16-001996 Jeffrey Alan Norkin vs. Department Of Financial Services Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, August 30, 2016.

Summary: Petitioner's application to sell insurance should be denied based upon his prior disciplinary history by the Florida Bar and failure to provide proof of satisfaction of resulting judgments against him, as indicated in the Notice of Denial.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

JEFFREY ALAN NORKIN,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 16 - 1996

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL

SERVICES,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a form al administrative hearing was

conducted before Administrative Law Judge Mary Li Creasy in Fort

Lauderdale, Florida, on June 21 , 2016.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Jeffrey A. Norkin , pro se

Apartment 311

1617 South Federal Highway

Pompano Beach, Florida 33 062

For Respondent: Matthew R. Daley, Esquire

Maribeth Bohanan, Esquire

Department of Financial Services

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whethe r Petitioner ' s application for licensure should be

denied based upon his prior disciplinary history by the Florida

Bar and failure to provide proof of satisfaction of resulting

cost judgments against him, as indicated in the Notice of Denial

issued by Resp ondent on February 12, 2016.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Petitioner , a former attorney, applied for a license as a

life , including variable annuity and health, insurance agent. On

February 12 , 2016, the Department of Financial Services ( " DFS ")

issued a Notice o f Denial with respect to Petitioner ' s

application based upon Petitioner ' s disciplinary history with the

Florida Bar and his failure to pay amounts assessed in his

suspen sion and disbarment proceedings.

DFS relies on s ection 626.611 (1) (g) , Florida Stat utes

( " [d] e monstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in

the business of insurance " ) , and on Florida Administrative Code

Rule 69B - 215.210 , which declares the business of life insurance

as a " public trust , " to deny licensure .

Petitioner elected to challenge the denial of licensure and

requested a s ection 120.57(1) , Florida Statutes , hearing. On

April 21, 2016 , the matter was referred to the Division of

Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") for assignment of an

Administrative Law J udge.

The final he aring was conducted as scheduled on June 21,

2016. Petitioner testified on his own behalf. Petitioner ' s

Exhibits 1 thr ough 16, 18, and 20 through 22 were admitted.

Respondent offered the testimony of Matt Tamplin, DFS Bureau

Chief of Licensing, and Ray Wenger, DFS Bureau Chief of

Investigation. DFS ' Exhibits 1 through 8 and 10 through 15 were

admitted.

The Transcript of the final heari ng wa s filed with DOAH on

Ju ly 25 , 2016. Both parties filed proposed recommended orders,

which have been considered in the prepar ation of this Recommended

Order. 1/ R eferences to statutes and rules are to the 2016

versions, unless otherwise indicated.

FINDING S OF FACT

1. DFS is the state agency responsible for licensing and

regulation of in surance in Florida pursuant to c hapter 626,

Florida Statutes.

2. On September 4, 2015 , Petitioner, Jeffrey A. Norkin,

applied for licensure as a life , including health and variable

annuity, insurance agent. On February 12, 2016, DFS issued a

Notice of Denial with respect to Petitioner ' s application based

upon Petitioner ' s disciplinary history with the Florida Bar

("Bar") and his failure to pay amounts assessed in his suspension

and disbarment proceedings.

Petitioner ' s Background

3. Petitioner graduated from the University of Miami Law

School in 1992 and was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1993.

4. Prior to attending law school, Petitioner worked for

several months as a life insurance agent and for a commodities

broker.

5. Until his suspension from the practice of law on

October 31, 20 13, Pet it i o ner maintained a successful general

litigation practice in Broward County, Florida , handling

commercial disputes and civil rights matters, including the

representation of victims in police brutality cases.

Petitioner ' s Disciplinary History as an Attorney

A. Petitioner ' s 2003 Reprimand

6. On April 20, 1999, in the case of Greenberg v. Hunter ,

U .S. D istrict Court, Northern District of Florida, Case

No. 4:99cv45 WS, Judge William Stafford issued a Contempt Order

against Petitioner for, a mong other things, falsely accusing

opposing counsel of improperly interrupting a deposition to coach

his client .

7. J udge Stafford noted:

I have observed . . . [ Petitioner ] is

constantly accusatory in tone and by choice

of words. He has been cons istently

disrespectful to the court, to the lawyers,

to the parties, to the witnesses. He has

accused counsel of spoliation of the

evidence, of illegal conduct, of

unprofessional behavior, of lying. He has

demeaned the justice system, law enforcement,

an d his own profession, and my profession.

He has refused to accept the court ' s rulings.

He has constantly argued about rulings once

I ' ve made them. . . . He has called not just

one attorney incompetent, but almost every

attorney that has appeared here ei ther as a

witness or as counsel of record, and even his

own client ' s prior counsel . . . . He has

berated the court. . . .

The Fla . Bar v. Norkin , 132 So. 3d 77, 88 (Fla. 2013) .

8. Judge Stafford banned Petitioner f rom practicing in the

Northern D istrict for a year.

9 . As a result, the U .S. District C ourt for the Southern

District of Fl o r ida instituted a disciplinary action pursuant to

the Rules G overn ing Attorney Discipline, Local R ules for the

Southern District of Florida, Rule V(B). The matter was

ultimately referred to the Bar for prosecution and on

S ept e m ber 24, 2003, the Florida Supreme Court in SC02 - 854, 2 / in

i ts capacity as the Bar Disciplinary Board , disciplined

Petitioner for " disrespectful, accusatory, argumentative, and

rude beh avior, " by issu ing a public reprimand , enter ing judgment

for the recovery of costs against Petitioner in the amount of

$930.00, and instructed him to attend 30 hours of continuing

legal education . The Fl a . Bar v. Norkin , 132 So. 3r d at 87

( citing The Fl a . Bar v. Norkin , 858 So. 2d 332

(Fla. 2003)(unpublished table decision).

B. Petitioner ' s 2013 Suspension

10 . Petitioner represented David Bee m in a commercial

litigation dispute, Gary Ferguson, individually, and derivatively

on behalf of Floors to Doors, Inc. v. David Beem and Floors to

Doors, Inc . , Circuit Court Case Number: 07 - 34790 CA 20, in the

Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami -

Dade County ( " Ferguson v. Beem " ) , which began in 2007. The

litigation was very conte ntious and opposing counsel representing

Ferguson, Gary Brooks , initiated a grievance against Petitioner ,

which resulted in the Bar complaint filed against Petit i oner in

July 2011 .

11 . On October 31, 2013, in The Florida Bar v. Norkin ,

supra, the Flo rida Supreme Court , again in i ts capacity as the

Bar Disciplinary Board , suspended Petitioner ' s license to

practice law for 24 months, issued him a public reprimand, placed

him on probation for 18 months upon reinstatement of his license,

assessed costs ag ainst him in the amount of $7,970.53, and

assessed administrative fees against him in the amount of

$1,250.00 for engaging in unprofessional conduct in the Ferguson

v. Beem litigation.

12. Pe ti ti oner was cited for violating the R ules Regulating

the Fl orida Bar 4 - 3.5(c), 4 - 8.2(a), 4 - 8.4(a), and 4 - 8.4(d) , 3 / for

disrupting several court hearings by yelling at judges and

exhibiting disrespectful conduct, falsely accusing a senior judge

of criminal conduct to berate him into withdrawing his request

for a fee, and engaging in " relentless unethical and

unprofessional " efforts to denigrate and humiliate opposing

counsel.

13. The c o urt adopted the referee ' s findings of fact and

recommendations as to guilt , because they were supported by

competent, subst antial evidence, including witness testimony,

exhibits, and transcripts from the Ferguson v. Beem litigation.

However , the c ourt disapproved the referee ' s recommended sanction

of a 90 - day suspension and, instead, imposed a two - year

suspension. The Court held:

Competent, zealous representation is required

when working on a case for a client. There

are proper types of behavior and methods to

utilize when aggressively representing a

client. Screaming at judges and opposing

counsel, and personally attacking opposing

counsel by disparaging him and attempting to

humiliate him, are not among the types of

acceptable conduct but are entirely

unacceptable. One can be professional and

aggressive without being obnoxious.

Attorneys should focus on the substance of

their cases, treating judges and opposing

counsel with civility, rather than trying to

prevail by being insolent toward judges and

purposefully offensive toward opposing

counsel. This Court has been discussing

professionalism and civility for years. We

d o not tolerate unprofessional and

discourteous behavior. We do not take any

pleasure in sanctioning Norkin, but if we are

to have an honored and respected profession,

we are required to hold ourselves to a higher

standard. Norkin has conducted himself in a

manner that is the antithesis of what this

Court expects from attorneys. By his

unprofessional behavior, he has denigrated

lawyers in the eyes of the public. Norkin ' s

violations of the Bar rules and

unprofessional behavior merit a two - year

suspension and a public reprimand. We direct

Norkin to appear personally before this Court

to receive the public reprimand. His

unprofessional conduct is an embarrassment to

all members of The Florida Bar.

Id. at 93.

14. Petitioner ' s conduct was con sidered s o outrageous that

the c ourt, in footnote 5 state d , " Members of The Florida Bar, law

professors, and law students should study the instant case as a

glaring example of unprofessional behavior. " Id.

C. Petitioner ' s 2015 Disbarment

15. T he Court ' s opinion required Petitioner to fully comply

with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3 - 5.1(h), which requires a

suspended attorney to give notice of the suspension to all

clients, opposing counsel or co - counsel, and all courts,

tribunals, or adjudicative agen cies before which the attorney is

counsel of record by furnishing them with a copy of the

suspension order. The rule also requires the s uspended attorney,

within 30 days of service of the order, to furnish B ar counsel

with a sworn affidavit listing the na mes and addresses of all

persons and entities to which notice was given.

16. On December 31, 2013, the Bar filed a petition for

contempt and order to show cause against Petitioner in case

number SC13 - 2480 alleging that despite several notifications o f

his noncompliance, he had failed to su bmit the required affidavit

to B ar counsel. O n January 13, 2014, the Bar filed an amended

pe tition also alleging that Pe ti ti oner had engaged in the

practice of law after the effective date of the suspension .

17 . Petitioner admits ghost writing numerous pleadings for

Mr. Beem after his suspension, both in the Ferguson v. Beem

litigation and i n In Re: Gary Ferguson, Debtor , United States

Bankruptcy Court Case Number 12 - 22368, in and for the Southern

District of Fl orida ("Ferguson bankruptcy") .

18 . In the meantime, the Bar filed, in case number SC11 -

1356, a mot ion for sanctions against Petitioner . The motion

alleged that after having been suspended and publicly reprimanded

by the Court, Petitioner sent B ar c ounsel three offensive and

threatening e - mails evidencing " complete disregard for the

contents of the Court ' s opinion, as well as the reprimand

administered by Justice Polston. " The mot ion also pointed out

that Petitioner , through his countenance and phys ical conduct

while the public reprimand was being administered in case number

SC11 - 135 6, showed his contempt for the c ourt. The motion urged

the c ourt to disbar Petitioner . This motion was referred to the

referee in case number SC13 - 2480 for a hearing an d

recommendation.

19 . On September 3, 2014, the referee filed a report and

recommendation on the Bar ' s petition for contempt and the motion

for sanctions. The referee found that based upon Petitioner ' s

own response to the motion for summary judgment and testimony at

the hearing, there were no genuine issues of material fact with

respect to the allegations concerning Petitioner ' s failure to

comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3 - 5.1(h). Similarly,

based on Petitioner ' s response and his own tes timony at the

hearing, the referee found that there was no genuine issue of

fact concerning whether he engaged in the practice of law after

the effective date of his suspension.

20 . The referee also found that with regard to the Bar ' s

motion for san ctions, Petitioner knowingly or through callous

indifference disparaged, threatened, and humiliated B ar counsel,

in violation of Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4 - 8.4(d). Based

on these findings, the referee recommended that Pe t it i oner be

found in cont emp t of the c ourt ' s suspension order in SC11 - 1356,

and that he be disbarred.

21 . The Florida Supreme Court unanimously approved the

recommendation, permanently disbarred Petitioner from the

practice of law , and entered a judgment against Petitioner for

costs in the amount of $3,034.19. See T he Fl a . Bar v. Norkin ,

183 So. 3r d 1018 (Fla. 2015).

22 . I n support of its decision, the c ourt reasoned:

Moreover, given Norkin ' s continuation of his

egregious behavior following his suspension

and during the a dministration of the public

reprimand, we conclude that he will not

change his pattern of misconduct. Indeed,

his filings in the instant case continue to

demonstrate his disregard for this Court, his

unrepentant attitude, and his intent to

continue his de fiant and contemptuous conduct

that is demeaning to this Court, the Court ' s

processes, and the profession of attorneys as

a whole. Such misconduct cannot and will not

be tolerated as it sullies the dignity of

judicial proceedings and debases the

constitut ional republic we serve. We

conclude that Norkin is not amenable to

rehabilitation, and as argued by the Bar, is

deserving of permanent disbarment.

Id. at 1023.

The Applic a tion

23 . On September 4, 2015, Petitioner began his application

for li censure as a resident life , including variable annuity and

health , insurance agent . On November 5, 2015, D F S sent

Petitioner a deficiency letter asking for, among other things,

proof that he " paid all outstanding monies due the Florida Bar

for recovery of costs ($7,970.53) and administrative fees

($1,250.00), with reference to . . . Florida Supreme Court Case

11 - 1356. "

24 . On November 17, 2015, DFS received a letter from

Petitioner indicating that he had not paid the costs or fees

assessed against hi m in the 2013 Action. Petitioner stated

" [m]ost of them are nothing more than fabricated costs, invented,

and unsupported in any way by the Florida Bar as a revenue

producer and as an additional means of harassing me. " This

submission completed his appli cation.

25 . Petitioner admits that to date, the assessments from

the suspension and disbarment have not been paid , and he has no

intention of paying them.

26 . On February 12, 2016, DFS informed Petitioner of its

intent to deny his application based on the Bar proceedings

against him. DFS did not interview anyone, including Petitioner,

prior to denying the application.

27 . Matt Tamplin, D F S Bureau Chief of Li censing , made the

decision to deny Petitioner ' s application for lack of fitness

based on Petitioner ' s suspension, disbarment, and failure to pay

the costs or fees the Bar assessed against him.

28 . The position for which Petitioner seeks licensure is

one of public trust. Tamplin ' s rational for the application

denial was that " F lorida is a very di verse and vulnerable

population " and that Petit i oner ' s disciplinary history resulted

in " very serious concerns about Mr. Norkin ' s failure to follow

rule s under a regulatory authority. "

Petitioner ' s Position

2 9 . Petitioner does not dispute his disciplinary record or

the fact that the fee s assessed are not paid. However, he takes

no responsibility for his actions , which resulted in his

suspension and disbarment. He claims that every negative

allegation against him " has been a total lie. "

30 . For example, a lthough P etitioner admits that he yelled

about Judge Stafford and his rulings in a crowded public

restaurant on a lunch break during trial , h e speculates that he

was disciplined by the federal court for the Northern District o f

Florida and the Bar in 2003 , because he and his client were

Jewish, he was " too handsome, " " too young , " " too loud, " or " from

N ew York. "

31 . Regarding the 2013 suspension, P etitioner contends that

he did nothing wrong, he apologized to the judges wh en he raised

his voice, and that his actions towards his opposing counsel were

justified because the litigation was " destroying " his client ' s

life. Petitioner asserts he was not fully advised of the charges

against him and that he was not under an obligat ion to

disseminate the Florida Supreme C ourt ' s order of suspension to

all of his opposing counsel and judges before whom he had cases

pending because " the decision did not require me to send them the

outrageous, false, and defamatory decision. "

32 . Petitioner fully admits ghost writing pleadings for

Mr. Beem in both the Ferguson v. Beem civil litigation and

Ferguson bankruptcy proceeding s after his suspension.

Petit i oner , who was not a party to either litigation, contends

this was not the unlicensed practice of law , bec ause he was

working to protect his " vested interest " in attorney ' s fees

earned and " to protect my client from having the court be used as

a weapon to steal money from him. " Petitioner argues he was " the

only lawyer in the world " who w ould help Mr. Beem and that he was

not practicing law because he was not collecting fees from

Mr. Beem.

33 . P etitioner also admits " staring down " each Florida

S upreme C ourt J ustice during his public reprimand , but justifies

it as his attempt to huma nize himself in their eyes. He also

believes it was constitutionally protected non - verbal speech and

that he did not receive due process because the justices did not

ask him to stop staring or recuse themselves.

34 . Petitioner explains his threateni ng communication to

Bar counsel :

And I wrote an email to my bar counsel who

destroyed my life telling her that she did

something, I can ' t remember what it was, and

telling her that she was the most despicable

lawyer and that ' s the Î - and that I ' m going to

fi le a lawsuit against her and to keep an eye

out for it.

35 . To date, Petitioner has not paid the assessments of the

Bar and has no intention of doing so. He claims an inability to

pay because of his disbarment and alleges that the imposition of

the costs " along with all the other punishment was

unconstitutional, and completely unjustified . "

36 . Petitioner argues there is no correlation between his

disciplinary history as a lawyer and his ability to sell life

insurance.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

3 7 . DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the

parties to this action in accordance with s ections 120.569 and

120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

38 . Petitioner is the person seeking licensure in this

proceeding. He bears the ultimate burden of proving e ntitlement

to a license and that he meets all of the relevant statutory

criteria for obtaining a license. DepÓt of Banking & Fin. v.

Osborne Stern and Co. , 670 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1996).

39 . The Notice of Denial cites Petitioner ' s lack of fitness

or trustworthiness to transact insurance as the basis for denial.

At all times material to the instant case, the relevant

provisions of section 626.611 provide:

(1) The department shall deny an application

for , suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or

cont inue the license or appointment of any

applicant, agent, title agency, adjuster,

customer representative, service

representative, or managing general agent,

and it shall suspend or revoke the

eligibility to hold a license or appointment

of any such person, if it finds that as to

the applicant, licensee, or appointee any one

or more of the following grounds exist:

* * *

(g) Demonstrated lack of fitness or

trustworthiness to engage in the business of

insurance.

40 . Chapter 626 does not define the term " fit. " When terms

are not defined in a statute, the " plain and ordinary meaning of

those terms applies. " Nat ' l Fed ' n of Retired Persons v. Dep ' t of

Ins. , 553 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Webster ' s

Dictionary provides the following defini tions of " fit " as used in

this context: " proper or acceptable, " " morally or socially

correct, " and " suitable for a specified purpose. " " F it. "

Merriam - Webster Dictionary , 2016 . http://www.merriam -

webster.com/dictionary/fit (2 Aug. 2016).

41 . DFS c oncluded Petitioner was unfit to transact

insurance based on his disciplinary history, unlicensed practice

of law, and failure to pay costs and fees assessed against him in

the 2013 suspension and 2015 disbarment .

42. Certainly one who no longer ha s the confidence of the

tribunal or regulatory body before which they appear is

"untrustworthy." As discussed in DeBock v. State , 512 So.

2d 164 (1987):

An attorney as an officer of the Court and a

member of the third branch of government

occupies a uniqu e position in our society.

Because attorneys are in position where

members of the public must place their trust,

property and liberty, and even their lives,

in a member of the bar, society rightfully

demands that an attorney must possess a

fidelity to trut h and honesty that is beyond

reproach. When an attorney breaches this

duty, the public is harmed. . . . For these

reasons, the vast weight of judicial

authority recognizes that bar discipline

exists to protect the public, and not to

punish the lawyer.

I d. at 166 - 167.

4 3 . The findings of the Florida Supreme Court in the

disciplinary proceedings against Petitioner constitute hearsay

and cannot be the sole basis for a finding in the instant matter

unless corroborated by evidence that is not hearsay or by

evidence subject to a hearsay exception.

§ 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015).

4 4 . However, Petitioner ' s own admissions are subject to a

hearsay exception. § 90.803, Fla. Stat. (2015). The findings of

the Florida Supreme Court are therefore ad missible and may be

relied upon for findings of fact in the instant matter because

they are corroborated by Petitioner ' s own statements.

Unlicensed Practice of Law

4 5 . DFS submitted Respondent ' s Exhibits 11, 12, and 13 as

examples of legal document s Petitioner drafted while unlicensed

on behalf of Mr. Beem. DFS also submitted Respondent ' s

Exhibit 14 as evidence of additional documents Petitioner drafted

while unlicensed. Petitioner testified that he did, in fact,

draft each of these documents aft er his suspension .

4 6 . Petitioner ' s argument, that this was not the unlicensed

practice of law because he was not paid by Mr. Beem, is not

persuasive. There is no evidence that Petitioner charged

Mr. Beem by the document prior to his suspension. P etitioner

pursued his interest in a percentage - based monetary award both

before and after the suspension. Any distinction based upon the

manner in which Petitioner " charged " for his services is

meaningless.

4 7 . E ven if Petitioner drafted the documen ts at no cost for

Mr. Beem, his actions still constitute the practice of law. This

scenario is squarely addressed by The Florida Bar v. Greene , 589

So. 2 d 281 (Fla. 1991), which provides, " [w]e accept the

referee ' s findings that Greene engaged in the prac tice of law

while under suspension. The fact that Greene did not charge a

fee for his services and was a personal friend of those for whom

he performed the services does not make a difference. " Id. at

282 , citing The Fla. Bar v. Keehley , 190 So. 2d 173 ( Fla. 1966),

(N on - attorney who prepared company charters engaged in the

unlicensed practice of law even though he performed the services

free of charge for family and friends . ) .

Failure to Pay Assessments

4 8 . Petitioner has not paid the costs or fees assessed

against him by the Bar. This fact is not in dispute and is

confirmed by Petitioner ' s testimony. While Petit i oner may

currently have the inability to pay the fines, there was no

evidence of any intention to pay, regardless of ability. To the

con trary, Petitioner only spoke with utter disdain and a lack of

respect of the regulatory authority governing his former

profession.

4 9 . In Dep artment of Financial Services. v. Cephas , Case

No. 03 - 0798PL, 2003 WL 21510765 ( Fla. DOAH June 1, 2003 ; DFS

July 25, 2003 ), the Administrative Law J udge found that

" disregard for the regulatory authority . . . an d for basic

ethical principles " definitively indicated a lack of fitness and

trustworthiness. Id. ¶ 45 .

Lack of Professionalism in Dealings with Coll eagues and

Competitors

50 . In the 2013 suspen sion order, the c ourt referred to the

referee ' s finding that , " Norkin is devoid of insight as to the

lack o f professionalism he exhibits. " The Fl a . Bar v. Norkin ,

132 So. 3d at 88 . Petitioner ' s discipli nary history and his

presentation in th e instant action fully corrob orates this

finding. During this proce e ding alone , Petitioner demeaned and

disparaged the S tate A ttorney ' s O ffice, the Miami Police

Department, his former brokerage employer, his opposing counsel

Brooks, the Fergusons, the Supreme Court Justices, Bar counsel,

m a ny of the judges before w hom he appeared, DFS, and the other

attorneys who attempted to represent Mr. Beem.

51 . Rule 69B - 215.210 states:

The Business of Life Insurance is here by

declared to be a public trust in which

service all agents of all companies have a

common obligation to work together in serving

the best interests of the insuring public, by

understanding and observing the laws

governing Life Insurance in letter and in

spirit by presenting accurately and

completely every fact essential to a client ' s

decision, and by being fair in all relations

with colleagues and competitors always

placing the policyholder ' s interests first.

5 2 . The evidence presented is overwhelm ing that Petitioner

lacks the ability to be fair in his relations with colleagues and

competitors. For example, Petitioner disregarded this tribunal ' s

June 2, 2016, Order on Pending Motions, which advised Petitioner

that he was not to d iscuss the merits o f Ferguson v. Beem . At

the administrative hearing, despite repeated concerns expressed

by the undersigned regarding relevance, Petitioner testified at

length to the merits of Ferguson v. Beem . Further, Petit i oner

ignored the explicit instructions of the undersigned regarding

the need to monitor the docket and timely file his proposed

recommended order , in order to try to gain an unfair advan tage

over DFS by reviewing its proposed recommended order before

submitting his own.

5 3 . Petitioner contends h e is entitled to a license ,

because he has never caused harm to a client , and is , therefore ,

not a risk to the insurance - buying public. In the small sample

of cases pertinent to this proceeding, however, PetitionerÓs

assertion is disproved. In the Fergus on bankruptcy p roceedings,

PetitionerÓs disregard of the ramifications of his unlicensed

practice resulted in the court sanctioning Mr. Beem. Not only

did the court repeatedly warn Petitioner to stop drafting

documents for Mr. Beem, it also found that sev eral of the

documents had no basis in law or fact, and that the documents

attempted to re - litigate matters already resolved by the court.

In the Ferguson v. Beem litigation, Petitioner's actions resulted

in an attorney's fees award against both Petitioner and his

client. Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of

the evidence , that he is not a risk to the insurance - buying

public.

5 4 . The manner in which Pe t it i oner conducted himself at

th is final hearing corroborates the findings of the Florida

Supreme Court 's 2013 suspension order. As described by Judge

Stafford in the 1999 action and referenced in the suspension

order , Petitioner was "constantly accusatory in tone and by

choice of words." Petitioner had to be reminded by the

undersig ned that , "casting aspersions on others who are not a

part of this proceeding really are not effective and I'd ask that

you calm down a little bit and focus on explaining to me why you

believe you're qualified."

5 5 . During the final hearing, Petitio ner became very

agitated, loud , and laughed inappropriately during his own

presentation . While Petit i oner maintains he is naturally loud,

like the Bar's referee, the undersigned finds this suggestion

specious at best . Petitioner spoke barely above a whis per when

he was on cross - examination and having to answer questions he

clearly did not like.

56 . Petitioner is correct that the findings of the Florida

Supreme Court in his disciplinary proceedings are not res

judicata for this administrative hearing . Nor does P etitioner's

suspension and disbarment automatically disqualify him from the

business of selling insurance. However, there is a plethora of

corroborating evidence of Petitioner's lack of fitness or

trustworthiness for the business of life insu rance sales.

5 7 . Accordingly , Petitioner failed to meet his ultimate

burden of proving entitlement to a life , including variable

annuity and health , insurance license.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, i t is RECOMMENDED that DFS enter a final order denying

PetitionerÓs application for licensure as a life , including

variable annuity and health , insurance agent in Florida.

DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August , 2016 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida .

S

MARY LI CREASY

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Fi led with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 30th day of August , 2016 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ The Transcript o f the proceedings was filed on July 25, 2016 ,

and the proposed recommended orders were due August 4, 2016.

Respondent's Proposed W ritten Report and Recommended Order were

timely filed on that date. Petitioner filed a Notice of Filing

Petitioner's Proposed Final Orde r and Motion for Leave to File

O ut of Time on August 8, 2016. Petitioner's Motion failed to

indicate that he conferred with opposing counsel or DFS'

opp os i tion to the Motion. Although Petitioner's excuses for late

filing were not "good cause" for the delay, the Motion was

granted on A ugust 9, 2016 , because Petit i oner is appearing

pro se , and he has indicated h is belief that selling insurance is

his only viable work option. The undersigned wanted to provide

Petitioner with a full and fair opportunity to prove his case.

On August 16, 2016, Respondent filed a Response to

Petitioner's Notice of Filing , and Petitione r also filed a

Response to Respondent's response, neither of which were

considered in the drafting of this Recommended Order.

2 / Neither party filed a copy of the referee ' s recommendation or

the Su preme Court ' s opinion in the The Fl o r ida Bar v. Norkin , 858

So. 2d 332 (Fla. 2003). The information regarding the nature of

Judge Stafford ' s Contempt Order came from The Florida Bar v.

Norkin , 132 So. 3d at 88, Pe t it i oner ' s testimony at final hearing

in this matter and his " Response to O rder to Show Cause , "

att ached as Exhibit B to Petitioner ' s Petit i on for Administrative

Hearing.

3 / Rule 4 - 3.5(c) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in

conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal." Rule 4 - 8.2(a) states

that a lawyer shall not make a statement that the law yer knows to

be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity

concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, mediator,

arbitrator, adjudicatory officer, or public legal officer.

Rule 4 - 8.4(a) provides that a lawyer shall not violate or attempt

to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 4 - 8.4(d)

prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct in connection with

the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of

justice, incl uding to knowingly, or through callous indifferenc e,

disparage or humiliate other lawyers on any basis.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Matthew R. Daley, Esquire

Merribeth Bohanan, Esquire

Department of Financial Services

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Jeffrey A. Norkin

Apa rtment 311

1617 South Federal Highway

Pompano Beach, Florida 33062

(eServed)

Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk

Division of Legal Services

Department of Financial Services

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0390

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RI GHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case .