16-002429EXE
Jamar Hall vs.
Agency For Persons With Disabilities
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Tuesday, September 20, 2016.
Recommended Order on Tuesday, September 20, 2016.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8JAMAR HALL,
10Petitioner,
11vs. Case No. 16 - 2429EXE
17AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH
21DISABILITIES,
22Respondent.
23_______________________________/
24RECOMMENDED ORDER
26A duly - noticed final hearing was held in this case on
38July 19, 2016, via video teleconference with sites in Tallahassee
48and Orlando, Florida, before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Van
57Wyk.
58APPEARANCES
59For Petitioner: Jamar Hall, pro se
65142 Heather Oak Circle
69Lady Lake, Florida 32159
73For Respondent: Andrew Langenbach, Esquire
78Agency for Persons with Disabilities
83Suite S430
85400 West Robinson Street
89Orlando, Florida 32801
92STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
96Whether the Agency for Persons with DisabilitiesÓ (AgencyÓs)
104intended action to deny PetitionerÓs application for exemption
112from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the AgencyÓs
122discretion.
123PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
125By letter dated March 30, 2016, the Agency issued its notice
136of agency action by w hich it informed Petitioner that his request
148for exemption from disqualification was denied. As a result,
157Petitioner was determined to be Ðnot eligible to be employed,
167licensed or registered in positions having direct contact with
176children or developmenta lly disabled people served in programs
185regulated by the Agency.Ñ In the letter, the Agency reported its
196determination that Petitioner had Ðnot submitted clear and
204convincing evidence of [his] rehabilitation.Ñ
209On April 18, 2016, Petitioner filed a Request for
218Administrative Hearing with the Agency (Request). In his
226Request, Petitioner disputed the AgencyÓs determination that he
234had not proven his rehabilitation. On May 2, 2016, the Agency
245referred the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings,
254whic h scheduled a final hearing for July 19, 2016.
264The final hearing commenced as scheduled. Petitioner
271testified on his own behalf, and offered the testimony of his
282wife, Jasmine Hall ; his daughter, Jasharie Hall ; and his father -
293in - law, Pernell Mitchell. P etitionerÓs Composite Exhibit P1 was
304admitted in evidence.
307Respondent presented the testimony of Michael Sauvé, the
315AgencyÓs deputy regional operations manager for the central
323region. RespondentÓs Exhibits A through J , M , and N were
333admitted in evidence.
336A one - volume Transcript of the proceedings was filed on
347August 3, 2016. Respondent timely filed a Proposed Recommended
356Order. Petitioner filed a letter on August 17, 2016, which is
367taken as PetitionerÓs timely - filed proposed recommended order. 1/
377Both p artiesÓ post - hearing submissions have been considered in
388preparing this Recommended Order.
392Ruling on Proffered Exhibit
396At final hearing, Petitioner sought to introduce as an
405exhibit an incident report, and arresting officer narrative, from
414the Leesburg Po lice Department regarding a domestic disturbance
423involving Petitioner in November 2008. Petitioner did not
431disclose the exhibit to the Agency prior to the hearin g, pursuant
443to the Order of Pre hearing Instructions, and did not have the
455exhibit available fo r review by the undersigned at the hearing.
466The undersigned allowed Petitioner to proffer the exhibit and
475provide the undersigned with a copy within five days of the close
487of the hearing.
490Having reviewed the proffered exhibit, the undersigned
497concludes th at the report of an incident which occurred three
508years prior to the disqualifying offense is irrelevant and is not
519admitted in evidence.
522FINDING S OF FACT
526Background
5271. Petitioner is a 29 - year - old male who lives in
540Leesburg, Florida, with his wife, Jasmin e Hall. Petitioner has
550four daughters whom he is actively engaged in parenting. 2/
5602. Petitioner is employed by a bail bond agency owned by
571his father - in - law.
5773. Petitioner is pursuing his bachelorÓs degree in
585organizational management at Lake Sumter Sta te College and
594anticipates graduating Spring 2017.
5984. Petitioner is the second oldest of five children raised
608by their mother, not knowing their fathers. Petitioner described
617his childhood as difficult , being raised without a male role
627model and in a rou gh area of town where violent crime was
640prevalent .
6425. Petitioner explained that he was studious, made good
651grades, and worked odd jobs throughout his childhood and young
661adulthood to help support the family. Despite his work ethic and
672good grades, he did make some poor decisions and fe ll in with the
686wrong crowd. Petitioner was exposed to violent acts in his
696community. In one incident, Petitioner witnessed his best friend
705being shot in the head at a nightclub.
7136. Petitioner has overcome many of the hard ships he
723encountered in his childhood and desires to improve the future
733for himself and his children, provide for his family with a
744steady full - time job, and be financially secure, rather than
755living paycheck - to - paycheck as his mother did.
765The Disqualifyin g Offense
7697. On April 24, 2011, foll owing a visitation with his
780two children at the time, Petitioner returned the children to
790their motherÓs home. The details of the disqualifying offense
799are in dispute, but the record supports the following findings.
8098. Petitioner and the childrenÓs mother became involved in
818a verbal altercation, during which Petitioner threw a can of soda
829at her. The record did not clearly establish that the soda can
841struck the childrenÓs mother, but did establish that soda was
851spla shed on her.
8559. After throwing the soda, Petitioner entered his vehicle
864with the intention to leave. The childrenÓs mother followed him
874and hit the driverÓs side window of PetitionerÓs vehicle, causing
884the driverÓs door to close before PetitionerÓs hand was
893completely inside the vehicle.
89710. This angered Petitioner, who then exited the vehicle.
906The victim ran away from Petitioner, who proceeded to the
916victimÓs vehicle and kicked the side of her vehicle leaving a
927dent in the vehicle. Petitioner then le ft the scene.
93711. PetitionerÓs children, who were inside their motherÓs
945home, did not witness the incident.
95112. According to the police report of the incident, the
961victim had no physical marking on her body, but her shirt was wet
974at the shoulder consis tent with being hit with a soda can.
98613. On May 11, 2011, Petitio ner pled nolo contendere to
997one count of domestic battery and one count of criminal mischief
1008in an amount of $200 or less. Adjudication was withheld and
1019Petitioner was ordered to serve 12 monthsÓ probation, which terms
1029required him to make restitution for the property damage, attend
1039a battererÓs intervention course, maintain no contact with the
1048victim, and incur no new law violations.
105514. Petitioner was granted early termination of probat ion
1064on November 7, 2011, having complied with all terms of the
1075probation.
1076Subsequent Criminal History
107915. Petitioner has had no criminal history subsequent to
1088the disqualifying offense.
109116. Petitioner has been cited for a number of traffic
1101infractions since the incident: three for speeding, one for
1110running a stop sign, and one for driving without a seatbelt. 3/
1122Petitioner was also cited for d riving without a license in
1133May 2014. PetitionerÓs license was in effect, but he failed to
1144have it on his perso n at the time of the traffic stop.
115717. Petitioner has disposed of all his traffic infractions.
1166Subsequent Employment History
116918. Petitioner has been continuously employed since the
1177disqualifying offense, mostly as a laborer. He has unloaded
1186trucks and tracked inventory for Target, cleaned the plant and
1196maintained machines for American Cement Company, and worked as a
1206day laborer for Labor Ready.
121119. Petitioner began working for Angle Truss in June 2015
1221in truss fabrication. Angle Truss is owned by Pe titionerÓs
1231father - in - law, Pernell Mitchell.
123820. Mr. Mitchell testified on PetitionerÓs behalf.
1245Mr. Mitchell was, until recently, a law enforcement officer with
1255the Leesburg Police Department, and served as school resource
1264officer and D.A.R.E. instructor at PetitionerÓs elementary
1271school . 4/ Mr. Mitchell has known Petitioner since Petitioner was
1282in the fifth grade. Mr. Mitchell has chosen to personally mentor
1293Petitioner, and has had significant interactions with him over
1302the past seven or more years.
130821 . Mr. Mitchell owns a bail bonding agency . As of the
1321date of the hearing, Petitioner was employed at Mr. MitchellÓs
1331bail bond agency. Mr. Mitchell finds Petitioner trustworthy
1339enough to leave him in charge of the agency when Mr. Mitchell is
1352out of town.
135522. Mr. Mitchell also owns Wings of Love, a group home and
1367Medicaid Waiver provider in Leesburg, Florida. Mr. Mitchell
1375hosts his group home clients at his personal residence for a
1386family dinner once each week. Petitioner and his family attend
1396the dinn ers, along with the clientsÓ families. Petitioner
1405interacts with the clients during dinner, and often plays
1414basketball or other games with them following dinner.
1422Mr. Mitchell describes Petitioner as caring, patient, and
1430compassionate with the clients. H e has observed that the clients
1441gravitate toward him because he treats them with respect.
1450Subsequent Education and Personal History
145523. Petitioner has attained significant educational goals
1462and taken on many new responsibilities since the 2011 incident.
147224. In 2012, Petitioner joined Citadel of Hope, a church in
1483Leesburg. The following year, Petitioner joined the churchÓs
1491security team, volunteering to guard doorways and patrol the
1500parking lot during services. In 2014, Petitioner joined the
1509churchÓs o utreach ministry, which raises funds to support
1518missionaries abroad and to provide food and toiletries for the
1528local community in need.
153225. Petitioner completed an Ass ociate in Arts degree from
1542Lake Sumter State College in May 2014, and an Associate in
1553Science degree (Criminal Justice Technology) from the college in
1562August 2015. Petitioner continues to pursue his education, and
1571anticipates completing his BachelorÓs degree in organizational
1578management in the spring of 2017. Petitioner has continuously
1587m aintained his employment while in school.
159426. James Cason, a librarian at the college, submitted a
1604character reference letter for PetitionerÓs exemption
1610application. Mr. Cason became familiar with Petitioner through
1618PetitionerÓs use of the library during 2014 and 2015. In the
1629letter, Mr. Cason described Petitioner as determined and having a
1639positive attitude. Mr. Cason was impressed with PetitionerÓs
1647character, his dependability, and his ability to manage his
1656school and work schedules.
166027. In 2014, Pe titioner voluntarily took a parenting class.
1670After pursuing premarital counseling, Petitioner married his
1677wife, Jasmine Hall, in June 2015. Together, Petitioner and his
1687wife, along with the birth mother, are raising his four children.
1698PetitionerÓs Exempt ion Request
170228. On his exemption questionnaire, Petitioner described
1709the events of the disqualifying offense as follows:
1717On 4/24/11, the mother of my kids and I had a
1728verbal disagreement as I attempted to return
1735my children home after my weekend visitati on.
1743She became irate [and] slammed the car door
1751on my wrist. At that point, I threw the
1760remainder of my soda on her. Although it was
1769wrong at the time I thought it was better
1778than physically retaliating and striking her.
1784I also put a small dent in her vehicle before
1794I left. I was subsequently arrested 15
1801minutes later.
180329. Petitioner indicated that there were no stressors in
1812his life at the time of the incident, but that he Ðwas just a
1826little upset about having [his] wrist shut in [his] car door.Ñ
18373 0. Michael Sauvé is the A gencyÓs d eputy r egional
1849o perations m anager for the central region. Mr. Sauvé reviewed
1860PetitionerÓs exemption request and made the recommendation to the
1869director to deny the request.
187431. According to Mr. Sauvé, he recommended de nial of
1884PetitionerÓs exemption request because, in his application,
1891Petitioner was not forthcoming with the details of the offense,
1901minimized the offense, shifted blame to the victim, and did not
1912genuinely express remorse. Further, due to the number of mo ving
1923violations for which Petitioner has been cited since the
1932disqualifying offense, Mr. Sauv doubts PetitionerÓs ability to
1940safely transport clients.
194332. Mr. Sauv questioned the veracity of PetitionerÓs
1951account of the disqualifying offense, particular ly with
1959PetitionerÓs claim that he sustained an injury to his wrist
1969during the altercation. He speculated that Petitioner fabricated
1977the injury Ðafter the factÑ to justify his a ctions on the day in
1991question.
199233. In support of this opinion, Mr. Sauvé twic e pointed to
2004the fact that the police report contains no documentation of
2014PetitionerÓs injury. He testified that Ð[i]f there was something
2023in the police report that talked about the wrist, if there was
2035something in any of the other documents that we saw t hat
2047mentioned this injury to his wrist, I w ould feel a lot
2059differently than I do today.Ñ 5 /
206634. Petitioner testified that he did report his injury to
2076the arresting officer, who did not include it in the report.
208735. Petitioner also credibly described, in some detail, how
2096the injury to his wrist occurred during the altercation with the
2107victim.
210836. The evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner
2118fabricated the injury.
212137. Next, in Mr. SauvÓs opinion, PetitionerÓs response
2129that he Ðput a small d ent in her vehicleÑ was an attempt to
2143minimize the damage he caused to the victimÓs vehicle. Mr. Sauvé
2154explained, ÐThe criminal recor ds show that it -- the criminal
2165mischief charge was $500 in property damage. I donÓt know very
2176much about cars, but that se ems like it might be more than a
2190small dent.Ñ
219238. While the arresting officer estimated the damage to the
2202vehicle at $500, Petitioner was actually charged with criminal
2211mischief in the am ount of $200 or less. No automobile repair
2223expert is needed to est ablish that a small dent may very well
2236cost at least $200 to repair.
224239. Mr. SauvÓs conclusion , that PetitionerÓs response was
2250an attempt to minimize the damage , is inconsistent with
2259PetitionerÓs response to question four, in which he acknowledged
2268causi ng approximately $500 in property damage to the victimÓs
2278car. It is illogical to conclude that Petitioner was attempting
2288to minimize damage to the vehicle in his answer to question one,
2300when three questions later, Petitioner disclosed the exact amount
2309of vehicle damage reported on the arrest affidavit.
231740. Mr. Sauv was particularly troubled by PetitionerÓs
2325answer to question number four, which require d the applicant to
2336explain the Ð[d]egree of harm to victim or property (permanent or
2347temporary), damage o r injuries[.]Ñ In response to that question,
2357Petitioner wrote, ÐThere was no harm to the victim. There was
2368approximately $500 worth of property damage to the victims [sic]
2378car that I made restitution for.Ñ
238441. Mr. Sauv questioned PetitionerÓs conclusi on that there
2393was no harm to the victim. He explained, as follows:
2403If I give him the benefit of the doubt by his
2414statements and I go back to his account
2422thatÓs set f orth on page 27, question 1, it --
2433it doesnÓt sound to me like there w as no harm
2444that the [m other of his children]
2451encountered. She -- he took a soda and threw
2460it at her. When you throw something at
2468someone and physically injure them, whether
2474or not itÓs something that just leaves a
2482bruise or anything, thatÓs scary. 6 /
248942. Apparently, Mr. Sauvé would have liked Petitioner to
2498state, in answer to this question, that Petitioner scared the
2508victim. The victim may have indeed been fearful, but the
2518question does not ask the applicant to speculate as to the
2529victimÓs state of mind at the time of the inc ident. The question
2542is phrased to elicit factual information from the applicant.
2551PetitionerÓs statement that the victim suffered no physical harm
2560is both factual and supported by the police officerÓs observation
2570at the scene that the victim had no physic al markings on her. 7 /
258543. Mr. SauvÓs recommendation to deny the exemption
2593request was further influenced by his belief that the children
2603witnessed the altercation between their parents. He testified as
2612follows:
2613ItÓs especially scary when the children t hat
2621he just finished his visitation with were
2628potentially within earshot. The statements
2633in the police report indicate that the
2640ch ildren were -- they had just went [sic]
2649inside th e house. So if theyÓre outside -- in
2659my mind, was trying to envision the
2666circum stances. And in my mind, I saw them
2675outside, the children inside. I donÓt know
2682if they heard . I donÓt know what happened. 8 /
269344. The only evidence on this issue is the arresting
2703officerÓs statement , as advised by the childrenÓs mother , that
2712the childr en went inside the house be fore the altercation took
2724place . There is no evidence to support a finding that the
2736children either witnessed or overheard the altercation between
2744their parents. Mr. SauvÓs speculation, or his Ðenvision[ing of]
2753the circumstanc es,Ñ is irrelevant. The factual circumstances
2762surrounding the incident are relevant, not what Mr. Sauvé saw in
2773his mind.
277545. Finally, in Mr. SauvÓs opinion, PetitionerÓs answers
2783on the questionnaire do not express remorse for the disqualifying
2793offense.
279446. In particular, Mr. Sauvé pointed to the following two
2804statements made by Petitio ner on the questionnaire:
2812(1) ÐAlthough it was wrong at the time I thought it was better
2825than physically retaliating and striking herÑ; and (2) ÐI regret
2835that I reacted during the situation as opposed to calling the
2846police and filing a report for the physical pain that I endured.Ñ
285847. In Mr. SauvÓs opinion, the first statement was
2867Ðpeculiar and off puttingÑ and he was concerned that five years
2878after the in cident, Peti tioner would remark (in Mr. SauvÓs
2889words), Ðwell, I didnÓt hit her.Ñ
289548 . On the one hand, PetitionerÓs statement does appear to
2906minimize the offense. However, it cannot be overlooked that, on
2916the continuum of battery offenses, throwing soda at a person
2926(with a force such that it leaves absolutely no physical mark) is
2938on the lower, or minimal, end of the scale.
294749 . On the other hand, the first statement documents
2957PetitionerÓs awareness that he had other choices available to him
2967during the incident, and t hat, even during the heat of the
2979moment, Petitioner exercised some degree of restraint. Throwing
2987the soda was indeed a better choice than hitting the mother of
2999his children.
300150 . The second statement is indeed concerning. It is
3011flippant and may be int erpreted to shift blame to the victim. It
3024is understandable how Mr. Sauvé could have been persuaded, based
3034solely on these two statements , that Petitioner was not sincerely
3044remorseful for his offense. Fortunately, the undersigned had an
3053advantage not aff orded the Agency -- live testimony from the
3064Petitioner in connection with his application.
3070Final Hearing
307251 . At the final hearing, Petitioner exhibited none of the
3083flippant attitude that might be gleaned from the two statements
3093discussed above. Petitioner took responsibility for his actions
3101and admitted that he knew it was wrong to throw the soda on the
3115victim. In fact, Petitioner testified that he never should have
3125let the incident escalate and he should have avoided reacting at
3136all.
313752 . Petitioner pre sented as a soft - spoken, intelligent, and
3149earnest individual, whose concern for both his family and the
3159developmentally - disabled community was profound and genuine. His
3168testimony underlined his motivation to improve his circumstances,
3176attain meaningful em ployment, and provide a better quality of
3186life for his family.
319053 . Petitioner was justifiably proud of the educational
3199achievements he has attained since the offense. His dedication
3208to school was equaled by his dedication to the church and the
3220ministrie s with which he has chosen to volunteer.
322954 . While the Agency did consider a character reference
3239letter from Mr. Mitchell, which was included in PetitionerÓs
3248application, the Agency did not have the benefit of
3257Mr. MitchellÓs live testimony. The letter d id not cover the
3268extent of the relationship between Mr. Mitchell and the
3277Petitioner, nor Mr. MitchellÓs dedication to mentoring Petitioner
3285over the last several years.
329055 . Mr. MitchellÓs testimony was both credible and
3299compelling. He exhibited a deep un derstanding of the negative
3309social circumstances Petitioner has overcome, and wisdom
3316regarding the excellent role model Petitioner could serve for
3325young black men and boys. The fact that Mr. Mitchell has been,
3337since June 2015, PetitionerÓs father - in - law , does not diminish
3349the credibility of his testimony. To the contrary, the fact that
3360Petitioner has so recently married into Mr. MitchellÓs family is
3370strong evidence of the trust and confidence that has been earned
3381by Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Mitchell is PetitionerÓs current
3389employer, a fact not evident from his character reference letter.
3399As an employer, Mr. Mitchell has been in a position to observe
3411PetitionerÓs ability to cope with stressful situations in a
3420business setting.
342256 . Mr. MitchellÓs accoun t of PetitionerÓs interaction with
3432current clients at Wings of Love was also unavailable to the
3443Agency during formulation of its intended decision to deny. This
3453testimony was compelling as it underscores PetitionerÓs
3460compassion toward persons with develop mental disabilities, and
3468his demonstrated ability to deal with them respectfully.
347657 . In addition, Petition er introduced in evidence
3485three letters of reference which were not included with h is
3496application.
349758 . The most significant of the letters was subm itted by
3509Tanya Harris - Rocker. Ms. Harris - Rocker was one of PetitionerÓs
3521college instructors with whom he remains in contact. She
3530described Petitioner as bot h diligent and personable.
3538Ms. Harris - Rocker observed that Petitioner meets deadlines,
3547submits qu ality work, and puts in many hours toward his studies.
3559She highlighted Petitioner as an independent thinker and praised
3568him for his ability to separate himself from his peers who have
3580chosen less productive paths. Ms. Harris - Rocker attested to
3590Petitioner Ós goals of attaining educational achievements and
3598providing an exemplary role model for his children.
360659 . Despite the isolated incident occurring more than five
3616years ago, Petitioner has a cordial relationship with the mother
3626of his children and they wor k cooperatively to raise their
3637children in a positive environment. Petitioner is determined to
3646give his children the stability and support of two loving,
3656devoted parents, an advantage he was denied.
366360 . The record is devoid of evidence that Petitioner wo uld
3675pose a threat to residents of a group home for the
3686developmentally disabled.
3688CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
369161 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has
3699jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceeding, and the
3709parties thereto, pursuant to sections 120.5 69 and 120.57(1),
3718Florida Statutes (2015). 9 /
372362 . Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, provides, in
3731pertinent part, that:
3734(1)(a) All employees required by law to be
3742screened pursuant to this section must
3748undergo security background investigations as
3753a cond ition of employment and continued
3760employment which includes, but need not be
3767limited to, fingerprinting for statewide
3772criminal history records checks through the
3778Department of Law Enforcement, and national
3784criminal history records checks through the
3790Federa l Bureau of Investigation, and may
3797include local criminal records checks through
3803local law enforcement agencies.
3807* * *
3810(3) The security background investigations
3815under this section must ensure that no person
3823subject to this section has been found guilty
3831of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a
3838plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any
3846offense that constitutes domestic violence as
3852defined in s. 741.28, whether such act was
3860committed in this state or in another
3867jurisdiction.
386863 . The Agency bas ed its disqualification of Petitioner on
3879his 2011 nolo contendere plea to battery.
388664 . Pursuant to section 741.28(2), Florida Statutes,
3894PetitionerÓs battery offense constituted Ðdomestic violence.Ñ
390065 . Section 435.07 establishes a process by which perso ns
3911with criminal offenses in their backgrounds, that would
3919disqualify them from acting in a position of special trust
3929working with children or vulnerable adults, may seek an exemption
3939from disqualification. That section provides:
3944435.07 Exemptions from disqualification. --
3949Unless otherwise provided by law, the
3955provisions of this section shall apply to
3962exemptions from disqualification for
3966disqualifying offenses revealed pursuant to
3971background screenings required under this
3976chapter, regardless of whether tho se
3982disqualifying offenses are listed in this
3988chapter or other laws.
3992(1)(a) The head of the appropriate agency
3999may grant to any employee otherwise
4005disqualified from employment an exemption
4010from disqualification for:
40131. Felonies for which at least 3 years have
4022elapsed since the applicant for the exemption
4029has completed or been lawfully released from
4036confinement, supervision, or sanction for the
4042disqualifying felony;
4044* * *
4047(3)(a) In order for the head of an agency to
4057grant an exemption to any employee, t he
4065employee must demonstrate by clear and
4071convincing evidence that the employee should
4077not be disqualified from employment.
4082Employees seeking an exemption have the
4088burden of setting forth clear and convincing
4095evidence of rehabilitation, including, but
4100not limited to, the circumstances surrounding
4106the criminal incident for which an exemption
4113is sought, the time period that has elapsed
4121since the incident, the nature of the harm
4129caused to the victim, and the history of the
4138employee since the incident, or any other
4145evidence or circumstances indicating that the
4151employee will not present a danger if
4158employment or continued employment is
4163allowed.
4164* * *
4167(c) The decision of the head of an agency
4176regarding an exemption may be contested
4182through the hearing procedur es set forth in
4190chapter 120. The standard of review by the
4198administrative law judge is whether the
4204agencyÓs intended decision is an abuse of
4211discretion.
421266 . An exemption from a statute enacted to protect the
4223public welfare is strictly construed agains t the person claiming
4233the exemption. See Heburn v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. , 772 So. 2d
4246561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
425167 . The abuse of discretion standard of review set forth in
4263section 435.07(3)(c) has been described as follows:
4270If reasonable men could dif fer as to the
4279propriety of the action taken by the trial
4287court, then the action is not unreasonable
4294and there can be no finding of an abuse of
4304discretion. The discretionary ruling of the
4310trial judge should be disturbed only when his
4318decision fails to sati sfy this test of
4326reasonableness.
4327* * *
4330The discretionary power that is exercised by
4337a trial judge is not, however, without
4344limitation . . . . [T]he trial courts'
4352discretionary power was never intended to be
4359exercised in accordance with whim or caprice
4366o f the judge nor in an inconsistent manner.
4375Canakaris v. Canakaris , 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980); Kareff
4386v. Kareff , 943 So. 2d 890, 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that,
4399pursuant to the abuse of di scretion standard, the test is
4410Ð whether any reasonabl e person Ñ could take the position under
4422review).
442368 . The statutorily - enumerated factors to be considered by
4434the Agency in evaluating an exemption application are the
4443circumstances surrounding the incident, the time period that has
4452elapsed since the incid ent, the nature of the harm caused to the
4465victim, and the history of the employee since the incident, or
4476Ð any other evidence or circumstances indicating that the employee
4486will not present a danger if employment or continued employment
4496is allowed. Ñ £ 435.0 7(3)(a), Fla. Stat.
450469 . The circumstances surrounding the incident in question
4513include an emotionally - charged situation between two parents,
4522whose personal relationship had deteriorated, but who were
4530nevertheless forced to interact due to shared parenting .
4539Jealousy and anger were at play, and the outcome was fairly
4550typical -- harsh words were exchanged and both parties reacted with
4561some degree of violence. The evidence established that the
4570incident was a singular, isolated event. The evidence does not
4580sup port a finding that a similar circumstance would arise in the
4592group home environment, triggering the type of emotions that
4601surfaced during the incident. However, assuming those emotions
4609were stirred in Petitioner, he has demonstrated that he has the
4620self - control to react without violence .
462870 . Other relevant circumstances include that the incident
4637was brief and the children were not witnesses. Moreover, the
4647nature of the harm to the victim was minor, the police report
4659noting that the victim Ðdid not have any physical markings on
4670her.Ñ
467171 . In considering the factor of time, the Agency took the
4683position that not enough time had passed since the incident for
4694Petitioner to have demonstrated rehabilitation. On the contrary,
4702five years is significant in the ca se at hand. The passing of
4715five years in a personÓs 20s can bring about significant changes
4726and maturity. Petitioner has grown from a young, single man
4736of 24 , trudging throug h low - paying labor - related jobs, to a
4750married man of 29 with more responsible em ployment, dedicated to
4761the pursuit of his education and the betterment of his family.
477272 . As to the last factor, Petitioner has a marked
4783personal, professional, and educational history since the
4790incident. Petitioner has been employed in a professional
4798bu siness, and entrusted, at times, with management of that
4808business. Petitioner has engaged with the substantial support
4816system of a church, actively participating in the ministries
4825thereof and volunteering his time to serve both his immediate
4835community and communities abroad. Petitioner has also embarked
4843on one of the most serious adult relationships by committing to
4854marriage. He is matched by his wife in dedication to raising his
4866children in a loving and stable environment. Finally,
4874PetitionerÓs educati onal achievements evidence his pursuit to
4882improve his life and the life of his family.
489173 . Petitioner proved his rehabilitation, clearly and
4899convincingly, with substantial evidence that was not before the
4908Agency when formulating its intended action to den y PetitionerÓs
4918request.
491974 . Having determined that Petitioner carried his burden to
4929establish rehabilitation, the inquiry turns to whether the
4937AgencyÓs intended action to deny PetitionerÓs request for
4945exemption constitutes an abuse of discretion. In J.D. v.
4954Department of Children and Families , 114 So. 3d 1127, 1132
4964(Fla. 1st DCA 2013), the First District Court of Appeal
4974established that:
4976[A] lthough the ultimate legal issue to be
4984determined by the ALJ in a proceeding under
4992section 435.07(3)(c) is whether t he agency
4999head's intended action was an Ðabuse of
5006discretion,Ñ the ALJ is to evaluate that
5014question based on the facts determined from
5021the evidence presented at a de novo chapter
5029120 hearing.
503175 . Based on Mr. SauvÓs testimony at the final hearing,
5042the AgencyÓs intended action to deny PetitionerÓs application
5050appears to have been based on speculation about the circumstances
5060surrounding the incident and his opinion that Petitioner was
5069untruthful in his responses on the questionnaire. As discussed
5078in the Findings of Fact, Mr. SauvÓs speculation was irrelevant,
5088and his opinion as to PetitionerÓs veracity unfounded. Given the
5098facts determined at the hearing, it is unreasonable to conclude
5108that Petitioner would pose a threat to developmentally - di sabled
5119adu lts or children in a group home setting.
512876 . While it may not have been an abuse of discretion for
5141the Agency to deny PetitionerÓs request based solely on the
5151information submitted with his exemption application, the clear
5159and convincing evidence adduced at the final hearing leads the
5169undersigned to conclude that Petitioner does not currently
5177present a danger to vulnerable clients of the Agency if employed
5188as a direct care service provider for de velopmentally - disabled
5199persons. In light thereof, it would c onstitute an abuse of
5210discretion for the Agency to deny his request for an exemption
5221from disqualification.
5223RECOMMENDATION
5224Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
5234Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order by the Agency for
5246Persons with D isabilities be entered granting PetitionerÓs
5254request for an exemption from disqualification.
5260DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of September , 2016 , in
5270Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
5274S
5275SUZANNE VAN WYK
5278Administrative Law Ju dge
5282Division of Administrative Hearings
5286The DeSoto Building
52891230 Apalachee Parkway
5292Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
5297(850) 488 - 9675
5301Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847
5307www.doah.state.fl.us
5308Filed with the Clerk of the
5314Division of Administrative Hearings
5318this 20th day of September , 2016 .
5325ENDNOTE S
53271/ The Agency filed no objection to the timeliness of
5337PetitionerÓs post - hearing submittal.
53422/ The record does not clearly establish which, if any, of the
5354children reside with Petitioner and his wife.
53613/ The Comprehensiv e Case Information System report regarding
5370Petitioner includes another traffic infraction noted as
5377ÐDatashare Traffic InfractionÑ but does not list either the
5386number or title of the statute violated. The evidence is
5396insufficient to find that P etitioner ha s had more than
5407six traffic infractions since the disqualifying event.
54144/ Mr. Mitchell has subsequently retired from the Leesburg
5423Police Department.
54255 / T38:10 - 13.
54306 / T40:18 - 25.
54357 / It is important to note that physical injury is not a
5448required eleme nt of the crime of battery . See § 784.03(1) ,
5460Fla. Stat. (B attery o ccurs when a person either Ð [a] ctually and
5474intentionally touches or strikes another perso n against the will
5484of the other;Ñ or Ð [i] ntentionally causes bodily harm to another
5497person.Ñ ) Ther efore, the Agency cannot infer from PetitionerÓs
5507nolo plea that the victim actually suffered bodily injury.
55168 / T41:1 - 8.
55219 / All references herein to the Florida Statutes are to the 2015
5534version.
5535COPIES FURNISHED:
5537Jamar Hall
5539142 Heather Oaks Circle
5543La dy Lake, Florida 32159
5548Andrew Langenbach, Esquire
5551Agency for Persons with Disabilities
5556Suite S430
5558400 West Robinson Street
5562Orlando, Florida 32801
5565(eServed)
5566Lori Oakley, Acting Agency Clerk
5571Agency for Persons with Disabilities
55764030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380
5581Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950
5586(eServed)
5587Barbara Palmer, Director
5590Agency for Persons with Disabilities
55954030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380
5600Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950
5605(eServed)
5606Richard Ditschler, General Counsel
5610Agency for Persons with Disabili ties
56164030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380
5621Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950
5626(eServed)
5627NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
5633All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
564315 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions
5654to this Re commended Order should be filed with the agency that
5666will issue the Final Order in this case.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 09/20/2016
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- Date: 08/03/2016
- Proceedings: Transcript of Proceedings (not available for viewing) filed.
- Date: 07/19/2016
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- PDF:
- Date: 07/15/2016
- Proceedings: Letter to Judge Van Wyk from Jamar Hall enclosing Respondent's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
- Date: 07/14/2016
- Proceedings: (Amended) Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
- Date: 07/14/2016
- Proceedings: Petitioner's Proposed Exhibits filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 07/14/2016
- Proceedings: Letter to Judge Van Wyk from Andrew Langenbach enclosing late submission of evidence filed.
Case Information
- Judge:
- SUZANNE VAN WYK
- Date Filed:
- 05/02/2016
- Date Assignment:
- 05/03/2016
- Last Docket Entry:
- 12/19/2016
- Location:
- Orlando, Florida
- District:
- Middle
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO
- Suffix:
- EXE
Counsels
-
Jamar Hall
Address of Record -
Andrew Langenbach, Esquire
Address of Record