16-003611 Yanira Santoni vs. Paradise One Realty Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, January 25, 2017.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was subject to unlawful discrimination on the basis of her religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

YANIRA SANTONI,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 16 - 3611

PARADISE ONE REALTY,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

The final hearing in this matter was conduct ed before

J. Bruce Culpepper, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administrative Hearings, pursuant to sections 120.569 and

120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2016), 1/ on October 18, 2016, in

Orlando, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Tushaar Desai, Esquire

Desai Law, P.A.

1916 East Robinson Street

Orlando, Florida 32803

For Respondent: John W. Bolanovich, Esquire

Bogin Munns & Munns, P . A .

Suite 1000

1000 Legion Place - Gateway Center

Orlando, Florida 32801

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respondent, Paradise One Realty, discriminated

against Petitioner, Yanira Santoni, in violation of the Florida

Fair Housing Act ; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is

entitled.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On February 11, 2016, Petitioner filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development (ÐHUDÑ) alleging that Respondent, Paradise One Realty

(ÐParadise OneÑ) , violated the Florida Fair Housing Act.

Petitioner alleged that Paradise One discriminated against her

based on her religion. HUD forwarded PetitionerÓs complaint to

the Florida Commission on Human Relations (the ÐCommissionÑ).

On June 1, 2016, the Comm ission notified Petitioner that

reasonable cause did not exist to believe that Paradise One had

committed a di scriminatory housing practice.

On June 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief

with the Commission alleging a discriminatory housing prac tice in

violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act. The Commission

transmitted the Petition to the Division of Administrative

Hearings (ÐDOAHÑ) to conduct a chap ter 120 evidentiary hearing.

The final hearing was held on October 18, 2016. At the

final hear ing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf and

presented the testimony of Lizette Pagan and Gregory Santoni.

PetitionerÓs Exhibits 1 through 3 were admitted into evidence.

Paradise One presented the testimony of Geil Fontanez, Natacha

Salamon, Jerome Go rdon, and Beverly Simmons - Henry. Paradise

OneÓs Exhibits 1 through 11 were admitted into evidence.

A court reporter recorded the final hearing. A two - volume

Transcript of the final hearing was filed with DOAH on

November 21, 2016. At the close of the h earing, the parties were

advised of a ten - day timeframe following DOAHÓs receipt of the

hearing transcript to file post - hearing submittals. Both parties

filed Proposed Recommended Orders which were duly considered in

preparing this Recommended Order.

FIND ING S OF FACT

1. On May 1, 2014, Petitioner rented an apartment i n

Kissimmee, Florida, for a one - year term .

2 . The apartment Petitioner rented is owned by James and

Marcela Stanislau (the ÐOwnersÑ). Paradise One served as the

management company for the p roperty and was in charge of leasing

the unit .

3 . Paradise One is owned by Beverly Simmons - Henry

(ÐMs. SimmonsÑ) , who is a licensed real estate agent.

Ms. Simmons handled the rental transaction for the apartment

Petitioner rented.

4 . Petitioner first approached Ms. Simmons seekin g to rent

an apartment in April 2014. At that time, Paradise One was

attempting to sell the OwnerÓs apartment . Paradise One had not

been successful in attracting a buyer. Therefore, the Owners

were amen able to allowing Parad ise One rent the apartment until a

buyer could be found .

5 . Petitioner rented the apartment through HUDÓs Section 8

program. Under Section 8, HUD assists qualified participants pay

for housing. See 4 2 U.S.C. § 1437f. To rent a dwelling using

Section 8 funds in Kissimmee, Florida, the participant applie s

through the Osceola County Human Services office (the ÐHousing

AuthorityÑ). Using Section 8 funds, the Housing Authority pays

most of the monthly rent on a leased unit directly to the

landlord. The pro gram participant pays the balance of the rent.

6 . Lizette Pagan works as a Section 8 Program Coordinator

for the Housing Authority. Ms. Pagan assisted Petitioner secure

a housing voucher from Section 8 to rent the apartment from

Paradise One. Ms. Pagan testified that the maximum housing

allowance Petitioner could receive through the Section 8 program

in 2014 was $729 a month. If the property owner/landlord agreed

to rent to the participant, they must accept the housing

allowance calculated by Section 8 and no more. The property

owner/landlordÓs agreement to rent to a Section 8 participant is

completely voluntary.

7 . In 2014, Paradise One had listed the rental price for

the apartment at $775 a month. However, Ms. Simmons agreed to

lease the apartment t o Petitioner through Section 8 for the

reduced rate of $729 a month. Of the $729 rental amount,

Section 8 paid $559. Petitioner paid the balance of $170.00.

Per Section 8 policy, Pe titioner could only enter a one - year

lease for the apartment. Petition er conceded that she could not

have rented the apartment without the assistance of the Section 8

program.

8 . Ms. Pagan further explained that if a landlord desired

to renew the lease at a higher rental amount following the first

lease term, Section 8 woul d conduct a reasonableness study to

ensure that the new lease amount was reasonable within the market

area. Ms. Pagan stated that the payment standard for a one -

bedroom apartment in Osceola County in 2015 would have been

approximately $794.00, including u tilities. If, however,

Section 8 found the new rental amount unreasonable, Section 8

would reject the lease, and the landlord would be free to either

renew the lease at the ÐreasonableÑ amount or not participate in

the Section 8 program. Ms. Pagan was n ot aware of any legal

obligation for a property owner/landlord to renew a Section 8

lease beyond the first year. 2/

9 . Ms. Simmons testified that the Owners were not pleased

to learn that Paradise One had rented their property through the

Section 8 program because they had had problems with Section 8

leases in the past. Therefore, the Owners instructed Ms. Simmons

to keep their apartment unit on the market for sale. The

apartment remained for sale during the year Petitioner rented the

property.

1 0 . Befor e signing the lease agreement , Petitioner

expressed to Ms. Simmons that she desired a two - year lease.

Ms. Simmons informed Petitioner that the Owners w ould only rent

the apartment for one year because they still desired to sell the

unit . The refore, Peti tioner signed a one - year lease that ran

from May 1, 2014 , through April 30, 2015. However, Petitioner

testified that Ms. Simmons told her that if she complied with all

the rules and regulations of her housing assistance program, she

could stay in the apar tment for two years.

11. Petitioner practices Santeria. Petitioner described

the Santeria religion as similar to Catholicism, but presented in

Ðan African way.Ñ Petitioner expressed that she believes in the

same God and Jesus as the Catholic Church. As described in

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah , 508 U.S. 520,

524, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2222 (1993):

[T]he Santeria religion . . . originated in

the 19th century. When hundreds of thousands

of members of the Yoruba people were brought

as slaves from western Africa to Cuba, their

traditional African religion absorbed

significant elements of Roman Catholicism.

The resulting syncretion, or fusion, is

Santeria, "the way of the saints." [Those

who practice Santeria] express their devotion

to spirits , called orishas , through the

iconography of Catholic saints, Catholic

symbols are often present at Santeria rites,

and Santeria devotees attend the Catholic

sacraments.

* * *

The Santeria faith teaches that every

individual has a destiny from God , a destiny

fulfilled with the aid and energy of the

orishas . The basis of the Santeria religion

is the nurture of a personal relation with

the orishas . . . .

Petitioner stated that her religion was passed down to her fr om

her mother and grandmother.

12 . Santeria encourages its adherents to maintain certain

religious objects throughout their homes. These items assist one

in prayers to God and the orishas (saints), as well as cleanse

the house from evil spiritsue to her faith, shortly after

moving into the apartment, Petitioner arranged a number of

religious artifacts throughout her dwelling. Next to her front

door, she placed a coconut. The coconut represents ÐEleggua,Ñ

the most important ÐsaintÑ who opens doors to conduct one to the

right spot i n their journey through life. Eleggua allows good to

pass into a home and keeps harm out. Petitioner also located a

pot in her living room that she used to pray to Eleggua.

13. In addition, Petitioner displayed an Indian ( Native

American) figure on a ta ble in her living room. Petitioner also

propped machetes on either side of her front door, in all the

corners of her front room, and in the form of crosses on her

walls. The machetes served to cut negative energy from coming

inside her home. Petitioner sat a rag doll in a rocking chair

and leaned a stick against a wall to represent her guardian

angels. Petitioner set out dozens of cups of water throughout

the apartment. The water served to refresh angels who visited

her home, as well as to absorb negat ive energy. Petitioner also

lit candles to the Santos (s aints) as part of her prayers.

14. The specific discriminatory act about which Petitioner

complains is that Paradise One (through Ms. Simmons) refused to

renew her lease to the apartment beyond the first year. Despite

PetitionerÓs belief that Ms. Simmons promise d that she could rent

the apartment for two years, in a conversation before her lease

term ended, Ms. Simmons announced to Petitioner that Paradise One

was not going to rent the apartment to her any longer. During

this conversation, Petitioner heard Ms. Simmons make several

questionable comments about her religious practices. Petitioner

concluded that Ms. SimmonsÓ denial of her request to renew her

lease was based on her religion.

15. Petit ioner testified that she did not tell Paradise One

or anyone else at the apartment complex that she practiced

Santeria. Therefore, Petitioner surmised that the only way

Ms. Simmons knew about her religion was if someone had disclosed

this fact to Paradis e One, or if they had seen the inside of her

apartment and observed her religious objects .

16. At the final hearing, Petitioner described an event

that occurred in June 2014, when a maintenance man entered her

apartment to perform repairs. During his vis it, the maintenance

man became nervous upon seeing all of her religious artifacts.

17. Following this visit, Petitioner expressed that

Ms. SimmonsÓ attitude towards her completely changed. Although

she did not know for sure, Petitioner believes that the

maintenance man reported what he saw to Ms. Simmons. 3/ Following

this incident, Petitioner believes that Ms. Simmons reached

unfounded and unjustified conclusions regarding her religious

beliefs.

18. Petitioner believes that when Ms. Simmons learned tha t

she practiced Santeria, Ms. Simmons decided not to allow her to

remain on the property or to renew the lease to the apartment.

Petitioner asserts that Ms. Simmons did not appreciate or

understand Santeria and believed that she worships the devil and

pra ctices witchcraft.

19. At the final hearing, both parties described a notable

encounter between Petitioner and Ms. Simmons involving mustard

seeds. In March or April 2015, Petitioner and a male companion

visited the Paradise One office hoping to talk to Ms. Simmons.

Petitioner intended to ask Ms. Simmons if she could renew her

lease for the apartment. Ms. Simmons was not present in the

office at that time. Therefore, Petitioner left shortly

thereafter.

20. Upon returning to her office, Ms. Simmons det ected

small seeds scattered across the lobby floor. Ms. Simmons later

viewed a video recording of the lobby which appeared to show that

PetitionerÓs companion, while sitting in the lobby, reached into

his pocket, pulled out a handful of some substance (th e seeds),

and tossed it discre et ly onto the floor. After examining the

seeds, Ms. Simmons believed they were mustard seeds.

21. Ms. Simmons called Petitioner to discuss the incident.

During this phone call, Ms. Simmons informed Petitioner that she

would not be offered the opportunity to renew her lease for a

second year. Ms. Simmons told Petitioner that the Owners were

selling the property. Petitioner testified that during their

conversation, Ms. Simmons called her a Ðwitch.Ñ Petitioner

further claime d that Ms. Simmons accused her of practicing voodoo

and that she had evil artifacts and demonic saints displayed

throughout her apartment.

22. Ms. Pagan of the Housing Authority recalls a similar

convers ation with Ms. Simmons in March 2015. Ms. Pagan had

called Ms. Simmons after Petitioner complained that Paradise One

had wrongfully retained a portion of her security deposit. 4/

Ms. Pagan testified that Ms. Simmons told her that Petitioner was

practicing witchcraft in her unit and that such activity viol ated

her apartment lease. Ms. Pagan also relayed that Ms. Simmons

told her that a pregnant employee of Paradise One, who was

supposed to perform a move - out inspection of Petitioner's unit,

was afraid to go into the apartment for fear of t he safety of her

unborn child.

23. Ms. Simmons recalled talking to both Petitioner and

Ms. Pagan about the mustard seed incident. However, she denied

making any statements to them about PetitionerÓs religion.

Ms. Simmons testified that the only thing she discussed wit h

Ms. Pagan was the return of Petitioner's security deposit.

24. Despite the comments she alleges Ms. Simmons made,

Petitioner stated that no one from Paradise One prevented her

from practicing Santeria while she rented the apartment. Neither

was she in structed to remove her reli gious items from the

property.

25. At the final hearing, Ms. Simmons denied refusing to

renew PetitionerÓs lease agreement based on her religion.

Ms. Simmons stated that she had never been inside Petitioner's

apartment to see her religious objects. Ms. Simmons denied ever

discussing Santeria with Petitioner. Ms. Simmons testified that

she had no knowledge of Petitioner's religious beliefs until

around April 2015. Ms. Simmons further denied ever agreeing to

allow Petitioner t o remain in the property for two years.

26. Ms. Simmons explained that Paradise One did not offer

Petitioner the opportunity to renew her lease because the Owners

desired to sell the apartment. Ms. Simmons relayed that the

Owners had purchased the proper ty as an investment. The

Section 8 rental price, however, advers ely a ffected their ability

to sell or lease the property. The reduced rental price made it

difficult for the Owners to justify their desired sale price or a

higher lease amount. It did not make financial sense to

potential buyers to purchase the property if the prospective

return on the investment was only the Section 8 rental amount.

Ms. Simmons asserted that the Owners, not she, made the ultimate

decision not to renew the lease with Peti tione r for a second

year.

27. Ms. Simmons expressed that she notified Petitioner in

January 2015 that the Owners did not intend to re - rent the

apartment to Petitioner. Petitioner acknowledged the OwnersÓ

de cision in a letter she wrote to the Housing Auth ority, dated

February 2, 2015. However, Petitioner explained that when she

authored the letter , she was under the impression that the Owners

had already sold the property .

28. On February 20, 2015, Ms. Simmons prepared a letter

officially notifying Petit ioner that her lease would not be

renewed. Ms. Simmons represented that she delivered the letter

to Petitioner. Petitioner denied receiving this letter.

29. After leaving th e apartment at the end of April 2015,

Petitioner continued in the Section 8 prog ram in another county

and located another apartment to rent. On May 1, 2015, Paradise

One re - rented the apartment for $800.00 to a non - Section 8

renter. The same tenant renewed the lease in 2016 for $825.00.

30. As of the date of the final hearing, desp ite

Ms. SimmonsÓ representation to Petitioner that the Owners were

selling the apartment, the unit remains unsold and is, in fact ,

being advertised for rental.

31. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the

final hearing, Petitioner did not dem onstrate, by a preponderance

of the evidence that Paradise One discriminated against her based

on her religion in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

32. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties a nd the subject matter of this

proceeding pursuant to sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and

760.35(3)(b) , Florida Statu t es .

33. Petitioner claims that Paradise One discriminated

against her in violation of FloridaÓs Fair Housing Act (the

ÐFHAÑ). The FHA is cod ified in sections 760.20 through 760.37

and makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person in

connection with the rental of housing on the basis of religion.

Section 760.23(1) specifically states:

It is unlawful to refuse to sell or rent after

the m aking of a bona fide offer, to refuse to

negotiate for the sale or rental of, or

otherwise to make unavailable or deny a

dwelling to any person because of race, color,

national origin, sex, handicap, familial

status, or religion.

3 4 . The FHA is patterned after the Federal Fair Housing Act

found in 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. Discrimination covered under

the FHA is the same discrimination prohibited under the Federal

Fair Housing Act. Savannah Club Worship Serv. v. Savannah Club

HomeownersÓ AssÓn , 456 F. S upp. 2d 1223, 1224 n. 1 (S.D. Fla.

2005); see also Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n ,

765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014)(ÐThe [Federal Fair Housing

Act] and the Florida Fair Housing Act are substantively identical,

and therefore the same legal a nalysis applies to each.Ñ) .

Specifically regarding the subject matter of PetitionerÓs claim,

the statutory language in section 760.23(1) is very similar to

that found in its federal counterpart in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 5/

35 . Accordingly, federal case law involving housing

discrimination is instructive in applying and interpreting the

FHA. See Loren v. Sasser , 309 F.3d 1296, 1300 n.9 (11th Cir.

2002). When Ða Florida statute is modeled after a federal law on

the same subject, the Florida statute will take on the same

constructions as placed on its federal prototype.Ñ Brand v. Fla.

Power Corp. , 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also

Dornbach v. Holley , 854 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002);

Milsap v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt. , 2010 U.S. Di st. LEXIS

8031 (S.D. Fla. 2010); and Fla. Dep't of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant ,

586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

3 6 . In cases involving a claim of housing discrimination,

the burden of proof is on the complainant. § 760.34(5), Fla.

Stat.; see also Sec Óy, U .S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. ex rel .

Herron v. Blackwell , 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990) .

3 7. Discrimination may be proven by direct, statistical, or

circumstantial evidence. Valenzuela v . GlobeGround N. Am., LLC. ,

18 So. 3d 17, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 20 09). Direct evidence is evidence

that, if believed, would prove the existence of discriminatory

intent behind the decision without any inference or presumption.

Denney v. City of Albany , 247 F.3d 1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001);

and Holifield v. Reno , 115 F. 3d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997).

Courts have held that ÐÒonly the most blatant remarks, whose

intent could be nothing other than to discriminate . . .Ó will

constitute direct evidence of discrimination.Ñ Damon v. Fleming

Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. , 196 F. 3d 1354, 1358 - 59 (11th Cir.

1999)(citations omitted).

3 8 . Petitioner presented no direct evidence of housing

discrimination by Paradise One. No evidence shows that Paradise

One prevented Petitioner from displaying her religious objects in

the apartment o r specifically denied PetitionerÓs request to renew

her lease because of her religious beliefs. Ms. SimmonsÓ comments

about ÐwitchcraftÑ and ÐvoodooÑ alone are not sufficiently

ÐblatantÑ to establish that Paradise One refused to renew

PetitionerÓs lease b ecause she practiced Santeria.

3 9 . When there is no direct evidence of discrimination, fair

housing cases are analyzed under the three - part, burden - shifting

framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp oration v. Green , 411

U.S. 792 (1973) , and Texas Depa rtment of Community Affairs v.

Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See Blackwell , supra ; Savannah Club

Worship Serv. , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 - 32.

40 . Under the three - part test, Petitioner has the initial

burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the eviden ce, a

prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas ,

411 U.S. at 802; Burdine , 450 U.S. at 252 - 253; Burke - Fowler v.

Orange Cnty. , 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006); Valenzuela ,

18 So. 3d at 22. ÐThe elements of a prima facie case are flexible

and should be tailored, on a case - by - case basis, to differing

factual circumstances .Ñ Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta , 2 F.3d

1112, 1123 (11th Cir. 1993) .

41 . To establish a prima facie case for housing

discrimination under the FHA, Petitioner m ust prove: (1) that she

is a member of a protected class (religious affiliation); (2) that

she applied for and was qualified to rent the dwelling; (3) that

Paradise One rejected her offer; and (4) that the dwelling

remained available thereafter. See Blac kwell , supra , and Selden

Apartments v. HUD , 785 F.2d 152, 159 (6th Cir. 1986).

42 . If Petitioner proves a prima facie case, she creates a

presumption of discrimination. At that point, the burden shifts

to Paradise One to articulate a legiti mate, non discr iminatory

reason for its actions. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 255; s ee also

Blackwell , supra ; Savannah Club Worship Serv. , supra . The reason

for Paradise OneÓs decision should be clear, reasonably specific,

and worthy of credence. See DepÓt of Corr. v. Chandle r , 582

So. 2d 1183, 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The burden on Paradise One

is one of production, not persuasion, to demonstrate to the finder

of fact that its action as a rental housing provider was

non discriminatory. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc. , 37 6 F.3d

1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). This burden of production is

"exceedingly light." Holifield , 115 F.3d at 1564.

4 3 . Finally, if Paradise One meets its burden, the

presumption of discrimination disappears. The burden then shifts

back to Petitioner to prove that Paradise OneÓs proffered reason

was not the true reason but merely a ÐpretextÑ for discrimination.

See Combs v. Plantation Patterns , 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir.

1997); and St. MaryÓs Honor C tr . v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 516 - 18

(1993).

44 . In order to satisfy this final step in the process,

Petitioner must show Ð either directly by persuading the court that

a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or

indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is

unworthy o f credence. Ñ Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S. Ct.

1089, 1095 . The petitioner must prove that the reasons

articulated were false and that the discrimination was the real

reason for the action. City of Miami v. Hervis , 65 So. 3d 1110,

1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)(citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr . , 509 U.S. at

515)("[A] reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for

discrimination ' unless it is shown both that the reason was false,

and that discrimination was the real reason.").

45 . Despite the shifting burdens of p roof, Ðthe ultimate

burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all

times with the plaintiff.Ñ Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S. Ct.

at 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207; Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 22. The

demonstration of pretext Ðmerges with the plaintiffÓs ultimate

burden of showing that the defendant intentionally discriminated

against the plaintiff.Ñ Holifield , 115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir.

1997).

46 . Based on the evidence in the record, Petitioner

established a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA.

First, Petitioner practices the Santeria religion. Therefore,

Petitioner belongs to a class of persons who the FHA protects from

unlawful discr imination because of religion.

47 . Second, the facts show that, before her apartment lease

term was over, Petitioner expressed her desire to Paradise One to

renew her lease for a second year. (In fact, Petitioner first

made her intent known before she actually moved into the apartment

whe n she asked Ms. Simmons for a two - year lease.) The evidence

also supports a finding that Petitioner would have qualified under

Section 8 to re - re nt the apartment in May 2015.

48 . Regarding the third and fourth prongs, the undisputed

facts show that Parad ise One declined Petition erÓs request to

renew her lease . Furthermore, immediately after Petitioner

vacated the apartment, Paradise One rented the unit to another

(non - Section 8) renter.

4 9 . Despite PetitionerÓs demonstration of a prima facie case

of hou sing discrimination, based on the evidence and testimony in

the record, Paradise One met its burden of articulating a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions not to renew

PetitionerÓs lease to the apartment. Ms. Simmons credibly

testified tha t Paradise One did not re - rent the unit to Petitioner

based on two nondiscriminatory reasons. First, the Owners desired

to lease the apartment to a tenant who would agree to pay a higher

rent amount. Second, the Owners were concerned that leasing the

apa rtment at the reduced Section 8 rental amount would harm their

investment in the property. These two reasons sufficiently rebut

the presumption of discrimination created by PetitionerÓs prima

facie case.

50 . Completing the McDonnell Douglas burden - shifti ng

analysis, Petitioner did not prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that Paradise OneÓs stated reasons for not renewing her

lease were not its true reasons, but were merely a ÐpretextÑ for

discrimination. The record in this proceeding does not supp ort a

finding or conclusion that Paradise OneÓs proffered explanation

for its decision was false or not worthy of credence.

51 . The evidence demonstrates that the Owners desired to

obtain the highest monetary return on th eir investment in the

apartment - Î e ither through the sale or rental of the unit. The

evidence also shows that the rental amount the Owners sought was

higher than the amount they could receive through the Section 8

program. In 2014, the OwnerÓs asking rental price was $46 higher

than Petit ionerÓs Section 8 housing allowance. In 2015, after

Petitioner left the apartment, Paradise One rented the unit for a

higher lease than Section 8 represented it would approve ($800

versus $794). This conclusion is supported by documentary

evidence evinci ng that, as early as January 2015, Paradise One had

determined to sell the Owners Ó property or find a higher paying

tenant. The undersigned also notes that Paradise One was under no

legal obligation to rent the apartment to Petitioner beyond the

first yea r.

5 2. Furthermore, Ms. Simmons credibly testified that the

Section 8 reduced rental amount would negatively affect the value

of the property because of the lower return the Owners or

potential buyers could expect to earn on future rentals or sales.

Cons equently, the more persuasive evidence establishes that

Paradise OneÓs stated reason for not renewing PetitionerÓs lease

is not a ÐpretextÑ for discrimination agains t her practice of

Santeria.

53 . Notwithstanding the above conclusion, the undersigned

does find that prior to P etitioner leaving the apartment ,

Ms. Simmons was both aware of and alarmed by PetitionerÓs practice

of Santeria. Although Ms. Simmons denied making any disparaging

remarks to Petitioner about Santeria or having any knowledge of

her r eligion until the final month of her lease, both Petitioner

and Ms. Pagan persuasively testified that Ms. Simmons made several

comments associating PetitionerÓs activities with ÐwitchcraftÑ and

that Petitioner possessed suspicious, if not Ðdemonic,Ñ object s in

her dwelling. However, this testimony alone does not establish,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that religious discrimination

was the real reason Paradise One did not renew PetitionerÓs

apartment lease.

5 4. For the reasons set forth herein, the evidence on record

does not support PetitionerÓs claim that Paradise One

discriminated against her because of her religion. Further, the

evidence does not establish that Paradise OneÓs stated reason for

not renewing PetitionerÓs lease was a ÐpretextÑ for religious

discrimination. Consequently, Petitioner did not meet her

ultimate burden of showing that Paradise One intentionally

discriminated against her in violation of the FHA.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law , it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Paradise

One, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against

Petitioner , Yanira Santoni , and dismiss her Petition for Relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2017 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

J. BRUCE CULPEPPER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Flor ida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 25th day of January, 2017 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the

2016 codification of the Florida Statutes.

2/ Section 8 does not approve of two - year or multiple - year

leases. Further, under the terms of the Housing Assistance

Payment Contract Paradise One agreed to with Section 8, the

Owners were free to terminate the Se ction 8 lease agreement if a

business or economic reason for termination existed , such as

"sale of the property, renovation of the unit, or the Owner's

desire to rent the unit for a higher rent."

3/ Petitioner did not identify or name the maintenance man who

visited her apartment. At the final hearing, Paradise One

offered the testimony of Jerome Gordon, a contractor who services

air conditioning units for Paradise One. Mr. Gordon testified

that he visited PetitionerÓs apartment on several occasions to

repair her air conditioning unit. Mr. Gordon denied having any

conversation with Ms. Simmons regarding items displayed in

PetitionerÓs apartment or PetitionerÓs religious practice.

4/ Several months following the non - renewal of PetitionerÓs

lease, a dis pute arose between Petitioner and Paradise One as to

the return of Petitioner's security deposit. On June 24, 2015,

Ms. Simmons emailed Ms. Pagan that she refunded PetitionerÓs

security deposit.

5/ The language in 42 U.S.C. § 3604 states that it shall b e

unlawful:

(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the

making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to

negotiate for the sale or rental of, or

otherwise make unavailable or deny, a

dwelling to any person because of race,

color, religion, sex, familial status, or

national origin.

(b) To discriminate against any person in

the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale

or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision

of services or facilities in connection

therewith, because of race, color, religion,

sex, familial sta tus, or national origin.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

John W. Bolanovich, Esquire

Bogin Munns & Munns, P . A .

Suite 1000

1000 Legion Place - Gateway Center

Orlando, Florida 32801

(eServed)

Yanira Santoni

Apartment 204

1270 Southeast 28th Court

Homestead, Florida 33035

(eServed)

Tushaar Desai, Esquire

Desai Law, P.A.

1916 East Robinson Street

Orlando, Florida 32803

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days fro m the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.