16-004409 Aliette L. Oliva vs. Office Of Financial Regulation Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, January 4, 2017.

Summary: The Office had a sufficient ground to deny the Petitioner's application for a loan originator license, due to the revocation of a real estate salesperson license previously held by the Petitioner.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

ALIETTE L. OLIVA,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 16 - 4409

OFFICE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This matter was heard before Ro bert L. Kilbride, an

Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative

Hearings ( " DOAH " ) on October 31, 2016, by video teleconference

with sites in Tallahassee and West Palm Beach, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Paul Drake, Esquire

William M. Furlow, Esquire

Edwin A. Bayó, Esquire

Grossman, Furlow and Bayó, LLC

2022 - 2 Raymond Diehl Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

For Respondent: Melinda Hilton Butler, Esq uire

Miriam S. Wilkinson, Esquire

Liam Kellison Lyon, Esquire

Office of Financial Regulation

Fletcher Building, Suite 550

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahass ee, Florida 32399 - 0379

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has carried her

burden of proving that her application for licensure in Florida

as a loan originator should be granted.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On or about May 25, 2016, Respondent denied Petitioner ' s

application for licensure, and Petitioner timely requested a

formal hearing.

On July 11, 2016, Respondent entered an order granting an

informal hearing pursuant to section 120.57(2), Fl orida Stat utes .

On July 20, 2016, Petitioner filed an Objection to Hearing N ot

Involving Disputed Issues of Fact and Renewed Petition for

Hearing Inv olving Disputed Issues of Fact.

On August 2, 2016, Respondent referred the matter to DOAH.

A Notice of Hearing was entered on August 16, 20 16, setting the

matter for hearing on October 10, 2016.

On October 4, 2016, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for

Continuance of Final Hearing. The e mergency m otion was granted ,

and the hearing was re - scheduled for October 31, 2016.

On October 28, 2016 , Respondent filed a Motion in Limine to

exclude testimony regarding mitigating factors listed on pages 4

and 5 of Petitioner ' s Petition for Hearing Involving Disputed

Issues of Material Fact.

The matter proceeded to a final hearing on October 31, 2016.

R espondent ' s Motion in Limine was granted , in part , and denied ,

in part.

Petitioner testified on her own behalf and presented the

testimony of three witnesses. Two of the witnesses, Edward

Geraghty and Marina Greenfield, appeared via video teleconference

from West Palm Beach, Florida . Elio Oliva, Petitioner ' s husband,

and Petitioner appeared in person at the hearing in Tallahassee.

Petitioner ' s Exhibits numbered 4, 6, 8, 11 through 15, 17, 18,

and 20 through 28 were admitted into evidence. Respondent

p resented the testimony of Jason Booth. Additionally,

Respondent ' s Exhibits numbered 1 through 6 were admitted into

evidence.

On November 17, 2016, the parties filed a Joint Motion to

Reschedule Proposed Recommended Orders Due Date. On November 17,

2016, the j oint m otion was granted, giving the parties leave to

file their proposed recommended orders with DOAH on or before

December 7, 2016, or ten days after the filing of the transcript

of the final hearing with DOAH, or whichever is later.

A T ranscript o f the final hearing was filed in two volumes

with DOAH on November 21, 2016. Both parties timely filed

proposed recommended orders, which were considered in the

preparation of this Recommended Order.

References to Florida Statutes are to the 2015 version,

unless otherwise indicated.

FINDING S OF FACT

The undersigned makes the following findings of material and

relevant facts:

1. The Office of Financial Regulation ( " Respondent , "

" Office , " o r " OFR " ) has regulatory jurisdiction over loan

originators and is re sponsible for the administration and

enforcement of the provisions of c hapter 494, Fl orida Statutes ,

which includes the approval or denial of applications for

licensure as loan originators.

2. Aliette Oliva ( " Petitioner " or " Oliva " ) applied for a

license as a loan originator and is the party that is affected by

the decision of Respondent to deny her application for licensure

as a loan originator. Petitioner ' s address of record is

13525 S outhwest 83 rd Avenue, Pinecrest, Florida 33156.

3. On or about May 2 5, 2016, Respondent issued Petitioner a

Notice of Intent to Deny Application for Loan Originator License,

which denied Petitioner ' s application for licensure on the basis

that Petitioner had a license, or the equivalent of such license,

to practice any pro fession or occupation revoked or otherwise

acted against by the State of Florida, citing provisions of

c hapter 494, particularly section 494.00255.

4. The license in question, that had been permanently

revoked, was Petitioner ' s r eal e state s alesperson lic ense wit h

the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida

Real Estate Commission ( " FREC " ) , revoked in Final Order No. BPR -

2003 - 02017. The Final Order incorporated an Administrative

Complaint issued by the FREC against Petitioner, Case

No. 200181619. The Final Order also incorporated an Affidavit

for the Voluntary Surrender of License, Registration,

Certificate/Permit for Permanent Revocation, which was

voluntarily signed by Petitioner on April 30, 2003, with input

and counsel f r o m her att orney. Resp. Ex. 3.

5. The certified copy of the Administrative Complaint in

question, moved into evidence by Respondent, is missing page

three. Resp. Ex. 3. 1/

6. It was stipulated by the parties that Oliva had an

active mortgage broker license with Re spondent, license number

MB0859332, from April 6, 1998, until December 31, 2010.

7. Oliva attempted to modify the terms of the revocation of

her real estate license by filing a Motion for Modification of

Terms of Revocation, filed with the FREC. This m ot ion was denied

by the FREC in their Order Denying Reconsideration dated

January 12, 2016.

8. Jason Booth, a s upervisor in the Bureau of Finance

Regulation, O FR, made the recommendation to deny Oliva ' s

application for licensure as a loan originator that is the

subject of this proceeding . Booth then forwarded his

recommendation to the legal staff and to the d irector of OFR , who

ultimately denied the license to Oliva.

9. The allegations of fraud in the 2003 Administrative

Complaint filed by the FREC were si gnificant factors supporting

Booth ' s recommendation to deny Oliva ' s application for licensure.

In Booth ' s opinion , " Fraud is the most egregious type of

violation that someone in the industry would be held accountable

for. "

10. In further support of his r ecommendation to deny

Oliva ' s application for licensure, Booth testified that C ount 37

in the Administrative Complaint was also a factor. Booth

testified that C ount 37 alleges that this would be the second

time that Oliva had been found guilty of conduct or misconduct

that warranted the suspension of her license.

11. Booth also testified that another factor in support of

his recommendation to deny Oliva ' s application for licensure was

that Oliva ' s Motion for Modification of Terms of Revocation filed

with the FREC on or about October 9, 2015, was denied on

January 12, 2016, as per a FREC order , an order that was not

appealed or contested . In addition, Booth explained that the

importance of the m otion and the FREC order was that the FREC did

not wish to re visit its prior action, which also supported

Respondent ' s recommendation to deny Oliva ' s license application.

12. When asked by counsel for Petitioner if Respondent must

automatically deny an application if the applicant has had a

license from another age ncy previously revoked, Booth answered

" maybe. "

13. Regarding the determination of whether to approve or

deny applications where the applicant has had a license

previously revoked, Booth was asked if Respondent has any

reasoning or criteria it uses to det ermine whether an application

for a loan originator license should be approved or denied.

Booth responded by stating that there is " no criteria " and that

those determinations are made on a " case - by - case basis. "

14. Other than the allegation in C ount 37 r egarding

Petitioner " having been found guilty a second time of any

misconduct that warrants his [ sic ] suspension , " there was no

evidence presented to explain or confirm the details of this

allegation. Similarly, despite questions to Booth about any

result s from the F ederal Bureau of Investigation or the F lorida

Department of Law Enforcement criminal background checks, there

was no evidence presented revealing any criminal convictions or

criminal conduct by Oliva.

15. There was also no evidence presented t o explain why the

FREC denied Oliva ' s Motion for Modification of Terms of

Revocation, or its reasoning.

16. Edward Geraghty, b ranch m anager for ResMac, the company

for which Oliva is currently employed, is licensed with the

Respondent as a loan originator . His license number is 320745.

17. Geraghty stated that Oliva has worked as a loan

coordinator and processor for Geraghty ' s branch since December of

2015. Oliva assists loan officers and Geraghty ' s processing team

in obtaining mortgages for ResMac ' s ap plicants, as well as

processing loans. Geraghty hired Oliva because of her experience

and her knowledge about products and about guidelines, which he

stated is very hard to find in his industry.

18. As an employee, Geraghty described Oliva as very

knowle dgeable, proactive, and helpful in the ResMac office,

and stated that she uses her experience to assist some of

ResMac ' s less - experienced loan officers. Geraghty has no

concerns over her honesty and trustworthiness and had never seen

anything that would g ive him any doubt about Oliva ' s honesty and

trustworthiness. Finally, Geraghty stated that he and his office

have seen nothing in any of Oliva ' s files or tasks that has given

them any questions about her abilities.

19. Marina Greenfield has been a friend of Petitioner for

ten years. Greenfield trusts Oliva explicitly and stated that

she is a great person. Greenfield testified that during a period

of economic misfortune for her family, she, her husband, and her

two children were practically homeless. Ol iva allowed them to

stay at her home with her family. Greenfield testified that , if

it had not been for Oliva, she would have been in a very bad

place and that she cannot speak any more highly of her.

20. During the hearing, the undersigned admitted depo sition

transcripts of three witnesses: Carlos Cabezas, Mayra Alderete,

and Octavio Diaz, without objection, all of which have been

reviewed by the undersigned.

21. Cabezas works for ACC Mortgage as an account executive,

has known Oliva for 15 years in a professional context, and has

worked with Oliva intermittently during those 15 years. Cabezas

described Oliva as very professional, with very high ethical

standards and very strong work ethics.

22. Alderete has known Oliva for 15 or 16 years as a forme r

client and as a friend. Alderete described Oliva as honest, that

she has integrity and good character, helps everyone that needs

it , and stated that she is professional.

23. Diaz, a Florida licensed real estate broker for

Midtown Realty International, Inc., testified that Oliva worked

with him from 2000 to 2003 as an associate realtor. Diaz wrote a

letter of support for Oliva and described Oliva as very

professional and truthful.

24. Petitioner also offered 13 letters of support, which

were admitted into evidence. These letters corroborated and

supplemented the testimony given by the character witnesses

present at the hearing. The letters of support were written by

friends; members of the community; professionals in the

community, including several who are licensed with Respondent;

and a family member.

25. The letters of support collectively confirm that Oliva

is a woman of good moral character, is honest and trustworthy,

has integrity, is a model citizen, and contributes a substantial

amount of her time to charity and community service.

26. Elio Oliva, Petitioner ' s husband, is a police officer.

He began his career working for the City of Hialeah Police

Department from 1988 to 1998. From 1999 to 2003, Elio Oliva was

detached to the Drug Enforcemen t Agency ( " DEA " ) and worked as a

" Task Force Agent. "

27. During the period the subject FREC Administrative

Complaint was opened and pending against Oliva , and when her real

estate license was revoked, Elio Oliva had been working to

inf iltrate a Colombian drug cartel money laundering organization.

He worked undercover for a year and a half in this role. The

extent of his involvement in this undercover operation is

explained in United States v. Puche , 350 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir.

2003). A copy of this case wa s admitted into evidence as

Petitioner ' s Exhibit 4.

28. Elio Oliva testified that his undercover work and

infiltration of the drug cartel was very dangerous. He testified

that , if the cartel knew he was an undercover DEA agent, they may

have stopped deal ing with him or killed him. Elio Oliva

performed his undercover operations in Miami and was allowed to

go home to his actual residence. After the Puche trial, Elio

Oliva had local police and U.S. Marshals surveilling his house

for protection.

29. Elio O liva testified that during the time the FREC

fraud case against Petitioner was active and pending, Oliva

shared with him that her identity had been stolen. After having

a discussion with his wife about who would have access to her

personal information, he testified that they concluded that the

people who stole Oliva ' s identity were Igor and Harold Kuntz, two

brothers that were involved in the real estate office where Oliva

had been working from 1999 to 2000.

30. The undersigned found it significant that , other than

this evidence from Elio Oliva and Petitioner, there was no

independent evidence offered to corroborate or prove that Oliva ' s

identity had been stolen. For instance, there were no police,

law enforcement , or other investigative reports to show t hat any

identity theft had been reported by Oliva, investigated by law

enforcement , or had, in fact, occurred.

31. At the time the FREC Administrative Complaint was filed

against Petitioner, their son was an infant. Elio Oliva

explained that Petitioner w as " going through a lot " and that he

was not home much because of his undercover work. Elio Oliva

testified that Petitioner was told by her attorney at the time to

sign the Voluntary Relinquishment so the Administrative Complaint

could " go away . " Elio Ol iva stated that Petitioner was advised

to " do the wrong thing . "

32. Oliva expressed to her husband that she did not want

their name out there and did not want people finding out who Elio

Oliva was. 2/ Elio Oliva stated that Petitioner voluntarily

relinqui shed her real estate license for the safety of the

family.

33. Elio Oliva has been married to Petitioner for 25 years.

He described her as an extraordinary human being, a giver, and

unselfish. Elio Oliva testified that his wife never committed

fraud, mi srepresentations , or concealment. Elio Oliva stated

that Oliva is " a victim " and that, because of his law enforcement

experience, he knows that " bad things happen to good people . "

34. Alluding to the alleged theft of Oliva ' s identity and

the resulting re vocation of her real estate license, he testified

that " in this case, that is what happened to her. "

35. During Petitioner ' s testimony, she explained her

employment with several mortgage and real estate companies:

Raurell Investment Corporation; Fidelity Plus; Capital Mortgage

Providers ; Millennium 2000 ; and Midtown Realty International ,

Inc. Oliva currently works for ResMac, where she works with the

loan originators to get their files ready for underwriting and

works in tandem with the loan processors, who perform the final

review of the file.

36. Regarding the FREC Administrative Complaint, her

voluntary relinquishment of her license, and FREC ' s Final Order

revoking her real estate license, Oliva testified that she was

unaware that she had a Final Orde r entered against her. She

testified that she never received a copy of the Final Order.

Oliva surrendered her license at the direction and on the advice

of her attorney.

37. The Certificate of Service section of the FREC Final

Order shows that a copy of the Final Order was sent to the same

attorney in Miami, Florida, who had notarized Petitioner ' s

signature on the a ffidavit which voluntarily relinquished her

license, and the s enior a ttorney for the Department of Business

and Professional Regulation (" DBP R ") .

38. Despite signing the a ffidavit marked as Resp ondent's

Ex hibit 3, page 4, and voluntarily relinquishing her real estate

license in response to the FREC 37 - count Administrative

Complaint , Oliva testified that she is not the person who

committed th e actions alleged in the FREC Administrative

Complaint. Oliva stated she believed that her identity had been

stolen by Igor and Harold Kuntz. She testified that , after one

of the people Oliva suspected of stealing her identity died, no

additional illicit transactions under her real estate license

occurred.

39. As support for her claim that she was not the culpable

party identified in the FREC fraud complaint, Oliva testified

that she could not have committed one of the fraud transaction s

alleged in the A dministrative Complaint because she was caring

for her infant son at the time, in February 2001. 3/

40. Because of Elio Oliva ' s undercover activity, and

because Elio Oliva had been involved in two police shootings in

1991 and 1997, Oliva testified that she was not doing well

mentally at the time she relinquished her real estate license.

In addition, Elio Oliva had not yet been clear ed by the state

attorney for a shooting incident in 1997 during the time the FREC

Administrative Complaint was filed, which al so was difficult for

her.

41. Oliva ' s counsel in the fraud case told her that it

would be nearly impossible to prove that her identity had been

stolen because of the nature of the identity theft and that it

would cost a lot of money to contest the allegat ions. Her

counsel also told her that everything was going to go away after

she signed the Voluntary Relinquishment form.

42. She claimed that the personal security provided to the

family by the police and the U.S. Marshals, the fear of

retaliation by the drug cartel against whom Elio Oliva had just

testified in Puche , the safety and health concerns of her family,

her desire to protect her family, and the pressure from her

counsel at the time all factored into her decision to voluntarily

relinquish her rea l estate license.

43. Oliva applied for a loan originator license because of

financial concerns, as her family has two children in college,

with one more about to go to college, and her husband is retiring

soon. Oliva believes she is qualified, that she is a good

person, and that she has lived her life in a way that allows her

to be an example for her family, friends , and clients.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

44. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter pursu ant to

sections 120.57(1) and 120.60 , Florida Statutes (2016) .

Administrative proceedings under c hapter 120 , Florida Statutes

(2016) , are conducted as a de novo review. § 120.57(1)(k), Fla.

Stat. (2016).

45. Respondent denied Petitioner ' s loan originato r license

application on the sole basis that Petitioner had her prior

license to practice a profession or occupation as a real estate

agent revoked or otherwise acted against by the State of

Florida. 4/

46. Section 494.00255(1)(o) expressly authorizes the Office

to deny a c hapter 494 loan originator license to any applicant

who previously had a license to practice any profession or

occupation revoked, suspended , or otherwise acted against.

47. In the same manner, section 494.00255(2)(d ) grants the

Office t he discretion to deny Petitioner ' s application for a loan

originator license due to the Final Order issued by DBPR,

Division of Real Estate , permanently revoking her real estate

license. In particular, the DBPR Final Order in question alleged

that Oliva w as responsible for se ven separate instances of fraud.

These violations were characterized as the most egregious type

for someone in the industry .

48. By imposing permanent revocation, an extreme penalty,

DBPR expressed its strong disapproval of Oliva ' s r epeated and

ongoing fraudulent misconduct. Further, DBPR ' s order denying

Petitioner ' s motion to modify the terms of the F inal O rder

underscored the agency ' s determination that Petitioner ' s

permanent revocation should not be changed and that the agency ' s

o rder permanently revoking Petitioner ' s real estate salesperson

license should remain final.

49. The general rule is that a party asserting the

affirmative of an issue has the burden of presenting evidence as

to that issue. Fla . Dep ' t of Transp . v. J.W.C. Co . , 396 So. 2d

778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

50. Thus, Oliva had the burden to present evidence of her

fitness for licensure. Similarly, the Office had the burden of

presenting evidence that Oliva was subject to disqualification

because she had had a previo us license revoked. Dep ' t of Banking

& Fin. v. Osborne Stern & Co. , 670 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1996).

51. Other legal principles are applicable as well. An

applicant for licensure bears the burden of ultimate persuasion

at each and every step of the lice nsure proceedings, regardless

of which party bears the burden of presenting certain evidence.

The burden of producing evidence may shift between the parties in

an application dispute proceeding. However, the burden of

persuasion always remains with the a pplicant to prove his or her

entitlement to the license, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Osborne , supra .

52. Notable , as well, is the Florida Supreme Court ' s

reminder that an agency has particularly broad discretion in

determining the fitness of appl icants who seek to engage in an

occupation, the conduct of which is a privilege rather than a

right. Id.

53. In a license application proceeding, the agency has the

burden of proving specific acts of misconduct by a preponderance

of the evidence if it se eks to deny a license application on that

ground. M.H. v. Dep ' t of Child. & Fam. Servs. , 977 So. 2d 755,

761 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)( " [I]f the licensing agency proposes to

deny the requested license based on specific acts of misconduct,

then the agency assumes the burden of proving the specific acts

of misconduct that it claims demonstrate the applicant ' s lack of

fitness to be licensed. " ). Here, OFR had the burden to prove

that Petitioner ' s application was subject to denial due to a

previous revocation of anot her license she held.

54. With this legal backdrop in mind, and considering the

respective burdens of proof, the undersigned draws several

conclusions from the evidence adduced at the hearing.

55. The more persuasive and credible evidence shows that

Peti tioner knew or should have known that by signing the

Affidavit voluntarily relinquishing her real estate license, it

would result in a permanent revocation of her license. She was

represented and advised by counsel throughout the process. The

Affidavit c learly informed her that a final order of permanent

revocation would be " rendered in accordance with the provisions

of this Affidavit . " A permanent revocation of her real estate

license was specifically mentioned in several other sections of

the Affidavit as well.

56. The Affidavit she signed was witnessed and notarized by

her attorney. 5/

57. The Office carried its burden of proving that Oliva

signed the Affidavit relinquishing her real estate license and

had her real estate license revoked. M.H. , supra . This

implicated the provisions of section 494.00255(1)(o) and

authorized OFR to deny her application under section

494.00255( 2)(d ).

58. Keeping in mind that Oliva had the ultimate burden of

persuasion throughout the application dispute to demonstrate

e ntitlement to the license by a preponderance of the evidence,

the undersigned was not persuaded that Oliva did not commit the

fraud events outlined in the FREC Administrative C omplaint, or

that the outcome of that case should be revisited.

59. In reachi ng this conclusion, several items are noted .

S he did not appeal or seek a prompt rehearing of the FREC Final

Order.

60. There was no evidence presented at this hearing by

Petitioner to contest, explain , or respond to allegations of the

Administrative Com plaint that Petitioner was interviewed by

investigators and admitted certain facts specifically related to

the fraud counts. See Admin. Complaint , paras. 34, 40, 47 ,

and 59.

61. Finally, the undersigned ruled at the hearing that it

would be improper to r evisit or allow the partie s to re litigate

the question of Oliva ' s guilt settled by the DBPR Final Order

dated May 21, 2003. See Castleman v. Off . o f the Comptroller,

Dep ' t of Banking & Fin . , 538 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ; and

McGraw v. Dep ' t of Stat e, Div. of Licensing , 491 So. 2d 1193

(Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

62. However, the undersigned also ruled that the parties

were entitled to present evidence of mitigation or aggravation

surrounding the relinquishment of her real estate license.

63. The evidence of mitigation presented by Oliva to

explain why and under what circumstances she voluntarily

relinquished her license w as informative. Regardless, the family

or psychological factors which may have influenced her decision

to relinquish her license in the face of a written warning that

permanent revocation of her real estate license was imminent do

not change the following:

(a) A state agency, charged with regulating licensed real

estate agents, undertook a formal and extensive forensic

investigation, inc luding interviews of Petitioner. Several

admissions by Petitioner were noted and alleged in the c omplaint.

(b) The agency formally charged Petitioner with seven

separate incidents of real estate fraud.

(c) In response to the charges , Petitioner, upon ad vice of

counsel, signed a sworn Affidavit agreeing to an " informal

hearing " under section 120.57(2) , Florida Statutes (2003 ) .

(d) The effect of this request was to acknowledge that

there were no material facts in dispute regarding the allegations

raised i n the Administrative Complaint, including, importantly,

her identity as the perpetrator .

(e) The undersigned was not presented with any reports or

other evidence from Petitioner issued by DBPR during the

investigation which questioned, or tended to questi on, her

identity as the person w ho committed the fraud alleged. Nor did

Petitioner provide evidence that she reported her stolen identity

to DBPR.

(f) Further, Petitioner presented no evidence and called no

witnesses, participants at the disputed real es tate closings, or

buyers or sellers related to the seven fraud counts to shed any

light on her purported lack of involvement or misid entification

as the perpetrator .

64 . The cases are clear that " [w]hen a party waives the

right to challenge the factual al legations of an administrative

complaint, . . . the facts of the complaint are deemed to be

admitted. " Nicks v. Dep ' t of Bus. & Prof ' l Reg . , 957 So. 2d 65,

67 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)( " When a party waives the right to

challenge the factual allegations of a n administrative complaint,

either by requesting an informal hearing pursuant to section

120.57(2), Florida Statutes, or by failing to respond to the

complaint at all, the facts of the complaint are deemed to be

admitted ." ); See also Trisha ' s One Stop, Inc . v. Off . of Fin.

Reg . , 130 So. 3d 285 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

65. Petitioner ' s failure to request a formal hearing and

her concession to the entry of a permanent revocation was a

" green light " for the agency to decide the case on the basis of

the facts alle ged in the complaint, and to impose the appropriate

penalty. Trisha ' s One Stop , supra , at 287.

66 . Furthermore, choosing a section 120.57(2) informal

hearing in a license - related proceeding is similar to pleading

guilty to the facts alleged in the admini strative complaint,

because they are not disputed. See generally , Autoworld of Am.

Corp. v. Dep ' t of High . Saf . , 754 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) .

67 . Under these circumstances, Petitioner cannot now be

heard to contest the factual allegations, nor persu asively

dispute her identity as the person who committed the fraudulent

acts outlined in the FREC A dministrative C omplaint.

68 . Because the law affords broad discretion to an agency

to determine the fitness of an applicant for licensure under

Osborne , and denial of the application by the Office is

authorized under section 494.00255(2)(d) , the undersigned has no

compelling legal or factual basis to make a recommendation to the

agency to change its preliminary decision to deny the application

of Petitioner.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation

enter a final order denying Aliette Oliva ' s application for a

loan originator license.

DONE AND ENTERED this 4 th day of January , 201 7 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

ROBERT L. KILBRIDE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 4 th day of January , 201 7 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ Both parties agreed that they were unable to retrieve and

present page three despite the un dersigned's request at the

hearing.

2/ It was unclear how the allegations of the FREC Administrative

Complaint or investigation against Petitioner would have

implicated or put her husband in the public spotlight or domain.

The allegations of the FREC Ad ministrative Compliant made no

mention of any involvement by Elio Oliva .

3/ The undersigned notes, however, that the other six fraud

events attributed to Petitioner were alleged to have occurred in

the year 2000. See Admin . Complaint allegations.

4/ Th ere was no evidence to suggest that Petitioner was

unqualified, or did not meet other requirements for licensure as

a loan originator in Florida.

5/ This attorney was the same attorney who was copied with the

F R EC Final Order in C ase N o. 200181619, and i t is reasonable to

infer that he represented Oliva in the F R EC proceedings.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Paul Drake, Esquire

William M. Furlow, Esquire

Edwin A. Bayó, Esquire

Grossman, Furlow and Bayó, LLC

2022 - 2 Raymond Diehl Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

(eSe rved)

Melinda Hilton Butler, Esquire

Miriam S. Wilkinson, Esquire

Liam Kellison Lyon, Esquire

Office of Financial Regulation

Fletcher Building, Suite 550

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0379

(eServed)

Colin M. Roopnarine, General Coun sel

Office of Financial Regulation

The Fletcher Building, Suite 118

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0370

(eServed)

Drew J. Breakspear, Commissioner

Office of Financial Regulation

200 East Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0350

( eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.