16-006033 Department Of Children And Families vs. Lincoln Marti Community Agency, Inc., D/B/A Lincoln Marti Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, April 4, 2017.

Summary: Although Respondent's employee hit or forcefully grabbed children in care, the act did not meet the statutory definition of child abuse, and thus Petitioner should not impose a fine of $400.00 against Respondent, a licensed child care facility.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND

FAMILIES,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 16 - 6033

LINCOLN MARTI COMMUNITY AGENCY,

INC., d/b/a LINCOLN MARTI,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case came before Administrative Law Judge John G.

Van Laningham for final hearing by video teleconference on

February 13, 201 7 , at sites in Tallahassee and Miami , Florida ,

and by telephone conference call on February 14, 201 7 .

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Karen Milia Annunziato , Esquire

Department of Children and Famil i es

401 Northwes t Second Avenue , Suite N - 1014

Miami , Florida 33128

For Respondent: Christopher G. Berga , Esquire

Miguel J. Chamorro, Esquire

Lydecker Diaz, LLC

1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor

Miami , Florida 33 1 31

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Whether Respondent's employee hit or forcefully grabbed

children in care, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint ;

and, if so, whether Petitioner should impose a fine of $400.00

against Respondent, a licensed child care facility, for the

commission, by an employee, of an act that meets the statutory

definition of child abuse.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On September 8 , 201 6 , Petitioner Department of Children and

Families issued an A dministrative Complaint against Respondent

Lincoln Marti Community Agency, Inc. , d/b/a Lincoln Marti,

charging the licensed day - care provider with an offense relating

to child abuse or neglect .

T he licensee timely exercised its right to be heard in a

formal administrative proceeding. On October 1 8 , 201 6 , the

agency referred the matter to the Division of Administrative

Hearings, where the case was assigned to an Administrative Law

Judge.

The fin al hearing took place as scheduled on February 13

and 14 , 201 7 , with both parties present. The agency called the

following witnesses: Laura Pantano, Denise Hannah, Andrea

Noguera , Paola Hincapie, Patricia Parker, and Yanet Perez - Cruz .

In addition, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2, 4, and 7 through 11

were received in evidence.

Respondent presented three witnesses: Gertrutis Lora,

Stephanie Duarte, and Michael J. DiTomasso, Ph.D. Respondent's

Exhibits A through E, J, K, M, and N were admitted into

e vidence.

The final hearing transcript, comprising three volumes, was

filed on March 6 , 2017. Each party timely filed a Proposed

Recommended Order on or before March 16 , 2017, the deadline

established at the conclusion of the hearing.

Unless otherwise indi cated, citations to the official

statute law of the state of Florida refer to Florida Statutes

2016, except that all references to statutes or rules defining

disciplinable offenses or prescribing penalties for committing

such offenses are to the versions t hat were in effect at the

time of the alleged wrongful acts.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all relevant times, Respondent Lincoln Marti

Community Agency, Inc. , d/b/a Lincoln Marti ("LMCA"), held a

Certificate of License, numbered C11MD1532 , which authorize d

LMCA to operate a child care facility (the "School") in Miami

Beach , Florida , for the period from June 7 , 201 6 , through

December 4 , 2016 . As a licensed child care facility , LMCA falls

under the regulatory jurisdiction of Petitioner De partment of

Children and Families ("DCF").

2. On August 25, 2016, Laura Pantano arrived at the School

in the afternoon to pick up her child . While waiting in the

reception area, Ms. Pantano noticed the real - time video feeds

from the surv eillance cameras in the classrooms . These live

videos were displayed on multiple monitors in plain view.

Ms. Pantano focused her attention on the classroom of Clara

Gonzalez - Quintero . Although her child was not in Ms. Quintero's

class, Ms. Pantano harbored suspicions that Ms. Quintero h ad

been hitting children.

3. Sure enough, right on cue, Ms. Quintero appeared to

forcefully grab and hit a child . It is not disputed in this

proceeding that Ms. Quintero used corporal discipline on two

children, D.D. and S.M , at the very moment Ms. Pantano happened

to be watching the closed - circuit television for just such an

occurrence .

4. That said, no one having personal knowledge of the

incident in question testified at hearing. Ms. Pantano

testified, but she was not a ctually an eyewitness , for she

merely observed live surveillance video on a display device , not

the incident itself. Naturally, t he surveillance video is in

evidence, allowing the undersigned (and anyone else) to see

exactly what Ms. Pantano saw that day. 1 / Yet, while the video

evidence is both captivating and seemingly unbiased, it is a

mistake to assume that the assertive narrative of this (or a ny )

video is objective and unambiguous, for rarely is that true, if

ever. Viewers of filmic evidence, including the undersigned, do

not som ehow become eyewitnesses to a genuine occurrence; we

perceive only the video, and the video merely represents,

imperfec tly, the real events captured on camera. Of necessity,

each viewer ÏÏ such as Ms. Pantano, who as stated above was

predisposed to believe the worst about Ms. Quintero ÏÏ projects

onto the images his or her own interpretation of the scenes

depicted. As the fa ct - finder, the undersigned must determine

the significance, meaning, and story of the images preserved in

the video based upon a critical review of the film in

conjunction with a careful consideration of all the available

evidence.

5. Had the fact been disputed, the undersigned would have

struggled with the question of whether Ms. Quintero "struck"

D.D. 2 / or merely made incidental nonviolent contact of the sort

parents and teachers routinely use when redirecting a

disobedient child. One significant lim itation of the video is

that it lacks sound . During the crucial moments, Ms. Quintero

appears to be reprimanding D.D., who was three year s old at the

time, but if so, the video provides no proof of the reasons , for

we cannot hear what she is saying . At the same time, however,

it is reason able to assume that Ms. Quintero had some bona fide

basis for approaching D.D. , for no evidence to the contrary was

offered .

6. On the video, Ms. Quintero appears to pat D.D. on the

shoulder while addressing the child. Without audio, however,

this action is ambiguous. Is she punishing, exhorting, or

encouraging the child? Hard to tell. D.D. seems to put his

hands over his ears. Fear , protective response , or defiance?

Take your pick. Then Ï did she just slap him? It happens so

fast, the picture is not clear, and the angle of the shot less

than ideal. Maybe.

7. So mething happened, to be sure, but different viewers

will form different conclusions about what the video depicts.

Because LMCA concedes th e point, and because the filmic

evidence, though ambiguous, justifies such acquiescence, t he

undersigned finds that Ms. Quintero administered a form of

physical punishment, which violated both the law 3 / and LMCA's

written policy on discipline. But the und ersigned does not find

that the corporal discipline at issue evinc ed malice or cruelty.

The record , in short, convinces the undersigned to find that

physical contact occurred, but not violent contact.

8. Believing that she had seen a teacher repeatedly slap a

child , Ms. Pantano rushed upstairs to confront Ms. Quintero in

the classroom , while she simultaneously called the police on her

cellphone. When she arrived in the classroom, excited and

crying, Ms. Pantano screamed accusations at the te acher, who

denied any wrongdoing. The commotion drew the School's

director, Yanet Perez - Cruz , to the room , where she heard

Ms. Pantano , in front of the children, uttering a conditional

threat to kill Ms. Quintero , the condition being Ms. Pantano's

possession of a knife, which fortunately for everyone involved

was not met.

9. Within a short time, the police arrived and immediately

set to work investigating the incident. Neither D.D. nor any of

the ot her children were found to have visible physica l injuries

attributable to Ms. Quintero. No evidence of such was presented

at hearing, and the undersigned finds that Ms. Quintero did not

cause any physical harm to D.D., S.M., or any child at the

School on the day in question. LMCA fired Ms . Quintero t he next

day, not for hurting a child , but for violating its policy on

corporal punishment.

10. As for possible mental injury, D.D. was anxious, did

not sleep quite as well, and had some instances of be d - wetting

after the occurrence with Ms. Quintero, acc ording to his mother.

These symptoms, however, reflected at most a marginal

aggravation of preexisting conditions, and within a few weeks or

so D.D. had returned to his baseline. In addition, D.D. had

been receiving speech therapy , for about ten months before the

incident, to treat a stutter . I n the months following the

occurrence at issue , after which he had been abruptly removed

from the School and enrolled in another day care facility, D.D.

made rapid improvement in his speech , to the point that by t he

time of the hearing, D.D.'s stutter was nearly gone.

11. The record lacks convincing evidence that D.D.'s

intellectual or psychological capacity was injured by

Ms. Quintero , as there is no persuasive proof of any discernible

and substantial impa irment of D.D.'s ability to function within

normal limits. To the contrary, the evidence shows that , as of

the hearing, D.D. is functioning within the normal ranges of

intellectual and psychological performance and not displaying

any signs of even mild , much less severe , mental or emotional

impairment .

12. With regard to S.M., there is likewise no convincing

evidence of any significant mental injury . Similar to D.D.,

S.M. was observed, by her parent, to be somewhat more anxious

than usual following the incident with Ms. Quintero, but this

general anxiety res olved before long and was not causing S.M.

any problems at the time of the hearing. Other evidence

suggests, credibly, that S.M. is (as of the hearing) a happy,

intelligent , and normal child evi ncing no discernable

impairments in intellectual or psychological functioning.

13. In sum, neither D.D. nor S.M. suffered any physical

harm at the hands of Ms. Quintero, and although there is some

( but not clear and convincing ) evidence that one or bot h

chil dren might have experienced mild emotional or psychological

distress ÏÏ as manifested by , e.g., bed - wetting or anxiety ÏÏ in the

immediate aftermath of the events at the School on August 25,

2016, it is clear that such symptoms did not persist or

substantially impair either child, even briefly, and that within

a few months , if not sooner, both D.D. and S.M. were back to

normal.

14. At hearing, LMAC presented Michael J. DiTomasso,

Ph.D., as an expert witness. Dr. DiTomasso is a clinical

psycholo gist who special izes in forensic psychology and, to the

point , child abuse. Indeed, Dr. DiTomasso has testified

frequently as an expert for DCF in dependency trials involving

child abuse and child neglect. Dr. DiTomasso provided the

following credible an d convincing overview of the current

dispute:

Okay. So we have a video recording of some

unpleasant behavior on the part of a

teacher. And I reviewed this. I looked at

it. I actually watched it a couple of

times.

I see that she hit the kid, she shook the

child. She was unpleasant with the

children. And I understand that this

behavior is prohibited by the school. . . .

But does the -- does what we see in this

tape rise to something monstrous that we

would think is going to cause significant

impairme nt in a child's psychological life

somewhere down the line? Maybe the first

question is: Did it cause -- does it cause

significant physical damage?

But everyone says no. The police say no,

the mothers say no, the children -- that

went to a doctor there 's no medical

findings. So by every measure, DCF says no.

By every measure everyone who considered

actual physical damage said no. So, no,

we're not at the psychological damage.

What we see in these tapes, it's unpleasant,

of course. But, I mean, is t here anyone,

really, who never saw behavior like this

before in their lives? In their own family,

in their own lives, in a Target.

In a Target store, in the K - Mart, we see

this kind of behavior. We don't like it,

but we're not -- we're not looking at it as

catastrophic. We're looking at it as maybe

unpleasant to see.

And the parents are maybe looking at it as

appropriate because parents in America

believe in physical discipline of their

children, corporal punishment of the

children -- of children is ac cepted by most

-- most parents in America and even more

here in Florida, in the south.

* * *

If the corporal punishment causes broken

bones or fractures or bruises or welts, oh,

we're talking a different name. But that's

not what happened for these kids. This was

ordinary run - of - the - mill corporal punishment

in a place where it shouldn't have happened.

But the fact that it happened in a place

where it shouldn't have happened doesn't

make it a traumatic event that leads to

psychological harm do wn the line.

Tr. 351 - 54. The undersigned agrees with the foregoing

description and explanation of the video evidence .

15. The bottom line, according to Dr. DiTomasso, is that

no "meaningful disruption of a child's ability to function and

enjoy his life " happened, " it's not going to happen, it

shouldn't be expected to ever happen based only on the event [at

the School on August 25, 2016,] and the follow - up seems to show

that it hasn't." Tr. 414. The undersigned accepts

Dr. DiTommasso's opinion on cause - and - effect and determines as a

matter of ultimate fact that neither of the subject children

suffered a "mental injury" as defined in section 39.01(42) ,

Florida Statutes, as a result of the incident in question. 4 /

Ultimate Factual Determinations

1 6. The undersigned determines that LMCA's employee,

Ms. Quintero, while caring for children at the School on August

25, 2016, did not commit an act or omission that meets the

definition of child abuse or neglect provided in chapt er 39. 5 /

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

17 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal

and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to

s ections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

18 . A proceeding, such as this one, to impose discipline

upon a license is penal in n ature. State ex rel. Vining v. Fla.

Real Estate Comm'n , 281 So. 2d 487, 491 (Fla. 1973).

Accordingly, DCF must prove the charges against LMCA by clear

and convincing evidence. Dep't of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec.

& Investor Prot. v. Osborne Stern & Co. , 670 So. 2d 932, 933 - 34

(Fla. 1996)(citing Ferris v. Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292, 294 - 95

(Fla. 1987)); Nair v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., Bd. of Med. ,

654 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

1 9 . Regarding the standard of proof, in Slomowitz v.

Walker , 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the court

developed a "workable definition of clear and convincing

evidence" and found that of necessity such a definition would

need to contain "both qualitative and quantitative standards."

The court held that:

c lear and convincing evidence requires that

the evidence must be found to be credible;

the facts to which the witnesses testify

must be distinctly remembered; the testimony

must be precise and explicit and the

witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to

th e facts in issue. The evidence must be of

such weight that it produces in the mind of

the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction, without hesitancy, as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be

established.

Id. The Florida Supreme Court later adop ted the Slomowitz

court's description of clear and convincing evidence. See In re

Davey , 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994). The First District

Court of Appeal also has followed the Slomowitz test, adding the

interpretive comment that "[a]lthough this standard of proof may

be met where the evidence is in conflict, . . . it seems to

preclude evidence that is ambiguous." Westinghouse Elec. Corp.

v. Shuler Bros., Inc. , 590 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991),

rev. denied , 599 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1992)(citation omitted).

20 . Section 402.310 , Florida Statutes, authorizes DCF to

impose discipline against licensed child care facilities . This

statute provides, in pertinent part, that DCF " may adminis ter

. . . disciplinary sanctions for a violation of any provision of

ss. 402.301 - 402.319, or the rules adopted thereunder ."

§ 402.310(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

21 . DCF charged LMCA with the offense of Child Abuse or

Neglect . 6 / Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C - 22.001(11)(a)

specifies that "[a]cts or omissions that meet the definition of

child abuse or neglect provided in Chapter 39, F.S., constitute

a violation of the standards in Sections 402.301 - .319, F.S., and

shall support imposition of a sanction, as pr ovided in Section

402.310, F.S."

22 . Rule 65C - 22.010(1)(d) defines the term "violation" as

meaning a "finding of noncompliance by the department or local

licensing authority of a licensing standard." In its

Administrative Complaint against LMCA, DCF c ited Standard #63 - 01

as the "licensing standard" supporting the alleged violation.

Standard #63 - 01 is found in CF - FSP Form 5316, which is titled

"Child Care Facility S tandards Classification Summary ." Rule

65C - 22.010(1)(d)1 i ncorporates CF - FSP Form 5316 by reference.

23 . Standard #63 - 01 makes it a Class I Violation for

"[t]he owner, operator, employee or substitute, while caring for

children, [to] commit[] an act or omission that meets the

definition of child abuse or neglect provided in Chapter 39,

F lorida Statutes. "

24. Child "abuse" is defined as :

[A] ny willful act or threatened act that

results in any physical, mental, or sexual

abuse, injury, or harm that causes or is

likely to cause the child ' s physical,

mental, or emotional health to be

sign ificantly impaired. Abuse of a child

includes acts or omissions. Corporal

discipline of a child by a parent or legal

custodian for disciplinary purposes does not

in itself constitute abuse when it does not

result in harm to the child.

§ 39.01(2) , Fla St at .

25. To constitute abuse under this definition, an act must

result in "harm." "Harm" is a term of art defined in section

39.01(30). The definition , however, is quite long , and need not

be quoted in full here . As relevant to this case, "harm"

includ es:

Inappropriate or excessively harsh

disciplinary action that is likely to result

in physical injury, mental injury as defined

in this section, or emotional injury. The

significance of any injury must be evaluated

in light of the following factors: the age

of the child; any prior history of injuries

to the child; the location of the injury on

the body of the child; the multiplicity of

the injury; and the type of traum a

inflicted. Corporal discipline may be

considered excessive or abusive when it

results in any of the following or other

similar injuries:

a. Sprains, dislocations, or cartilage

damage.

b. Bone or skull fractures.

c. Brain or spinal cord damage.

d. I ntracranial hemorrhage or injury to

other internal organs.

e. Asphyxiation, suffocation, or drowning.

f. Injury resulting from the use of a

deadly weapon.

g. Burns or scalding.

h. Cuts, lacerations, punctures, or bites.

i. Permanent or temporary disfi gurement.

j. Permanent or temporary loss or

impairment of a body part or function.

k. Significant bruises or welts.

§ 39.01(30) (a)4. , Fla. Stat.

26. As found above, D.D. and S.M. did not suffer any

physical injuries at the School on August 25, 2016. The

statutory list of bodily injuries indicative of abuse is

instructive, nevertheless, for it draws a fairly clear line

between (i) ordinary corporal punishment as that co ncept is

commonly understood and (ii) abusive corporal punishment as

conceived under chapter 39. However much one might disapprove

of Ms. Quintero's conduct as captured on the surveillance video,

her actions are easily distinguishable from the kind of abusive

corporal discipline that the statute contemplates , regarding

which "we're talki ng a different name, " as Dr. DiTomasso put it.

27. The definition of "harm" also includes "mental

injury," a term defined to mean "an injury to the intellectual

or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a

discernible and substantial impairm ent in the ability to

function within the normal range of performance and behavior."

§ 39.01(42), Fla. Stat. As found above, neither D.D. nor S.M.

suffered a mental injury meeting this definition.

28. The foregoing statutory provisions and rule s "must be

construed strictly, in favor of the one against whom the penalty

would be impo sed." Munch v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., Div. of Real

Estate , 592 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); see Camejo v.

Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg. , 812 So. 2d 583, 583 - 84 (Fla. 3d DCA

2002); McClung v. Crim. Just. Stds. & Training Comm'n , 458 So.

2d 887, 888 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)("[W]here a statute provides for

revocation of a license the grounds must be strictly construed

because the statute is penal in nature. No conduct i s to be

regarded as included within a penal statute that is not

reasonably proscribed by it; if there are any ambiguities

included, they must be construed in favor of the licensee.");

see also, e.g. , Griffis v. Fish & Wildlife Conserv. Comm'n , 57

So. 3d 92 9 , 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)(statutes imposing a penalty

must never be extended by construction).

29 . Further, the grounds proven must be those specifically

alleged in the administrative complaint. See, e.g. , Cottrill v.

Dep't of Ins. , 685 So. 2d 1371, 137 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Kinney

v. Dep't of State , 501 So. 2d 129, 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987);

Hunter v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg. , 458 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 2d DCA

1984). Due process prohibits an agency from taking disciplinary

action against a licensee based on m atters not specifically

alleged in the charging instrument. See § 120.60(5), Fla. Stat.

(" No revocation, suspension, annulment, or withdrawal of any

license is lawful unless, prior to the entry of a final order,

the agency has served, by personal service or certified mail, an

administrative complaint which affords reasonable notice to the

licensee of facts or conduct which warrant the intended action .

. . ."); see also Trevisani v. Dep't of Health , 908 So. 2d 1108,

1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)( "A physician may not be disciplined for

an offense not charged in the complaint."); Marcelin v. Dep't of

Bus. & Prof'l Reg. , 753 So. 2d 745, 746 - 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000);

Delk v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg. , 595 So. 2d 966, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA

1992)("[T]he conduct pr oved must legally fall within the statute

or rule claimed [in the administrative complaint] to have been

violated.").

30 . In determining as a matter of ultimate fact that LMCA

did not commit the offense of Child Abuse or Neglect, the

undersigned concluded that the plain language of the applicable

statutes and rule s , being clear and unambiguous, could be

applied in a straightforward manner to the historical events at

hand without resorting to principles of interpretation or

examining extrinsic evidence of l egislative intent . It is

therefore unnecessary to make additional legal conclusions

concerning this offense .

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and

Families ente r a final order exonerating Lincoln Marti Community

Agency, Inc., d/b/a Lincoln Marti, from the accusation of Child

Abuse or Neglect as charged in the Administrative Complaint.

DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April , 20 1 7 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

___________________________________

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 4th day of April , 20 1 7 .

ENDNOT ES

1 / Viewing the tape of an historical event is a different

experience from seeing the broadcast images of the same event

unfolding in real time. But even though Ms. Pantano was there,

in a sense, she was not actually present to witness the alleged

abuse, which means that she does not have any more personal

knowledge about the disputed incident than any competent

present - day viewer of the tape can acquire.

2 / If Ms. Quintero made contact with the other child, S.M., the

undersigned was unable to observe the act on the video.

3 / See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C - 22.001(8)(b)("Spanking or any

other form of physical punishment is prohibited for all child

care personnel." ).

4 / The undersigned has considered the testimony of Patricia

Parker, who appeared as an expert witness for DCF. Her

credibility was adversely affected by several factors, including

an unprofessional demeanor, prior inconsistent statements, and

the fac t that she appears to have engaged in the unlicensed

practice of marriage and family therapy under the title of "MFT"

(an acronym which reasonably suggests that the person using it

is a licensed marriage and family therapist), possibly in

violation of Flor ida law. See § 491.012(1)(b), Fla. Stat. In

any event, to the extent that any of the findings herein

contradict, or are inconsistent with, Ms. Parker's testimony,

the latter is rejected as unpersuasive in favor of evidence that

the undersigned found to b e more believable and convincing,

including Dr. DiTommasso's testimony.

5 / LMCA did not have the burden to prove its innocence by any

standard of proof; the burden, rather, was on DCF to prove the

allegations against LMCA by clear and convincing evidence , which

DCF failed to do. It so happens, however, that LMCA is actually

exonerated by the greater weight of the evidence (at least),

which is more than sufficient proof to find LMCA not guilty of

the instant charges.

6 / As defined in section 39.01(44), "neglect" involves a

deprivation of necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical

care. There were no factual allegations or proof of child

"neglect" in this case.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Karen Milia Annunziato, Esquire

Department of Children and Famil i es

401 Northwest Second Avenue, Suite N - 1014

Miami, Florida 33128

(eSer v ed )

Christopher G. Berga, Esquire

Miguel J. Chamorro, Esquire

Lydecker Diaz, LLC

1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor

Miami, Florida 33131

(eSer v ed )

Paul Sexton, Agency Clerk

Department of Children and Families

Building 2, Room 204

1317 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0700

(eServed)

Mike Carroll, Secretary

Department of Children and Families

Building 1, Room 202

1317 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0700

(eServed)

Rebecca Kapusta, General Counsel

Department of Children and Families

Building 2, Room 204

1317 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0700

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.