16-006424EXE
Sonya Nicole Samuels vs.
Agency For Persons With Disabilities
Status: Closed
Recommended Order on Monday, February 27, 2017.
Recommended Order on Monday, February 27, 2017.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8SONYA NICOLE SAMUELS,
11Petitioner,
12vs. Case No. 16 - 6424EXE
18AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH
22DISABILITIES,
23Respondent.
24_______________________________/
25RECOMMENDED ORDER
27On December 20, 20 16, an administrative hearing in this
37case was held in Leesburg, Florida, before Lawrence P.
46Stevenson, a duly - appointed Administrative Law Judge of the
56Division of Administrative Hearings.
60APPEARANCES
61For Petitioner: Sonya Nicole Samuels, pro se
684 96 Goss Avenue
72Leesburg, Florida 34748
75For Respondent: Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire
81Agency for Persons with Disabilities
86Suite 422
88200 North Kentucky Avenue
92La keland, Florida 33801
96STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
100The issue in this case is whether it would be an abuse of
113discretion to deny Petitioner's request for exemption from
121employment disqualification.
123PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
125By letter dated September 26, 2016, Barba ra Palmer, the
135Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (the
144ÐAgencyÑ), denied the request of Petitioner for exemption from
153employment disqualification. Petitioner timely filed a Request
160for Administrative Hearing in which she disputed the fac ts on
171which the Agency relied in making its decision to deny the
182exemption and requested a formal administrative hearing. The
190Agency forwarded the Request for Administrative Hearing to the
199Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") on November 2,
2092016.
210The hearing was scheduled for December 20, 2016, on which
220date it was convened and completed.
226At the hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf and
236presented the testimony of her daughter, Candace Chatman.
244Petitioner offered no exhibits. The Agency presented the
252testimony of its Deputy Regional Operations Manager for the
261Central Region, Michael Sauvé. The AgencyÓs Exhibits A
269through D were admitted into evidence.
275No Transcript was ordered. The Agency timely filed its
284Proposed Recommended Order on December 30, 2016. Petitioner
292made no post - hearing filing of any kind.
301Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Florida
309Statutes are to the 2016 edition.
315FINDING S OF FACT
3191. Petitioner is seeking employment with the Lake County
328Board of County Commi ssioners, in a service provider function
338that is regulated by the A gency. As a prospective direct
349service provider, Petitioner was required to comply with
357background screening requirements.
3602. The Agency's clients are a vulnerable population,
368consisting of persons with the following statutorily defined
376developmental disabilities: intellectual disability, autism,
381spina bifida, Prader - Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down
390syndrome, and/or Phelan - McDermid Syndrome. § 393.063(12), Fla.
399Stat. Without the Ag ency's services, these clients would
408otherwise require institutionalization.
4113. The Agency's clients often have severe deficits in
420their abilities to complete self - care tasks and communicate
430their wants and needs. Such clients are at a heightened risk of
442abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental
450disabilities and inability to self - preserve. Consequently,
458employment as a direct service provider to the AgencyÓs clients
468is considered a position of special trust.
4754. The Agency is respon sible for regulating the employment
485of direct service providers in positions of special trust such
495as that sought by Petitioner. See §§ 110.1127(2)(c)1 . and
505393.0655, Fla. Stat. Many of the tasks undertaken by direct
515service providers for individuals wit h disabilities are of a
525social, personal needs, and/or financial nature.
5315. The background screening unit of the Department of
540Children and Families (ÐDCFÑ) performs background screenings for
548the Agency. Petitioner received notification from DCF, via
556let ter dated January 8, 2016, of her disqualification from
566employment due to her criminal history. The specific
574disqualifying offense listed in the letter was aggravated
582battery with a weapon, in violation of section 784.045, Florida
592Statutes, a second degre e felony.
5986. Because PetitionerÓs screening indicated a
604disqualifying offense, Petitioner was required to seek an
612exemption from disqualification in order to proceed with her
621application to work as a direct service provider.
6297. On or about February 26, 2 016, Petitioner submitted to
640DCF a Request for Exemption form, a completed Exemption
649Questionnaire form, various criminal records, character
655references, and other documents in support of granting of
664exemption from employment disqualification. DCF subseque ntly
671forwarded these materials to the Agency for review.
6798. The Agency began its exemption review by considering
688Petitioner's disqualifying offense. In June 1988, Petitioner
695committed the disqualifying offense of aggravated battery with a
704weapon. The po lice report of the incident stated that
714Petitioner stabbed her husband in the shoulder with a knife
724during an argument. The stab wound was serious enough to
734require treatment at the hospital and a subsequent visit to a
745specialist. On her Exemption Questi onnaire form, Petitioner
753indicated that her husband suffered permanent scarring from the
762wound.
7639. An arrest affidavit for probable cause was issued by
773the Leesburg Police Department. Petitioner later pled nolo
781contendere to the disqualifying offense a nd adjudication was
790withheld. She was sentenced to thirty - six (36) months of
801probation, payment of fines, court costs, mental health
809counseling, and a drug and alcohol program. Petitioner
817successfully completed her probation on August 29, 1991.
82510. In t he Exemption Questionnaire form, Petitioner set
834forth her version of the circumstances involved in the
843disqualifying offense:
845At 21 years of age, I was dealing with
854regular occurrences of mental distress
859within the home, such as emotional, mental,
866verbal a nd physical abuse by my ex - husband.
876On the day of this offense, my ex - husband
886entered our home in a rageful [sic] manner.
894Fear gripped me. He began to argue. He
902also went into the closet, pulling out a
910motorcycle chain. He began to strike me
917with it. After running outside, my ex -
925husband chased me with his belt off, hitting
933me with the belt buckle. A girl scoutÓs
941knife was already in my hand. He continued
949to hit me with the belt buckle, swinging his
958arm. As I turned around in self - defense, my
968ex - hus band was struck with the girl scoutÓs
978knife. Realizing what happened, I began to
985cry frantically, (my concern was to get
992medical attention for him), apologizing and
998begging for forgiveness.
100111. PetitionerÓs record indicates no other criminal
1008offenses of any kind, whether disqualifying or non -
1017disqualifying.
101812. The Exemption Questionnaire form requires applicants
1025to describe the degree of harm to any victim of their
1036disqualifying offenses. Petitioner wrote, ÐThanks be unto God,
1044my ex - husband sustained n on - life threatening injuries with
1056permanent scarring.Ñ
105813. The Exemption Questionnaire form requires applicants
1065to describe any stressors in their lives at the time of the
1077disqualifying incident and at present. Petitioner wrote that
1085there were stressors in her life at the time of the
1096disqualifying incident. She did not elaborate, but in answer to
1106another question she wrote that at age 21 she Ðhad begun to
1118abuse chemical substances.Ñ She stated that her drug use was
1128short - lived and that she ceased it per manently after the
1140stabbing incident.
114214. Regarding whether there are any current stressors in
1151her life, Petitioner wrote that she is "practising [sic]
1160unhealthy habits." Again, Petitioner did not elaborate as to
1169the nature of these unhealthy habits, bu t at the hearing she
1181explained that she was referencing overeating and not
1189exercising.
119015. Petitioner wrote that she is single and lives with her
1201mother, and that her community activities include her family,
1210women's group, church, art workshops, poetry and prose writing,
1219and volunteering for the community development center when
1227needed.
122816. The Exemption Questionnaire form asks for an
1236applicant's prior three years' work history and an explanation
1245of any job changes. PetitionerÓs employment record indic ated
1254she had driven a school bus for several years. Petitioner
1264provided the following explanation for changing jobs: "changed
1272careers from transportation to medical industry to procure an
1281immense financial gain. Have also decided to strive above and
1291bey ond my comfort zones to secure a position of my dreams."
130317. The Exemption Questionnaire form requires the
1310applicant to list his or her educational history and any
1320specialized training. Petitioner listed the following:
1326Office Support Technology, special izing in
1332Professional Leadership Development; Master
1336Security Officer, specializing in Basic
1341Supervisor, Leadership, & Advanced Manager;
1346Patient Care Technician, specializing in
1351Pharmacy Aide, EKG Aide and Unit
1357Secretary/Coordinator; and Private
1360Investig ation, specializing in Legal
1365Assistant & Fraud Insurance.
136918. Petitioner listed no specific institution for these
1377certifications or specializations, but other documents submitted
1384by Petitioner indicate that the Office Support Technology and
1393Patient Care Technician courses were provided by Lake Technical
1402College in 1996 - 97 and 1999, respectively; the Master Security
1413Officer certification was provided by Barton MSO in 2003; and
1423the Private Investigator diploma was received from City College
1432in 2011.
143419. I n response to the Exemption Questionnaire formÓs
1443requirement that the applicant document any history of
1451counseling, Petitioner wrote that she received mental health
1459counseling in 1988 and anger management counseling in 2007.
146820. Finally, under the heading ÐRemorse/accept
1474responsibility,Ñ the Exemption Questionnaire form requires the
1482applicant to document any relevant information related to the
1491acceptance of responsibility for his or her offenses. Petitioner
1500wrote as follows:
1503The harm done to my ex - husband caused me to
1514feel very awful. Because of the forgiveness
1521from my trespasses, the acceptance of the
1528offense towards my ex - husband subsided day by
1537day. Taking responsibility for my actions
1543made me realize that I must become a better
1552person and live a bett er life by improving
1561myself so that I would someday become a
1569productive citizen and asset to society and
1576my family.
157821. Petitioner listed the following specific employment
1585record: CareMinders Home Care, February 2015 to August 2015
1594(certified nurse assi stant); Interim Healthcare, December 2014
1602to June 2015 (certified nurse assistant); Lake County School
1611Board, October 2005 to August 2013 (school bus driver).
162022. In support of her exemption request, Petitioner also
1629submitted a copy of a ÐLake County Head Start Parent of the
1641YearÑ award she received in 1999, a copy of an ÐInternational
1652Poet of MeritÑ award she received in 2000, and reference letters
1663from previous employers and longtime friends. PetitionerÓs
1670friends described her as hard - working, compassio nate,
1679respectful, and considerate.
168223. By letter dated September 26, 2016, the Director of the
1693Agency informed Petitioner that her request for an exemption from
1703disqualification had been denied Ðbased on a Background Screening
1712that was performed on 1/07/2 016 . . . . The Agency considered
1725all available information that led to your disqualification, as
1734well as all information provided by you regarding your
1743disqualification. The Agency has denied your request for an
1752exemption because you have not submitted clear and convincing
1761evidence of your rehabilitation.Ñ
176524. The DirectorÓs letter informed Petitioner of her right
1774to request an administrative hearing to dispute the AgencyÓs
1783proposed action. Petitioner timely filed a Request for
1791Administrative Hearing.
179325. At the hearing, the Agency presented the testimony of
1803Michael Sauv, the AgencyÓs Deputy Regional Operations Manager
1811for the Central Region. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency had
1822reviewed all of the documentation submitted by Petitioner in
1831response to the Exemption Questionnaire , as well as additional
1840documents she submitted with her Request for Administrative
1848Hearing. These additional documents included an exemption from
1856disqualification, dated March 26, 2013, granted by the Department
1865of Health, Board of Nursing ; and a letter of disqualification
1875from employment from the Agency for Health Care Administration,
1884dated December 30, 2015.
188826. Mr. Sauvé testified that in reviewing exemption
1896requests, the Agency considers the disqualifying offense, the
1904c ircumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of the harm
1914caused to the victim, the history of the applicant since the
1925incident, and any other evidence indicating that the applicant
1934will not present a danger to a vulnerable population if the
1945exemption i s granted. Mr. Sauvé also stated that the Agency
1956seeks consistency in the applicant's account of events in his or
1967her Exemption Questionnaire, and considers the passage of time
1976since the disqualifying incident, whether or not the applicant
1985accepts respons ibility for his or her actions, and whether the
1996applicant expresses remorse for his or her prior criminal acts.
200627. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency noted marked
2015inconsistencies between Petitioner's account of her
2021disqualifying offense and the stateme nts found in the police
2031report. However, the police report of the incident consists of
2041hearsay within hearsay, i.e., the responding officerÓs narrative
2049of events as told to him by the involved parties. The police
2061report may not be relied upon in this tri bunal for the truth of
2075the matters asserted therein. It is of no use in establishing
2086that PetitionerÓs version of events is untruthful or minimizes
2095the seriousness of the incident.
210028. In any event, the inconsistencies noted by the Agency
2110were relatively minor critiques of PetitionerÓs written
2117narrative. For example, Petitioner stated in her Exemption
2125Questionnaire that she ran outside as her husband chased her and
2136hit her with his belt buckle and that she already had a Girl
2149Scout knife in her hand. She offered no explanation as to how
2161or why the knife came to be in her hand. Given that she freely
2175admitted to stabbing her husband, PetitionerÓs failure to detail
2184exactly when she picked up the knife , as he hit her with a
2197motorcycle chain and a belt buckle , seems of little importance.
220729. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency was also concerned
2217that Petitioner appeared to minimize the seriousness of the
2226incident when she wrote that her husband suffered Ðnon - life
2237threatening injuries with permanent scarring.Ñ Mr. Sauvé
2244contrasted PetitionerÓs statement with the police report stating
2252that the victim was Ðstabbed deep enough that he had to go to
2265[the hospital] for treatment and then to have a specialist work
2276on him due to the seriousness of the cut.Ñ The cut w as on the
2291back of the victimÓs shoulder and in no account was the incident
2303described as Ðlife threatening.Ñ PetitionerÓs description may
2310have lacked detail but was more or less consistent with the
2321police report.
232330. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency ex amined
2332PetitionerÓs driving record and found three speeding tickets.
2340Such violations are a concern to the Agency because individuals
2350who are granted exemptions could be called upon to transport
2360clients. The Agency must be confident that these clients wil l
2371be transported safely.
237431. More than her written statements, PetitionerÓs
2381testimony caused the undersigned to share the AgencyÓs concern
2390about Petitioner minimizing her disqualifying offense. She
2397seemed much more concerned with explaining the speeding tickets
2406than in expanding upon her brief written statement regarding
2415aggravated battery with a weapon. Petitioner simply read aloud
2424her written statement about stabbing her husband, then launched
2433into a detailed discussion of her speeding tickets. Also,
2442Petitioner could not recall whether her driverÓs license had
2451ever been suspended. When confronted with documentation that it
2460had, Petitioner stated that her license had never been suspended
2470Ðfor cause.Ñ None of this testimony was helpful in establishing
2480PetitionerÓs unvarnished veracity or her appreciation of the
2488seriousness of her disqualifying offense.
249332. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency had a concern with
2504PetitionerÓs statement that she had changed careers to the
2513medical field to "procure an immen se financial gain." Mr. Sauvé
2524noted that it is not unreasonable for a person to seek a decent
2537income, but that it is highly unusual and somewhat disconcerting
2547for a person to enter the field of serving persons with
2558disabilities with the idea of Ðimmense f inancial gain.Ñ
256733. Mr. SauvÓs concern on this point was well taken. In
2578another case, the undersigned might be inclined to find that the
2589applicant had merely chosen an unartful way to express her hope
2600of bettering her station in life, but Petitioner p resents
2610herself as the professional author of two books. She may be
2621presumed to understand the form of the thoughts she puts to
2632paper. Petitioner said nothing at the final hearing to allay
2642the concern Mr. Suave expressed about her stated motivation for
2652e ntering the field.
265634. Mr. Sauvé also discussed three DCF reports involving
2665Petitioner in allegations of abuse. The first report, dated
26741989, involved a verified finding of sexual battery against
2683Petitioner's then - husband. According to the report, a rel ative
2694told the investigator that the husband had a history as a sexual
2706perpetrator. The report stated that Petitioner allowed access
2714to her daughter and that the husband had fondled the child. The
2726report stated that Petitioner had been made aware of what
2736happened but chose to forgive the husband. She remained in the
2747home with him, allowing continued access to the child. DCF
2757cited Petitioner for failure to protect her child. The husband
2767was subsequently arrested and charged with sexual battery.
277535. Pet itioner testified that her actions should be viewed
2785in light of the fact that she herself was an abuse victim. She
2798stated that she took steps to protect her children as soon as
2810she learned her husband was abusing them.
281736. Petitioner presented the testim ony of her daughter,
2826Candace Chatman, who stated that she was the child victim
2836identified in the 1989 DCF report. Ms. Chatman testified that,
2846contrary to the report, her mother did not know about the abuse
2858when it was occurring. She stated that she was e ight years old
2871and was living with her grandmother at the time of the abuse,
2883which she recalled occurring only once. Ms. Chatman stated that
2893she did not tell her mother about the abuse; rather, she told
2905another child at school about it. Ms. ChatmanÓs tes timony was
2916credible.
291737. The second DCF report, dated 1996, involved
2925allegations that Petitioner hit her daughter in the head,
2934resulting in migraine headaches. According to the report, the
2943daughter stated that Petitioner "does hit her in the head" and
2954on ce threw a bowl at her, hitting her in the face. DCF rendered
2968findings of Ð some indicators Ñ for the maltreatments of beatings,
2979physical injury, and family violence that threatens a child,
2988though the report assessed the risk as ÐlowÑ because of the
2999presenc e of family members to monitor the situation.
300838. Neither Petitioner nor Ms. Chatman directly addressed
3016the 1996 report in their testimony. The hearsay report may not
3027be relied upon for the truth of the matters asserted therein,
3038but the undersigned is entitled to take notice of PetitionerÓs
3048silence as to the very serious allegation made in the report.
305939. Mr. Sauvé discussed the final DCF report, dated 2002.
3069This incident pertained to an allegation involving Petitioner's
3077sons, who were then aged 13 and 8. The older boy had been
3090sexually abused by PetitionerÓs spouse, and was now believed to
3100be sexually Ðacting outÑ with his younger brother. The DCF
3110report states that Petitioner denied any knowledge of an
3119incident between the boys, and that Petitioner alternatively
3127admitted and then denied having knowledge of the older boyÓs
3137prior molestation. Child services authorities advised
3143Petitioner to separate the boys at any time they might be
3154unsupervised. The younger child started going to his
3162grandmotherÓs house after school, where he stayed until
3170Petitioner picked him up on her way home from work.
318040. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that she had
3189never seen the 2002 DCF report. She first denied that any abuse
3201was occurring in her home in 2002, then st ated that she had not
3215been aware of anything untoward. Petitioner denied any
3223knowledge that her older son had been molested by her husband.
3234She testified that her admission to the authorities that
3243molestation had occurred Ðwas a way to get him counseling Ñ
3254because of the way he had been acting out in school.
326541. During cross - examination, Petitioner denied knowing
3273why child services advised her to separate the boys. She stated
3284that she did not ask why. The authorities simply told her that
3296everything woul d be all right if she separated them and so she
3309complied.
331042. PetitionerÓs testimony as to the 2002 DCF report
3319cannot be credited. This finding is not based on any
3329contradiction between PetitionerÓs testimony and the facts as
3337stated in the hearsay DCF re port; rather, it is based on the
3350inherent lack of credibility in PetitionerÓs statements.
3357Especially problematic is her claim that she did not even ask
3368the authorities why her sons should be kept apart. PetitionerÓs
3378unwillingness to admit any knowledge o f , or even curiosity as to
3390what the authorities alleged was happening in her home , raises
3400serious concerns as to her character and judgment.
340843. PetitionerÓs overall presentation tended to undermine
3415her case. As noted above, she seemed unduly preoccupied with
3425traffic tickets as opposed to the far more serious matters that
3436concerned the Agency. Her testimony was rambling, discursive,
3444and argumentative. The undersigned could not help but note that
3454Ms. Chatman often interjected comments, sotto voce , in an effort
3464to keep her mother on point during her testimony. As the
3475hearing progressed, Petitioner became increasingly angry at the
3483Agency for failing to recognize her Ðcompassion.Ñ
349044. PetitionerÓs initial burden is to demonstrate, by clear
3499and con vincing evidence, that she is entitled to an exemption.
3510The Ðclear and convincingÑ standard requires evidence sufficient
3518Ðto convince the trier of fact without any hesitancy.Ñ In re
3529Adoption of Baby E.A.W. , 658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995), cert.
3541denied , 516 U.S. 1051, 116 S. Ct. 719, 133 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1996).
3555PetitionerÓs presentation clearly failed to rise to this
3563standard. Petitioner appears to have turned her life around
3572somewhat after a history of abuse, but she failed to convince
3583either the Agency or the undersigned that she is sufficiently
3593rehabilitated to be trusted to work with persons who are
3603vulnerable and highly susceptible to abuse, neglect , and
3611exploitation due to their developmental disabilities.
361745. In light of all the evidence presente d at the hearing,
3629it cannot be found that the Agency abused its discretion in
3640denying Petitioner's request for an exemption. Taken in its
3649entirety, the evidence supports the Agency's determination that
3657the evidence of Petitioner's rehabilitation was insuf ficient.
3665CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
366846. The Division of Administrative Hearings has
3675jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this
3685proceeding. §§ 120.569, 120.57(1), and 435.07, Fla. Stat.
369347. Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, provides in relevant
3701part as follows:
3704(1)(a) All employees required by law to be
3712screened pursuant to this section must
3718undergo security background investigations
3722as a condition of employment and continued
3729employment which includes, but need not be
3736limited to, fingerprinting for statewide
3741criminal history records checks through the
3747Department of Law Enforcement, and national
3753criminal history records checks through the
3759Federal Bureau of Investigation, and may
3765include local criminal records checks
3770through local law enforcement a gencies.
3776* * *
3779(2) The security background investigations
3784under this section must ensure that no
3791persons subject to the provisions of this
3798section have been arrested for and are
3805awaiting final disposition of, have been
3811found guilty of, regardless of adj udication,
3818or entered a plea of nolo contendere or
3826guilty to, or have been adjudicated
3832delinquent and the record has not been
3839sealed or expunged for, any offense
3845prohibited under any of the following
3851provisions of state law or similar law of
3859another jurisd iction:
3862* * *
3865( i ) Chapter 784, relating to assault,
3873battery, and culpable negligence, if the
3879offense was a felony.
388348. In this case, PetitionerÓs disqualifying offense was
3891aggravated battery with a weapon, in violation of section
3900784.045, Florida Statutes, a second degre e felony.
390849. Section 393.0655(1), Florida Statutes, requires the
3915Agency to conduct Level 2 employment screening under chapter 435
3925for direct service providers who are unrelated to their clients.
3935Section 393.0655(5) provides a list of disqualifying offen ses
3944for purposes of the AgencyÓs screening:
3950The background screening conducted under
3955this section must ensure that, in addition
3962to the disqualifying offenses listed in
3968s. 435.04 , no person subject to the
3975provisions of this section has an arrest
3982awaiting final disposition for, has been
3988found guilty of, regardless of adjudication,
3994or entered a plea of nolo contendere o r
4003guilty to, or has been adjudicated
4009delinquent and the record has not been
4016sealed or expunged for, any offense
4022prohibited under any of the following
4028provisions of state law or similar law of
4036another jurisdiction:
4038* * *
4041(i) Section 784, relating to assa ult,
4048battery, and culpable negligence if the
4054offense was a felony.
405850. Under appropriate circumstances, an exemption from
4065disqualification may be available. Section 435.07(1) provides,
4072in relevant part:
4075(1)(a) The head of the appropriate agency
4082may gra nt to any employee otherwise
4089disqualified from employment an exemption
4094from disqualification for:
40971. Felonies for which at least 3 years have
4106elapsed since the applicant for the
4112exemption has completed or been lawfully
4118released from confinement, supervis ion, or
4124nonmonetary condition imposed by the court
4130for the disqualifying felony.
413451. Section 393.0655(2) provides: ÐThe agency may grant
4142exemptions from disqualification from working with children or
4150adults with developmental disabilities only as provid ed in
4159s. 435.07 .Ñ
416252. Section 435.07(3) sets forth the standards to be
4171applied by an agency head in considering a request for
4181exemption, and the standard of review to be applied in a DOAH
4193proceeding reviewing the agency head's preliminary decision:
4200(3)(a) In order for the head of an agency
4209to grant an exemption to any employee, the
4217employee must demonstrate by clea r and
4224convincing evidence that the employee should
4230not be disqualified from employment.
4235Employees seeking an exemption have the
4241burden of setting forth clear and convincing
4248evidence of rehabilitation, including, but
4253not limited to, the circumstances
4258surrou nding the criminal incident for which
4265an exemption is sought, the time period that
4273has elapsed since the incident, the nature
4280of the harm caused to the victim, and the
4289history of the employee since the incident,
4296or any other evidence or circumstances
4302indic ating that the employee will not
4309present a danger if employment or continued
4316employment is allowed.
4319(b) The agency may consider as part of its
4328deliberations of the employeeÓs
4332rehabilitation the fact that the employee
4338has, subsequent to the conviction for the
4345disqualifying offense for which the
4350exemption is being sought, been arrested for
4357or convicted of another crime, even if that
4365crime is not a disqualifying offense.
4371(c) The decision of the head of an agency
4380regarding an exemption may be contested
4386thro ugh the hearing procedures set forth in
4394chapter 120. The standard of review by the
4402administrative law judge is whether the
4408agencyÓs intended action is an abuse of
4415discretion.
441653. In this case, the agency head determined that
4425Petitioner did not clearly a nd convincingly establish that she
4435is sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant an exemption from
4443disqualification from employment in a position of special trust
4452at this time.
445554. The Ðabuse of discretionÑ standard of review has been
4465cogently described as fol lows, in the context of appellate review
4476of a trial judge's discretionary rulings:
4482If reasonable men could differ as to the
4490propriety of the action taken by the trial
4498court, then the action is not unreasonable
4505and there can be no finding of an abuse of
4515dis cretion. The discretionary ruling of the
4522trial judge should be disturbed only when
4529his decision fails to satisfy this test of
4537reasonableness.
4538* * *
4541The trial court's discretionary power is
4547subject only to the test of reasonableness,
4554but that test requ ires a determination of
4562whether there is logic and justification for
4569the result. The trial courtsÓ discretionary
4575power was never intended to be exercised in
4583accordance with whim or caprice of the judge
4591nor in an inconsistent manner. Judges
4597dealing with c ases essentially alike should
4604reach the same result.
4608Canakaris v. Canakaris , 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980).
461855. The undersigned concludes that the agency head's
4626determination that Petitioner failed to clearly and convincingly
4634establish her entitlement to an exemption from disqualification
4642was not an abuse of discretion.
4648RECOMMENDATION
4649Based on the foregoing Fin dings of Fac t and Conclusions of
4661Law, it is
4664RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities
4672enter a final order denying the request of Petitioner for
4682exemption from employment disqualification.
4686DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February , 2017 , in
4696Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
4700S
4701LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON
4704Administrative Law Judge
4707Division of Administrative Hearings
4711The DeSoto Building
47141230 Apalachee Parkway
4717Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060
4722(850) 488 - 9675
4726Fax F iling (850) 921 - 6847
4733www.doah.state.fl.us
4734Filed with the Clerk of the
4740Division of Administrative Hearings
4744this 27th day of February , 2017 .
4751COPIES FURNISHED:
4753Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire
4757Agency for Persons with Disabilities
4762Suite 422
4764200 North Kentucky A venue
4769Lakeland, Florida 33801
4772(eServed)
4773Sonya Nicole Samuels
4776496 Goss Avenue
4779Leesburg, Florida 34748
4782(eServed)
4783Michele Lucas, Agency Clerk
4787Agency for Persons with Disabilities
47924030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380
4797Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950
4802(eServed)
4803B arbara Palmer, Director
4807Agency for Persons with Disabilities
48124030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380
4817Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950
4822(eServed)
4823Richard Ditschler, General Counsel
4827Agency for Persons with Disabilities
48324030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380
4837Tallahassee, Flo rida 32399 - 0950
4843(eServed)
4844NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
4850All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
486015 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions
4871to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency tha t
4883will issue the Final Order in this case.
- Date
- Proceedings
- PDF:
- Date: 02/27/2017
- Proceedings: Recommended Order cover letter identifying the hearing record referred to the Agency.
- Date: 12/30/2016
- Proceedings: Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order filed. Confidential document; not available for viewing.
- Date: 12/20/2016
- Proceedings: CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
- Date: 12/12/2016
- Proceedings: Notice of Filing Respondent's Proposed Exhibit List filed (exhibits not available for viewing).
- PDF:
- Date: 12/09/2016
- Proceedings: Notice of Confidential and/or Sensitive Information within Court Filing filed.
Case Information
- Judge:
- LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON
- Date Filed:
- 11/02/2016
- Date Assignment:
- 11/02/2016
- Last Docket Entry:
- 04/20/2017
- Location:
- Leesburg, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- ADOPTED IN TOTO
- Suffix:
- EXE
Counsels
-
Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire
Agency for Persons with Disabilities
Suite 422
200 North Kentucky Avenue
Lakeland, FL 33801
(863) 413-3379 -
Sonya Nicole Samuels
496 Goss Avenue
Leesburg, FL 34748
(352) 323-8043 -
Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire
Address of Record