16-001312EXE
Roxanna Marchan vs.
Agency For Persons With Disabilities
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Friday, June 17, 2016.
Recommended Order on Friday, June 17, 2016.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8ROXANNA MARCHAN,
10Petitioner,
11vs. Case No. 16 - 1312EXE
17AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH
21DISABILITIES,
22Respondent.
23_______________________________/
24RECOMMENDED ORDER
26The final hearing in th is matter was conducted before
36J. Bruce Culpepper, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of
46Administrative Hearings, pursuant to sections 120.569 and
53120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2016), 1/ on May 16, 2016, by video
64teleconference at sites in Fort Myers and Tallahassee, Florida.
73APPEARANCES
74For Petitioner: Roxanna Marchan
78241 San Carlos Boulevard , No. 22
84Fort Myers Beach, Florida 33931
89For Respondent: Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire
95Agency for Persons wit h Disabilities
101Suite 422
103200 North Kentucky Avenue
107Lakeland, Florida 33801
110STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE S
115The issues in this matter are whether Petitioner has shown,
125by clear and convincing evidence, that she i s rehabilitated from
136her disqualifying offense , and, if so, whether RespondentÓs
144action to deny Petitioner's request for exemption from
152disqualification constitutes an abuse of discretion.
158PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
160On June 28, 2015, Petitioner, Roxanna Marchan
167(ÐPetitionerÑ), applied for a Request for Exemption from
175disqualification from Respondent, Agency for Persons with
182Disabilities (the ÐAgencyÑ).
185By correspondence , dated February 4, 2016, the Agency
193notified Petitioner that it denied her Request for Exempt ion
203pursuant to sec tion 435.07, Florida Statutes.
210On March 1, 2016, Petitioner timely requested an
218administrative hearing to challenge the AgencyÓs action. On
226March 9, 2016, the Agency referred the matter to the Division of
238Administrative Hearings (ÐDOAHÑ ) and requested assignment to an
247Administrative Law Judge (ÐALJÑ) to conduct an evidentiary
255hearing pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1).
262The final hearing was held on May 16, 2016. Petitioner
272testified on her own behalf. Petitioner submitted Exhib its 1
282and 2 , which were admitted into evidence. The Agency presented
292t he testimony of Jeff r e y Smith, regional operations m anager for
306the Agency. Agency Exhibits 1 through 4 were admitted into
316evidence without objection.
319A court reporter recorded the fin al hearing. However, the
329parties did not order a transcript.
335At the close of the hearing, the parties were advised of the
347ten - day timeframe following the final hearing for filing post -
359hearing submittals. Both parties submitted post - hearing
367submittals whi ch were duly considered in preparing of this
377Recommended Order.
379FINDING S OF FACT
3831. Petitioner seeks employment as a direct service provider
392for persons with developmental disabilities. Petitioner desires
399to work with Project Choice, LLC, a service provi der the Agency
411regulates.
4122. The Agency is the state agency responsible for
421regulating the employment of persons in positions of special
430trust as direct service providers. See § 393.0655(1), Fla. Stat.
440A Ðdirect service providerÑ is a person who has dir ect contact
452with and provides services to an Agency client. See
461§ 393.063(11), Fla. Stat.
4653. The Agency's clients are a vulnerable population
473consisting of those persons who are eligible for services and
483support for developmental disabilities. See § 39 3.063, Fla.
492Stat. Agency clients often have severe deficits in their ability
502to complete self - care tasks and communicate their wants and
513needs. Agency clients are at a heightened risk of abuse,
523exploitation, and neglect because of their developmental
530dis abilities and inability to self - preserve. Consequently,
539employment as a direct service provider is regarded as a position
550of special trust.
5534. The Agency relies on the Department of Children and
563Families, Background Screening Unit (the ÐDepartmentÑ) , to
570initially receive and screen requests for exemption from
578disqualification from individuals seeking employmen t as direct
586service providers.
5885. On June 28, 2015, Petitioner submitted a Request for
598Exemption, with attachments, to the Department. The Departm ent
607subsequently forwarded PetitionerÓs application to the Agency for
615review.
6166. To qualify as a direct service provider, Petitioner must
626comply with the employment screening requirement established in
634chapter 435. See § 393.0655(1), Fla. Stat. Petition er's
643background screening revealed a criminal offense. In September
6511978, Petitioner was arrested for felony possession of marijuana
660in the State of Texas. Petitioner pled guilty and was given a
672suspended sentence. The court deferred adjudication of gui lt and
682placed Petitioner on two years of probation.
6897. At the final hearing, the Agency also p roduced evidence
700of several non - disqualifying criminal offenses Petitioner
708committed subsequent to her 1978 drug arrest. Petitioner was
717arrested for or convicte d of the following crimes: 1) a
728misdemeanor conviction for P ossession of M arijuana in 2005 ;
7382) Bail Jumping and Failure to Appear in 2008 ; 3) Bail Jumpin g
751and Failure to Appear in 2010; and 4) Failure to Appear in 2013.
7648. In accordance with section 435 .04(2), PetitionerÓs
772criminal misconduct, as a Ðdisqualifying offense,Ñ disqualified
780her from working as a direct service provider for persons with
791developmental disabilities. Consequently, in order to be
798employed in such a capacity, Petitioner was requir ed to seek an
810exemption from disqualification from the Agency. Therefore,
817Petitioner submitted to the Agency a Request for Exemption from
827her disqualifying offenses as provided in section 435.07.
8359. On February 4, 2016, the Agency issued a letter
845notifyi ng Petitioner that it denied her Request for Exemption.
855The Agency denied PetitionerÓs application because it did not
864believe Petitioner submitted clear and convincing e vidence of her
874rehabilitation.
87510. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified on her own
885behalf. Petitioner expressed her desire to work as a caregiver
895for disabled persons. Petitioner described herself as a giving,
904helpful, and responsible person. Petitioner further explained
911that she is seeking a change in her career in light of her r ecent
926health challenges. She is also the sole supporter of her family.
937Petitioner believes that a job as a health care assistant for
948persons with developmental disabilities will allow her to take
957care of her family , as well as accommodate her physical
967li mitations.
96911. Regarding her disqualifying offense, Petitioner
975explained that her 1978 felony arrest for marijuana possession
984occurred when she was only 19 years old. She explained that she
996had little life experience after growing up in a small town, and
1008she had just started college in Houston. Her boyfriend asked her
1019to carry a suitcase for him in her car on a drive back to
1033college. Unfortunately for Petitioner, a state trooper stopped
1041her car for speeding. Even more unfortunately for Petitioner,
1050the state trooper searched her trunk. The state trooper found
1060her boyfriendÓs suitcase. And, inside it, the state trooper
1069found marijuana. Petitioner claimed that she had no knowledge of
1079the contents of her boyfriendÓs suitcase. Despite her lack of
1089knowled ge, Petitioner pled guilty to the charge.
109712. Regarding her four non - disqualifying offenses,
1105Petitioner explained that her 2005 conviction for marijuana
1113possession also involved a car trip near Houston. She disclosed
1123that a friend asked her to carry some Christmas presents in her
1135car. In a lamentable case of déjà vu, a state trooper stopped
1147her car for speeding. The state trooper searched her trunk. The
1158state trooper found her friendÓs Christmas presents. And, inside
1167a present, the state trooper found marijuana. Once again,
1176Petitioner stated that she had no knowledge of the contents of
1187her friendÓs presents. Despite her lack of knowledge, Petitio ner
1197pled guilty to the charge.
120213. Regarding the multiple bail jumping and failure to
1211appear convictions, Petitioner explained that she had problems
1219knowing when her court dates were scheduled.
122614. In expressing that she has rehabilitated from her
1235disqualifying offense, Petitioner asserts that she has moved past
1244her criminal misconduct, and her record is now clear. She has
1255satisfied all fees, fines, and sentences from her criminal
1264charges. Petitioner stated that she has learned not to expose
1274herself to these bad situations. Furthermore, her crimes did not
1284result in harm to any vic tims or property.
129315. Pet itioner testified that there are no present
1302stressors in her life, and she relies on her faith for inner
1314guidance and strength. Petitioner has had a stable work history
1324for the past six years. Petitioner also represented that she has
1335taken several Agency training courses in order to become better
1345prepared to work with disabled persons. Additionally, at the
1354final hearing, Petitioner produced evidence that s he voluntarily
1363attended a faith - based, alcohol rehabilitation program in 2006.
1373She sought assist fr om the rehabilitation program based on her
1384concerns with her alcohol consumption. Petitioner asserted that
1392the rehabilitation program was very helpful and successful.
140016. Petitioner also provided four letters of reference
1408attesting to her good character. The letters were written by
1418various individuals, including some in notable positions, who
1426have known Petitioner for several years. The letters describe
1435Petitioner as hard - w orking, caring, and nurturing.
144417. At the final hearing, the Agency presented t h e
1455testimony of Jeffrey Smith, r egional o perations m anager for the
1467Suncoast Region. Mr. Smith oversees all services to persons with
1477developmental disabilities in his jurisdiction. Mr. SmithÓs
1484responsibilities include reviewing requests for exemptio n from
1492disqualifying offenses.
149418. Mr. Smith explained that the Agency serves vulnerable
1503individuals who are highly susceptible to abuse, exploitation,
1511and neglect due to their developmental disabilities. Many of the
1521tasks direct service providers offer Agency clients involve
1529financial, personal, and/or social necessities. Therefore, the
1536Agency must ensure that direct service providers are detail -
1546oriented and trustworthy. When considering a request for an
1555exemption, the Agency must weigh the benefit against th e risk of
1567endangerment to its clients.
157119. Mr. Smith described the AgencyÓs process when reviewing
1580a request for exemption from disqualification. Mr. Smith relayed
1589that the Agency considers the disqualifying offense itself, the
1598circumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of any harm
1607caused to a victim, the history of the employee since the
1618incident and, finally, any other evidence indicating that the
1627individual will present a da nger if employment is allowed.
163720. Specifically regarding PetitionerÓs application,
1642Mr. Smith explained that the Agency reviewed all of the
1652documentation Petitioner provided in her Request for Exemption ,
1660including the various records documenting Petitioner's criminal
1667history, her work experience, and her character reference
1675letters. In addition to her criminal records, the Agency
1684reviewed PetitionerÓs driving record. Mr. Smith advised that a
1693direct service provider will often be tasked to transport
1702clients. Mr. Smith noted that Petitioner's driving record
1710included several traffic related violations. He commented that
1718these records show a pattern of questi onable judgment by
1728Petitioner.
172921. Mr. Smith further testified that the Agency considered
1738PetitionerÓs evidence of rehabilitation, including PetitionerÓs
1744statements submi tted with her Request for Exemption and the
1754letters of recommendation supporting her application.
176022. Mr. Smith explained that, based on its review, the
1770Agency determined that Petitioner's criminal history indicates a
1778pattern of poor judgment and a lack o f acceptance of full
1790responsibility for her actions. PetitionerÓs repeated
1796involvement with the criminal court system reflects a lack of
1806remorse for her misconduct. In addition, the Agency found that
1816Petitioner failed to disclose the full and complete de tails of
1827her criminal offenses in her application. Mr. Smith testified
1836that inconsistencies in PetitionerÓs Exemption Questionnaire,
1842including her unreported attendance at the alcohol reh abilitation
1851program, called her truthfulness into question . Finally ,
1859Mr. Smith was concerned about the nature of PetitionerÓs offenses
1869(disqualifying and non - disqualifying) , as well their close
1878proximity in time with PetitionerÓs application.
188423. Upon careful consideration of the record evidence, the
1893undersigned finds t hat Petitioner did not demonstrate, by clear
1903and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her
1912disqualifying offense from 1978. While Petitioner has made
1920commendable strides to change her life, her repeated criminal
1929proceedings since 1978 raise serious concerns, and some
1937hesitancy, in finding that she has sufficiently established that
1946she should be employed in a position of special trust with
1957persons with developmental disabilities. Despite the fact that
1965Petitioner's disqualifying and non - disqua lifying offenses did not
1975result in harm to another, they do demonstrate a failure to
1986exercise good judgment and responsibil ity that cannot be
1995discounted.
199624. Therefore, based on the evidence set forth, Petitioner
2005has not met her burden of demonstrating th at she has
2016rehabilitated from her past disqualifying offense or proven that
2025the Agency should grant her request for exemption from
2034disqualification under sections 393.0655 and 435.07.
2040CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
204325. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties to and su bject
2054matter of this proceeding pursuant to sections 120.569,
2062120.57(1), and 393.0655(4), Florida Statutes.
206726. To be employed as a direct service provider for persons
2078with developmental disabilities, Petitioner must comply with
2085certain background screeni ng requirements. As explained in
2093section 393.0655:
2095(1) MINIMUM STANDARDS. Ï The agency shall
2102require level 2 employment screening pursuant
2108to chapter 435 for direct service providers
2115who are unrelated to their clients, including
2122support coordinators, and managers and
2127supervisors of residential facilities or
2132comprehensive transitional education programs
2136licensed under this chapter and any other
2143person, including volunteers, who provide
2148care or services, who have access to a
2156clientÓs living areas, or who ha ve access to
2165a clientÓs funds or personal property.
2171Background screening shall include employment
2176history checks as provided in s. 435.03(1)
2183and local criminal records checks through
2189local law enforcement agencies.
2193* * *
2196(2) EXEMPTIONS FROM DISQ UALIFICATION. Ï The
2203agency may grant exemptions from
2208disqualification from working with children
2213or adults with developmental disabilities
2218only as provided in s. 435.07.
222427. Section 435.04 establishes the level 2 screening
2232standard and states, in pertine nt part:
2239(1)(a) All employees required by law to be
2247screened pursuant to this section must
2253undergo security background investigations as
2258a condition of employment and continued
2264employment which includes, but need not be
2271limited to, fingerprinting for stat ewide
2277criminal history records checks through the
2283Department of Law Enforcement, and national
2289criminal history records checks through the
2295Federal Bureau of Investigation, and may
2301include local criminal records checks through
2307local law enforcement agencies.
2311* * *
2314(2) The security background investigations
2319under this section must ensure that no
2326persons subject to the provisions of this
2333section have been arrested for and are
2340awaiting final disposition of, have been
2346found guilty of, regardless of adj udication,
2353or entered a plea of nolo contendere or
2361guilty to, or have been adjudicated
2367delinquent and the record has not been sealed
2375or expunged for, any offense prohibited under
2382any of the following provisions of state law
2390or similar law of another jurisd iction:
2397* * *
2400(ss) Chapter 893, relating to drug abuse
2407prevention and control, only if the offense
2414was a felony or if any other person involved
2423in the offense was a minor.
242928. PetitionerÓs criminal history includes a plea of guilty
2438to a charge of felony drug possession in violation of the Texas
2450Con trolled Substance Act of 1970, section 4.12. This offense is
2461similar to chapter 893 relating to drug abuse prevention and
2471control. Accordingly, PetitionerÓs criminal offense from 1978 is
2479a Ðdisquali fying offenseÑ which prevents her from working as a
2490direct service provider. Therefore, if Petitioner desires to
2498work with children or adults with developmental disabilities, she
2507must seek an exemption from her disqualifying offense from the
2517Agency under section 435.07. See § 393.0655 (2), Fla. Stat.
252729. Pursuant to section 435.07(1)(a), Petitioner is
2534eligible to seek an exemption from disqualification Ðfor which at
2544least 3 years have elapsed since the applicant has completed or
2555been lawfully released fro m confinement, supervision, or sanction
2564for the disqualifying felony.Ñ An individual seeking an
2572exemption Ðmust demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
2581the employee should not be disqualified from employment.Ñ
2589Section 435.07(3)(a) further state s that the individual bears
2598Ðthe burden of setting forth clear and convincing evidence of
2608rehabilitation.Ñ Section 43 5.07 states, in pertinent part:
2616Exemptions from disqualification. Ï Unless
2621otherwise provided by law, the provisions of
2628this section apply to exemptions from
2634disqualification for disqualifying offenses
2638revealed pursuant to background screenings
2643required under this chapter, regardless of
2649whether those disqualifying offenses are
2654listed in this chapter or other laws.
2661(1)(a) The head of the ap propriate agency
2669may grant to any employee otherwise
2675disqualified from employment an exemption
2680from disqualification for:
26831. Felonies for which at least 3 years have
2692elapsed since the applicant for the exemption
2699has completed or been lawfully released fr om
2707confinement, supervision, or nonmonetary
2711condition imposed by the court for the
2718disqualifying felony[.]
2720* * *
2723For the purposes of this subsection, the term
"2731felonies" means both felonies prohibited
2736under any of the statutes cited in this
2744chapt er or under similar statutes of other
2752jurisdictions.
2753* * *
2756(3)(a) In order for the head of an agency to
2766grant an exemption to any employee, the
2773employee must demonstrate by clear and
2779convincing evidence that the employee should
2785not be disqualifi ed from employment.
2791Employees seeking an exemption have the
2797burden of setting forth clear and convincing
2804evidence of rehabilitation, including, but
2809not limited to, the circumstances surrounding
2815the criminal incident for which an exemption
2822is sought, the t ime period that has elapsed
2831since the incident, the nature of the harm
2839caused to the victim, and the history of the
2848employee since the incident, or any other
2855evidence or circumstances indicating that the
2861employee will not present a danger if
2868employment or continued employment is
2873allowed.
2874(b) The agency may consider as part of its
2883deliberations of the employee's
2887rehabilitation the fact that the employee
2893has, subsequent to the conviction for the
2900disqualifying offense for which the exemption
2906is being sought, been arrested for or
2913convicted of another crime, even if that
2920crime is not a disqualifying offense.
2926(c) The decision of the head of an agency
2935regarding an exemption may be contested
2941through the hearing procedures set forth in
2948chapter 120. The standard of review by the
2956administrative law judge is whether the
2962agency's intended action is an abuse of
2969discretion.
297030. In reviewing a request for exemption from
2978disqualification, the ALJ is charged with making the factual
2987determination whether, based on the ev idence adduced in a de novo
2999hearing conducted purs uant to section 120.57(1), P etitioner has
3009shown rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence. See
3017§ 435.07(3)(a), Fla. Stat.
302131. Clear and convincing evidence is a heightened standard
3030that requires mo re proof than a mere preponderance of the
3041evidence. Clear and convincing evidence requires that the
3049evidence Ðmust be found to be credible; the facts to which the
3061witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony
3069must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in
3081confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such
3094weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
3108belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the
3119allegations sought to be established.Ñ In re Davey , 645 So. 2d
3130398, 404 (Fla. 1994); Slomowitz v. Walker , 429 So. 2d 797, 800
3142(Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
314632. If the ALJ finds that P etitioner has met her burden of
3159proving rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence, the ALJ
3168also det ermines whether the A gency headÓs intended action to deny
3180P etitioner's request for exemption constitutes an abuse of
3189discretion. J.D. v. Dep't of Child. and Fams. , 114 So. 3d 1127,
32011132 (Fla. 1st DCA 201 3); § 435.07(3)(c), Fla. Stat.
321133. An agency abuses its discretion Ðwhen the . . . action
3223is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of
3233saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable
3242[person] would take the view adopted.Ñ Canakaris v. Canakaris ,
3251382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 19 80); See also J.D. v. Dep't of
3265Child. and Fams. , 114 So. 3d at 1130 (stating that under the
3277abuse of discretion standard, Ð[i]f reasonable men could differ
3286as to the propriety of the action taken by the [lower tribunal],
3298then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding
3310of an abuse of discretion.Ñ) Therefore, if reasonable persons
3319could differ as to the appropriateness of the AgencyÓs decision
3329to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption, the AgencyÓs
3338decision is not unreasonable and, thus, not an abuse of
3348discreti on.
335034. In determining the ultimate legal issue of whether the
3360agency head's action was an Ðabuse of discretion,Ñ the ALJ Ð is to
3374evaluate that question based on the facts determined from the
3384evidence presen ted at the de novo chapte r 120 hearing. Ñ J.D. v.
3398Dep't of Child. and Fams. , 114 So. 3d at 1132, 1133. However,
3410even if the ALJ determines that the agency head's proposed action
3421constitutes an abuse of discretion, the agency is not bound by
3432the ALJ's determination, although the a gency's review is
3441circumscribed by the standards in section 120.57(1)(l). Id.
344935. As discussed above, the undersigned determines that
3457Petitioner did not meet her burden of proving, by clear and
3468convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her 1978
3477disqualifying offense for felony possession of marijuana. Based
3485on her testimony at the final hearing, Petitioner appears genuine
3495in her endeavor to turn her life around. Petitioner recognizes
3505that she needs to address her past misconduct. She also
3515vol untarily sought counseling to ward off potential alcohol abuse
3525issues. Petitioner is also to be commended for her efforts to
3536increase her knowledge of Agency - related matters and clientele
3546through training. However, the evidence Petitioner produced to
3554est ablish her rehabilitation did not rise to the level of clear
3566and convincing in order for the undersigned to conclude, without
3576hesitancy, that the Agency should allow her to be employed as a
3588direct service provider.
359136. It is further determined, based on t he record evidence,
3602that a Ðreasonable personÑ could have reached the AgencyÓs
3611conclusion that PetitionerÓs Request for Exemption should be
3619denied. In determining whether an applicant has set forth clear
3629and convincing evidence of rehabilitation, the agen cy head is to
3640consider matters such as Ðthe circumstances surrounding the
3648criminal incident for which an exemption is sought, the time
3658period that has elapsed since the incident, the nature of the
3669harm caused to the victim, and the history of the employee since
3681the incident, or any other evidence or circumstances indicating
3690that the employee will not present a danger if employment or
3701continued employment is allowed.Ñ £ 435.07(3)(a), Fla. Stat.
3709In addition, the agency head may consider whether the applica nt
3720has been arrested for or convicted of another crime subsequent to
3731the conviction for the disqualifying offense for which the
3740exemption is being sought, even if the new crime is not a
3752disqualifying offense. § 435.07(3)(b), Fla. Stat.
375837. The Agency ack nowledges that Petitioner has initiated
3767steps to rehabilitate her life. The Agency also recognizes
3776PetitionerÓs sincere interest in becoming a home health care
3785assistant for those with disabilities. However, while Petitioner
3793has not committed another dis qualifying offense since her 1978
3803felony drug possession, she has engaged in repeated instances of
3813unlawful behavior. Although Petitioner claims that these
3820incidents were unknowing or unintentional, a Ðreasonable personÑ
3828could take the AgencyÓs position t hat Petitioner has not shown
3839sufficient responsibility to alleviate the AgencyÓs concerns for
3847the risk she may pose to those vulnerable indi viduals the Agency
3859serves.
386038. Therefore, the AgencyÓs conclusion that Petitioner has
3868not achieved sufficient rehab ilitation is not unreasonable, and
3877the AgencyÓs action in denying PetitionerÓs request for exemption
3886from disqualification does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
3895Accordingly, the AgencyÓs denial of Petitioner's request for
3903exemption from disqualifica tion should be upheld.
3910RECOMMENDATION
3911Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
3921Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with
3931Disabilities, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request
3939for an exemption from disqualifi cation from employment.
3947DONE AND ENTERED this 17 th day of June , 2016 , in
3958Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
3962S
3963J. BRUCE CULPEPPER
3966Administrative Law Judge
3969Division of Administrative Hearings
3973The DeSoto Building
39761230 Apalac hee Parkway
3980Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
3985(850) 488 - 9675
3989Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
3995www.doah.state.fl.us
3996Filed with the Clerk of the
4002Division of Administrative Hearings
4006this 17 th day of June , 2016 .
4014ENDNOTE
40151/ All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2016),
4024unless otherwise noted.
4027COPIES FURNISHED:
4029Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire
4033Agency for Persons with Disabilities
4038Suite 422
4040200 North Kentucky Avenue
4044Lakeland, Florida 33801
4047(eServed)
4048Roxanna Marchan
405019241 San Carlos Boulevard , No. 22
4056Fort M yers Beach, Florida 33931
4062(eServed)
4063David De La Paz, Agency Clerk
4069Agency for Persons with Disabilities
40744030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380
4079Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950
4084(eServed)
4085Richard Ditschler, General Counsel
4089Agenc y for Persons with Disabilities
40954030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380
4100Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950
4105(eServed)
4106Barbara Palmer, Director
4109Agenc y for Persons with Disabilities
41154030 Espla nade Way, Suite 380
4121Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950
4126(eServed)
4127NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
4133All par ties have the right to submit written exceptions within
414415 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions
4155to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that
4166will issue the Final Order in this case.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 06/17/2016
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- PDF:
- Date: 05/25/2016
- Proceedings: Letters of support for Petitioner's request for an exemption filed.
- Date: 05/16/2016
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- Date: 05/09/2016
- Proceedings: Notice of Filing Respondent's Proposed Exhibit List filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
- Date: 05/06/2016
- Proceedings: Certificates filed. Confidential document; not available for viewing.
Case Information
- Judge:
- J. BRUCE CULPEPPER
- Date Filed:
- 03/09/2016
- Date Assignment:
- 03/10/2016
- Last Docket Entry:
- 12/19/2016
- Location:
- Fort Myers, Florida
- District:
- Middle
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO
- Suffix:
- EXE
Counsels
-
Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire
Address of Record -
Roxanna Marchan
Address of Record