16-006521EXE Dominic Chambers vs. Agency For Persons With Disabilities Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, February 10, 2017.

Summary: Petitioner is rehabilitated in fact and hence is eligible for an exemption from disqualification from employment as a direct service provider to developmentally disabled clients.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DOMINIC CHAMBERS,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 16 - 6521EXE

AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH

DISABILITIES,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case came before Administrative Law Judge John G.

Van Laningham for final hearing by video teleconference on

January 11 , 201 7 , at sites in Tallahassee and Lauderdale Lakes ,

Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Dominic Chambers , pro se

Apartme nt 2

2867 Forest Hills Boulevard

Coral Springs , Florida 33 065

For Respondent: Jeannette L. Estes , Esquire

Agency for Persons with Disabilities

Office of the General Counsel

200 North Kentucky Avenue , Suite 422

Lakeland , Florida 33 8 01

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should be

granted an exemption from disqualification from employment as a

direct service provider having face - to - face contact with

developmentally disabled clients receiving adult day training .

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By a letter dated October 13, 2016 , the Executive Director

of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities , Barbara Palmer,

notified Petitioner Dominic Chambers that his request for an

exemption fro m disqualification from employment as a provider of

services to developmentally disabled persons would be denied.

In a Request for Administrative Hearing, which he signed on

October 23 , 201 6 , Mr. Chambers exercised his right to be heard

in a formal admin istrative proceeding. On November 7 , 201 6 , the

agency referred the matter to the Division of Administrative

Hearings, where the case was assigned to an Administrative Law

Judge.

The final hearing took place as scheduled on

January 11 , 201 7 , with both parties present. Petition er

testified on his own behalf; presented as his witnesses Donna

Shula, Sharron Roberson, and Christa Chambers; and offered no

exhibits. Respondent called one additional witness, Rita

Castor , and elicited further testimony from M r. Chambers .

Addit ionally, Respondent's Exhibits A, B, C, and D were received

in evidence.

The final hearing was recorded but not transcribed. Each

party timely submitted a Proposed Recommended Order on or before

the established deadline, which was Ja nuary 24 , 201 7 .

Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the official

statute law of the S tate of Florida refer to Florida Statutes

2016, except that all references to statutes or rules defining

offenses or prescribing penalties for committing such offens es

are to the versions that were in effect at the time of the

alleged wrongful acts.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At some time rele vant to this case, Petitioner Dominic

Chambers ("Chambers") sought employment with, or to perform

volunteer services for, The Schott Communities, a private,

nonprofit corporation that provides services to adults with

disabilities under the regulatory jurisdiction of Respondent

Agency for Persons with Disabilities ("APD") . Chambers was

required to undergo a background investigati on as a condition

precedent to taking a position as a personal provider of

services to clients of The Schott Communities .

2 . Consequen t ly , a criminal records search was conducted,

and the results were forwarded to the Department of Children and

Famili es ("DCF") , which administers the background screening

process for APD. By letter dated June 7, 2016, DCF notified

Chambers that it had discovered the following two criminal

convictions in his past:

• Grand theft of the third degree - - December 3,

2007

• Violation of probation - Î January 21, 2009

DCF alleged that each of the foregoing crimes is a

"disqualifying offense" under the applicable screening

standards, which rendered Chambers ineligible to work for The

Schott Communities without an exemption from s uch

disqualification.

3. DCF was partially mistaken, as a matter of fact and

law, for "violation of probation" is not a crime and thus cannot

lead to a criminal conviction , nor is it listed among the

statutorily designated disqualifying offenses . As wi ll be shown

below, however, grand theft is a disqualifying offense, and ,

therefore , DCF correctly advised Chambers that he would need to

apply for and obtain an exemption if he wanted a job as a direct

service provider .

4. Chambers timely sought an exemption from

disqualification from employment , submitting his Request for

Exemption to APD in July 2016. By letter dated

October 13, 2016, APD informed Chambers that i t intended to deny

his request based solely on t he ground that Chambers had "not

subm itted clear and convincing evidence of [his]

rehabilitation." In other words, APD determined as a matter of

ultimate fact that Chambers was not rehabilitated, which meant

(as a matter of law) that the head of the agency had no

discretion to grant an exemp tion. 1 / APD did not, as an

alternative basis for its proposed agency action, articulate any

rationale for denying the exemption notwithstanding a showing of

rehabilitation, assuming arguendo that such had been made.

5. Chambers initiated the instant proceeding, hoping to

prove his rehabilitation. The undersigned has considered the

evidence as it relates to the statutory criteria for assessing

rehabilitation, and makes the following findings of fact as a

predicate for the ultimate determinatio n.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Criminal Incident.

6. On or about May 31, 2007, Chambers stole a cell phone

valued at approximately $350.00 from a package in the possession

of his employer, United Parcel Service (" UPS ") . At hearing,

Chambers testi fied that he committed this crime at the instance

of a fellow employee, whom he knew from high school. He and his

accomplice were arrested in June 2007 and charged with grand

theft of the third degree, a felony offense as defined in

section 812.014, Flori da Statutes. T he other man was not

prosecuted , however, apparently for want of evidence.

7. At th e time of the offense, Chambers, then 18 years

old, was taking classes at the local community college, in

addition to working at UPS . Obviously, he lost hi s job with UPS

due to the theft. On December 3, 2007, appearing before the

Circuit Court in and for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of

Florida, Chambers entered a plea of nolo contendere to the

criminal charge, was convicted by plea (adjudication withheld) ,

and was sentenced to 18 months' probation with orders to make

restitution and complete anti - theft and counseling courses.

8. Chambers completed the term of probation in 2009 and

complied with all of the other conditions imposed by the court.

9. APD contends that Chambers's account of the criminal

incident (on which the findings above are based) differs in some

respects from the police reports prepared at the time of his

arrest, which Chambers provided APD in connection with his

exemption requ est. The police reports, however, which are

themselves hearsay if offered for the truth of the matters

asserted therein, contain multiple layers of embedded hearsay,

making them relatively useless as substantive evidence. More

important, APD is quibbling about details , none of which make

Chambers's crime "worse," even if believed, or impugn Chambers's

fundamental credibility as a witness.

The Time Period That Has Elapsed Since the Incident.

10. The disqualifying offense was committed about ten

years ago, when Chambers was a young adult. He thus has had

ample time to restore his reputation and usefulness to society

as a law abiding citizen following his conviction , and to mature

into an older, more responsible adult .

The Nature of the Harm Caused to the Victim.

11. Chambers did not cause personal injury to any person

in the commission of his crime. The stolen property (a $350.00

cell phone) was returned to UPS. In addition, Chambers was

ordered to make restitution, and did, although the details of

this transaction are not available in the record. Therefore,

the economic harm caused by Chambers's theft appears to have

been m inim al . ( Just to be clear, the undersigned is not

implying that the crime was minor; he is merely finding, as the

statute req uires, that as crimes go, this one fortunately caused

little harm, if any. Further, to be even clearer, the

undersigned recognizes that Chambers's criminal activity might

have caused much greater harm had he not been caught so

quickly. )

The History of the Applicant Since the Incident.

12. Since his conviction, Chambers has continued taking

college level courses, at Florida International University and

Broward College, where he hope s to earn an Associate of Arts

d egree in the area of beh avioral analysis. In 2011, he

completed a program of training to become a nursing assistant,

although he has not applied for licensure as a certified nursing

assistant. In 2016, Chambers obtained a certification in

Professional Crisis Management, after s uccessfully completing a

course in reactive strategies for controlling the behavior of

persons with developmental disabilities.

13. Chambers has been working with special needs children

for a number of years. For the eight years before, and through ,

t he instant proceeding, Chambers served as a patient care

assistant to the adult son of Donna Shula , 2 / whose name is T.C.

T.C. is currently 26 ye ars old, over six feet tall, and can be

difficult to handle due to his disabilities. Chambers assists

directly in the care of T.C., primarily in the home, both on a

volunteer and privately paid basis.

14. Chambers also worked for several years as a behavioral

tech at Broward Academy, a private school for children with

disabilities. In this capacity, h e worked in a classroom

setting, teaching life skills, social skills, and academics.

15. APD argues that Chambers has failed to "take

responsibility" for his criminal behavior and "appeared to show

a lack of remorse." These arguments are not well foun ded in

fact. While it is true that Chambers believes, mistakenly, that

the theft of property worth $350.00 would have been classified

as a misdemeanor offense until the statute was , he claims,

amended shortly before he stole the cell phone (it was not ) ,

t his does not impress the undersigned as a sufficient basis for

finding that Chambers considers his conviction insignificant or

illegitimate. Indeed, that Chambers wants others to think of

his crime as less serious (based on his misunderstanding of the

law ) implies a sense of shame that might be consistent with

remorse. In any event, Chambers has owned up to his wrongdoing

and accepted his punishment. As for remorse, this can be

difficult both to discern in another person, and to

differentiate from other emotions; it would be challenging

indeed for that person to prove he is experiencing remors e. The

undersigned cannot find, based on the evidence of record, that

Chambers is constantly wracked with guilt , but he seemed

sincerely sorry for what he had done and credibly disclaimed the

capacity to repeat the mistake.

16. APD severely faults Chambers for so - called omissions

from his responses on the exemption questionnaire, which is part

of the exemption re quest form. The form asks the applicant to

"write your DETAILED version of the events and be specific" with

respect to " EACH criminal offense appearing on your record."

APD argues that Chambers failed to provide detailed information

about the circumstanc es surrounding his "non - disqualifying

offense" of violation of probation (the fact of which he did

disclose), and that he failed to disclose an "arrest" by U.S

Customs and Border Patrol. There is nothing to these arguments.

17. First, violation of pro bation ("VOP") is not a

disqualifying offense , as APD acknowledges. Moreover, VOP is

not itself an independent criminal offense for which a

probationer may be punished. 3 / If the state proves by the

greater weight of the evidence that the probationer comm itted a

willful and substantial violation of the conditions of his

probation , 4 / then the court may, among other things, revoke

probation and resentence the probationer o n the original

charge . 5 / Because VOP is not a criminal offense, APD's exemption

questionnaire does not unambiguously require an applicant to

provide deta ils concerning a VOP incident. Chambers cannot

fairly be criticized for not volunteering information in

addition to that which APD specifically sought.

18. At hearing, Chambers testified about the VOP charge

against him. He was arrested in December 2008 for shoplifting

at a Walmart. Chambers claims that he "forgot to pay" for a

jacket that h e had put on in the store. The undersigned

considers this explanation to be m inimally plausible but not

particularly credible. Whether Chambers actually committed a

crime is irrelevant, however, because he was not prosecuted and

convicted of theft. Instead, Chambers was arrested for VOP,

and , in January 2009 , the court modified h is probation by adding

two months to the term.

19. The upshot of the VOP incident is that it shows

Chambers was not rehabilitated as of December 2008, about one

year after the commission of his disqualifying offense. The

question at issue, however, is whether he is rehabilitated now .

The VOP is only marginally relevant, if at all, to that

determination.

20. The incident involving Customs is murkier as the

record contains no useful documentation of it. Based on

Chamber s 's testimony, a brief summary of the situation can be

given. Chambers is a legal permanent resident of the United

States ÏÏ not a citizen. In November 2011, while attempting to

leave the country on a cruise, Chambers was detained by Customs

officials and war ned that , due to his felony conviction for

grand theft, he might be deemed an "inadmissible alien" upon his

return, which could preclude him from reentering the United

States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Chambers's attorney "straightened

things out," and he was released.

21. APD asserts that Chambers was "arrested" by Customs,

which might be literally true in that he was, it seems, detained

and held involuntarily in the custody of federal officials for a

period of time. There is , however, no evidence of any kind that

Chambers was arrested for, charged with, or convicted of any

crime in connection with this matter. Indeed, there is no basis

in the record for finding that simply being an inadmissible

alien is even a criminal offense. To top it off, it appears

highly unlikely th at Chambers, a lawful permanent resident,

would have been regarded as seeking "admission" (and thus

subject to the grounds of inadmissibility) after merely taking a

brief, innocent, casual cruise outside of the U .S. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(13)(C).

22. The bottom line is that the Customs incident did not

involve a criminal offense or conviction. Chambers's testimony

that he did not believe the matter needed to be reported to APD

is highly credible; his belief was , in fact, both reasonable and

correct. Chambers was under no duty to disclose this matter on

the exemption questionnaire because APD's form does not

unambiguously request such information .

23. APD makes much of the fact that, since his

disqualifyi ng offense, Chambers has been given roughly a dozen

tickets for noncriminal traffic infractions such as speeding.

The undersigned views these as of little significance. T o

begin, it is a matter of common knowledge that many law abiding

folks receive similar tickets without ever, as a result, being

regarded by others as threats to society. What should not be

lost sight of , here, is that the issue at hand is whether

Chambers is a good person , not whether he is a good driver. The

undersigned finds not hing in the fact of the tickets, which he

has considered, that sheds persuasive light on the question of

whether Chambers is a reformed criminal.

Circumstances Showing Applicant Poses No Danger.

24. Chambers presented three character witnesses at

hearing, each of whom gave compelling testimony about Chambers's

rehabilitation. Sharron Roberson, who had supervised Chambers

at Broward Academy, was able to watch Chambers closely while he

work ed with special needs children , and she testified credibly

a bout her perception of his rehabilitation. Chambers's sister,

Christa, testified believably in support of her brother's good

moral character, although, to be sure, her rel ationship to

Chambers reduces the value of her opinion, which cannot be

considered i mpartial.

25. The strongest character evidence was the testimony of

Ms. Shula, who as mentioned above is the mother of a special

needs adult for whom Chambers has provided in - home care and

services. Her testimony that she totally trusts Chambers ÏÏ who

sh e believes has a "heart of gold" ÏÏ and considers him to be a

part of her family is given great weight because she has no

apparent reason to fudge the truth on these issues. Further,

Ms. Shula walks the walk , which is most impressive . It is

highly unlikely, if not inconceivable, th e undersi gned finds,

that Ms. Shula would allow Chambers into her home if she felt he

posed even the slightest danger to her family, her son, or

herself. The fact that she does allow Chambers to work in her

house, and has done so for more than eight years, is compelling

proof of her confidence in him.

26. T he undersigned find s without hesitation that Chambers

would likely not present a danger in the future if an exemption

from disqualification were granted.

Ultima te Factual Determination

27 . The undersigned has determined, based on clear and

convincing evidence, including sufficient persuasive ev idence of

rehabilitation, that Chambers should not be disqualified from

employment because he is, in fact, rehabilitate d.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

28 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal

and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceedi ng pursuant to

sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and 435.07(3)(c), Florida Statutes .

29 . Chambers seeks to volunteer for, or be a n employee of ,

a facility that serves persons with disabilities. Thus, the

position that Chambers seeks to hold falls under the

classification of " direct service provider." See § 393.063 ( 1 3),

Fla. Stat. (defining " direct s ervice provider " to include

pers ons having " face - to - face contact with a client while

providing services to the client. ").

30 . Section 39 3.0655 (1), Florida Statutes, provides that

APD " shall require level 2 employment screening pursuant to

chapter 435 for direct service providers who are unrelated to

their clients, including support coordinators, and managers and

supervisors of residential facilities or comprehensive

transitional educati on programs licensed under this chapter and

any other person, including volunteers, who provide care or

services, who have access to a client's living areas, or who

have access to a client's funds or personal property ."

31 . The level 2 screening standards to which section

393.0655(1) refers are set forth in s ection 435.04, in pertinent

part, as follows:

(2) The security background investigations

under this section must ensure that no

persons subject to the provisions of this

section have been arrested for and are

awaiting final disposition of, have been

found guilty of, regardless of adjudication,

or entered a plea of nolo contendere or

guilty to, or have been adjudicated

delinquent and the record has not been

sealed or expunged for, any offense

prohibited under any of the following

provisions of state law or similar law of

another jurisdiction:

* * *

(cc) Chapter 812, relating to theft,

robbery, and related crimes, if the offense

is a felony.

32 . Having been found guilty of grand theft of the third

degree , Chambers is disqualified from employment as a direct

service provider unless he "is granted an exemption from

disqualification pursuant to s. 435.07." See § 435.06(2), Fla.

Stat.

33 . Section 39 3.0655(2) provides that APD " may grant

exempt ions from disqualification from working with children or

adults with developmental disabilities only as provided in

s. 435.07. "

34 . Under section 435.07, the head of APD is granted

authority to exempt some employees from disqualification.

Employees whom the agency head may exempt (as opposed to

employees he or she may not exempt) include, as relevant, those

whose disqualifying convictions were for:

1. Felonies for which at least 3 years have

elapsed since the applicant for the

exemption has completed or been lawfully

released from confinement, supervision, or

nonmonetary condition imposed by the court

for the disqualifying felony.

§ 435.07(1) (a) , Fla. Stat.

35 . The agency head is prohibited, however, from granting

exemptions to all employees who are "exemptible" under section

435.07(1). Section 435.07(3)(a) provides:

In order for the head of an agency to grant

an exemption to any employee, the employee

must demonstrate by clear and convincing

evidence that the employee should not be

disqualified fro m employment. Employees

seeking an exemption have the burden of

setting forth clear and convincing evidence

of rehabilitation , including, but not

limited to, the circumstances surrounding

the criminal incident for which an exemption

is sought, the time pe riod that has elapsed

since the incident, the nature of the harm

caused to the victim, and the history of the

employee since the incident, or any other

evidence or circumstances indicating that

the employee will not present a danger if

employment or contin ued employment is

allowed .

(Emphasis added). Further, the " agency may consider as part of

its deliberations of the employee's rehabilitation the fact that

the employee has, subsequent to the conviction for the

disqualifying offense for which the exemptio n is being sought,

been arrested for or convicted of another crime, even if that

crime is not a disqualifying offense ." § 435.07(3)(b) , Fla.

Stat.

36 . Thus, to fall within the agency's power to award an

exemption from disqualification, an employee must be not only

"exemptible" under section 435.07(1), but also able to prove

successfully, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she

has been rehabi litated, according to the standards prescribed in

section 435.07(3)(a).

37 . A clearly rehabilitated, "exemptible" employee is not

entitled to an exemption, but is merely eligible to be granted

one at the agency's broad discretion. See Heburn v. Dep't of

Child. & Fams. , 772 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), rev. denied ,

790 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 2001); Phillips v. Dep't of Juv. Just. ,

736 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). "However, an agency's

discretion is not unbridled; discretionary agency action is

subject to a review for reasonableness." K.J.S. v. Dep't of

Child. & Fam. Servs. , 974 So. 2d 1106, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Further, whether the employee has been rehabilitated is a

question of fact; the agency may not reject or modify a finding

on this issue unless it first determines, based on a review of

the entire record, that the finding is not supported by

competent substantial evidence. Id. ; see § 120.57(1)( l ), Fla.

Stat.; accord , B.J. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. , 983 So. 2d

11, 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)(agency improperly reweighed ALJ's

factual findings regarding employee's rehabilitation), reh.

denied , 983 So. 2d 11, 16 (agency may not reject ALJ's findings

of fact regarding credibility, which are within the discretion

of the ALJ and may not be reweighed).

38 . In this case, as found above, Chambers carr ied his

burden of establishing rehabilitation clearly and convincingly.

Therefore, Chambers is eligible , in fact, for an exemption . See

J.D. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. , 114 So. 3d 11 27, 1131 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2013)("The ultimate issue of fact to be determined in a

proceeding under section 435.07 is whether the applicant has

demonstrated rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence.").

39. Had APD's intended action on Chambers's exem ption

request involved the exercise of discretion, then the

undersigned would have been required to "reach the legal

conclusion as to whether the proposed decision was an abuse of

discretion." Id. at 1133; see also § 435.07(3)(c), Fla. Stat.

APD found, ho wever, that Chambers was not, as a matter of fact,

eligible for an exemption, and thus, having so found, deprived

itself of any discretion over the proposed decision . This is

because the decision to deny the exemption reques t of an

ineligible applicant is not a matter of discretion but a clear

legal duty.

40. There is, accordingly, n o discretionary decision for

the undersigned to review.

41. The undersigned's opinion as to whether or not

Chambers should be granted an exemption is practically worthless

since the agency retains the discretion to do what it wants ,

regardless, within the confines of section 120.57(1)( l ) . See,

e.g. , J.D. , 114 So. 3d at 1133. As the courts in Heburn and

Phillips made clear, moreover, the denial of an exemption to an

eligible employee will not generally be considered an abuse of

discretion. 6 / The undersigned will , therefore, refrain from

making what would be, in effect, a futile recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with

Disabilities enter a final order, consistent herewith, either

granting or denying Dominic Chambers the exemption from

disqualification for which he is , in fact, eligible.

DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February , 20 1 7 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

___________________________________

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 3239 9 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 10th day of February , 20 1 7 .

ENDNOT ES

1 / The question of whether to grant an exemption is committed to

the agency head's discretion if and only if the employee has

proved his rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence. See

§ 435.07(3)(a), Fla. Stat. If the employee is not

rehabilitated, then the agency head has no choice but to deny

the exemption ÏÏ there is no discretion to be exercised in that

event. Id.

2 / Yes, she is the daughter of the legendary coach.

3 / See, e.g. , Lee v. State , 54 So. 3d 573, 573 - 74 (Fla. 1st DCA

2011).

4 / Melton v . State , 65 So. 3d 96, 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

5 / See § 948.06, Fla. Stat.

6 / In Heburn , 772 So. 2d at 563, the court wrote that the

agency's "exercise of discretion [in granting or denying an

exemption to an eligible employee] is circumscribed by the

standards set forth in section 435.07(3)." These standards

specifically bear on the issue of rehabilitation, a fact which

an "exemptible" applicant must establish, by clear and

convincing evidence, in order simply to be eligible for an

exemption. Since t he agency has no discretion to exempt

ineligible applicants but instead may grant exemptions only to

those who are eligible and hence who, by definition, have

adequately demonstrated rehabilitation pursuant to the section

435.07(3) standards, it is not ent irely clear how those same

standards are to be applied in distinguishing between eligible

applicants who, in the exercise of sound discretion, reasonably

should be exempted from disqualification and those who

reasonably should not be. In any event, when d enying an

exemption to an eligible applicant such as Chambers, the agency

ideally should articulate the facts and circumstances upon which

its discretionary decision has been based, so that the outcome

will not appear to be arbitrary or capricious, and als o to

enable a reviewing court to determine whether or not the

agency's discretion was abused, if the disappointed applicant

appeals.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Dominic Chambers

Apartment 2

2867 Forest Hills Boulevard

Coral Springs, Florida 33065

Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire

Agency for Persons with Disabilities

Office of the General Counsel

200 North Kentucky Avenue, Suite 422

Lakeland, Florida 33801

(eSer v ed )

Michele Lucas , Agency Clerk

Agency for Persons with Disabilities

4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950

(eServed)

Barbara Palmer, Executive Director

Agency for Persons with Disabilities

4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950

(eServed)

Richard Ditschler, General Counsel

Agency for Persons with Disa bilities

4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.