Ðone that teaches; especially: one whose
3810occupation is to instruct.Ñ ÐTeacherÑ also means Ða perso n who
3821passes on information or skill.Ñ MERRIAM - WEBSTER DICTIONARY, at
3831http://www.merriam - webster.com. See Seagrave v. State , 802 So.
38402d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001) (ÐWhen necessary, the plain and ordinary
3851meaning of words [in a statute] can be ascertained by re ference
3863to a dictionary.Ñ); see also Raymond James Fin. Servs. v.
3873Phillips , 110 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (ÐIt is
3885appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions when c onstruing
3894statutes or rules.Ñ) .
389842. Based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the term
3909Ðteacher,Ñ Petitioner is eligible to participate in the
3918Scholarship Program. It is undisputed that Petitioner
3925ÐinstructsÑ the ESE students assigned to her at Brentwood
3934Elementary. Petitioner also Ðpasses on information or skillsÑ to
3943her students . Therefore, based on the common understanding of
3953the word Ðteacher,Ñ the undersigned concludes that the term
3963ÐteacherÑ as used in Appropriation 99A includes Petitioner.
397143. The School Board (and the Department) interpret the
3980term Ðteacher , Ñ based on a d efinition set forth in section
39921012.01(2)(a). Section 1012.01(2)(a) provides definitions for
3998c hapter 1012, the Personnel Chapter of the Florida Educator Code.
4009Section 1012.01 states, in pertinent part:
4015(2) INSTRUCTIONAL PERSONNEL. Ï
4019ÐInstructional perso nnelÑ means any K - 12
4027staff member whose function includes the
4033provision of direct instructional services to
4039students. Instructional personnel also
4043includes K - 12 personnel whose functions
4050provide direct support in the learning
4056process of students. Include d in the
4063classification of instructional personnel are
4068the following K - 12 personnel:
4074(a) Classroom teachers. Ï Classroom teachers
4080are staff members assigned the professional
4086activity of instructing students in courses
4092in classroom situations, including b asic
4098instruction, exceptional student education,
4102career education, and adult education,
4107including substitute teachers.
4110(b) Student personnel services. Ï Student
4116personnel services include staff members
4121responsible for: advising students with
4126regard to t heir abilities and aptitudes,
4133educational and occupational opportunities,
4137and personal and social adjustments;
4142providing placement services; performing
4146educational evaluations; and similar
4150functions. Included in this classification
4155are certified school co unselors, social
4161workers, career specialists, and school
4166psychologists.
4167* * *
4170(d) Other instructional staff. Ï Other
4176instructional staff are staff members who are
4183part of the instructional staff but are not
4191classified in one of the categories sp ecified
4199in paragraphs (a) - (c). Included in this
4207classification are primary specialists,
4211learning resource specialists, instructional
4215trainers, adjunct educators certified
4219pursuant to s. 1012.57 , and similar
4225positions.
422644. Despite this definition available in section
42331012.01(2), the School Board is not permitted to add the word
4244ÐclassroomÑ to Appropriation 99A that the Legislature did not
4253include therein. Ð[C]ourts are not at liberty to add words to
4264statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature.Ñ
4273Caceres v. Sedano's Supermarkets , 138 So. 3d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 1st
4284DCA 2014); see also L.G. v. State , 939 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla.
42971st DCA 2006) (ÐWhere the legislature has used a term in one part
4310of the statute and excluded it in another, it is improper to
4322imply the term in a provision where it has been otherwise
4333excluded.Ñ) If the drafters of Appropriation 99A h ad intended to
4344restrict the Scholarship Program to only Ðclassroom teachersÑ
4352instead of Ðteachers,Ñ the drafters would have specifically
4361included that extra word in the proviso language. Consequently,
4370section 1012.01(2)(a) does not support the School Boar dÓs
4379position that Ðclassroom teachersÑ are the only individuals
4387eligible for the Scholarship Program.
439245. Even if the School Board could rely on section
44021012.01(2) to interpret the term Ðteacher,Ñ the statutory
4411definition of Ðclassroom teacherÑ appears to support PetitionerÓs
4419claim. Parsing through the statutory language, the evidence in
4428the record demonstrates that Petitioner is a Ðstaff memberÑ of
4438Brentwood Elementary assigned a Ðprofessional activityÑ by the
4446School District. She ÐinstructsÑ students a ssigned to her. She
4456conducts Ðcourses in classroom situations.Ñ And, her courses are
4465specifically prepared for Ðexceptional student education.Ñ 5/
4472Further, the classification of education personnel set forth in
4481section 1012.01, makes no separate mention of personnel who
4490provide Ðrelated services.Ñ Accordingly, there is no legal
4498reason one who provides a Ðrelated serviceÑ cannot also be a
4509ÐteacherÑ for purposes of the Scholarship Program. 6 /
451846. Notwithstanding the plain and ordinary meaning of the
4527term ÐteacherÑ in Appropriation 99A, the undersigned recognizes
4535that Florida courts defer to agency interpretation of their own
4545statutes. However, because the proviso language in Appropriation
455399A is unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the
4564co urt must apply that meaning even if it conflicts with the
4576interpretation of the statute adopted by the administrative
4584agency charged with enforcing it. See Muratti - Stuart v. Dep't of
4596Bus. & Prof'l Reg . , Constr. Indus. Licensing Bd. , 174 So. 3d 538,
4609540 (F la. 4th DCA 2015) (ÐAn agency's interpretation of a statute
4621is entitled to great deference unless the agency's interpretation
4630conflicts with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.Ñ);
4640Verizon Bus. Purchasing , 164 So. 3d at 812 (ÐJudicial deference
4650d oes not require that courts adopt an agency's interpretation of
4661a statute when the agency's interpretation cannot be reconciled
4670with the plain language of the statute.Ñ); Micjo, Inc. v. Dep't
4681of Bus. & Prof'l Reg . , 78 So. 3d 124, 126 - 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
4698(rejecting the agency's interpretation of the definition of
4706Ðwholesale sales priceÑ in section 210.25(13) , Florida Statutes
4714(2009) , because the interpretation was inconsistent with the
4722p lain language of the statute).
472847. The undersigned also notes that, w hile the Legislature
4738tasked the Department with disbursing the scholarship funds,
4746Appropriation 99A did not grant the Department with rulemaking
4755authority over the Scholarship Program. As the Department
4763repeatedly stressed, the Memorandum it issued offeri ng a
4772suggested definition for ÐteacherÑ was simply guidance to the
4781school districts. Consequently, the School Board is not
4789obligated to foll ow the DepartmentÓs Memorandum.
479648. Finally, the School Board (and the Department) suggest
4805that language in the 20 16 General Appropriations Act can be used
4817to interpret the term ÐteacherÑ in Appropriation 99A. During its
48272016 Session, the Legislature enacted section 1012.731, Florida
4835Statutes (2016), entitled ÐThe Florida Best and Brightest Teacher
4844Scholarship Progra m.Ñ See C h . 2016 - 62, Laws of Fla . , § 25, at
486133 - 34 (ÐSection 25Ñ). Through Section 25, the Legislature
4871allocated funds to award scholarships to Ðclassroom teachers, as
4880defined in s. 1012.01(2)(a).Ñ 7 /
488649. The School BoardÓs argument, however, is not
4894pers uasive. The undersigned recognizes that, to interpret
4902ambiguous statut ory language , legislation enacted in subsequent
4910legislative sessions may be examined to discern legislative
4918intent. See Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. ,
4930945 So. 2d 1216, 1230 (Fla. 2006) . However, Section 25 contains
4942no express language that the Legislature intended the proviso
4951language in the 2016 Scholarship Program to apply retroactively
4960to the 2015 Scholarship Program. Neith er does Section 25 contain
4971any l egisl ative expression that Appropriation 99A was incorrectly
4981implemented or misapplied. The undersigned considers the 2016
4989enactment a new/renewal of the Scholarship Program, not a
4998ÐclarificationÑ of the funds the Legislature specifically
5005appropriated in 2015. See e.g. , D & T Props. v. Marina Grande
5017Assocs. , 985 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (ÐWhere the
5029legislature expressly characterizes the intent of legislation, it
5037is especially appropriate to consider the amended statute to
5046determine the original legis lative intent of the statute.Ñ)
5055Consequently, the undersigned concludes that Appropriation 99A
5062means what its text most appropriately conveys, that the term
5072ÐteacherÑ means ÐteacherÑ and is not restricted to Ðclassroom
5081teacher.Ñ
508250. In applying the clear and unambiguous language of
5091Appropriation 99A, the undersigned concludes that, as a matter of
5101law, the Legislature intended the Scholarship Program to be open
5111to all ÐteachersÑ and not restricted to just Ðclassroom
5120teachers.Ñ Based on the competent subst antial evidence in the
5130record, Petitioner demonstrated that she serves as a ÐteacherÑ in
5140her role at Brentwood Elementary. Accordingly, Petitioner has
5148met her burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
5159that she is entitled to a scholarship und er the Scholarship
5170Program.
5171RECOMMENDATION
5172Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
5182Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Sarasota County,
5193Florida, issue a final order fulfilling its responsibilities
5201under Appropriation 99A, i.e . , submitting PetitionerÓs name to
5210the Department of Education as a teacher eligible for the
5220scholarship created by the 2015 Florida Best and Brightest
5229Teacher Scholarship Program.
5232DONE AND ENTERED this 13 th day of June , 2016 , in
5243Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
5247S
5248J. BRUCE CULPEPPER
5251Administrative Law Judge
5254Division of Administrative Hearings
5258The DeSoto Building
52611230 Apalachee Parkway
5264Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
5269(850) 488 - 9675
5273Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
5279www.doah.sta te.fl.us
5281Filed with the Clerk of the
5287Division of Administrative Hearings
5291this 13 th day of June, 2016 .
5299ENDNOTE S
53011/ All statutory references are to the 201 5 Florida Statutes,
5312unless otherwise noted.
53152/ The proviso language also stated that a teacher m ust have been
5328evaluated as highly effective pursuant to section 1012.34,
5336Florida Statutes, unless the teacher was a first - year teacher who
5348had not yet been evaluated under that section. Pet itioner, as a
5360first - year teacher at the time she applied, had not been
5372evaluated under section 1012.34. Therefore, her only requirement
5380for the scholarship award was to have the requisite SAT or the
5392ACT score at or above the 80th percentile. Petitioner took the
5403SAT in 2004. Petitioner scored a 98 percent on her verbal test
5415and an 89 percent on her math test. The School Board does not
5428dispute that Petitioner met all the eligibility requirements for
5437the scholarship aside from the question of whether the School
5447Board should consider her a ÐteacherÑ for purposes of
5456partic ipating in the Scholarship Program.
54623/ This contract refers to Petitioner as a ÐTeacher.Ñ
54714/ Funds appropriated to the Scholarship Program became available
5480on July 1, 2015. See C h . 2015 - 232, § 113 , Laws of Fla .
54975/ The fact that the Legislature specif ically included
5506Ðexceptional special educationÑ in the statutory definition of
5514Ðclassroom teacherÑ in section 1012.01(2)(a) shows the value the
5523Legislature places on instructing ESE students , as well as those
5533individuals who provide them the specialized in struction they
5542need to achieve their educational goals. By opening the
5551Scholarship Program to Ðteachers,Ñ the Legislature expressed its
5560intent that those teachers who instruct ESE students Ðin
5569classroom situationsÑ should receive the same scholarship
5576oppo rtunity as those teachers who lead more traditional course
5586subjects.
55876 / The undersigned finds the facts of this matter are unique to
5600this case and distinguishable from the factual findings and
5609conclusions in the Recommended Order in Andrew v. Sarasota C o u nty
5622Sch ool B oar d , Case No. 15 - 7041, ( Fla. DOAH Apr. 8, 2016). Along
5639with the factors listed in paragraph 36, the School Board
5649representative specifically acknowledged that Petitioner
5654ÐinstructsÑ and ÐteachesÑ the ESE students assigned to her
5663classes. Ad ditionally, the Petitioner in Andrew did not hold a
5674teaching certificate.
56767 / See section 1012.731(2), effective July 1, 2016.
5685COPIES FURNISHED:
5687Arthur S. Hardy, Esquire
5691Matthews Eastmoore
5693Suite 300
56951626 Ringling Boulevard
5698Sarasota, Florida 34236 - 6815
5703(eServed)
5704Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire
5708Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A.
5714Post Office Box 1547
5718131 North Gadsden Street (32301)
5723Tallahassee, Florida 32302
5726(eServed)
5727Margaret R. Good, Esquire
5731Matthews Eastmoore
5733Suite 300
57351626 Ringling Boulevard
5738Sarasota, Florida 34236
5741(eServed)
5742Daniel Terrence Gaffney, Esquire
5746Florida Department of Education
5750Suite 1244
5752325 West Gaines Street
5756Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400
5761(eServed)
5762David L. Jordan, Esquire
5766Department of Education
5769Suite 1244
5771325 West Gaines Street
5775Talla hassee, Florida 32399 - 0400
5781(eServed)
5782Lynn C. Hearn, Esquire
5786Meyer, Brooks, Demma, and Blohm, P.A.
5792Post Office Box 1547
5796131 North Gadsden Street
5800Tallahassee, Florida 32302
5803(eServed)
5804Lori White, Superintendent
5807Sarasota County School Board
58111960 Landings Boulevard
5814Sarasota, Florida 34231
5817Pam Stewart, Commissioner of Education
5822Department of Education
5825Turlington Building, Suite 1514
5829325 West Gaines Street
5833Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400
5838(eServed)
5839Matthew Mears, General Counsel
5843Department of Education
5846Tur lington Building, Suite 1244
5851325 West Gaines Street
5855Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400
5860(eServed)
5861NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
5867All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
587715 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exce ptions
5889to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that
5900will issue the Final Order in this case.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 06/13/2016
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- PDF:
- Date: 05/13/2016
- Proceedings: Respondent's Amended Proposed Recommended Order, Amended to Correct Scrivener's Error in Title filed.
- PDF:
- Date: 04/26/2016
- Proceedings: Intervenor's Unopposed Motion for Extension to File Proposed Recommended Order filed.
- Date: 04/21/2016
- Proceedings: Transcript of Proceedings (not available for viewing) filed.
- Date: 03/31/2016
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- PDF:
- Date: 03/22/2016
- Proceedings: Letter to Judge Culpepper from Ronald Meyer enclosing Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
Case Information
- Judge:
- J. BRUCE CULPEPPER
- Date Filed:
- 01/22/2016
- Date Assignment:
- 01/25/2016
- Last Docket Entry:
- 08/19/2016
- Location:
- Sarasota, Florida
- District:
- Middle
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO
Counsels
-
Daniel Terrence Gaffney, Assistant General Counsel
Address of Record -
Margaret R. Good, Esquire
Address of Record -
Arthur S. Hardy, Esquire
Address of Record -
Lynn C. Hearn, Esquire
Address of Record -
David L. Jordan, Esquire
Address of Record -
Ronald G Meyer, Esquire
Address of Record -
Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire
Address of Record