16-000378 Cordelia Brown vs. Sarasota County School Board
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, June 13, 2016.


View Dockets  
Summary: Petitioner proved that she is a "teacher," and, therefore, she is eligible for an award under the 2015 Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8CORDELIA BROWN,

10Petitioner,

11vs. Case No. 16 - 0378

17SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

21Respondent,

22and

23DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

26Intervenor.

27_______________________________/

28RECOM MENDED ORDER

31The final hearing in this matter was conducted before

40J. Bruce Culpepper, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

50Administrative Hearings, pursuant to sections 120.569 and

57120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2015), 1/ on March 31, 2016, in

67Saras ota, Florida.

70APPEARANCES

71For Petitioner: Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire

77Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A.

83Post Office Box 1547

87131 North Gadsden Street (32301)

92Tallahassee, Florida 32302

95For Respondent: Margaret R. Good, Esquire

101Matthews Eastmoore

103Suite 300

1051626 Ringling Boulevard

108Sarasota, Florida 34236

111For Intervenor : David L. Jordan, Esquire

118Departm ent of Education

122Suite 1244

124325 West Gaines Street

128Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

133STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

137Whether Petitioner, Cordelia Brown, is eligible to receive a

146scholarship offered by the 2015 Flor ida Best and Brightest

156Teacher Scholarship Program.

159PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

161On September 3 , 2015, Petitioner, Cordelia Brown

168(ÐPetitionerÑ), applied to the School Board of Sarasota County,

177Florida (the ÐSchool BoardÑ), for a scholarship under the 2015

187Florid a Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Progr am (the

197ÐScholarship ProgramÑ).

199On November 11, 2015, the School Board notified Petitioner

208that it had determined that she was not eligible for the

219scholarship.

220On January 13, 2015, Petitioner timely requested an

228administrative hearing to contest the School BoardÓs denial of

237her application. On January 22, 2016, the School Board referred

247the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings (ÐDOAHÑ)

256and requested assignment to an Administrative Law Judge (ÐALJÑ )

266to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

271On January 26, 2016, the Florida Department of Education

280(the ÐDepartmentÑ) filed a Motion to Intervene. The DepartmentÓs

289motion was granted by Order, dated January 27, 2016.

298The final hearing was held on March 31, 201 6. At the

310hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf. The School

319Board presented the testimony of Sonia Figaredo - Alberts,

328e xecutive d irector of p upil s upport s ervices, and Al Harayda,

342e mployee r elations and equity a dministrator. The Department

352pres ented t he testimony of Brian Dassler, d eputy chancellor of

364educator q uality. The parties stipulated to the introduction of

374Exhibits 1 through 14 , which were received into evidence.

383A one - volume T ranscript of the final hearing was filed with

396DOAH on April 21, 2016. At the close of the hearing, the parties

409were advised of the ten - day timeframe following DOAHÓs receipt of

421the transcript to file post - hearing submittals. Following the

431DepartmentÓs Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File

440Proposed Recomm ended Order , filed on April 26, 2016, the parties

451were given until May 12, 2016, to file proposed recommend ed

462orders. Each party filed a P roposed R ecommended O rder that was

475duly - considered in preparing this Recommended Order.

483FINDING S OF FACT

4871. The Flor ida Legislature created the Scholarship Program

496during its 2015 Session. Through the 2015 General Appropriations

505Act, the Legislature adopted proviso language in Specific

513Appropriation 99A (ÐAppropriation 99AÑ) allocating $44,022,483.00

521to Ðaward a maximu m of 4,402 teachers with a $10,000 scholarship

535based on high academic achievement on the SAT or ACT.Ñ See

546C h. 2015 - 232, § 2, 9 9A, at 27, Laws of Fla.

5602. To be eligible to receive the scholarship, Appropriation

56999A stated that, Ða teacher must have score d at or above the 80th

583percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based upon the percentile

595ranks in effect when the teacher took the assessment.Ñ 2/

6053. Appropriation 99A further provided that an Ðeligible

613teacherÑ was to apply to the employing school distri ct no later

625than October 1, 2015. Thereafter, each school district was to

635submit to the Department the number of eligible teachers who

645qualified for the scholarship by December 1, 2015. By

654February 1, 2016, the Department was to disburse scholarship

663fun ds to each school district for each teacher who was to receive

676the scholarship. By April 1, 2016, each school district was to

687pay the scholarship award to each eligible teacher.

695Appropriation 99A further stated that if the number of eligible

705teachers exc eeded the total appropriated amount ($44,022,483.00),

715the Department was to prorate the per teacher scholarship amount.

7254. On September 3, 2015, Petitioner timely applied to the

735School Board to receive the scholarship award under the

744Scholarship Program.

7465. On November 11, 2015, the School Board notified

755Petitioner that it had been determined that she did not qualify

766for the Scholarship Program. The School Board explained that

775Petitioner was not a Ðclassroom teacher.Ñ Therefore, she was not

785eligib le to receive the scholarship.

7916. Petitioner is a first - year employee with the School

802Board. The School Board hired her at the start of the 2015 - 2016

816school year. The School Board hired Petitioner as a speech -

827language pathologist.

8297. Prior to working for the School Board, Petition er taught

840in Fulton County, Georgia. One factor in her decision to accept

851the School BoardÓs offer of employment and relocate to Florid a

862was the Scholarship Program.

8668. For the 2015 - 2016 school year, Petitioner entered into a

878ÐProb ationary Contract of Employment for Instructional Personnel

886of the Public SchoolsÑ with the School Board. 3/ Petitioner holds

897a two - year, temporary teaching certificate issued by the

907Department in the ar ea of Speech - Language Impaired.

9179. For the 2015 - 2016 school year, the School Board assigned

929Petitioner to work as a speech language pathologist at Brentwood

939Elementary. All of PetitionerÓ s students were identified as

948e xceptional s tudent e ducation or ÐESEÑ students.

95710. At Brentwood Elementary, Petitioner led two class

965subjects, Speech Therapy and Language Therapy. In her Speech

974Therapy class, Petitioner addressed her studentsÓ problems with

982speech and fluency ( e.g. , stuttering). PetitionerÓs Language

990Therapy class focused on the content of what is being said ( i.e. ,

1003expressive and receptive language). Petitioner instructed

1009students in areas including reading, reading alo ud, and analysis.

101911. Petitioner instructed a total of 25 students over six

1029class periods. Her classes consisted of small groups of two - to -

1042four students. PetitionerÓs students ranged in age from pre -

1052kin dergarten through fifth - grade.

105812. For her six classes, Petitioner prepared daily lesson

1067plans. Her lesson plans targeted the goals and objectives on

1077each of her studentsÓ individualized education plans. She

1085aligned her lesson plans with Florida state standards. Some of

1095the state standa rds are general education grade - level standards,

1106and some are specific to speech or language therapy. Each lesson

1117plan included sections addressing ÐSet ting the Purpose for

1126Learning,Ñ ÐInstruction and Assessment,Ñ ÐTeacher Supported

1134Guided Instruction,Ñ and ÐApplication.Ñ Petitioner submitted her

1142lesson plans to her assistant principal for a quarterly review.

1152Petitioner was observed and evaluated by her assistant principal

1161using the same form used for evaluating other teachers at

1171Brentwood Elementary. Petitioner was observed and evaluated on

1179criteria related to the instruction she provided to her students

1189as well as the culture of her classroom.

119713. Th e School Board reported that Petitioner is

1206ÐoutstandingÑ in her role and was doing Ða great jobÑ according

1217to the Brentwood Elementary administration. The School Board

1225further relayed that Ðthere is no question that [Petitioner] is

1235an up - and - coming great professional.Ñ

124314. The School Board denied PetitionerÓs application

1250because it did not consider a speech language pathologist to be

1261eligible for the Scholarship Program. The School Board explained

1270that it understood the term ÐteacherÑ as used in Appropri ation

128199A to mean a Ðclassroom teacherÑ as that term is defined in

1293section 1012.01(2)(a). The School Board did not believe that

1302Petitioner fit into the definition of a Ðclassroom teacher.Ñ The

1312School Board described a Ðclassroom teacherÑ as a Ðperson who is

1323in charge of the whole classroom who is doing the daily

1334instr uctional services to the kids.Ñ

134015. In contrast to a Ðclassroom teacher,Ñ the School Board

1351considers speech - language pathology as a type of Ðrelated

1361service.Ñ Related services are services provided to exceptional -

1370education students to assist them in accessing and benefiting

1379from classroom instruction. The School Board considers its

1387Ðclassroom teachersÑ and speech language pathologists to possess

1395different skill - sets, bases of knowledge, and job goals and

1406responsibilities. Speech - language pathologists have a specific

1414role to support other teachers by helping student s meet their

1425educational goals.

142716. The School Board described PetitionerÓs job duties as

1436Ðtherapeutic services.Ñ In general, speech - language pathologists

1444are professionals who assess, diagnose, and provide therapeutic

1452treatment for various speech, language, and hearing disorders.

1460In her role at Brentwood Elementary, Petitioner provided a

1469comprehensive program to her ESE student s to treat those

1479studentsÓ specific speech or language impairments. PetitionerÓs

1486Speech Therapy and Language Therapy classes were provided to two -

1497to - four students at a time who were evaluated and deemed to have

1511a disability that impacted their educational classroom

1518performance. Petitioner taught her selected students specific

1525skills or coping mechanisms that would allow them to overcome

1535their impairments in order to better access instruction and

1544curriculum. In other words, PetitionerÓs focus was to give her

1554students the ability to learn.

155917. The School Board further explained that PetitionerÓs

1567Ðlesson plansÑ are referred to in the therapy setting as Ðplans

1578of care.Ñ Plans of care are similar in form to lesson plans

1590created by classroom teachers, but the y differ in substance.

1600Classroom teachersÓ lesson plans set forth strategies for an

1609educator to deliver instruction to an entire classroom. Speech -

1619language pathologistsÓ plans of care, on the other hand, set

1629forth tailored therapy plans that address an individual studentÓs

1638specific impairment. In addition, PetitionerÓs class roster is

1646referred to as a Ðcaseload.Ñ Furthermore, while the PetitionerÓs

1655Speech Therapy and Language Therapy classes were assigned course

1664codes similar to general education cours e codes, her two classes

1675were specially coded. PetitionerÓs students did not receive

1683course credit for attending her classes with the t herapy course

1694code designation.

169618. Testimony at the final hearing, however, revealed that

1705in an academic setting the g oals and responsibilities of a

1716speech - language pathologist have objectives similar to a

1725Ðclassroom teacher Ós .Ñ Sonia Figare do - Alberts, the School

1736BoardÓs e xecutive director of pupil support s ervices, who is also

1748a speech - language pathologist, recognized t hat Petitioner Ðis

1758instructing students with communication disorders.Ñ

1763Ms. Figaredo - Alberts explained that Ðwe, as speech and language

1774pathologists assist with very specific targeted areas . . . we do

1786a very therapeutic intervention. WeÓre teaching [our students].

1794ThereÓs no question that our therapy is about teaching that

1804student specific skills . . . in a very thorough and specialized

1816area.Ñ

181719. According to Appropriation 99A, the Legislature gave

1825the decision regarding a ÐteacherÓsÑ eligibility to r eceive a

1835scholarship to the school districts. Appropriation 99A directed

1843each Florida school district to receive teacher applications for

1852the Scholarship Program and to submit the number of eligible

1862teachers who qualified for the scholarship to the Depart ment.

187220. While processing applications, several school districts

1879sent questions to the Department regarding the implementation of

1888the Scholarship Program. In particular, the Department received

1896inquiries regarding who should be considered a ÐteacherÑ fo r

1906purposes of the scholarship. Although the Department

1913administered the Scholarship Program, Appropriation 99A did not

1921grant the Department rulemaking authority. Therefore, the

1928Department did not adopt rules regarding what teachers were

1937eligible for the scholarship. The Department, however, did

1945prepare and issue a memorandum addressing school districtsÓ

1953commonly asked questions.

195621. On July 27, 2015, Hershel Lyons, c hancellor of the

1967Division of Public Schools for the Department, issued a

1976memorandum enti tled ÐGuidance on Best and Brightest Teacher

1985ScholarshipÑ (the ÐMemorandumÑ) to the Florida School District

1993Superintendents. The Memorandum provided that Ð[t]eachers

1999eligible for the Best and Brightest Teachers Scholarship Program

2008are classroom teachers a s defined in [section] 1012.01(2)(a),

2017F.S., who are employed by Florida school districts, charter

2026schools, or the [Florida S chool for the Deaf and Blind].Ñ

203722. The Department based its interpretation of the term

2046ÐteacherÑ on the various classes of employe es set forth in

2057section 1012.01(2)(a). The Department determined that the term

2065Ðclassroom teacherÑ in section 1012.01(2)(a) provided the best

2073definition of the word ÐteacherÑ for purposes of the Scholarship

2083Program.

208423. On September 4, 2015, Chancellor L yons issued a second

2095memorandum to School District Superintendents with an attached

2103Frequently Asked Questions document. The Frequently Asked

2110Questions provided, in relevant part:

21151. What are the eligibility criteria for the

2123Best and Brightest Teacher Sc holarship

2129Program?

2130In order to meet eligibility requirements for

2137the scholarship, the individual must:

2142a. Be a classroom teacher as defined in

2150section 1012.01(2)(a), Florida Statutes . . .

2157* * *

21602. According to section 1012.01(2)(a), F.S.,

2166w hat is the definition of a classroom

2174teacher?

2175Classroom teachers are staff members assigned

2181the professional activity of instructing

2186students in co urses in classroom situations,

2193including basic instruction, exceptional

2197student education, career educatio n and adult

2204education, including substitute teachers.

220824. Upon reviewing the Memorandum, the School Board

2216believed the Department confirmed its view that Ðclassroom

2224teachersÑ were the only individuals eligib le for the Scholarship

2234Program.

223525. The Depart ment did not follow up to determine whether

2246any school district followed its guidance. The Department did

2255not believe that Appropriat ion 99A gave it that authority.

226526. The Department received the names of 5,332 teachers

2275that the school districts determi ned were eligible for the

2285scholarship awards. Appropriation 99A directed the Department to

2293act as the fiscal agent for the Scholarship Program. As

2303Appropriation 99A directed, the Department disbursed scholarship

2310funds by February 1, 2016. 4/ The Departme nt prorated the

2321scholarship funds so that each eligible teacher received

2329approximately $8, 300.

233227. Based on the evidence and testimony presented during

2341the final hearing, Petitioner proved, by a preponderance of the

2351evidence that she qualifies for the Sch olarship Program.

2360Accordingly, the School Board should take the necessary steps to

2370ensure that Petitioner receives the appropriate scholarship award

2378contained in Appropriations 99A.

2382CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

238528. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

2392juris diction over the subject matter and parties pursuant to

2402sections 120.569 and 120.57(1) .

240729. The School Board is a duly - constituted governing body

2418charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise public

2428schools within Sarasota County, Florida. See Art. IX, § 4(b),

2438Fla. Const.; and §§ 1001.30 and 1001.33, Fla. Stat.

244730. The Department acts as the administrative and

2455supervisory education agency under the direction of the State

2464Board of Education. See § 1001.20(1), Fla. Stat. The Department

2474is requ ired to Ðassist in providing professional leadership and

2484guidance and in carrying out the policies, procedures, and duties

2494authorized by law.Ñ £ 1001.20(2), Fla. Stat.

250131. Petitioner challenges the School BoardÓs denial of her

2510application for a financial award under the Scholarship Program.

2519Absent specific statutory authority, the burden of proof is on

2529the party asserting the affirmative of an issue in an

2539administrative proceeding. See Antel v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg. ,

2548522 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); and Dep't of Transp. v.

2561J. W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1s t DCA 1981).

257332. The preponderance of the evidence standard is

2581applicable to this case. See § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.;

2590Dep't of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. & Investor Prot. v. Osborne

2603Stern & Co. , 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996). Preponderance of the

2615evidence is defined as Ðthe greater weight of the evidence,Ñ or

2627evidence that Ðmore likely than notÑ tends to prove a certain

2638proposition. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC ,

2648139 So. 3d 869, 872 (Fla. 2014); see also Dufour v. State , 69 So.

26623d 235, 252 (Fla. 2011) (ÐPreponderance of evidence is defined as

2673evidence Òwhich as a whole shows that the fact sought to be

2685proved is more probable than not.ÓÑ) . Accordingly, Petitioner

2694carries the ultimate burden to prove, by a preponderance of the

2705evidence, that she is entitled to receive an award under the

2716Scholarship Program.

271833. The Florida L egislature, through the 2015 General

2727Appropriations Act, created the Scholarship Program. See

2734Ch. 2015 - 232, § 2, 99A, at 27, Laws of Fla. The proviso language

2749in Appropriation 99A established the eligibility prerequisites

2756for the Scholarship Program. Appropriation 99A states:

276399A SPECIAL CATEGORIES GRANTS AND AIDS -

2770THE FLORIDA BEST AND BRIGHTEST TEACHER

2776SCHOL ARSHIP PROGRAM

2779FRO M GENERAL REVENUE FUND . . .

278744,022,483

2790Funds in Specific Appropriation 99A are

2796provided to implement Florida's Best and

2802Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program. The

2807funds shall be used to award a maximum of

28164,402 teachers with a $10,000 scholarship

2824based on high academic achievement on the SAT

2832or ACT. To be eligible for a scholarship, a

2841teacher must have scored at or above the 80th

2850percentile on either the SAT or the ACT based

2859upon the percentile ranks in effect when the

2867teacher took th e assessment and have been

2875evaluated as highly effective pursuant to

2881section 1012.34, Florida Statutes, or if the

2888teacher is a first - year teacher who has not

2898been evaluated pursuant to section 1012.34,

2904Florida Statutes, must have scored at or

2911above the 80t h percentile on either the SAT

2920or the ACT based upon the percentile ranks in

2929effect when the teacher took the assessment.

2936In order to demonstrate eligibility for an

2943award, an eligible teacher must submit to the

2951school district, no later than October 1,

295820 15, an official record of his or her SAT or

2969ACT score demonstrating that the teacher

2975scored at or above the 80th percentile based

2983upon the percentile ranks in effect when the

2991teacher took the assessment. By December 1,

29982015, each school district, charter school

3004governing board, and the Florida School for

3011the Deaf and the Blind shall submit to the

3020department the n umber of eligible teachers

3027who qualify for the scholarship. By

3033February 1, 2016, the department shall

3039disburse scholarship funds to each school

3045district for each eligible teacher to receive

3052a scholarship. By April 1, 2016, each school

3060district, charter school governing board, and

3066the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind

3075shall provide payment of the scholarship to

3082each eligible teacher. If t he number of

3090eligible teachers exceeds the total the

3096department shall prorate the per teacher

3102scholarship amount.

310434. The parties agree that, except for the issue of

3114PetitionerÓs status as a Ðteacher,Ñ Petitioner is otherwise

3123eligible for a scholarship. Accordingly, the legal issue to

3132determine in this matter is whether Petitioner qualifies as a

3142ÐteacherÑ as the L egislature used the term in Appropriation 99A.

315335. The facts establish that Petitioner, a speech - language

3163pathologist, is not a Ðclassroom tea cherÑ as defined by the

3174School Board. She does not teach a subject for which her

3185students receive academic credit. She does not teach a full

3195classroom. PetitionerÓs les son plans differ from those of

3204Ðclassroom teachers.Ñ PetitionerÓs Ðplans of careÑ ar e

3212individualized to treat a single studentÓs specific speech or

3221language impairment while Ðc lassroom teachersÓÑ lesson plans set

3230forth strategies to deliver instruction to an entire classroom.

323936. However, the facts also establish that Petitioner does

3248ins truct students in a classroom setting at Brentwood Elementary.

3258She is assigned 25 students. Petitioner teaches two class

3267subjects. She is assigned six class periods. She prepares

3276lesson plans (Ðplans of careÑ) for each subject in accordance

3286with Florid a state standards. Petitioner inculcates her students

3295in certain academic skills including reading, reading

3302comprehension, and speech. Petitioner also holds a (temporary)

3310teaching certifi cate issued by the Department.

331737. In reviewing Appropriation 99A, the undersigned

3324concludes that the term ÐteacherÑ is broad enough to encompass

3334Petitioner in her role at Brentwood Elementary. The Legislature

3343specifically used the term ÐteacherÑ to describe the individuals

3352it desired to be eligible for the Scholarship Program. The term

3363ÐteacherÑ means Ðteacher.Ñ The Legislature did not limit the

3372scholarship to just Ðclassroom teachers.Ñ Consequently, as

3379explained below, the undersigned determines that the School Board

3388should not restrict its employeesÓ eligibility fo r a scholarship

3398award to just Ð classroom teachers.Ñ

340438. The resolution of this matter centers on statutory

3413interpretation. The interpretation of Appropriation 99A begins

3420with the question of whether the proviso language is clear and

3431unambiguous. ÐWhen c onstruing a statute, the court must first

3441look to the plain meaning of the words used by the Legislature.Ñ

3453Brandy's Prods. v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg . , Div. of Alcoholic

3466Bev . & Tobacco , 188 So. 3d 130 , 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5244, *4

3480(Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC v. Dep't

3491of Revenue , 164 So. 3d 806, 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)); see also

3504W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See , 79 So. 3d 1, 9 (Fla. 2012).

3519ÐWhen a statute is clear, a court may not look behind the

3531statute's plain langu age or resort to rules of statutory

3541construction to determine legislative intent.Ñ Dep't of High .

3550Saf . & Motor Veh . v. Peacock , 185 So. 3d 632, 633 (Fla. 1st DCA

35662016) (citing State, Dep't of Rev . v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 905

3578So. 2d 1017, 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 20 05)).

358739. ÐTo discern legislative intent, a court must look first

3597and foremost at the actual language used in the statute.Ñ

3607Larimore v. State , 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008) . ÐThe

3619Legislature is assumed to know the meaning of the words used in a

3632st atute and to have expressed its intent through the use of the

3645words.Ñ Peacock , s upra , at 633. The actual language the

3655Legislature used in Appropriation 99A is clear and unambiguous.

366440. Appropriation 99A does not define the term Ðteacher.Ñ

3673Where the L e gislature has not specifically defined the words used

3685in a statute, Ðthe language should be given its plain and

3696ordinary meaning.Ñ Greenfield v. Daniels , 51 So. 3d 421, 426

3706(Fla. 2010) (citing Sch . Bd. of Palm Beach C n ty . v. Survivors

3721Charter Schs . , Inc. , 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009) (quoting

3733Fla. Birth - Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v. Fla. Div.

3744of Admin. Hr g s . , 686 So. 2d 1349, 1354 (Fla. 1997)). It is

3759appropriate to refer to a dictionary definition to ascertain the

3769plain and ordinary meanin g of a word used in a statute.

3781Survivors Charter Sch s . , s upra , at 1233.

379041. The word ÐteacherÑ has a plain and ordinary meaning.

3800ÐTeacherÑ is defined as Ðone that teaches; especially: one whose

3810occupation is to instruct.Ñ ÐTeacherÑ also means Ða perso n who

3821passes on information or skill.Ñ MERRIAM - WEBSTER DICTIONARY, at

3831http://www.merriam - webster.com. See Seagrave v. State , 802 So.

38402d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001) (ÐWhen necessary, the plain and ordinary

3851meaning of words [in a statute] can be ascertained by re ference

3863to a dictionary.Ñ); see also Raymond James Fin. Servs. v.

3873Phillips , 110 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (ÐIt is

3885appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions when c onstruing

3894statutes or rules.Ñ) .

389842. Based on the plain and ordinary meaning of the term

3909Ðteacher,Ñ Petitioner is eligible to participate in the

3918Scholarship Program. It is undisputed that Petitioner

3925ÐinstructsÑ the ESE students assigned to her at Brentwood

3934Elementary. Petitioner also Ðpasses on information or skillsÑ to

3943her students . Therefore, based on the common understanding of

3953the word Ðteacher,Ñ the undersigned concludes that the term

3963ÐteacherÑ as used in Appropriation 99A includes Petitioner.

397143. The School Board (and the Department) interpret the

3980term Ðteacher , Ñ based on a d efinition set forth in section

39921012.01(2)(a). Section 1012.01(2)(a) provides definitions for

3998c hapter 1012, the Personnel Chapter of the Florida Educator Code.

4009Section 1012.01 states, in pertinent part:

4015(2) INSTRUCTIONAL PERSONNEL. Ï

4019ÐInstructional perso nnelÑ means any K - 12

4027staff member whose function includes the

4033provision of direct instructional services to

4039students. Instructional personnel also

4043includes K - 12 personnel whose functions

4050provide direct support in the learning

4056process of students. Include d in the

4063classification of instructional personnel are

4068the following K - 12 personnel:

4074(a) Classroom teachers. Ï Classroom teachers

4080are staff members assigned the professional

4086activity of instructing students in courses

4092in classroom situations, including b asic

4098instruction, exceptional student education,

4102career education, and adult education,

4107including substitute teachers.

4110(b) Student personnel services. Ï Student

4116personnel services include staff members

4121responsible for: advising students with

4126regard to t heir abilities and aptitudes,

4133educational and occupational opportunities,

4137and personal and social adjustments;

4142providing placement services; performing

4146educational evaluations; and similar

4150functions. Included in this classification

4155are certified school co unselors, social

4161workers, career specialists, and school

4166psychologists.

4167* * *

4170(d) Other instructional staff. Ï Other

4176instructional staff are staff members who are

4183part of the instructional staff but are not

4191classified in one of the categories sp ecified

4199in paragraphs (a) - (c). Included in this

4207classification are primary specialists,

4211learning resource specialists, instructional

4215trainers, adjunct educators certified

4219pursuant to s. 1012.57 , and similar

4225positions.

422644. Despite this definition available in section

42331012.01(2), the School Board is not permitted to add the word

4244ÐclassroomÑ to Appropriation 99A that the Legislature did not

4253include therein. Ð[C]ourts are not at liberty to add words to

4264statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature.Ñ

4273Caceres v. Sedano's Supermarkets , 138 So. 3d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 1st

4284DCA 2014); see also L.G. v. State , 939 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla.

42971st DCA 2006) (ÐWhere the legislature has used a term in one part

4310of the statute and excluded it in another, it is improper to

4322imply the term in a provision where it has been otherwise

4333excluded.Ñ) If the drafters of Appropriation 99A h ad intended to

4344restrict the Scholarship Program to only Ðclassroom teachersÑ

4352instead of Ðteachers,Ñ the drafters would have specifically

4361included that extra word in the proviso language. Consequently,

4370section 1012.01(2)(a) does not support the School Boar dÓs

4379position that Ðclassroom teachersÑ are the only individuals

4387eligible for the Scholarship Program.

439245. Even if the School Board could rely on section

44021012.01(2) to interpret the term Ðteacher,Ñ the statutory

4411definition of Ðclassroom teacherÑ appears to support PetitionerÓs

4419claim. Parsing through the statutory language, the evidence in

4428the record demonstrates that Petitioner is a Ðstaff memberÑ of

4438Brentwood Elementary assigned a Ðprofessional activityÑ by the

4446School District. She ÐinstructsÑ students a ssigned to her. She

4456conducts Ðcourses in classroom situations.Ñ And, her courses are

4465specifically prepared for Ðexceptional student education.Ñ 5/

4472Further, the classification of education personnel set forth in

4481section 1012.01, makes no separate mention of personnel who

4490provide Ðrelated services.Ñ Accordingly, there is no legal

4498reason one who provides a Ðrelated serviceÑ cannot also be a

4509ÐteacherÑ for purposes of the Scholarship Program. 6 /

451846. Notwithstanding the plain and ordinary meaning of the

4527term ÐteacherÑ in Appropriation 99A, the undersigned recognizes

4535that Florida courts defer to agency interpretation of their own

4545statutes. However, because the proviso language in Appropriation

455399A is unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the

4564co urt must apply that meaning even if it conflicts with the

4576interpretation of the statute adopted by the administrative

4584agency charged with enforcing it. See Muratti - Stuart v. Dep't of

4596Bus. & Prof'l Reg . , Constr. Indus. Licensing Bd. , 174 So. 3d 538,

4609540 (F la. 4th DCA 2015) (ÐAn agency's interpretation of a statute

4621is entitled to great deference unless the agency's interpretation

4630conflicts with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.Ñ);

4640Verizon Bus. Purchasing , 164 So. 3d at 812 (ÐJudicial deference

4650d oes not require that courts adopt an agency's interpretation of

4661a statute when the agency's interpretation cannot be reconciled

4670with the plain language of the statute.Ñ); Micjo, Inc. v. Dep't

4681of Bus. & Prof'l Reg . , 78 So. 3d 124, 126 - 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

4698(rejecting the agency's interpretation of the definition of

4706Ðwholesale sales priceÑ in section 210.25(13) , Florida Statutes

4714(2009) , because the interpretation was inconsistent with the

4722p lain language of the statute).

472847. The undersigned also notes that, w hile the Legislature

4738tasked the Department with disbursing the scholarship funds,

4746Appropriation 99A did not grant the Department with rulemaking

4755authority over the Scholarship Program. As the Department

4763repeatedly stressed, the Memorandum it issued offeri ng a

4772suggested definition for ÐteacherÑ was simply guidance to the

4781school districts. Consequently, the School Board is not

4789obligated to foll ow the DepartmentÓs Memorandum.

479648. Finally, the School Board (and the Department) suggest

4805that language in the 20 16 General Appropriations Act can be used

4817to interpret the term ÐteacherÑ in Appropriation 99A. During its

48272016 Session, the Legislature enacted section 1012.731, Florida

4835Statutes (2016), entitled ÐThe Florida Best and Brightest Teacher

4844Scholarship Progra m.Ñ See C h . 2016 - 62, Laws of Fla . , § 25, at

486133 - 34 (ÐSection 25Ñ). Through Section 25, the Legislature

4871allocated funds to award scholarships to Ðclassroom teachers, as

4880defined in s. 1012.01(2)(a).Ñ 7 /

488649. The School BoardÓs argument, however, is not

4894pers uasive. The undersigned recognizes that, to interpret

4902ambiguous statut ory language , legislation enacted in subsequent

4910legislative sessions may be examined to discern legislative

4918intent. See Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. ,

4930945 So. 2d 1216, 1230 (Fla. 2006) . However, Section 25 contains

4942no express language that the Legislature intended the proviso

4951language in the 2016 Scholarship Program to apply retroactively

4960to the 2015 Scholarship Program. Neith er does Section 25 contain

4971any l egisl ative expression that Appropriation 99A was incorrectly

4981implemented or misapplied. The undersigned considers the 2016

4989enactment a new/renewal of the Scholarship Program, not a

4998ÐclarificationÑ of the funds the Legislature specifically

5005appropriated in 2015. See e.g. , D & T Props. v. Marina Grande

5017Assocs. , 985 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (ÐWhere the

5029legislature expressly characterizes the intent of legislation, it

5037is especially appropriate to consider the amended statute to

5046determine the original legis lative intent of the statute.Ñ)

5055Consequently, the undersigned concludes that Appropriation 99A

5062means what its text most appropriately conveys, that the term

5072ÐteacherÑ means ÐteacherÑ and is not restricted to Ðclassroom

5081teacher.Ñ

508250. In applying the clear and unambiguous language of

5091Appropriation 99A, the undersigned concludes that, as a matter of

5101law, the Legislature intended the Scholarship Program to be open

5111to all ÐteachersÑ and not restricted to just Ðclassroom

5120teachers.Ñ Based on the competent subst antial evidence in the

5130record, Petitioner demonstrated that she serves as a ÐteacherÑ in

5140her role at Brentwood Elementary. Accordingly, Petitioner has

5148met her burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,

5159that she is entitled to a scholarship und er the Scholarship

5170Program.

5171RECOMMENDATION

5172Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

5182Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Sarasota County,

5193Florida, issue a final order fulfilling its responsibilities

5201under Appropriation 99A, i.e . , submitting PetitionerÓs name to

5210the Department of Education as a teacher eligible for the

5220scholarship created by the 2015 Florida Best and Brightest

5229Teacher Scholarship Program.

5232DONE AND ENTERED this 13 th day of June , 2016 , in

5243Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

5247S

5248J. BRUCE CULPEPPER

5251Administrative Law Judge

5254Division of Administrative Hearings

5258The DeSoto Building

52611230 Apalachee Parkway

5264Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

5269(850) 488 - 9675

5273Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

5279www.doah.sta te.fl.us

5281Filed with the Clerk of the

5287Division of Administrative Hearings

5291this 13 th day of June, 2016 .

5299ENDNOTE S

53011/ All statutory references are to the 201 5 Florida Statutes,

5312unless otherwise noted.

53152/ The proviso language also stated that a teacher m ust have been

5328evaluated as highly effective pursuant to section 1012.34,

5336Florida Statutes, unless the teacher was a first - year teacher who

5348had not yet been evaluated under that section. Pet itioner, as a

5360first - year teacher at the time she applied, had not been

5372evaluated under section 1012.34. Therefore, her only requirement

5380for the scholarship award was to have the requisite SAT or the

5392ACT score at or above the 80th percentile. Petitioner took the

5403SAT in 2004. Petitioner scored a 98 percent on her verbal test

5415and an 89 percent on her math test. The School Board does not

5428dispute that Petitioner met all the eligibility requirements for

5437the scholarship aside from the question of whether the School

5447Board should consider her a ÐteacherÑ for purposes of

5456partic ipating in the Scholarship Program.

54623/ This contract refers to Petitioner as a ÐTeacher.Ñ

54714/ Funds appropriated to the Scholarship Program became available

5480on July 1, 2015. See C h . 2015 - 232, § 113 , Laws of Fla .

54975/ The fact that the Legislature specif ically included

5506Ðexceptional special educationÑ in the statutory definition of

5514Ðclassroom teacherÑ in section 1012.01(2)(a) shows the value the

5523Legislature places on instructing ESE students , as well as those

5533individuals who provide them the specialized in struction they

5542need to achieve their educational goals. By opening the

5551Scholarship Program to Ðteachers,Ñ the Legislature expressed its

5560intent that those teachers who instruct ESE students Ðin

5569classroom situationsÑ should receive the same scholarship

5576oppo rtunity as those teachers who lead more traditional course

5586subjects.

55876 / The undersigned finds the facts of this matter are unique to

5600this case and distinguishable from the factual findings and

5609conclusions in the Recommended Order in Andrew v. Sarasota C o u nty

5622Sch ool B oar d , Case No. 15 - 7041, ( Fla. DOAH Apr. 8, 2016). Along

5639with the factors listed in paragraph 36, the School Board

5649representative specifically acknowledged that Petitioner

5654ÐinstructsÑ and ÐteachesÑ the ESE students assigned to her

5663classes. Ad ditionally, the Petitioner in Andrew did not hold a

5674teaching certificate.

56767 / See section 1012.731(2), effective July 1, 2016.

5685COPIES FURNISHED:

5687Arthur S. Hardy, Esquire

5691Matthews Eastmoore

5693Suite 300

56951626 Ringling Boulevard

5698Sarasota, Florida 34236 - 6815

5703(eServed)

5704Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire

5708Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A.

5714Post Office Box 1547

5718131 North Gadsden Street (32301)

5723Tallahassee, Florida 32302

5726(eServed)

5727Margaret R. Good, Esquire

5731Matthews Eastmoore

5733Suite 300

57351626 Ringling Boulevard

5738Sarasota, Florida 34236

5741(eServed)

5742Daniel Terrence Gaffney, Esquire

5746Florida Department of Education

5750Suite 1244

5752325 West Gaines Street

5756Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

5761(eServed)

5762David L. Jordan, Esquire

5766Department of Education

5769Suite 1244

5771325 West Gaines Street

5775Talla hassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

5781(eServed)

5782Lynn C. Hearn, Esquire

5786Meyer, Brooks, Demma, and Blohm, P.A.

5792Post Office Box 1547

5796131 North Gadsden Street

5800Tallahassee, Florida 32302

5803(eServed)

5804Lori White, Superintendent

5807Sarasota County School Board

58111960 Landings Boulevard

5814Sarasota, Florida 34231

5817Pam Stewart, Commissioner of Education

5822Department of Education

5825Turlington Building, Suite 1514

5829325 West Gaines Street

5833Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

5838(eServed)

5839Matthew Mears, General Counsel

5843Department of Education

5846Tur lington Building, Suite 1244

5851325 West Gaines Street

5855Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

5860(eServed)

5861NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

5867All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

587715 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exce ptions

5889to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

5900will issue the Final Order in this case.

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Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 08/19/2016
Proceedings: Agency Final Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/02/2016
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 06/13/2016
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 06/13/2016
Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
PDF:
Date: 06/13/2016
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held March 31, 2016). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 05/13/2016
Proceedings: Respondent's Amended Proposed Recommended Order, Amended to Correct Scrivener's Error in Title filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/13/2016
Proceedings: Intervenor's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 05/12/2016
Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
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Date: 05/12/2016
Proceedings: Intervenor's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 04/27/2016
Proceedings: Order Granting Extension of Time.
PDF:
Date: 04/26/2016
Proceedings: Intervenor's Unopposed Motion for Extension to File Proposed Recommended Order filed.
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Date: 04/22/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Filing Transcript.
Date: 04/21/2016
Proceedings: Transcript of Proceedings (not available for viewing) filed.
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Date: 04/21/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Filing Transcript of Proceeding filed.
Date: 03/31/2016
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
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Date: 03/23/2016
Proceedings: Order Denying Intervenor`s Motion to Dismiss.
PDF:
Date: 03/22/2016
Proceedings: Letter to Judge Culpepper from Ronald Meyer enclosing Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
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Date: 03/22/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Filing Exhibits filed.
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Date: 03/22/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Filing Statutory Reference filed.
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Date: 03/22/2016
Proceedings: Pre-hearing Stipulation filed.
PDF:
Date: 03/21/2016
Proceedings: Response to Intervenor's Motion to Dismiss filed.
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Date: 03/14/2016
Proceedings: Intervenor's Motion to Dismiss filed.
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Date: 02/05/2016
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
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Date: 02/05/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for March 31, 2016; 9:30 a.m.; Sarasota, FL).
PDF:
Date: 02/01/2016
Proceedings: Report of Party Coordination Conference filed.
PDF:
Date: 01/29/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Appearance (Lynn Hearn) filed.
PDF:
Date: 01/27/2016
Proceedings: Order Granting Motion to Intervene.
PDF:
Date: 01/26/2016
Proceedings: Department of Education's Motion to Intevene filed.
PDF:
Date: 01/25/2016
Proceedings: Initial Order.
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Date: 01/22/2016
Proceedings: Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed.
PDF:
Date: 01/22/2016
Proceedings: Agency action letter filed.
PDF:
Date: 01/22/2016
Proceedings: Referral Letter filed.

Case Information

Judge:
J. BRUCE CULPEPPER
Date Filed:
01/22/2016
Date Assignment:
01/25/2016
Last Docket Entry:
08/19/2016
Location:
Sarasota, Florida
District:
Middle
Agency:
ADOPTED IN TOTO
 

Counsels

Related Florida Statute(s) (9):