16-001934 Mccrory&Apos;S Sunny Hill Nursery, Llc vs. Department Of Health Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, June 3, 2016.

Summary: Pet. cannot allege it rec'd highest score or that DOH determined Pet. did not meet a statutory requirement. Ch. 2016-123 s. 3(1) doesn't apply; claim that Pet. would have gotten highest score but for DOH clear errors can be pursued (and is) under s. 3(2).

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

MCCRORY'S SUNNY HILL NURSERY,

LLC,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 16 - 1934

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This case is before the undersigned on the motion to dismiss

(Motion) by Respondent the Department of Health (Respondent or

Department), filed on April 25, 2016. The Motion asserts that as

a matter of law, Petitioner McCroryÓs Sunny Hill Nursery, LLC

(Petitioner or McCroryÓs) is not entitled to the relief it seeks

by its Petition for Formal Administrative Proceedings (Petition)

that gave rise to this proceeding. McCroryÓs filed a written

response and request for oral argument on May 2, 2016, and a

notice of supplem ental authority on May 3, 2016. A telephonic

hearing was conducted on May 23, 2016, to hear argument on the

Motion.

Having carefully considered the partiesÓ filings and the

arguments presented at hearing, the undersigned is persuaded that

as a matter of l aw, McCroryÓs is not entitled to the relief it

seeks. Since the factual allegations in the Petition

affirmatively demonstrate the legal insufficiency of PetitionerÓs

claim, no amendment could cure this deficiency. Accordingly, the

Motion should be grante d with prejudice, and issuance of a

Recommended Order of Dismissal is appropriate.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: David C. Ashburn, Esquire

Lorence Jon Bielby, Esquire

Greenberg Traurig, P.A.

101 East Colleg e Avenue

Post Office Drawer 1838

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent: W. Robert Vezina, III, Esquire

Eduardo S. Lombard, Esquire

Megan Reynolds, Esquire

Vezina, Lawrence and Piscitelli , P.A.

413 East Park Avenue

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In 2015, pursuant to section 381.986, Florida Statutes

(2014) (the Compassionate Use of Low - THC Cannabis Act), and

implementing rules, McCroryÓs was one of several applicants

seeking approval to become the single dispensing organization

(DO) of low - THC cannabis in the central Florida region. The

Department evaluated the central region applications, which were

assigned scores pursuant to the DepartmentÓs process set forth in

its rules. The Department determined that another applicant,

Knox Nursery, Inc. (Knox), achieved the highest aggregate score,

and therefore, should be approved as the single DO f or the

central region. Other central region applicants, including

McCroryÓs, were notified that their applications were not

approved because they did not achieve the highest aggregate score

in the central region, and therefore, were not determined to be

t he best for that region. Several initially denied applicants,

including McCroryÓs, timely filed petitions for administrative

hearings to contest the DepartmentÓs initial decisions to approve

KnoxÓs application and deny their applications.

The central regi on cases were assigned to the undersigned

and were consolidated. The McCroryÓs petition (McCroryÓs I) was

assigned DOAH Case No. 15 - 7275 and remains pending.

Before a final hearing was held in the consolidated central

region cases, c hapter 2016 - 123, Laws of Florida, was enacted and

took effect immediately on becoming law, on March 25, 2016. The

new law amended section 381.986, and also adopted provisions that

did not amend the statute, but gave rise to the Petition filed by

McCroryÓs at issue here (McCro ryÓs II).

McCroryÓs filed its Petition with the Department on April 5,

2016. The Department referred the matter to the Division of

Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on April 8, 2016, when it was

assigned to the undersigned as a related case to DOAH Case

No. 15 - 7275, and by Order issued on April 18, 2016, was

consolidated with the other consolidated central region cases.

By virtue of the r ecommendation made herein on the Motion, it is

appropriate to sever McCroryÓs II from the other consolidated

central regi on cases that include McCroryÓs I.

FINDING S OF FACT BASED ON PETITION

The material facts alleged in the Petition are accepted as

true for purposes of ruling on the Motion and are summarized

here:

1. The Department was directed by section 381.986 to

auth orize the establishment of five DOs statewide, one each in

five different regions.

2. The Department promulgated an application form,

incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule

64 - 4.002, to be used by applicants seeking approval as on e of the

five regional DOs.

3. The Department conducted its application review process

pursuant to rule 64 - 4.002(5), which provides for three reviewers

to independently review and score each application using a

scorecard form that is incorporated by refer ence.

4. Pursuant to rule 64 - 4.002(5)(b), Ð[s]corecards from each

reviewer will be combined to generate an aggregate score for each

application. The Applicant with the highest aggregate score in

each dispensing region shall be selected as the regionÓs

D ispensing Organization.Ñ

5. McCroryÓs timely submitted an application to become the

DO in the central Florida region, as did a number of others,

including Knox.

6. According to McCroryÓs, the scorecards completed by the

DepartmentÓs reviewers for the cen tral region applications reveal

Ðclearly erroneously assigned scores, and scores that were

assigned in an arbitrary and capricious manner.Ñ

(Petition at 4).

7. According to McCroryÓs, Ð[c]orrection of the clearly

erroneous scoring errors would result in McCroryÓs being the

highest scoring Applicant in the Central Region, and [the

Department] would have been required to select McCroryÓs as the

DO for the Central Region.Ñ (Petition at 4).

8. McCroryÓs seeks a formal evidentiary hearing to prove

its alleg ations of scoring errors because by doing so, McCroryÓs

contends it would thereby be entitled to be a central region DO

by legislative decree.

9. The Petition is predicated on section 3, subsection (1)

of the new law, which provides:

Notwithstanding s. 3 81.986(5)(b), Florida

Statutes, a dispensing organization that

receives notice from the Department of Health

that it is approved as a regionÓs dispensing

organization, posts a $5 million performance

bond in compliance with rule 64 - 4.002(5)(e),

Florida Admi nistrative Code, meets the

requirements of and requests cultivation

authorization pursuant to rule 64 - 4.005(2),

Florida Administrative Code, and expends at

least $100,000 to fulfill its legal

obligations as a dispensing organization ; or

any applicant that received the highest

aggregate score through the departmentÓs

evaluation process, notwithstanding any prior

determination by the department that the

applicant failed to meet the requirements of

s. 381.986, Florida Statutes , must be granted

cultivation auth orization by the department

and is approved to operate as a dispensing

organization for the full term of its

original approval and all subsequent renewals

pursuant to s. 381.986, Florida Statutes.

Any applicant that qualifies under this

subsection which h as not previously been

approved as a dispensing organization by the

department must be given approval as a

dispensing organization by the department

within 10 days after the effective date of

this act, and within 10 days after receiving

such approval must comply with the bond

requirement in rule 64 - 4.002(5)(e), Florida

Administrative Code, and must comply with all

other applicable requirements of chapter 64 -

4, Florida Administrative Code. (emphasis

added).

The Petition asserts that McCroryÓs would, if all owed to prove

its allegations of scoring errors, achieve the status described

in the emphasized language following the semi - colon. 1/

10. The language McCroryÓs seeks to invoke identifies

attributes of an applicant in a two - part description. The first

pa rt of the description is Ðany applicant that received the

highest aggregate score through the departmentÓs evaluation

process.Ñ The second part of the description is

Ð[n]otwithstanding any prior determination by the department that

the applicant failed to meet the requirements of s. 381.986,

Florida Statutes.Ñ

11. McCroryÓs has not alleged that it was an applicant that

received the highest aggregate score through the DepartmentÓs

evaluation process, nor has McCroryÓs alleged that the Department

previously determined that McCroryÓs failed to meet the

requirements of section 381.986, Florida Statutes.

12. Instead, McCroryÓs admits by its allegations that it

was not the applicant that received the highest aggregate score

among the central region DO applicant s, through the DepartmentÓs

evaluation process. McCroryÓs instead alleges that its

application did not receive the highest aggregate score because

of scoring errors characterized as clearly erroneous or arbitrary

and capricious. McCroryÓs can only allege that correction of the

scoring errors Ðwould result in McCroryÓs being the highest

scoring Applicant in the central region.Ñ 2/

13. McCroryÓs also cannot allege that it meets the second

part of the two - part description after the semi - colon. McCroryÓs

ack nowledges by its allegations that its application was denied

because it did not receive the highest aggregate score in the

central region, not because it did not satisfy one of the

statutory requirements.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

14. The Division of Administr ative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, pursuant to

sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2015).

15. The Department has moved to dismiss the Petition on the

grounds that the factual allegations are legally insu fficient for

the relief requested.

16. In ruling on the Motion, consideration of factual

matters has been limited to the four corners of the Petition, and

the allegations are accepted as true. See St. Francis Parkside

Lodge v. DepÓt of Health & Rehab. Se rvs. , 486 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla.

1st DCA 1986).

17. As an applicant for DO approval in the central region

whose application was initially denied by the Department,

McCroryÓs was entitled to file a petition for an administrative

hearing to contest the denial of its application. However,

McCroryÓs already has pending in McCroryÓs I, DOAH Case

No. 15 - 7275, its petition for an administrative hearing to

contest the DepartmentÓs denial of its DO application.

18. McCroryÓs II, the second McCroryÓs petition challe nging

the denial of the same DO application, seeks to take advantage of

a legislative provision for more automatic DO approval than

through litigation in which McCroryÓs will have the opportunity

to try to prove that the McCroryÓs application should have b een

approved instead of denied. However, the legislative provision

that McCroryÓs is attempting to invoke does not fit. It requires

a two - part status that McCroryÓs does not have and cannot claim.

19. Taken together, the two - part description of an

appli cant entitled to the legislatively mandated approval

requires (1) an applicant that received the highest aggregate

score in the DepartmentÓs initial review and scoring process, but

(2) was determined by the Department to not be entitled to

approval, despit e the applicantÓs highest aggregate score,

because of a failure to meet one or more of the statutory

requirements. The two parts of the description are linked

grammatically, by virtue of the use of Ðany applicantÑ in the

first part and Ðthe applicantÑ in the second part to refer back

to an applicant meeting the description in the first part.

20. The original 2014 law contemplated approval of five DOs

by January 1, 2015. Instead, it was not until well after that

date before the Department had established the process by which

the five DOs would be approved (through rulemaking, challenges,

more rulemaking, and more challenges); then the Department had to

carry out the application submission and evaluation process; and

then, once the Department made its decis ions, those decisions had

to be conveyed with the requisite Ðclear points of entryÑ to

allow applicants to challenge the DepartmentÓs decisions in de

novo administrative hearings. Instead of seeds in the ground in

the beginning of 2015, the 2016 Legislatu re was confronted with

the prospect of protracted administrative litigation before the

five regional DOs would be finally approved.

21. Considered in this context, the point of section 3,

subsection (1), of the new law seems clear: the Legislature

wanted to accelerate what had become a long, drawn - out process,

by legislatively approving the applicants selected by the

Department as the best in each region, and setting them free from

protracted litigation to go forth and start growing the product.

The lang uage before the semi - colon gives legislative approval to

the initially approved applicants that had taken certain steps in

reliance on that initial approval -- Knox, in the central region.

While generally, under the DepartmentÓs rules, the initially

approve d applicant would be the applicant that received the

highest aggregate score, the language after the semi - colon

addresses the circumstance in which an applicant that received

the highest aggregate score did not end up being the initially

approved applicant , because of a determination by the Department

that the highest - scoring applicant did not meet statutory

requirements. In that instance, the highest - scoring applicant

would have been disqualified, and the initially approved

applicant would have been the n ext - highest scorer.

22. The Department asserts that the circumstance addressed

by the language after the semi - colon applies to one region -- the

northeast region -- and one applicant -- San Felasco Nurseries, Inc.

(San Felasco). Indeed, the supplemental author ity filed by

McCroryÓs bears out the DepartmentÓs contention. See San Felasco

Nurseries Inc., et al., v. DepÓt of Health, et al. , DOAH Case

Nos. 15 - 7268, 15 - 7274, and 15 - 7276, Order Granting Dismissal of

Parties and Amendment of Remaining Petition, May 2, 2016 (filed

by McCroryÓs as supplemental authority). 3/ The Order, issued by

Administrative Law Judge Bruce McKibben, recites as undisputed

background:

Applications were submitted to the Department

and, in November 2015, the Department issued

its decision as to which of the applicants in

the Northeast region should be approved.

Based upon its review of the criteria, the

Department assigned the following aggregate

scores to those applicants: San Felasco --

3.9750 points; Chestnut -- 3.7917 points; and

LoopÓs - - 3.5708 points. However, due to the

DepartmentÓs determination that San FelascoÓs

application did not Ðmeet the requirements of

s. 381.986 [Florida Statutes],Ñ the

Department initially approved the application

of Chestnut.

Order at 2. By operation of se ction 3, subsection (1) of the new

law, Judge McKibben determined that ChestnutÓs application was

legislatively approved under the language before the semi - colon,

and San FelascoÓs application was legislatively approved by the

language after the semi - colon . Accordingly, Judge McKibben

dismissed ChestnutÓs petition filed to support the DepartmentÓs

initial decision to approve its application, as well as San

FelascoÓs petition challenging the denial of its application,

because those two petitioners had becom e finally approved DOs.

23. Prior to the 2016 legislative session, Judge McKibben

presided over a hearing brought to contest the DepartmentÓs prior

determination that San FelascoÓs application had to be

disqualified because one of the statutory requirem ents was not

met. In particular, the Department had determined that Daniel

Banks, identified in San FelascoÓs application as a prospective

manager, had not passed his level 2 background screening. See

§ 381.986(5)(b)6., Fla. Stat. (2014) (requiring that a DO

applicant demonstrate that Ðall owners and managers have been

fingerprinted and have successfully passed a level 2 background

screening pursuant to s. 435.04Ñ).

24. Prior to the passage of the bills that became the new

law, Judge McKibben issued hi s Recommended Order in Banks v.

Department of Health , DOAH Case No. 15 - 7267 (Fla. DOAH Feb. 26,

2016), in which he concluded that Daniel Banks did not commit a

disqualifying event that would cause him to not pass his level 2

background screening. Judge Mc Kibben recommended that the

Department enter a final order determining that Mr. Banks did not

have a disqualifying event in his level 2 background screening. 4/

25. A legislature that was aware of the administrative

proceedings involving DO applications ( as may be presumed when

interpreting statutes, and as is confirmed by reference to the

legislative history) 5/ could have been persuaded by the

circumstances known at that time that San FelascoÓs application

was wrongly disqualified, as had been determined by Judge

McKibben. A legislature aware of Judge McKibbenÓs Recommended

Order could well have decided that while crafting law to

legislatively approve the applicants initially approved by the

Department, it should also legislatively approve San Felasco on

the rationale that San Felasco would have been the initially

approved applicant but for the erroneous disqualification.

26. San Felasco meets the two - part description after the

semi - colon in section 3, subsection (1) of the new law. It is an

applicant th at received the highest aggregate score through the

DepartmentÓs evaluation process, but instead of being approved,

was denied because of a prior determination by the Department

that San Felasco did not meet one of the statutory requirements.

McCroryÓs doe s not dispute that San Felasco meets both parts of

the two - part description following the semi - colon.

27. On the face of the Petition, however, McCroryÓs has

demonstrated that it was not (and could not allege that it was)

the applicant that received the h ighest aggregate score through

the DepartmentÓs evaluation process. And McCroryÓs was not, and

cannot allege that it was, the applicant that received the

highest aggregate score in the central region, but that was

denied because of a prior Department dete rmination that McCroryÓs

failed to satisfy the statutory requirements.

28. McCroryÓs argues that it would be unreasonable to

interpret Ðreceived the highest aggregate scoreÑ literally to

require that the applicant invoking this provision be one that

actua lly came out of the DepartmentÓs evaluation process having

received the highest aggregate score. McCroryÓs also argues that

it would be unreasonable to interpret the second part of the two -

part test as actually requiring a prior determination by the

Depar tment that the statutory requirements were not satisfied.

But that is what the two - part description says. While McCroryÓs

may wish the legislation had said something different, it is

hardly unreasonable to conclude that the law means exactly what

it says .

29. McCroryÓs argues that an applicant can satisfy the

first part of the test -- that it Ðreceived the highest aggregate

score through the DepartmentÓs evaluation processÑ -- if the

applicant alleges, and subsequently proves in an administrative

hearing, th at scoring errors were made by the DepartmentÓs

evaluators, and if those errors are corrected, then the applicant

will become the applicant with the highest aggregate score. Such

a reading of the statute not only distorts the language used by

the Legislat ure, but it eviscerates any distinction between the

clause conferring legislative approval on any applicant meeting

the two - part description that McCroryÓs seeks to invoke, and the

alternative option in subsection (2), which McCroryÓs calls the

Ðlitigation option.Ñ

30. While section 3, subsection (1) provides for

legislative approval of the initially approved applicants, plus

any San - Felasco - like applicants that received the highest

aggregate score but were disqualified, section 3, subsection (2)

of the ne w law keeps alive the Ðlitigation optionÑ for denied

applicants who have not yet had their hearings. Section 3,

subsection (2) affords an avenue for a denied applicant to become

an approved DO by proving that the applicant Ðwas entitledÑ to be

a DO under the statute and applicable rules. The whole point of

the clause conferring legislative approval is that those

qualifying under subsection (1) do not have to go the litigation

route to prove that they should have received the highest

aggregate score and wo uld have received the highest aggregate

score but for scoring errors.

31. McCroryÓs contends that its allegations of scoring

errors are different, somehow. The undersigned understands the

McCroryÓs argument to highlight how close its aggregate score was

to the highest aggregate score achieved by Knox, and that in its

view, the scoring errors that would make all the difference are

very clearly erroneous and highly arbitrary and capricious.

These are distinctions of degree that make no difference to the

vi ability of the McCroryÓs II claim. No matter how egregious

McCroryÓs claims the scoring errors were, no matter how minute

the correction that McCroryÓs contends it can prove should be

made for it to leapfrog over Knox and become the highest

aggregate scor er, the remedy available to McCroryÓs is the

litigation option, not the automatic legislative approval option.

The PetitionÓs allegations that the DepartmentÓs initial decision

to deny McCroryÓs application was erroneous, arbitrary,

capricious, and/or unr easonable, for reasons large or small, and

that a proper evaluation of McCroryÓs application will result in

a determination that its application was the one that should have

been approved, are viable allegations to pursue the litigation

option, but they ar e not viable to invoke automatic DO approval

under subsection (1).

32. The so - called litigation option, in section 3,

subsection (2) of the new law, provides in pertinent part:

If an organization that does not meet the

criteria of subsection (1) receives a final

determination from the Division of

Administrative Hearings, the Department of

Health, or a court of competent jurisdiction

that it was entitled to be a dispensing

organization under s. 381.986, Florida

Statutes, and applicable rules, such

organizat ion and an organization that meets

the criteria of subsection (1) shall both be

dispensing organizations in the same region.

33. McCroryÓs has availed itself of the litigation option,

which is pending as McCroryÓs I. That proceeding is the one in

which McCroryÓs has the opportunity to prove that it was entitled

to be the central regionÓs DO instead of Knox, because its

application was the best for the region, not KnoxÓs as the

Department determined through its evaluation process.

34. Finally, McCroryÓs argues that DOAH should avoid an

unconstitutional interpretation of the law. McCroryÓs argues

that if the Department is correct that the portion of subsection

(1) invoked by McCroryÓs applies to one applicant and one

applicant only -- San Felasco -- then it would be an unconstitutional

special law.

35. It is unnecessary to determine whether San Felasco is

the only applicant that meets both parts of the two - part

description following the semi - colon in subsection (1). It is

only necessary to conclude that McC roryÓs does not, and cannot,

meet either part of the two - part description it seeks to invoke

in an effort to avail itself of automatic DO approval by

legislative decree. That San Felasco does meet the two - part test

as interpreted in accordance with its cl ear terms lends credence

to the interpretation as a reasonable one. The McCroryÓs

suggestion that the literal interpretation of this provision may

prove to mean that the provision would not withstand

constitutional scrutiny may be so, or may not be so, bu t in

either event cannot transform the language chosen by the

Legislature into different language that would fit McCroryÓs.

DOAH is neither a court nor the Legislature; just as DOAH lacks

the authority to address the constitutional question McCroryÓs

inje cts, so too DOAH lacks the authority to rewrite legislation.

36. Accepting the factual allegations in the Petition as

true, McCroryÓs is not entitled to the automatic DO approval it

seeks in this proceeding, and the Petition should be dismissed.

37. Since it conclusively appears from the face of the

Petition that the legal insufficiency of McCroryÓs claim cannot

be cured, the dismissal should be with prejudice. See

£ 120.569(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (ÐDismissal of a petition shall, at

least once, be withou t prejudice to petitionerÓs filing a timely

amended petition curing the defect, unless it conclusively

appears from the face of the petition that the defect cannot be

cured.Ñ).

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a

final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Administrative

Proceedings filed by Petitioner McCroryÓs Sunny Hill Nurseries,

LLC, with prejudice.

DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June , 2016 , in Tall ahassee,

Leon County, Florida.

S

ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (85 0) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 3rd day of June , 2016 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ McCroryÓs does not contend that it is entitled to legislative

approval as a DO approved by the Department, as desc ribed in the

language preceding the semi - colon in subsection (1). In its

response opposing the Motion, McCroryÓs acknowledges that the

language preceding the semi - colon applies to Knox, which is the

central region DO applicant that was initially approved by the

Department, and now finally approved by legislative decree by

virtue of the language before the semi - colon in subsection (1).

2/ Instead, as McCroryÓs concedes in its response in opposition

to the Motion, ÐThe scoring error resulted in the Depart ment

erroneously awarding the highest score to Knox.Ñ Thus, the only

applicant that received the highest aggregate score through the

DepartmentÓs evaluation process is Knox.

3/ The Order filed by McCroryÓs as supplemental authority was

subsequently amen ded, but only to clarify that jurisdiction was

being relinquished to the Department on those petitions for which

there was no longer a factual dispute for determination. See

Amended Order Granting Dismissal of Parties, Relinquishing

Jurisdiction, and Amen dment of Remaining Petition, May 10, 2016.

4/ By Final Order rendered May 2, 2016, after the new law was

already in effect, the Department Ðinvalidated and voidedÑ its

prior determination that Daniel Banks failed his level 2

background screening -- the det ermination that caused San FelascoÓs

application to be disqualified. The Department resolved the

issue by different means than in the Recommended Order, by

concluding that Mr. Banks was not a manager required to undergo

background screening, but the resul t is the same: the

DepartmentÓs prior determination that San FelascoÓs application

was disqualified no longer stands.

5/ It is not necessary to rely on legislative history to

interpret section 3, subsection (1) of the new law, because the

language, at l east insofar as relevant to resolving the issue

presented in this case, is clear. The point made here is that

the plain meaning makes sense when considered in context of the

sequence of events since the original law was adopted.

Nonetheless, if it were n ecessary to resort to legislative

history, which has been filed in the consolidated cases including

McCroryÓs I, and which has, until now, also included McCroryÓs

II, the legislative history would further buttress the plain

meaning of the new law as descri bed herein.

COPIES FURNISHED:

David C. Ashburn, Esquire

Greenberg Traurig, P.A.

101 East College Avenue

Post Office Drawer 1838

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Lorence Jon Bielby, Esquire

Greenberg Traurig, P.A.

101 East College Avenue

Post Offic e Drawer 1838

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

(eServed)

William Robert Vezina, Esquire

Vezina, Lawrence and Piscitelli, P.A.

413 East Park Avenue

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Eduardo S. Lombard, Esquire

Vezina, Lawrence and Piscitelli, P.A.

413 Eas t Park Avenue

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Megan Reynolds , Esquire

Vezina, Lawrence and Piscitelli, P.A.

413 East Park Avenue

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Celeste Philip, M.D., M.P.H.

In t erim State Surgeon General

Department of Health

4 052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin AOO

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1701

(eServed)

Nichole C. Geary, General Counsel

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin AO 2

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1701

(eServed)

Shannon Revels, Agency Clerk

Department of Health

40 52 Bald Cypress Way, Bin AO2

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 170 1

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recomme nded Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.