16-005042 Ryan Pough vs. Soler And Palau
 Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Tuesday, March 21, 2017.


View Dockets  
Summary: Petitioner failed to make a prima facie case of employment discrimination; he was fired for poor performance, not because of his race or color.

1STATE OF FLORIDA

4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

8RYAN POUGH,

10Petitioner,

11vs. Case No. 16 - 5042

17SOLER AND PALAU USA VENTILATION

22SYSTEMS, LLC , 1/

25Respondent.

26_______________________________/

27RECOMMENDED ORDER

29A formal hearing was conducted in this case on November 8,

402016, in Jacksonville, Florida, before Lawrence P. Stevenson, a

49duly - designated Administrative Law Judge with the Division of

59Administrative Hearings.

61APPEARANCES

62For Petitioner: Ryan Pough, pro se

68Apartment N o. 1103

7211011 Harts Road

75Jacksonville, Florida 32218

78For Respondent: Michelle Bedoya Barnett, Esquire

84David E. Chauncey, Esquire

88Alexander DeGance Barnett, P.A.

921500 Riverside Avenue

95Jacksonville, Florida 32204

98STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

102The issue is whether Respondent, Soler and P alau USA

112Ventilation Systems, LLC (ÐSoler & PalauÑ) , discriminated

119against Petitioner based upon his race or color, in violation of

130section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016). 2 /

137PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

139On or about January 22, 2016, Petitioner , Ryan Pough

148("Pe titioner") , filed with the Florida Commission on Human

159Relations ("FCHR") an Employment Charge of Discrimination

168against Soler & Palau. Petitioner alleged that he had been

178discriminated against pursuant to chapter 760, Florida Statutes,

186and Title VII of t he Federal Civil Rights Act, based upon race,

199as follows:

201I am a black male who has been discriminated

210[against] on the basis of race and color. I

219began working for Respondent on 7/21/2014 as

226a Crater. Respondent treats me differently

232and assigns more wo rk duties to me compared

241to other co - workers. Employees that are

249white are favored. I was terminated on

2569/18/2015. I firmly believe I have been

263discriminated against because of my race and

270color.

271The FCHR conducted an investigation of PetitionerÓs

278alle gations. On July 20, 2016, the FCHR issued a written

289determination that there was no reasonable cause to believe that

299an unlawful practice occurred. The FCHRÓs determination stated

307as follows, in relevant part:

312The Complainant in this matter filed a

319char ge of discrimination against the

325Respondent alleging that he was subjected to

332different terms and conditions and

337discharged based on race. The facts and

344evidence as set forth in the Investigative

351Memorandum do not support the ComplainantÓs

357allegation. Th e evidence in this matter

364reveals that the Complainant was terminated

370for poor performance by making shipping

376errors. The Complainant was not terminated

382based on his race and he failed to provide

391any competent substantial evidence to prove

397otherwise.

398On August 24, 2016, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for

408Relief with the FCHR. On August 31, 2016, the FCHR referred the

420case to the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH"). The

431case was scheduled for hearing on November 3, 2016. On

441November 2, 2016 , Petitioner requested a brief continuance due

450to a family emergency. The parties agreed to move the hearing

461forward to November 8, 2016, on which date it was convened and

473completed.

474At the hearing, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and

484entered Petit ionerÓs Exhibits A through O into evidence.

493Respondent presented the testimony of Krissy Velleca, human

501resources and payroll administrator for Soler & Palau ; and of

511Tracy Noble, distribution warehouse manager for Soler & Palau.

520RespondentÓs Exhibits 1 t hrough 13 were entered into evidence.

530The one - volume Transcript of the hearing was filed at DOAH

542on November 29, 2016. On December 7, 2016, Respondent filed a

553motion to extend the time for submitting proposed recommended

562orders, which was granted by O rd er dated December 13, 2016. In

575accordance with the O rder granting extension, Respondent timely

584filed its P roposed R ecommended O rder on December 21, 2016. On

597December 20, 2016, Petitioner filed a five - page handwritten

607letter addressed to the undersigned, which has been treated

616without objection as PetitionerÓs P roposed R ecommended O rder.

626FINDING S OF FACT

6301. Soler & Palau is an employer as that term is defined in

643section 760.02(7). Soler & Palau is mainly in the business of

654manufacturing and supplying f ans and other recovery ventilators

663to various industries, including residential, commercial,

669industrial, and institutional buildings.

6732. Petitioner, a black male, was hired at Soler & Palau as

685a Crater I in the distribution department at the companyÓs

695B - 2 warehouse facility on July 21, 2014. Petitioner was

706interviewed and hired by Soler & PalauÓs warehouse distribution

715manager, Tracy Noble, who is a white female.

7233. As a Crater I, Petitioner was responsible for

732fabricating wooden crates or boxes, using woodworking hand tools

741and power tools, around the items (mostly industrial fans and

751accessories) to be shipped. Crater I was the entry level

761position at Soler & PalauÓs warehouse. Petitioner was the only

771Crater I at the B - 2 facility, but most , if not al l , of the other

788employees at B - 2 had started at the Crater I position and

801understood its duties and job requirements.

8074. Eight employees worked under Ms. Noble at the

816B - 2 facility. Six of those employees were black and two were

829white.

8305. Ms. Noble tes tified that training as a Crater I

841normally takes about 90 days , and that Petitioner was fully

851trained. She testified that, although it is an entry level

861position, Crater I is very important because Soler & PalauÓs

871customers order fans specific to their n eeds and the crater is

883responsible for making sure the right fan goes in the crate.

894Many Soler & Palau customers are restaurants that cannot open if

905the correct equipment is not in place. Some building codes

915require specific fans. Each Soler & Palau fan has a specific

926drive pack that provides the horsepower to move a specific

936amount of air. Two fans may look the same but have very

948different capabilities. One fan may meet code for a specific

958purpose and one may not.

9636. It was PetitionerÓs responsibilit y to review the

972orders, which listed everything that should go into the package

982by part number. Petitioner would pull the corresponding fan ,

991and any accessories (such as a damper or speed controls) , and

1002place them on a pallet. Petitioner would then build the crate

1013around the fan. He would weigh the order, record the weight and

1025dimensions of the package, and turn that information over to the

1036shipping clerk, who would print the shipping documents and

1045labels for Petitioner to affix to the package. Petition er would

1056place the labels on the fan, again making sure that all numbers

1068matched and that he had the correct fan. Petitioner would then

1079send out the order.

10837. On May 19, 2015, nearly 10 months after his hiring,

1094Petitioner pulled and shipped the wrong pro duct to a customer.

11058. On June 2, 2015, Petitioner again shipped the wrong

1115product to a customer. The product was needed by another

1125customer immediately. At its own expense, Soler & Palau rushed

1135another order to that customer.

11409. As a consequence of hi s errors, Petitioner received an

1151informal warning from Ms. Noble on June 8, 2015. On the same

1163date, Ms. Noble sent an email to human resources administrator

1173Krissy Velleca (née Carter) requesting that the informal warning

1182be noted in PetitionerÓs employee file. Ms. Noble wrote that

1192the company was going through a transition to new fans that were

1204very similar to the old ones, and that she counseled Petitioner

1215Ðto double - check and triple - check himself until the transition

1227is complete.Ñ She wrote that Petit ioner agreed to watch his

1238work more closely and that she had asked a couple of other

1250employees to check behind him Ðuntil we are all used to the

1262changes.Ñ Finally, Ms. Noble wrote that she did not want to

1273issue a formal warning to Petitioner because of al l the recent

1285changes and that she would watch Petitioner to make sure the

1296problem did not repeat itself.

130110. Ms. Noble testified that she had three different

1310people attempt to retrain Petitioner, out of concern that he was

1321not catching on to the job becau se of the manner of his original

1335training.

133611. On June 19, 2015, Petitioner again made a mistake on

1347an order by placing the wrong part number and wrong order

1358identification on the shipment. Soler & Palau incurred

1366additional freight and expedited UPS ch arges in correcting

1375PetitionerÓs mistake. The company also had to deal with a

1385disappointed customer who had been mistakenly informed that

1393their shipment was in transit.

139812. On June 22, 2015, Ms. Noble issued a formal written

1409warning to Petitioner for the June 19 incident. The warning

1419statement read as follows:

1423This statement will serve as a verbal

1430warning for Poor Workmanship in accordance

1436with Section 3.26 of the Employee Handbook.

1443Gus [ 3 /] is required to always verify that the

1454fan tag matches the order acknowledgement

1460with both the order and part number. Both

1468of these orders were entered 06/19/15 with a

1476Ðsame dayÑ shipping request that did put

1483additional workload and time pressures on

1489the crew, but this is one step that cannot

1498be skipped. In accordanc e with the company

1506handbook, any future occurrences of this

1512same offense can result in a written

1519warning, (3) days suspension and/or

1524termination.

152513. Petitioner signed the statement, acknowledging that he

1533had read and understood the formal written warnin g.

154214. Ms. Noble testified that Petitioner was again provided

1551additional training.

155315. On July 20, 2015, Ms. Noble completed PetitionerÓs

1562annual performance review. She noted that Petitioner needed

1570improvement in the quality of his work and in his knowl edge of

1583the technical aspects of his job. She further noted that

1593PetitionerÓs attendance and punctuality verged on an

1600ÐunsatisfactoryÑ rating.

160216. In spite of PetitionerÓs spotty evaluation, Ms. Noble

1611recommended him for the full three percent raise avai lable to

1622Soler & Palau employees upon their annu al reviews. In an email

1634to Ms. Velleca and vice president of operations , Greg Johnson,

1644Ms. Noble explained her rationale as follows:

1651Please see attached for GusÓ annual review.

1658You may question why I am giv ing him the

1668full 3% when I didnÓt give him a great

1677review. All of his attendance issues have

1684stemmed from transportation issues as far as

1691I remember. I know it must be hard to do

1701anything about that situation when he is

1708barely making enough to live on. IÓm hoping

1716it will make a difference in what he is able

1726to do to remedy his attendance problems. I

1734donÓt think there would have been these

1741issues if there were bus service offered

1748here, but that is not currently available.

1755Please let me know if this seem s out of

1765line. He is currently at the minimum for

1773his position, so it is not an overly

1781generous move. Please let me know if you

1789see anything else that needs to be clarified

1797or changed.

179917. Mr. Johnson responded, ÐI am fine with your decision

1809and reason ing.Ñ

181218. At the hearing, Ms. Noble testified that she knew

1822Petitioner had trouble getting to work. She thought that if he

1833were making enough money to get his truck repaired, his

1843attendance issues would stop and he would feel less stress and

1854make fewer m istakes on the job. Ms. Noble stated that she does

1867not like firing people because it causes disruption to the

1877operation and means that she has to hire and train a new person,

1890who may or may not turn out to be a good employee. She was

1904willing to do everyt hing she could to improve PetitionerÓs

1914deficiencies because he did a good job most of the time.

192519. On September 3, 2015, while Ms. Noble was on vacation,

1936Mr. Johnson discovered that Petitioner had once again shipped

1945the wrong product to a customer. Mr. Johnson sent an email to

1957Ms. Velleca inquiring about PetitionerÓs hiring date and job

1966responsibilities. He wrote, ÐI ask because he just made a

1976significant mistake in pulling 2 fans for shipment. I need to

1987dig into how he was trained, are we asking him t o do something

2001outside his expected responsibilities, etc.Ñ

200620. Ms. Velleca testified that she investigated to make

2015sure that Petitioner was on the job when the error occurred and

2027that a fill - in had not made the mistake. She stated that she

2041and Mr. Johns on did not want to take action against Petitioner

2053if the error was not his fault. She ultimately determined that

2064Petitioner had made the error.

206921. Ms. Velleca testified that the B - 2 facility had

2080historically been graded as 100 percent efficient and 99 p ercent

2091error - free by the parent company in Spain. PetitionerÓs errors

2102were affecting B - 2Ós overall performance. The parent company

2112was starting to notice a falloff in customer orders and the

2123additional freight costs attributable to correcting PetitionerÓ s

2131errors.

213222. Upon returning to work, Ms. Noble began her own

2142investigation of the mistake, which involved PetitionerÓs mixing

2150up two fans for shipment. On the same day, Ms. Noble caught

2162Petitioner making yet another error by placing the wrong tags on

2173a fan. Though she caught this mistake on the warehouse floor

2184before the fan shipped, Ms. Noble decided that Petitioner had

2194made too many mistakes and that he should be terminated from

2205employment with Soler & Palau.

221023. On September 18, 201 5, Petitioner was called to

2220Ms. NobleÓs office and provided with a separation notice from

2230Soler & Palau. The stated reason for his discharge was

2240unacceptable performance of his job duties.

224624. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that he believed

2255he was fired because he did not volunteer for overtime work. He

2267believed that the errors of which he was accused were the fault

2279of other employees and constituted a pretext for his dismissal.

228925. Specifically, Petitioner blamed two delivery truck

2296drivers for the erroneous deliv eries. They were Gevon Campbell,

2306who was black, and a white driver whom Petitioner knew only as

2318Mike. Petitioner claimed that these drivers were charged with

2327checking the orders and ensuring that they are correct. Aside

2337from his claim, Petitioner offere d no evidence that the delivery

2348drivers were responsible for checking the orders. Ms. Noble

2357persuasively described PetitionerÓs Crater I job as inclusive of

2366ensuring that the correct items go into the crates.

237526. Petitioner also alleged that a wiring tec hnician named

2385Dave Boyin told him that when he worked as a crater, he made

2398many mistakes on the job but was nonetheless promoted to a

2409higher position. Mr. Boyin is white. He did not testify at the

2421hearing.

242227. Ms. Noble testified that she promoted Mr. B oyin to

2433wiring technician because he was doing a good job as a crater.

2445She stated that Mr. Boyin made errors during his 90 - day training

2458period, as does any trainee, but that he made no mistakes as a

2471crater after his training period was over. Ms. NobleÓs

2480testimony was persuasive.

248328. At the hearing, PetitionerÓs testimony was mostly

2491directed toward making a case of wrongful termination, not

2500racial discrimination. At the conclusion of PetitionerÓs

2507testimony, the undersigned counseled Petitioner that the

2514j urisdiction of this tribunal was limited to his discrimination

2524claim. In response, Petitioner stated, ÐI donÓt think it was

2534race. I donÓt really think it was race, you know what IÓm

2546saying?Ñ Petitioner continued to insist that he was fired for

2557refusing to work overtime. Even if PetitionerÓs insistence on

2566this point were credited, it would not establish that he had

2577been discriminated against because of his race or color. 4 /

258829. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Soler &

2597Palau discriminated against him because of his race or color in

2608violation of section 760.10.

2612CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

261530. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

2622jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this

2633proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat.

26403 1. The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the "Florida

2651Civil Rights Act" or the "Act"), chapter 760, Florida Statutes,

2662prohibits discrimination in the workplace.

266732. Section 760.10 states the following, in relevant part:

2676(1) It is an unlawful employment practice

2683for an employer:

2686(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to

2695hire any individual, or otherwise to

2701discriminate against any individual with

2706respect to compensation, terms, conditions,

2711or privileges of employment, because of such

2718individual's race, color, religion, sex,

2723national origin, age, handicap, or marital

2729status.

273033. Soler & Palau is an "employer" as defined in section

2741760.02(7), Florida Statutes, which provides the following:

2748(7) "Employer" means any person employing

275415 or more employe es for each working day in

2764each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the

2773current or preceding calendar year, and any

2780agent of such a person.

278534. Florida courts have determined that federal case law

2794applies to claims arising under the Florida Civil Rights Act,

2804and as such, the United States Supreme Court's model for

2814employment discrimination cases set forth in McDonnell Douglas

2822Corp oration v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d

2837668 (1973), applies to claims arising under section 760.10,

2846absent dir ect evidence of discrimination. 5 / See Harper v.

2857Blockbuster EntmÓt Corp. , 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998);

2867Paraohao v. Bankers Club, Inc. , 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361 (S.D.

2879Fla. 2002); Fla. State Univ. v. Sondel , 685 So. 2d 923, 925 n.1

2892(Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Fla. DepÓt of Comm. Aff. v. Bryant , 586

2904So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

291135. Under the McDonnell analysis, in employment

2918discrimination cases, Petitioner has the burden of establishing

2926by a preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of unlawful

2937d iscrimination. If the prima facie case is established, the

2947burden shifts to the employer to rebut this preliminary showing

2957by producing evidence that the adverse action was taken for some

2968legitimate, non - discriminatory reason. If the employer rebuts

2977the prima facie case, the burden shifts back to Petitioner to

2988show by a preponderance of evidence that the employer's offered

2998reasons for its adverse employment decision were pretextual.

3006See Texas DepÓt of Comm. Aff. v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248,

3017101 S. Ct. 1089 , 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981).

302736. In order to prove a prima facie case of unlawful

3038employment discrimination under chapter 760, Petitioner must

3045establish that: (1) he is a member of the protected group;

3056(2) he was subject to adverse employment action; (3) S oler &

3068Palau treated similarly situated employees outside of his

3076protected classifications more favorably; and (4) Petitioner was

3084qualified to do the job and/or was performing his job at a level

3097that met the employerÓs legitimate expectations. See, e.g. ,

3105Jiles v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 360 Fed. Appx. 61, 64 (11th

3117Cir. 2010); Burke - Fowler v. Orange Cnty . , 447 F.3d 1319, 1323

3130(11th Cir. 2006); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. , 330

3141F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Vitro Serv. Corp. ,

3152144 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998); McKenzie v. EAP Mgmt.

3163Corp. , 40 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374 - 75 (S.D. Fla. 1999).

317537. Petitioner has failed to prove a prima facie case of

3186unlawful employment discrimination.

318938. Petitioner established that he is a member of a

3199protected group, in that he is a black male. Petitioner

3209established that he was subject to an adverse employment action,

3219in that he was dismissed from his position as a Crater I after

3232holding the job for more than one year.

324039. However, no evidence s upports an inference that

3249Petitioner was discriminated against based upon his race or

3258color. Petitioner offered no persuasive evidence to establish

3266that any similarly situated employee was treated differently by

3275Soler & Palau. 6 / While Petitioner was qual ified to do the job of

3290Crater I, and at times performed adequately, he was ultimately

3300fired for failing to perform the job at a level that met Soler &

3314PalauÓs legitimate expectations.

331740. Even if Petitioner had provided sufficient evidence

3325that there was an adverse employment action, Soler & Palau

3335presented plentiful evidence of legitimate, non - discriminatory

3343reasons for Petitioner's termination. PetitionerÓs multiple

3349errors on the job cost the company money out - of - pocket to

3363correct, as well as a loss of customer goodwill and possible

3374future business. PetitionerÓs immediate employer, the

3380B - 2 warehouse facility, suffered intra - company damage in terms

3392of its lowered efficiency rating . PetitionerÓs supervisor,

3400Ms. Noble, showed great forbearance with Peti tioner, giving him

3410a raise that was not strictly merited and continuing to work

3421with him through his mistakes until the company could no longer

3432be expected to bear the cost of carrying Petitioner as an

3443employee. At the hearing, Petitioner himself conceded that his

3452firing was not based on his race or color.

3461RECOMMENDATION

3462Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

3472Law, it is

3475RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

3483issue a final order finding that Soler and Palau USA Venti lation

3495Systems, LLC , did not commit any unlawful employment practices

3504and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case.

3514DONE AND ENTERED this 2 1st day of March , 2017 , in

3525Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

3529S

3530LAWRE NCE P. STEVENSON

3534Administrative Law Judge

3537Division of Administrative Hearings

3541The DeSoto Building

35441230 Apalachee Parkway

3547Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

3552(850) 488 - 9675

3556Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

3562www.doah.state.fl.us

3563Filed with the Clerk of the

3569Division of Administrative Hearings

3573this 2 1st day of March , 2017 .

3581ENDNOTE S

35831/ The style of the case has been amended to reflect

3594RespondentÓs full name.

35972 / Citations shall be to Florida Statutes (2016) unless

3607otherwise specified. Section 760.10 has been unchange d since

36161992, save for a 2015 amendment adding pregnancy to the list of

3628classifications protected from discriminatory employment

3633practices. Ch. 2015 - 68, § 6, Laws of Fla.

36433 / On the job, Petitioner went by his middle name, Gus

3655(presumably short for Augus tus).

36604 / On this point, Petitioner testified that he was not present

3672when Ms. Noble asked his shift to work overtime for a week.

3684Petitioner left at his regular time of 3:30 p.m., though he

3695noticed the other employees were staying. He appears to have

3705ta ken offense at not having been asked in person by Ms. Noble to

3719work overtime and so continued going home each day at his

3730regular time , even though he knew the company wanted him to stay

3742over. There was no element of racial discrimination involved in

3752a bla nket request to all employees to work overtime.

37625 / Ð Direct evidence is Òevidence, which if believed, proves

3773existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.Ó"

3782Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc. , 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 n.6 (11th Cir.

37931987) ( quoting Blac kÓs Law Dictionary 413 (5th ed. 1979)). In

3805Carter v. City of Miami , 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1989), the

3818court stated:

3820This Court has held that not every comment

3828concerning a person's age presents direct

3834evidence of discrimination. [ Young v. Gen.

3841F oods Corp. 840 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir.

3850Young Court made clear that

3855remarks merely referring to characteristics

3860associated with increasing age, or facially

3866neutral comments from which a plaintiff has

3873inferred discriminatory intent, are not

3878dir ectly probative of discrimination. Id .

3885Rather, courts have found only the most

3892blatant remarks, whose intent could be

3898nothing other than to discriminate on the

3905basis of age, to constitute direct evidence

3912of discrimination.

3914Petitioner offered no evidence that would satisfy the

3922stringent standard of direct evidence of discrimination.

39296 / As to the question of disparate treatment, the applicable

3940standard was set forth in Maniccia v. Brown , 171 F.3d 1364,

39511368 - 1369 (11th Cir. 1999):

"3957In determining whether employees are

3962similarly situated for purposes of

3967establishing a prima facie case, it is

3974necessary to consider whether the employees

3980are involved in or accused of the same

3988or similar conduct and are disciplined in

3995different ways." Jones v. Bessemer Carraw ay

4002Med. Ctr. , 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th

4009Cir.), opinion modified by 151 F.3d 1321

4016(1998) ( quoting Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d

40241555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997)). "The most

4031important factors in the disciplinary

4036context are the nature of the offenses

4043committed and the nature of the punishments

4050imposed." Id . (internal quotations and

4056citations omitted). We require that the

4062quantity and quality of the comparator's

4068misconduct be nearly identical to prevent

4074courts from second - guessing employers'

4080reasonable decisions and confusing apples

4085with oranges. See Dartmouth Review

4090v. Dartmouth College , 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st

4098Cir.1989) ("Exact correlation is neither

4104likely nor necessary, but the cases must be

4112fair congeners. In other words, apples

4118should be compared to apples.") . (Emphasis

4126added) .

4128The Eleventh Circuit has questioned the "nearly identical"

4136standard enunciated in Maniccia , but has in recent years

4145reaffirmed its adherence to it. See , e.g. , Brown v. Jacobs

4155EngÓg, Inc. , 572 Fed. Appx. 750, 751 (11th Cir. 2014); Esc arra

4167v. Regions Bank , 353 Fed. Appx. 401, 404 (11th Cir. 2009);

4178Burke - Fowler , 447 F.3d at 1323 n.2.

4186In any event, Petitioner in the instant case failed to

4196provide any persuasive evidence to establish disparate

4203treatment.

4204COPIES FURNISHED:

4206Tammy S. B arton, Agency Clerk

4212Florida Commission on Human Relations

4217Room 110

42194075 Esplanade Way

4222Tallahassee, Florida 32399

4225(eServed)

4226Michelle Bedoya Barnett, Esquire

4230Alexander DeGance Barnett , P.A.

42341500 Riverside Avenue

4237Jacksonville, Florida 32204

4240Ryan Pough

4242Apa rtment No. 1103

424611011 Harts Road

4249Jacksonville, Florida 32218

4252David E. Chauncey, Esquire

4256Alexander DeGance Barnett , P.A.

42601500 Riverside Avenue

4263Jacksonville, Florida 32204

4266(eServed)

4267Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

4271Florida Commission on Human Relation s

42774075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

4282Tallahassee, Florida 32399

4285(eServed)

4286NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

4292All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

430215 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

4313to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

4324will issue the Final Order in this case.

Select the PDF icon to view the document.
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Date
Proceedings
PDF:
Date: 05/25/2017
Proceedings: Agency Final Order
PDF:
Date: 05/25/2017
Proceedings: Agency Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed.
PDF:
Date: 03/21/2017
Proceedings: Recommended Order
PDF:
Date: 03/21/2017
Proceedings: Recommended Order (hearing held November 8, 2016). CASE CLOSED.
PDF:
Date: 03/21/2017
Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
PDF:
Date: 12/21/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Ex-parte Communication.
PDF:
Date: 12/21/2016
Proceedings: Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/20/2016
Proceedings: Letter to Judge Stevenson from Ryan Pough filed.
PDF:
Date: 12/13/2016
Proceedings: Order Granting Extension.
PDF:
Date: 12/07/2016
Proceedings: Respondent's Unopposed Motion For Extension of Time to Submit Proposed Recommended Orders filed.
Date: 11/08/2016
Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
PDF:
Date: 11/02/2016
Proceedings: Court Reporter ReSchedule filed.
PDF:
Date: 11/02/2016
Proceedings: Order Granting Continuance and Re-scheduling Hearing (hearing set for November 8, 2016; 9:30 a.m.; Jacksonville, FL; amended as to ).
PDF:
Date: 11/02/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Ex-parte Communication.
PDF:
Date: 11/02/2016
Proceedings: Letter from Ryan Pough requesting a continuance, or hearing by phone filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/27/2016
Proceedings: Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation (with attachments) filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/27/2016
Proceedings: Court Reporter Request filed.
PDF:
Date: 10/27/2016
Proceedings: Soler and Palau's Witness List filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/14/2016
Proceedings: Order of Pre-hearing Instructions.
PDF:
Date: 09/14/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Hearing (hearing set for November 3, 2016; 9:30 a.m.; Jacksonville, FL).
PDF:
Date: 09/13/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Compliance with Initial Order filed.
PDF:
Date: 09/01/2016
Proceedings: Initial Order.
PDF:
Date: 08/31/2016
Proceedings: Employment Charge of Discrimination filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/31/2016
Proceedings: Notice of Determination: No Reasonable Cause filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/31/2016
Proceedings: Determination: No Reasonable Cause filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/31/2016
Proceedings: Petition for Relief filed.
PDF:
Date: 08/31/2016
Proceedings: Transmittal of Petition filed by the Agency.

Case Information

Judge:
LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON
Date Filed:
08/31/2016
Date Assignment:
09/01/2016
Last Docket Entry:
05/25/2017
Location:
Jacksonville, Florida
District:
Northern
Agency:
ADOPTED IN TOTO
 

Counsels

Related Florida Statute(s) (6):