16-003461 Claudia S. Williams vs. Escambia County School District Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, January 31, 2017.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove employment discrimination based on race, age, or retaliation.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CLAUDIA S. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 16 - 3461

ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

An administrative hearing was conducted in this case on

October 28 , 2016 , in Pensacola , Florida, before James H.

Peterson, III, Administrative Law Judge with the Division of

Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

F or Petitioner: Jamison Jessup

557 Noremac Avenue

Deltona, Florida 32738

For Respondent: Joseph L. Hammons , Esquire

The Hammons Law Firm, P.A.

17 West Cervantes Street

Pensacola, Florida 32 501

S TATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respondent , Escambia County School District

( Respondent , School District , or School Board ) , violated the

Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01 Î 760.11 and

509.092, Florida Statutes, 1/ by discriminating against

Petitioner , Claudia Williams (Petitioner) , based upon

PetitionerÓs race , age , or in retaliation for her participation

in protected activity.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On April 22 , 2015 , Petitioner filed a n Employment Charge of

Discrimination (Complaint) with the Florida Commission on Human

Relations (Commission or FCHR ) , alleging that Respondent had

discriminated against her based upon her race and age, and

retaliated against her in violation of the Florida Civil Rights

Act. The Commission investigated the Complaint, whi ch was

assigned FCHR No. 201 500 806 .

Following completion of its investigation, the CommissionÓs

executive director issued a Determination dated May 13, 201 6 ,

stating that that Ðno reasonable cause exists to believe that an

unlawful practice occurred.Ñ That same day , the Commission sent

Petitioner a Notice of Determination : No Reasonable Cause

(Notice) which advised Petitioner of h er right to file a

Petition for Relief within 35 days of the Notice . Petitioner

timely filed a Petition for Relief wit h FCHR on June 15, 2016 .

FCHR referred the matter to the Divisi on of Administrative

Hearings and the case was assigned to the undersigned to conduct

an administrative hearing pursuant to chapter 120, Florida

Statutes.

The final hearing was originally scheduled for August 17,

2016, but was subsequently rescheduled for October 28, 2016,

after RespondentÓs unopposed Motion to Continue and Reschedule

Hearing was granted.

At the final hearing, Petitioner testified on her ow n

behalf and called as witnesses Dr. Alan Scott, Glen Smith, Jim

Taylor, and Lisa Arnold. Petitioner submitted in to evidence ,

without objection , E xhibits P - D1 ; P - E5 ; P - E2 ; P - A , p. 29 ; P - D 2 ;

P - A , pp. 285, 286; and P - A , pp. 204 - 243. Respondent presented

the testimony of Steven Marcanio and submitted in to evidence ,

without objection , E xhibits R - 1 and R - 2. In addition, as

authorized during the final hearing, on October 31, 2016,

Respondent timely submitted a Post - Hearing Submission,

consisting of documents identifying the compensation Petitioner

would have received had she been a successful applicant for th e

two positions identified in School District job postings

00047313 and 00048094.

The proceedings were recorded and a transcript was ordered.

The parties were given 30 days from the filing of the transcript

within which to file proposed r ecommended o rders. A one - volume

Transcript of the proceedings was filed December 7, 2016.

Respondent timely filed its P roposed Recommended Order on

January 6, 2017, which was considered in preparing this

Recommended Order. Petitioner did not file a proposed

r ec ommended o rder .

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner, Claudia S. Williams, also known as Claudia

Curry Brown Williams , is a 60 - year - old African - American woman.

2. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner had worked

for the School District for 28 years and was employed by

Respondent as a g uidance c ounselor.

3. During her employment with Respondent, Petitioner was

evaluated annually . The School District's employee evaluation

forms during the pertinent time period included evaluation

categories of "needs improvement," "effective," and "highly

effective." F or school year 2016, Petitioner was evaluated

" effective. "

4. The parties ag ree that the relevant time frame for

PetitionerÓs Complaint is limited to one year prior to April 22,

2015, the date that Petitioner's Complaint was filed with FCHR.

5. In her Complaint, Petitioner alleges that she was

denied promotion to the administrative position of assistant

p rincipal because of race, age, and retaliation. There were

three assistant p rincipal positions for which Petitioner appli ed

in the year leading up to the filing of her Complaint . The

three positions are identified by School District job posting

n umbers 000 48094, 000 48095, and 000 47313. Job posting 000 48095

is not at issue because Petitioner withdrew her application for

that position prior to completion of the selection process .

6. The School D i strict considers applicants and fills

positions for administrative positions throu gh a selection

process involving a selection committee. According to the

School District's selection process, t he selection committee

interviews all qualified applicants. All qualified applicants

interviewed are ranked in order based on numerical scores

assigned by the selection committee members. The names of the

highest ranked applicants are then sent to the School District's

superintendent for consideration . The super intendent is

responsible for selecting the successful candidate from among

those listed as most qualified. The superintendent is not

involved with the selection committee's scoring process .

7. The candidate who is selected by the superintendent is

then s ubmitted to the School Board for approval of an employment

contract. The School Board may only reject the superintendent Ós

recommendations of candidates to fill vacant positions for just

cause.

8. School District s election committees that interview

candidates for administrative positions are organized by the

School District's director of the Division of E ducation for the

position at issue. The School District's director of elementary

e ducation is responsible for or ganiz ing selection committee s for

elementary school administrative positions. The selection

committee s are organized based on objective human resource

materials identifying the types of persons that should serve on

selection committees. In addition to ot her members, t he

director of education for the school level at issue participate s

in the selection committee, along with a member of the

bargaining unit for the teacherÓs unit , and a paren t

representative.

9. Selection committees are sometimes called upo n to fill

more than one position. The committees follow the same process

for interviewing applicants each time, whether there is one

position to be filled or several positions. The committee

develops the questions that will be asked of applicants for the

positions at issue. Once the questions are agreed upon , the

same questions are asked of every applicant. Each committee

member receives a packet consisting of each applicantÓs

application, resume, and background material.

10. T he two selection committees that considered

Petitioner , and applicants for the two positions at issue ,

consist ed of a variety of individuals , including parents. Th e

committee members had the task of scoring each applicant and

giving them a numerical score that was then r anked. Petitioner

did not i dentify anyone on either of the two selection

committees as demonstrating any racial or age bias in their

communications with Petitioner.

11. F or the two positions at issue, position posting

number 00048094 and position posting number 00047313,

Petitioner's name was not included on the short list of those

deemed most qualified by the selection committees that was sent

to the superintendent for selection .

12. Position postin g number 00048094 was for an assistant

principal position. With regard to that position, Petitioner

was ranked 25 out of 26 of the applicants evaluated by the

selection committee. As an applicant who was ranked 25 out of

26 applicants, according to the S chool District's process,

Petitioner's name would not be among those sent to the

superintendent for final selection.

13. Position posting number 000 47313 was also for an

assistant principal position. The selection committee for that

posting ranked Petit ioner 26 out of 27 applicants. Therefore,

PetitionerÓs name was not among those submitted to the

superintendent for selection for that position.

14. Steven Marcanio, at all pertinent times, s erved as the

School District's a ssistant superintendent for curriculum

i nstruction. In that capacity, Mr. Marcanio oversees all of the

departments that service students in elementary, middle, and

high school, as well as alternative educa tion. He previously

served as d irector of middle s chools. By virtue of his

position, Mr. Marcanio is familiar with the selection process

the School District utilizes when considering applicants for

administrative positions. His experience includes actual

service on selection committees considering candidates for

administrati ve positions.

15. Mr. Marcanio presented credible testimony that age and

race are not considerations that are allowed to be considered by

selection committees for the selection of the names of those

applicants deemed most qualified to be sent to the

superintendent . The purpose of the selection committee scoring

is to send to the superintendent the names of those applicants

deemed best qualified among the group of applicants for the

position at issue. Under the School District's process, t he

superintendent does not have the ability to influence the

scoring of applicants for administrative positions.

16. Petitioner submitted no evidence to support her claim

that she was unlawfully denied selection for the two positions at

issue . In an attemp t to support the allegations of her

Complaint, Petitioner testified that she was told by Jim Taylor,

a 2012 selection committee member, that at the end of the

interview process with the selection committee in 2012 , the

School District's director of element ary e ducation, Linda

Malesides, said that Petitioner did not meet n ecessary

qualifications and her name could not be submitted to the

superintendent because the superintendent Ðdoes not like her . Ñ

17. Jim Taylor was called to testify at the hearing in this

cause. Mr. Taylor testified he is employed by the School

Distr ict as a social worker. He testified that he thought

Petitioner had applied a number of times for a couple of

different jobs. When asked whether it was for either of the two

positions at issue , he testified that he did not remember.

Mr. Taylor described the subject of his testimony as Ða few

years ago .Ñ Mr. Taylor stated that there was an occasion where

he had a conversation with Petitioner and that he told her there

was a c omment made by someone from the District that he did not

agree with. According to Mr. Taylor, the comment that he

recalled consisted of an ind ividual saying to the committee that

it does not matter how you score her, the superintendent does

not want her. He did not recall the person who made that

statement , but described the person as Ða District person . Ñ He

did not know the personÓs position. Rather, he stated that

Ð[t] hey worked for the District .Ñ

18. School District recor ds reflect that in June of 2012,

Mr. Taylor served on a selection committee for job posting

000 45934, for employment as a Coordinator III for Student

Services. Mr. Taylor acknowledged scoring all of the applicants

during that selection process along with other committee members

and agreed that if School District records reflect all committee

members ranked applicant Lisa Joiner, the person selected, as

the best qualified , that h e would not dispute that .

Mr. Taylor's testimony does not support Petitioner's Complaint.

19. Petitioner also testified that Carolyn Spooner, the

School District's director of h igh s chools, told Petitioner that

Petitioner had not been given credit for prior administrative

experience. No time frame was provided for this statement.

Petitioner testified that her administrative experience included

that of a school p rincipal and as a teacher in charge of a teen

parent program for the School District.

20. PetitionerÓs Complaint includes the allegation that

she feels that the superintend ent Ðis blackballing meÑ because

she ran for the same elective position as the superintendent and

that he tried to convince her to drop out of the race , which she

declined to do. When asked at hearing about that allegation and

her clai ms that she had been denied the administrative positions

at issue, Petitioner acknowledged that her name was not on the

short list prepared by the selection committee representing

those deemed most qualified . Petitioner also acknowledged that

her name was not among those the s uperintendent was in a

position to consider when reviewing those deemed best qualified

by the selection committee for the positions at issue .

21. In sum, the evidence was insufficient to support

Petitioner's claim of age, race, or retaliation discrimination.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

22. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this

proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin.

Code R. 60Y - 4.016(1).

23. The s tate of Florida secures freedom from

discrimination for its citizens under the legislative scheme

contained in sections 760.01 - 760.11 a nd 509.092, Florida

Statutes, known as the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the

Act). Section 760.10(2)(b) of the Act prohibits discrim ination

in the workplace , and makes it unlawful for an employer:

To limit, segregate, or classify employees

or applicants for employment in any way

which would deprive or tend to deprive any

individual of employment opportunities, or

adversely affect any i ndividualÓs status as

an employee, because of such individualÓs

race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy,

national origin, age, handicap, or marital

status.

24. In addition , section 760.10(7) of the A ct makes it an

unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate

against a person because that person has, Ðopposed any practice

which is an unlawful employment practiceÑ or because that person

Ðhas made a charge . . . under this subsection.Ñ

25. The Act incorporates and adopts the legal principles

and precedents established in the federal anti - discrimination

laws specifically set forth under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

26. Florida courts have held that because the Act is

patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, federal case law dealing with Title VII is applicable .

See, e.g. , Fla. Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205,

1209 (Fla. 1st D CA 1991); Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC ,

18 So. 3d 17, 21 - 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

27. As developed in federal cases, discrimination under

Title VII may be established by statistical proof of a pattern

of discrimination, or on the basis of direct ev idence which, if

believed, would prove the existence of discrimination without

inference or presumption. 2/ Usually, however, direct evidence is

lacking and one seeking to prove discrimination must rely on

circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, using the

shifting burden of proof pattern established in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Holifield v.

Reno , 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997).

28. Under the shifting burden pattern developed in

McDonnell Douglas :

First, [Petitioner] has the burden of

proving a prima facie case of discrimination

by a preponderance of the evidence. Second,

if [Petitioner] sufficiently establishes a

prima facie case, the burden shifts to

[Respondent] to Ðarticulate some legitimate,

n ondiscriminatory reasonÑ for its action.

Third, if [Respondent] satisfies this

burden, [Petitioner] has the opportunity to

prove by a preponderance that the legitimate

reasons asserted by [Respondent] are in fact

mere pretext.

U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Blackwell , 908 F.2d 864,

870 (11th Cir. 1990)(housing discrimination claim); accord ,

Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC , 18 So. 3d at 22 (gender

discrimination claim)("Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a

plaintiff must first establish , by a preponderance of the

evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination.").

29. In this case , Petitioner did not present statistical

or direct evidence of discrimination . Therefore, in order to

prevail in her claim against the School District , Petitioner

must first establish a prima facie case by a preponderance of

the evidence. Id. ; § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. ("Findings of

fact shall be based upon a preponderance of the evidence, except

in penal or licensure proceedings or except as otherwis e

provided by statute and shall be based exclusively on the

evidence of record and on matters officially recognized.").

30. Petitioner alleges that the School District

discriminated against her based upon PetitionerÓs race and age,

and in retaliation for her participation in protected activity.

The evidence, summarized in the Findings of Fact, above, does

not support those claims and Petitioner otherwise failed to

present sufficient evidence necessary to establish even a prima

facie case for any of those claims. PetitionerÓs claims are

analyzed under separate headings A through C, below.

A. Race Discrimination

31. In order to prevail on her claim of discrimination

based on race, t he Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a

prima facie case . In the failure - to - promote context, the prima

facie case consists of showing these elements: (1) that the

plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) that she applied for

and was qualified for a promotion; (3) that she was rejected

despite her qualifications; and (4) that other equally or less -

qualified employees outside her class were promoted. Wilson v.

B/E Aero. , Inc. , 376 F.3d 1079, 1089 (11 th Cir. 2004). The

comparators for the fourth prong must be Ðsimilarly situated in

all relevant respectsÑ. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d at 1562 .

32. If a plaintiff makes the required showing of a prima

facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate, non - discriminatory reason for its

actions. Rojas v. Fl a . , 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11 th Cir. 2002)

(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. at 802 ) .

Once the employer ÐarticulatesÑ one or more reasons, the

presumption of discrimination is rebutted and the burden of

production shifts to the plaintiff to offer evidence that the

alleged reason of the employer is a pretext for illegal

discrimination. Wilson v. B/E Aero, Inc. , 376 F.3d at 1087.

33. In this case , Petitioner failed to establish a prima

facie case of race discrimination because she failed to present

direct or circumstantial evidence that other equally or less -

qualified employees outside her class (race) were promoted.

Because the selection process for the two administrative

positions at issue invo lved all applicants meeting minimum

qualifications, it was incumbent upon the Petitioner to

demonstrate with cre dible evidence that a similarly situated ,

equally - qualified employee outside the protected class was

treated more favorably.

34. Petitioner did not present evidence that any of the

applicants were treated more favorably than Petitioner. The

only evidence of record is that the selection committees,

without any evidence of racial bias, ranked numerous qualified

applicants based on scores assign ed by individual members of the

selection committees and that those deemed best qualified had

their names forwarded to th e s uperintendent for selection.

According to the numerical scores assigned by the members of the

selection committees, Petitioner was among the least qualified

after rankings were completed for the two positions at issue.

While , ultimately , the person s selected to fill the position s at

issue received favorable consideration, there is no evidence

that the selection committees ' evaluations and ranking of the

applicants was other than fair and impartial.

35. Even if Petitioner had established a prima facie claim

of racial discrimination, RespondentÓs legitimate, non -

discriminatory reason proffered at the final hearing was that

only the names of the most qualified and highly ranked

applicants were submitted to the superintendent for selection of

the successfu l applicant. For both positions , Petitioner was

ranked near the bottom of all the applicants. RespondentÓs

legitimate non - discriminatory reason for the selection of the

successful applicants is that they were among those ranked by

the selection committee s as the best qualified.

36. N o evidence was presented indicating that race played

any role in the ranking of the candidates by the selection

committee s . The superintendent was constrained to select the

successful candidate from among those presented to him by the

committee s as highest ranked and best qualified , and he did so.

Petitioner failed to demonstrate Ðweaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the

employerÓs proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a

reasonable fact finder could find unworthy of credence. Ñ See

Combs v. Plantation Patterns, Meadowcraft Inc., 106 F.3d 1519,

1538 (11 th Cir. 1997).

B. Age Discrimination

37. A plaintiff claiming discrimination based on age bears

the ultimate burden of proving that age was a determining factor

in the employerÓs decision. As in race discrimination, t he

elements for a prima facie showing of age discrimination follow

the pattern for other Title VII discrimination cases using the

McDonnell Douglas s tandard, in which Petitioner must make a

showing that : (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was

qualified for the position at issue; (3) she suffered an adverse

employm ent action; and (4) a similarly situated employee outside

the protected class was treated more favorably.

38. As to the first element, i t is undisputed that

PetitionerÓs age, 60, is in an age - protected class. As for the

second element, it is undisputed that Petitioner was qualified

f or the two positions at issue because only qualified candidates

were interviewed. The Petitioner can also satisfy the third

element of a prima facie case because she suffered an adverse

employment action by not being selected for either of the two

positio ns. Petitioner cannot, however, satisfy the fourth

element of a prima facie case. Petitioner has not demonstrated

with any evidence of record that Respondent treated similarly

situated employees of a different age or any age more favorably.

See City of Hollywood v. Hogan, 986 So. 2d 634, 641 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2008) ; Johnny L. Torrence v. Hendrick Honda Daytona , Case

No . 14 - 5506 ( Fla. DOAH Feb. 26, 2015; Fla. FCHR May 21, 2015).

39. While PetitionerÓs Complaint includes discrimi nation

on the basis of age, Petitioner presented no evidence that age

played any role in the selection of the successful candidates

for the two positions at issue. Because Petitioner failed to

demonstrate that she was treated less favorably than other

equally qualified applicants be cause of age, she did not

demonstrate a prima facie case.

40. Even if Petitioner had established a prima facie c ase

of age discrimination, RespondentÓs legitimate non -

discriminatory reason proffered at hearing was that only the

names of the most qualified and highly ranked applicants were

submitted to the superintendent for selection of the successful

applicant. For both positions considered , Petitioner was ranked

near the bottom of all the applicants. Petitioner failed to

submit any evidence to rebut the employerÓs legitimate non -

discriminatory reason for selecting successful candidates, that

being that the best qualified were selected.

C. Retaliation

41. The Act prohibits an employer from retaliating

against an employee that has opposed an unlawful act. See

§ 760.10 (7) , Fla. Stat. This opposition is often referred to

as the employee Ð engaging in protected activity.Ñ Similar to

claims of race and age discrimination, clai ms of retaliation

are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden - shifting

paradigm.

42. In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of

retaliation, Petitioner must show: (1) that she was engaged in

statutorily protected expression or conduct; (2) that she

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is

some causal relationship between the two events. Holifield v.

Reno , 115 F . 3d at 15 5 6. The lesser standard of Ðsome causal

relationshipÑ articulated in Holifield has been replaced with

Ðthe causation in factÑ standard. In University of Texas

Southwestern Medical Center v . Nassar , 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525

(2013), the United States Supreme Court held that the proper

standard of causation for Title VII retaliation clai ms would be

causation in fact rather than the lesser motivating - factor

standard applicable to status - based 3/ claims of discrimination .

Id. at 2534.

43. If the employee makes out a prima facie case of

retaliation, then the burden shifts to the employer to

demonstrate a legitimate, non - retaliatory reason for its

challenged action. Once the employer does so, the burden

returns to the employee to demonstrate that the employerÓs

articulated reason is pretext for retaliatory action. See

McDonnell Douglas , supra .

44. Before the Complaint filed April 22, 2015, the only

protected activity that Petitioner demonstrate d i s that she

filed previous EEOC c omplaints of discrimina tion. This would,

arguably, satisfy the fir st part of the three - part test.

45. P etitioner also demonstrated the second element by

showing adverse employment action, given the fact she was not

the successful applicant.

46. Petitioner, however, failed to satisfy the third

element for a prima facie case of retaliation in that she did

not provide credible evidence showing a causal relationship

between her previous EEOC complaints and her failure to secure

the two administrative positions at issue. Petitioner presented

no evidence that those who served on the selection committees

for the two positions had any knowledge that Petitioner had

engaged in a protected activity , or that, even if it is assumed

that one or more members of the selection co mmittee had such

knowledge, the alleged protected activity had any relationship

whatsoever with the overall committee evaluation finding

Petitioner among the least qualified of those candidates

interviewed.

47. Thus, Petitioner failed to demonstrate a prima facie

case of retaliation . Even if she had, the evidence otherwise

demonstrated that the selection process for the two positions

was designed and functioned to identify those best qualified and

that the names of those deemed best qualified were submitted to

the superintendent for selection. Petitioner Ós name was not

among those deemed bes t qualified and there is no evidence that

Petitioner was treated unfairly with regard to the evaluation

and selection process.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of

Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms

of this Recommended Order.

DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January , 2017 , in

Tall ahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

JAMES H. PETERSON, III

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 31st day of January , 2017 .

ENDNOTES

1/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Florida

Statutes, Florida Administrative Code, and federal laws are to

the current versions which have not substantively changed since

the time of the alleged discrimination.

2 / For instance, an example of direct evidence in an age

discrimination case would be the employer's memorandum stating,

ÐFire [petitioner] Î he is too old,Ñ clearly and directly

evincing that the plaintiff was terminated based on his age.

See Earl e y v. Champio n Int'l Corp. , 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th

Cir. 1990).

3/ That is , race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Jamison Jessup

557 Noremac Avenue

Deltona, Florida 32738

(eServed)

Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire

The Hammons Law Firm, P.A.

17 West Cervantes Street

Pensacola, Florida 32501

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any e xceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.