16-001019RP Choice Plus, Llc vs. Department Of Financial Services Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Thursday, May 19, 2016.

Summary: Petitioner failed to demonstrate that it has standing to challenge the proposed repeal of Rule 69I-44.021. The Petitioner's alleged injury in fact occured before Respondent moved to repeal the Rule.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CHOICE PLUS, LLC ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 16 - 1019RP

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL

SERVICES ,

Respondent .

/

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case

on March 21 and March 28, 2016, in Tallahassee, Florida, before

Garnett W. Chisenhall, a duly - designated Administrative Law

Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings (ÐDOAHÑ).

APPEA RANCES

For Petitioner: Seann M. Frazier, Esquire

Parker, Hudson, Rainer and Dobbs, LLP

215 South Monroe Street , Suite 750

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

For Respondent: Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel

Department of Financial Services

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Lori Lynn Jobe, Esquire

Department of Financial Services

Larson Build ing, Room 612 - K

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 4247

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the proposed repeal of Florida Administrative Code

Rule 69I - 44.021 amounts to an invalid exercise of delegated

legis lative authority within the meaning of section s

120.52(8)(b) and/ or ( e ), Florida Statutes, (2015). 1/

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Department of Financial Services (Ðthe DepartmentÑ)

published a Notice of Proposed Rule on January 1 3, 2016,

proposing to repeal r ule 69I - 44.021. On February 19, 2016,

Choice Plus, LLC (ÐChoice PlusÑ) filed a p etition alleging that

the proposed repeal of r ule 69I - 44.021 is an invalid exercise of

delegated legislative authority on the grounds that the proposed

action would: ( 1 ) exc eed the DepartmentÓs grant of rulemaking

authority; and ( 2 ) be arbitrary and capricious.

On March 17, 2016, the Department filed a Motion to Dismiss

asserting that Choice Plus failed to state a cause of action and

lacked standing to challenge the propose d repeal of r ule 69I -

44.021.

The f inal h earing was commenced as s cheduled on March 21,

2016, but the undersigned gran ted Choice PlusÓ s request for a

short continuance so that Choice Plus could arrange for its

president to testify via telephone. In additio n, t he

undersigned deferred ruling on Choice PlusÓ s Motion to Dismiss. 2/

The final hearing resumed on March 28, 2016, and concluded that

day.

During the final hearing, Choice Plus presented the

testimony of two witnesses, and Choice PlusÓs Exhibits 1 thr ough

3 and 5 through 7 were accepted into evidence. The Department

did not present any witnesses, but the DepartmentÓs Exhibits 1

through 3 were accepted into evidence.

The proceedings were recorded and a two - volume T ranscript

was filed on April 21, 201 6. The p arties filed timely Proposed

Final Orders that were carefully considered in the preparation

of this Final Order

FINDING S OF FACT

Unclaimed Property

1. The Department is responsible for administering and

enforcing chapter 717, Florida Statutes . The aforementioned

chapter is entitled as the Ð Florida Disposition of Unclaimed

Property Act,Ñ and it requires the Department to: (a) receive

unclaimed property; (b) safeguard unclaimed property; and (c)

process claims for the return of unclaimed prope rty to its

rightful owner. See generally ch. 717, Fla. Stat.

2. Chapter 717 applies to property such as trav e lerÓs

checks, money orders, gift certificates, bank deposits, and

proceed s from life insurance policies that ha ve been

outstanding, unredeeme d , or inactive for a certain number of

years. See § § 717.104(1) & ( 2), .1045, . 106, & .107, Fla. Stat.

3. In return for a fee, licensed private investigators,

certified public accountants, and attorneys research the

DepartmentÓs unclaimed property record s in order to assist the ir

clients with making claims on unclaimed property.

See § § 717.124, .135 & .1400, Fla. Stat.

4. Pursuant to sections 717.124 and 717.126, Florida

Statutes, the Department is authorized to require proof of

entitlement, personal identification, and (if applicable) proof

of the filerÓs authority to act as the claimantÓs agent.

See § 717.124 , .126, Fla. Stat. Also, Ðthe burden shall be upon

the claimant to establish entitlement to the property by a

preponderance of evidence. Ñ £ 717.126(1), Fla. Stat.

5. Section 717.138, Florida Statutes , authorizes the

Department to adopt rules to implement the provisions of

chapter 717.

6. The Department has utilized that authority to adopt

Florida Administrative Code Ru le 69I - 20.0 021, which sets forth

the p rocedures for filing unclaimed property claims.

7. Rule 69I - 20.0021 has several provisions requiring

claimants to demonstrate to the Department that they are

entitled to the unclaimed property at issue.

8. For instance, rul e 69I - 20.0021(1) provides that

Ð[c]laims for unclaimed property in the custody of the

Department shall be submitted to the Department on the form(s)

prescribed and supplied by the Department, together with

documentation proving entitlement to the unclaimed property.Ñ

(emphasis added) .

9. Rule 69I - 20.0021(1)(b) mandates that Ð[a] complete

paper format claim shall include the correct claim form

identified in this rule, fully completed with all blanks filled

in and manually signed and dated by all claimant s or the

ClaimantsÓ Representative, proof of entitlement , and all

supporting documentation as described and required by this rule,

and Rule 69I - 20.00022, F.A.C.Ñ (emphasis added) .

10. Also, rule 69I - 20.0021(2) provides that Ð[t]he

Department will only review the merits of a claim that has been

deemed complete as filed. The Department will determine whether

the claimant has established ownership and entitlement to the

unclaimed property.Ñ (emphasis added) .

11. Rule 69I - 20.0021 also incorporates by r eference

certain forms.

12. For example, r ule 69I - 20.0021(4)(a) states that

Ð[c]laims by apparent owners for unclaimed property shall be

submitted on Form DFS - UP - 106, entitled Claim Filed by Apparent

Owner, which is hereby incorporated by reference, eff ective

1 - 3 - 05. Ñ This form must be accompanied by Ð[p]roof

demonstrating that the claimant is the owner and is entitled to

the unclaimed property as required by Rule 69I - 20.0022, F.A.C.Ñ

See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69I - 20.0021(4)(c)2. (emphasis added) .

13. Also, r ule 69I - 20.0021(6) states that Ð[a]ll claims

for unclaimed property filed by a ClaimantÓs Representative

shall be submitted on Form DFS - UP - 108, entitled Claim Filed by

ClaimantÓs Representative on Behalf of the Claimant, which is

hereby incorpo rated by reference, effective 1 - 3 - 05.Ñ This form

must be accompanied by Ð [p]roof demonstrating that the person(s)

or entity being represented is entitled to the property being

claimed consistent with Rule 69I - 20.0022, F.A.C.Ñ

See Fla. Admin. C ode R. 69I - 20.0021(6)(b)4. (emphasis added) .

Escheated Property

14. The Department also plays a role in administering (and

returning to its rightful owner) other types of property

governed by other chapters with in the Florida Statutes. For

inst ance , the Department is involved with: ( a) property

resulting from judgments deposited with a court pursuant to

section 43.19, Florida Statutes; (b) escheated property gathered

pursuant to section 732.107, Florida Statutes; (c) property held

by a personal representative pursuant to section 733.816,

Florida Statutes; and (d) fund s held by a guardian following the

death of a ward pursuant to section 744.534, Florida Statutes.

15. When a person dies with an estate but has no known

heirs, the decedentÓs pr operty escheats to the state.

See § 732.107(1), Fla. Stat. Th at property is sold , and the

proceeds (i.e., the Ðescheated fundsÑ) are paid to the

Department for deposit into the State School Fund pursuant to

section 732.107(2), Florida Statutes.

16. In 2009, the Department was receiving repeated

i nquir i es from claimants regarding the proper claim forms for

property governed by sections 43.19, 732.107, 733.816, and

744.534, Florida Statutes. The Department responded by adopting

r ule 69I - 44.021 w hich establishes a hard copy claim form

specifically for the aforementioned properties.

17. Unlike r ule 69I - 20.0021 which requires a claimant to

demonstrate to the Department that he or she is entitled to the

unclaimed property in question, r ule 69I - 44. 021 (1) requires a

potential claimant to simply prove his or her entitlement to a

court. That is consistent with provisions within chapter 732

that require courts (rather than the Department) to determine

whether a claimant is e ntitled to escheated propert y. See

§ § 732.107(3) and (4), Fla. Stat. (requiring an action to re -

open the administration of probate and prove entitlement to a

probate judge, while allowing the Department of Legal Affairs

the right of intervention to protect the stateÓs interests).

18. For those claimants who successfully demonstrate to a

court that they are entitled to particular funds, r ule 69I -

44.021 incorporates by reference a form (Form # 198) that those

claimants are to file with the Department. 3 / Unlike the

situation with cla imants using the forms incorporated by

reference in rule 69I - 20.0021, claimants using the form

incorporated by reference in rule 69I - 44.021 are not require d to

prove to the Department that they are entitled to the property

in question.

19. In 2013, th e Florida Legislature amended section

717.124, to provide that the claims procedure for unclaimed

property also applies to property governed by sections 43.19,

732.107, 733.816, and 744.534. See § 717.124(8), Fla. Stat.

(providing that Ð[t]his section app lies to all unclaimed

property reported and remitted to the Chief Financial Officer,

including, but not limited to, property reported pursuant to ss.

43.19, 45.032, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534.Ñ).

20. As a result of an internal review of its rules , th e

Department determined that r ule 69I - 44.021 should be repealed

given that section 717.124(8), effectively made the procedure

set forth in r ule 69I - 20.0021 applicable to escheated property.

Choice Plus Pursues Escheated Property for its Clients

21. Choice Plus is a private investigative agency licensed

pursuant to chapter 493 that files claims with the Department as

a claimantÓs representative (ÐlocatorÑ) . I n exchange for its

services, Choice Plus receive s a fee paid from approved property

claim s .

22. In addition to seeking the recovery of unclaimed

property pursuant to c hapter 717, Choice Plus also assists in

the recovery of funds that have escheated to the State of

Florida pursuant to section 732.107.

23. Choice Plus files several hundred claims in Flo rida

for unclaimed property each year. It files five to 10 claims in

Florida each year for escheated property.

24. The President of Choice Plus testified during the

final hearing that Choice Plus had filed 19 claims for escheated

property with the Depart ment using F orm # 198 and attaching the

pertinent documentation . See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69I -

44.021(2)(a) (providing that Ð[t]he claim form must be

accompanied by a certified copy of the final order or judgment

awarding the funds to each claimant, supporti ng documentation

establishing each claimantÓs right to the funds, and a

government - issued photographic identification issued to each

claimant.Ñ).

25. According to the President of Choice Plus, the

Department began to require Choice Plus to re - establi sh

entitlement to escheated funds in 2013 . In other words, the

Department now allegedly conduct s its own review of the evidence

that a court already found to be sufficient for establish ing

entitlement.

26. Choice Plus asserts that prov ing entitlement to

escheated funds a second time cause s it to spend additional time

and money in making a claim . According to Choice Plus, this

extra effort adds $5,000 to the cost of the av erage claim for

escheated property .

27. In fact, Choice Plus is currently appealing the

DepartmentÓs denial of a n escheated property claim.

28. Th at appeal is proceeding under appellate case number

1D15 - 3184 before the First District Court of Appeal and involves

the estate of a deceased Florida resident named Eleanor Rigley. 4 /

29. Because Ms. Rigley died intestate and without any

known living heirs, the proceeds from the sale of her residence

escheated to the State of Florida and were paid to the

Department for deposit in the State School Fund.

See § 732.107, Fla. Stat .

30. Choice Plus learned of Ms. RigleyÓs escheated property

and hired a genealogist who found ten individuals related to

Ms. Rigley.

31. Choice Plus subsequently entered into contract s with

each of the ten individual claimants authoriz ing Choice Plus t o

obtain the escheated funds on their behalf. In accord with

section 732.107 and r ule 69I - 44.021, Choice Plus then petitioned

the Pinellas County Circuit Court to reopen Ms. RigleyÓs estate

and declare that the ten Choice Plus clients we re Ms. RigleyÓs

he irs.

32. On June 12, 2013, the Pinellas County Circuit Court

entered an O rder reopening Ms. RigleyÓs estate and declaring the

ten Choice Plus clients to be Ms. RigleyÓs heirs. The Circuit

Court then directed the Department to distribute the funds from

Ms . RigleyÓs estate to the claimants.

33. On July 12, 2013 and as required by r ule 69I - 44.021,

Choice Plus filed with the Department Form #198, a certified

copy of the Pinellas County Circuit CourtÓs Order awarding the

escheated funds to the claimants, supp orting documentation

submitted to the Circuit C ourt, and a photocopy of each

claimantÓs government - issued photo identification.

34. However, t he Department issued a Notice of Intent to

deny Choice PlusÓ s claim on January 23, 2014, and ultimately

issued a Final Order on June 29, 2015, denying the claim . In

that Final Order, the Department allegedly concluded that it has

sole jurisdiction to determine the disposition of funds within

its possession, including escheated funds held pursuant to

section 732.1 07. Accordingly, the Department concluded that the

Circuit CourtÓs ruling was not binding on i t. The Department

also allegedly concluded that the denial was justified because

Choice Plus failed to submit Ðappropriate documentationÑ

connecting the individ ual claimants to Ms. Rigley by a

preponderance of the evidence.

35. In the ensuing appeal, Choice Plus argue d that the

DepartmentÓs Final Order must be reversed because the Department

does not have the authority to determine entitlement to

escheated fun ds held by the Department pursuant to section

732.107.

36. As for why the Department lacks the necessary

authority, Choice Plus argue d that section 717.124 is the only

provision within chapter 717 that applies to escheated funds

held by the Department. The 2013 amendment to section 717.124 ,

which added subsection ( 8 ) , merely stated that Ð [t]his section

applies to all unclaimed property reported and remitted to the

Chief Financial Officer, including, but not limited to, property

reported pursuant to ss. 43.19, 45.032, 732.107, 733.816, and

744.534.Ñ (emphasis added) . In contrast, the amendment did not

state that Ð [t]his chapter applies to all unclaimed property

reported and remitted to the Chief Financial Officer, including,

but not limited to, propert y reported pursuant to ss. 43.19,

45.032, 732.107, 733.816, and 744.534.Ñ (emphasis added).

37. Thus, Choice Plus argue d that the Department cannot

apply section 717.126 to escheated fund claims because the

Florida Legislature only made section 717.124 a pplicable to such

claims. As noted above, section 717.126 mandates that Ðthe

burden shall be upon the claimant to establish entitlement to

the property by a preponderance of evidence.Ñ

38. In other words , Choice Plus argued that the Department

cannot second - guess the Pinellas County Circuit Court , an

argument that carries over into this proceeding .

39. The Department responded in its Answer Brief by

asserting that it has correctly determined that the chapter 717

claims process applies to all unclai med property once it is

transferred to the Department, including unclaimed estate

proceeds that may eventually escheat to the State of Florida. 5 /

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

40 . DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties to and the

subject matter of this proc eeding. § § 120.56, and 120.57(1),

Fla. Stat.

4 1 . The Department has asserted that Choice Plus lacks

standing to challenge the proposed repeal of r ule 69I - 44.021.

Accordingly, the undersigned will address the standing issue

prior to considering the meri t s of Choice PlusÓs challenge to

r ule 69I - 44.021. See generally Ferreiro v. Phila. Indem. Ins.

Co. , 928 So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)(noting that Ð[t]he

issue of standing is a threshold inquiry which must be made at

the outset of the case before addre ssing whether the case is

properly maintainable as a class action.Ñ).

42. In order to have standing to challenge the validity of

an administrative rule, a person must be Ðsubstantially

affectedÑ by the rule in question. £ 120.56(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

43 . As the First District Court of Appeal has observed,

[t]o establish standing under the

Ðsubstantially affectedÑ test, a party must

show: (1) that the rule or policy will

result in a real or immediate injury in

fact; and (2) that the alleged interest is

w ithin the zone of interest to be protected

or regulated. Jacoby v. Fla. Bd. of Med. ,

917 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2005).

Off. o f Ins. Reg. v. Secure Enters., LLC. , 124 So. 3d 332, 336

(Fla. 1 st DCA 2013; see also Fla. Med. AssÓn, Inc. v. DepÓt of

ProfÓl Reg. , 426 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1983).

44. With regard to the second prong of the substantially

affected test, r ule 69I - 44.021 clearly regulates Choice PlusÓ s

industry. Thus, Choice Plus satisfies the zone of interest

test. See Telev isual CommcÓn s v. DepÓt of Labor & Emp.

Sec. /Div. of WorkersÓ Comp . , 667 So. 2d 372 , 374 (Fla. 1 st DCA

1995)( concluding that Ð[t]he hearing officer correctly noted

that TVC was not a health care provider affected by secti o n

440.13(3), Florida Statutes (Sup p. 1994), but failed to

recognize that TVC was indeed affected by the proposed rule

which has the collateral effect of regulating TVCÓs industry.Ñ)

45. As for t he first prong of the substantiall y - affected

test , the First District Court of Appeal ha s noted that economic

injury can amount to an injury in fact. See Secure Enters. LLC ,

124 So. 3d at 338.

4 6 . In the instant case, Choice Plus allege s that prov ing

entitlement to escheated funds a second time cause s Choice Plu s

to spend additional time a nd money in order to obtain escheated

funds that a court previously ordered to be disbursed.

According to Choice Plus, this extra effort adds $5,000 to the

cost of the av erage claim for escheated funds.

4 7 . However, e ven if Choice PlusÓ s allegations rega rding

increased costs were accepted as true, that alleged injury is

not the result of the proposed repeal of r ule 69I - 44.021.

Instead, Choice PlusÓ s alleged injury results from the fact that

the Department interprets the relevant statutes (especially the

2013 amendment which added subsection ( 8 ) to section 717.124) as

giving it the authority to require a claimant to prove to the

Department by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is

entitled to escheated funds.

4 8 . Inde ed , and as illustrated by the case involving the

alleged heirs to the Eleanor Rigley estate, Choice Plus began

experiencing this alleged injury long before the Department

moved to repeal r ule 69I - 44.021. Therefore, even if the

Department were not moving to repeal rule 69I - 44.021, the

alleged injury to Choice Plus would still be occurring.

4 9 . In sum , even if Choice PlusÓ s allegations were to be

accepted as true, its alleged injury in fact does not result

from the proposed repeal of r ule 69I - 44.021. Accordingly,

Choice Plus fai ls to demonstrate that it has standing to

challenge the proposed repeal of r ule 69I - 44.021.

50 . In the alternative, even if Choice Plus could

demonstrate that it has standing , Choice Plus fails to

demonstrate that the proposed repeal would amount to an invalid

exercise of legislative authority on the grounds set forth in

Choice PlusÓ s Petition.

5 1 . A Ðru leÑ within the meaning of c hapter 120, Florida

Statutes, Ðincludes the amendment or repeal of a rule.Ñ

§ 120.52(16), Fla. Stat.

5 2 . As noted abo ve, Choice Plus alleges in its Petition

that the proposed repeal of r ule 69I - 44.021 is an invalid

exercise of delegated authority because the proposed action

would: ( a ) exceed the DepartmentÓs grant of rulemaking

authority; and ( b ) be arbitrary and capric ious.

See § 120.52(8) (b) & (e) , Fla. Stat. (providing in pertinent

part that a proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of

delegated legislative authority if the agency has exceeded its

grant of rulemaking authority or if the rule is arbitrary or

capricious).

5 3 . Choice PlusÓs argument regarding the DepartmentÓs

alleged lack of authority to repeal the rule is circular. If

the Department lacks the authority to repeal the rule, then it

lacks the authority to adopt the rule in the first place , and

the rule should be repealed . Therefore, Choice Plus Ós argument

based on section 120.52(8)(b) is meritless .

5 4 . As for Choice PlusÓs assertion that repeal of rule

69I - 44.021 is arbitrary or capricious, s ection 120.52(8)

specifies that Ð[ a] rule is arbitrary if it is not supported by

logic or the necessary facts; [and] a rule is capricious if it

is adopted without thought or reason or is irrational . . . .Ñ

5 5 . While Choice Plus has made a reasonable argument that

the Department lacks the authority to second - guess a courtÓs

determination that a particular claimant is entitled to

escheated property , Choice Plus has not demonstrated that the

DepartmentÓs proposed repeal of r ule 69I - 44.021 is illogical or

irrational. 6 /

56. The repeal of rul e 69I - 44.021 may contravene section

732.107, one of the laws implemented by the rule.

See §120.52(8)(c). However, that argument was not set forth in

Choice PlusÓs petition , nor was it otherwise raised in this

proceeding . Nevertheless, it appe ars that the First District

Court of Appeal may soon address whether the Department is

misinterpreting the relevant statutes.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is ORDERED that Choice Plus, LLCÓs challenge to the

rep eal of r ule 69I - 44.021 is d ismissed .

DONE AND ORD ERED this 19th day of May , 2016 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

G.W. Chisenhall

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 19th day of May , 2016 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references will be to

the 2015 version of the Florida Statutes.

2/ The substance of the DepartmentÓs Motion to Dismiss is

addressed herein.

3/ Rule 69I - 44.021(2) identifies this form as DFS - A4 - 1988.

However, the President of Choice Plus testified during the final

hearing t hat the aforementioned form has actually been numbered

as 198 rather than 1988 . In addition, PetitionerÓs Exhibit 7

indicates that this form has been numbered as 198. As a result,

all references to that form herein will utilize ÐForm # 198Ñ

rather than ÐF orm # 1988.Ñ

4 / The findings regarding Choice PlusÓs pending appeal were

derived from the appellate brief s that the undersigned received

into evidence through official recognition. Because the

undersigned does not have access to the Record on Appeal in case

number 1D15 - 3184, the undersigned cannot independently verify

the assertions set forth in those briefs. Nevertheless, the

assertions therein are helpf ul for illustrating Choice PlusÓs

argument in the instant case.

5 / The First District Court of Appeal heard oral argument on

Choice PlusÓs appeal on May 11, 2016. However, the appeal was

still pending when the instant Final Order was rendered.

6 / The ruling set forth herein should not be interpreted as an

indication that the undersigned agree s that the Department has

the authority to determine whether a claimant is entitled to

escheated property.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Seann M. Frazier, Esquire

Parker, Hudson, Rainer and Dobbs, LLP

215 South Monroe Street , Suite 750

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

( eServed)

Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel

Department of Financial Services

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Lori Lynn Jobe, Esquire

D epartment of Financial Services

Larson Building, Room 612 - K

200 East Gaines Street

Tallah assee, Florida 32399 - 4247

(eServed)

Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk

Division of Legal Services

Department of Financial Services

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0390

(eServed)

Ken Plante, Coordinator

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee

Room 680, Pepper Building

111 West Madison Street

T allahassee, Florida 32399 - 1400

( eServed)

Ernest Reddick, Chief

Alexandra Nam

Department of State

R. A. Gray Building

500 South Bronough Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0250

(eServed)

N OTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicial review pursuant to section 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such procee dings are commenced by

filing the original notice of administrative appeal with the

agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within

30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy of

the notice, accompanied by any filing fees pr escribed by law,

with the clerk of the District Court of Appeal in the appellate

district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a

party resides or as otherwise provided by law.