16-006631 Meti J. Ferguson vs. Cti Resource Management Services Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, March 24, 2017.

Summary: Petitioner failed to establish that she was the victim of discrimination based upon race.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

METI J. FERGUSON,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 16 - 6631

CTI RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

SERVICES,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held on

January 24, 2017, by video teleconference with locations in

Jacksonville and Tallahassee, before W. David Watkins, the duly -

designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Me ti J. Ferguson, pro se

200 Crete Court

St. Augustine, Florida 32084

For Respondent: Peter R . Corbin, Esquire

FordHarrison LLP

225 Water Street, Suite 710

Jacksonville, Florida 32202

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Did Respondent, CTI Resource Management Services,

discriminate against Petitioner on account of her race , in

violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes?

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Petitioner, Meti J. F erguson (Petitioner or Ms. Ferguson),

filed a Complaint of Discrimination with the Florida Commission

on Human Relations (FCHR) on December 1, 2015. In her Complaint,

Petitioner alleged that Respondent, CTI Resource Management

Services, Inc. (Respondent o r CTI), discriminated against her on

the basis of her race (African - American) when it terminated her

employment on September 16, 2015. The allegations were

investigated, and on October 4, 2016, FCHR issued its

Determination: No Cause.

On November 4, 2016 , Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief

requesting an administrative hearing regarding the FCHRÓs ÐNo

CauseÑ determination pursuant to section 760.11(7).

The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative

Hearings on November 14, 2016, and on Nov ember 23, 2016, the

undersigned issued a Notice of Hearing, setting the final hearing

for January 24, 2017.

The final hearing was convened as noticed on January 24,

2017. At hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf and did

not offer any exhibits in evidence. 1/

Respondent presented the testimony of Robin Norton, d irector

of Human Resources, and Chris Getz, e xecutive v ice p resident and

c hief o perating o fficer. CTI offered Exhibits 1 through 11 in

evidence, all of which were received.

A one - vol ume Transcript of the final hearing was filed on

February 8, 2017. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties

agreed to file proposed orders within 10 days of the transcript

filing. Respondent timely filed its Proposed Recommended Order

on February 17 , 2017. On February 22, 2017 , Petitioner filed a

document entitled , ÐMotion for ContinuanceÑ which was in reality

a request for extension of time for her to file her proposed

recommended order. On February 27, 2017 , Petition er filed a

Revised Motion for Continuance which, again, was actually a

request for extension of time regarding her proposed recommended

order. On March 1, 2017 , Respondent filed a response to the

motion stating that Respondent did not object to the requested

extension, and on March 3, 2017 , the undersigned entered an O rder

granting the requested extension. Thereafter, Petitioner filed

her Proposed Recommended Order on March 15, 2017. Both partiesÓ

Proposed Recommended Orders have been carefully considered in the

preparation of this R ecommended Order.

All statutory citations are to Florida Statutes (2016),

unless otherwise indicated.

FINDING S OF FACT

Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and

other evidence presented at the final hearing , and on the entire

record o f this proceeding, the following F indings of F act are

made:

1 . Ms. Ferguson worked for CTI as an e nterprise a pplication

s upport (EAS) c ustomer s ervice r epresentative (CSR) at the

companyÓs corporate headquarters in Jacksonville, Florida . She

was hired on June 18, 2012.

2 . CTI is a Service - Disabled Veteran - Owned Small Business .

The company operates as a government contractor and provides

support for information technology, logistics, staff

augmentation, and administrative support primarily for governmen t

customers. CTI has been in business since March 2003.

3 . At all times relevant to this case, CTI has maintained a

Discrimination, Harassment , and Retaliation Policy, prohibiting

all forms of unlawful discrimination, harassment , and

retaliation. The p olicy states in part as follows:

Conduct that interferes with CTI, or an

individualÓs work performance, or creates an

intimidating, hostile or offensive working

environment is prohibited. CTI will not

tolerate any attempts of retaliation against

an emplo yee who raises a sincere and valid

concern that this policy has been violated.

CTI takes all allegations of discrimination,

harassment and retaliation very seriously and

is firmly committed to ensuring a workplace

free of discriminatory activities. Anyon e

engaging in discrimination, harassment, or

retaliation is subject to disciplinary action

up to and including termination.

(RespondentÓs Ex. 2)

4 . Ms. Ferguson was familiar with this policy and received

annual training on it. In fact, in 2015, she mad e a perfect

score of 100 on her discrimination policy training.

5 . Ms. Ferguson reported to her t eam l eader, Sarah

McKibben. Ms. McKibben , in turn , reported to the a dministrative

d irector and p rogram m anager, Wendy Marsh. Ms. Marsh reported to

CTIÓs e x ecutive v ice p resident and c hief o perating o fficer, Chris

Getz. Mr. Getz reported directly to CTIÓs c hief e xecutive

o fficer, Chris Imbach. CTI also employed a d irector of Human

Resources, Robin Norton. Ms. Norton has been employed in this

position for a pproximately six years and has over 20 years of

experience in the field of human resources.

6 . Iris Maldonado Borges was employed as a coworker on

Ms. FergusonÓs Team, and , in fact, occupied the cubicle

immediately adjacent to Ms. Ferguson. Ms. Borges i s Hispanic.

7 . On Thursday, September 9, 2015, Ms. Marsh advised

Ms. Norton that Ms. Borges was resigning from her employment.

This surprised Ms. Norton, since Ms. Borges recently had sought a

promotion within the company , and , in the process, had advis ed

Ms. Norton how much she loved wor king for CTI. Accordingly,

Ms. Norton asked Ms. Borges to come to her office to talk about

her resignation.

8 . When Ms. Borges repor ted to Ms. NortonÓs office,

Ms. Borges initially did not want to talk about the reaso ns for

her resignation, simply saying that she was resigning Ðfor

personal reasons.Ñ When pressed further, Ms. Borges said that

she did not want to Ðget anyone in troubleÑ and started crying.

She also stated that she was afraid of retaliation. When she was

assured that CTI had a policy against retaliation, she finally

talked about four separate incidents that she had experienced in

the workplace.

9 . The first incident related by Ms. Borges involved mean

and hurtful comments and gossip about Team Leader McKibben and

another employee, Veronica Smoot, allegedly being in a lesbian

relationship. According to Ms. Borges, Ms. Ferguson and another

coworker, Phylisia Knowles, were the ones making the Ðloudest

comments.Ñ This was upsetti ng to Ms. Borges since b oth

Ms. McKibben and Ms. Smoot were friends.

10 . The second incident also involved Ms. Knowles.

Ms. Borges said that Ms. Knowles was Ðvery meanÑ to her, would

not speak to her, and during a team meeting, she had Ðshot her a

bird. Ñ

11 . The third incident occurred during the employee Ðcrazy

hat day.Ñ According to Ms. Borges, she, Ms. Knowles (African -

American), and Ms. Ferguson were posing for a picture, when

another employee, who was Caucasian, attempted to join the

picture. Ms. Ferguson then allegedly told the employee, Ðno,

this is a minority picture,Ñ and the employee was not included in

the picture.

12 . The fourth incident in volved alleged gossiping by

Ms. Ferguson with another coworker about Ms. Borges allegedly

being in a relationship with a male coworker. Ms. Borges

overheard the conversation, which upset her because she was

married , and she felt like the conversation was very

disrespectful to her marriage.

13 . After relating the above incidents, Ms. Borges stated

that Ðthese things had been b uilding up and that she couldnÓt

take it anymoreÑ and she wanted to resign. Ms. Norton then asked

Ms. Borges to take some time off with pay until the matter could

be investigated, which she agreed to do.

14 . Ms. Norton conferred with Ms. Marsh and Mr. G etz, and

it was determined that Ms. Ferguson and Ms. Knowles would both be

interviewed the following Monday, September 14, 2015 (the first

day that both were scheduled to be at work). It was also

d etermined that Ms. BorgesÓ work station would be moved to a new

location that was not imme diately adjacent to that of

Ms. Ferguson.

15 . Both Ms. Ferguson and Ms. Knowles were interviewed the

following Monday, September 14, 2015 , by Ms. Norton, Mr. Getz ,

and Ms. Marsh. Ms. Norton initially conducted both intervi ews,

asking a sequence of questions concerning the incidents raised by

Ms. Borges. With respect to Ms. Ferguson, she recalled rumors

circulating about Ms. McKibben and Ms. Smoot being in a lesbian

relationship, but denied participating in them. She could not

recall the Ðthis is a minority pictureÑ comment during Ðcrazy hat

day,Ñ but stated that it sounded like something she could have

said in a joking manner. She denied participating in a

conversation about Ms. Borges allegedly being in a relationship

wi th a coworker.

16 . Mr. Getz conclud ed the interviews with both

Ms. Ferguson and Ms. Knowles by stating that whether or not they

had participated in the incidents and rumors involving coworkers,

such conduct did not resonate with CTIÓs values and was not to be

tolerated. He reiterated that if such conduct happened again,

the offending employee would be immediately terminated and he

would personally escort him or her out the door. At the

conclusion of the interviews, Mr. Getz, Ms. Norton , and Ms. Marsh

co nferred and it was decided that, aside from the stern warning

from Mr. Getz, no further action was to be taken against either

Ms. Ferguson or Ms. Knowles.

17 . Two days later, on Wed nesday, September 16, 2015,

Ms. Marsh, Ms. McKibben , and Ms. Borges, who was crying, all came

into Ms. NortonÓs office. Ms. Borges described an incident that

had occurred that morning in the ladiesÓ room involving

Ms. Ferguson. She stated that as she was exiting her stall,

Ms. Ferguson was standing there blocking her exit and ÐfrontingÑ

her. When asked what she meant by ÐfrontingÑ her, Ms. Borges

stated that Ms. Ferguson had her chest bowed out, and had a Ðvery

mean and intimidating look on [her] faceÑ like she was Ðgoing to

fight. Ñ While describing the incident, Ms. Borges was very, very

upset and crying. She stated that she Ðhad had it . . . that she

couldnÓt take it anymore and she wanted to resign . Ñ Ms. Norton

again asked her to please go home until they had an opportunity

to address the situation.

18 . Ms. Norton, Ms. Marsh , and Ms. McKibben then contacted

Mr. Getz and related to him what Ms. Borges had reported. In

discussing the situation, it was determined that they had no

reason not to believe Ms. Borges. She had been an excellent

employee and was very non - confro ntational in her demeanor. There

also were no other witnesses to the incident besides Ms. Borges

and Ms. Ferguson. Mr. Getz and Ms. Norton also conferred with

CTIÓs c hief e xecutive o fficer, Chris Imbach. It was decided that

the type of intimidating beha vior reported by Ms. Borges was not

consistent with the companyÓs values, particularly since it had

occurred a mere two days after Mr. Getz had made it Ðcrystal

clearÑ that such conduct would not be tolerated. Accordingly,

the decision was made to termina te Ms. FergusonÓs employment.

19 . Mr. Getz, Ms. Norton, Ms. Marsh , and Gary Rogers,

d irector of Security, met with Ms. Ferguson that same afternoon.

Mr. Getz conducted the meeting, which was Ðrelatively short and

to the point.Ñ He advised Ms. Ferguson t hat she was being

terminated for her intimidating behavior in the womenÓs bathroom,

which was found to have created a hostile working environment.

Ms. Ferguson was argumentative and tried to interrupt Mr. Getz

throughout the meeting. Ms. Ferguson stated t hat she could not

believe that she was being fired for merely ÐglaringÑ at a

coworker. This statement confirmed to Mr. Getz and Ms. Norton

that Ms. Ferguson knew what she had d one in the ladiesÓ room, as

Mr. Getz had simply told her that she was being ter minated for

her Ðintimidating behaviorÑ in the ladiesÓ room -- no details of

the incident were disclosed to her. Ms. Ferguson was provided a

written letter of termination at the meeting, confirming the

reason for her termination.

20 . Mr. Getz made the fin al decision on termination. There

was no persuasive evidence presented at hearing that race played

any part in Mr. GetzÓs decision. Mr. Getz was a pastor in a

local church for 15 years prior to being an executive with CTI.

Mr. Getz also has a very racia lly diverse family. He and his

wife adopted four children, one of which is Asian, one is half

Caucasian, half Hispanic, and two are African - American.

21 . The evidence established that CTI has a racially

diverse workforce at its corporate headquarters. In 2015, 21 of

its 70 employees, or 30 percent , were African American; five, or

seven percent , were Hispanic; and three, or four percent , were

Asian.

22 . Petitioner presented evidence that an African - American

coworker, Jeff Lazenby, had made a complaint of a hostile work

environment against his Caucasian supervisor, Adam Highfill, but

that Mr. Highfill was not terminated by CTI. The complaint

against Mr. Highfill occurred in June 2011, over four years prior

to the incident leading to Ms. FergusonÓs termi nation.

23 . Mr. LazenbyÓs complaint was investigated by Ms. Norton ;

Mr. Getz ; Mike Vonbalson, senior p rogram manager and

Mr. HighfillÓs supervisor ; and Bob Bearden, also a p rogram

m anager. It was determined that Mr. Highfill had not created a

hostile wo rking environment; rather the two individuals became

engaged in a disagreement on the work floor and both were found

to have acted inappropriately. Mr. Lazenby and Mr. Highfill were

both counseled for their behavior. Further, Mr. Highfill was

found to ha ve engaged in poor management practices. He was

placed on a 30 - day development plan to attempt to improve his

management skills. When his management skills did not improve to

an acceptable level, Mr. Highfill was demoted to a nonsupervisory

position on A ugust 3, 2011, where he remains employed.

24 . Ms. Knowles, who is African - American, was not

terminated by CTI, because there were no further complaints or

incidents involving alleged behavior by her following the

companyÓs interview with her on September 14, 2015.

25 . The credible evidence of record established that

Ms. Ferguson was terminated for creating a hostile work

environment after being specifically advised on September 14,

2015 , that any such behavior in the future would result in her

termination by the company. There is no credible evidence of

record that Ms. FergusonÓs termination was racially motivated.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

26 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

cause pursuan t to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida

Statutes.

27 . The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (ÐFCRAÑ) prohibits

discrimination in the workplace. Among other things, FCRA makes

it unlawful for an employer:

To limit, segregate, or classify employees or

applicants for employment in any way which

would deprive or tend to deprive any

individual of employment opportunities, or

adversely affect any individualÓs status as

an employee, because of such individualÓs

race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy,

nationa l origin, age, handicap, or marital

status.

§ 760.10(1)(b), Fla. Stat.

28 . FloridaÓs chapter 760 is patterned after Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Consequently, Florida

courts look to federal case law when interpreting chapter 76 0.

Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC , 18 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 3rd

DCA 2009).

29 . Petitioner claims she was discriminated against by CTI

because of her race (African American) in violation of FCRA.

Specifically, Petitioner alleges that race was a motiva ting

factor in RespondentÓs decision to terminate her employment.

30 . Section 760.11(7) permits a party who receives a no

cause determination to request a formal administrative hearing

before the Division of Administrative Hearings. ÐIf the

administrati ve law judge finds that a violation of the Florida

Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, he or she shall issue an

appropriate recommended order to the commission prohibiting the

practice and recommending affirmative relief from the effects of

the practice , including back pay.Ñ Id.

31. Petitioner claims disparate treatment (as opposed to

disparate impact) under the FCRA; in other words, she claims she

was treated differently because of her race. Petitioner has the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

Respondent discriminated against her. See Fla. DepÓt of Transp.

v. J.W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A party may

prove unlawful race discrimination by direct or circumstantial

evidence. Smith v. Fla. DepÓt of Corr. , Case No. 2:07 - cv - 631,

(M.D. Fla. May 27, 2009); 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44885 (M.D. Fla.

2009). When a p etitioner alleges disparate treatment under

chapter 760, or the Civil Rights Act, the p etitioner must prove

that her race Ðactually motivated the employerÓs decision. That

is, the [ p etitionerÓs race] Ò must have actually played a role

[in the employerÓs decision making] process and had a

determinative influence on the outcome. Ó Ñ Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (alteration i n

original).

32 . Direct evidence is evidence that, Ðif believed, proves

[the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or

presumption.Ñ Burrell v. Bd. of Tr s . of Ga. Mil . Coll . ,

125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). Direct evidence consists

of Ðonly the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing

other than to discriminateÑ on the basis of an impermissible

factor. Carter v. City of Miami , 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir.

1989).

33 . The record in this case did not establish unlawful

race discrimination by direct evidence.

34. To prove unlawful discrimination by circumstantial

evidence, a party must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. If

successful, this creates a presumption of discriminati on. Then

the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, non -

discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the

employer meets that burden, the presumption disappears and the

employee must prove that the legitimate reasons were a pr etext.

Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC , supra . Facts that are

sufficient to establish a prima facie case must be adequate to

permit an inference of discrimination. Id.

35 . Accordingly, Petitioner must prove discrimination by

indirect or circums tantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas

framework. Petitioner must first establish a prima facie case

by showing: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she

was qualified for the position held; (3) she was subjected to an

adverse employment a ction; and (4) other similarly - situated

employees, who are not members of the protected group, were

treated more favorably than Petitioner. See McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). ÐWhen comparing

similarly situated individuals to raise an inference of

discriminatory motivation, these individuals must be similarly

situated in all relevant respects.Ñ Jackson v. BellSouth

Telecomm. , 372 F.3d 1250, 1273 (l1th Cir. 2004).

36 . Thus, in order to establish a prima facie case of

disparat e treatment based on race, Petitioner must show that CTI

treated similarly situated non - African American employees

differently or less severely. Valdes v. Miami - Dade Coll. ,

463 Fed. Appx. 843, 845 (11th Cir. 2012); Camara v. Brinker

IntÓl , 161 Fed. Appx. 893 (11th Cir. 2006).

37. The F indings of F act here are not sufficient to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race.

The greater weight of the evide nce does not establish that

Ms. Ferguson was treated less favorably than other employ ees

outside of her protected class. Nor has Petitioner presented Ða

convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidenceÑ showing that she

was the victim of race discrimination. Smith v. Lockheed - Martin

Corp. , 644 F.3d 1321 (1 1th Cir. 2011).

38 . Petitioner pre sented evidence attempting to show that

CTI treated Caucasian supervisor Adam Highfill more favorably

than it did her when one of Mr. HighfillÓs subordinates, who was

African - American, filed a complaint against him that he was

creating a hostile work envir onment. To be a proper comparator,

Mr. HighfillÓs conduct must have b een Ðnearly identicalÑ to

Ms. FergusonÓs. Vickers v. Hyundai Motor M f g . Ala . , LLC ,

648 Fed. Appx. 751 (11 th Cir. April 14, 2016); and Stone &

Webster Constr., Inc. v. U.S. DepÓt of Labo r , 684 F.3d 1127,

1134 - 35 (11 th Cir. 2012). This requirement prevents courts from

Ðsecond - guessing employersÓ reasonable decisions and confusing

apples with oranges.Ñ Maniccia v. Brown , 171 F.3d 1364, 1368

(11 th Cir. 1999).

39 . The evidence shows that Mr. HighfillÓs conduct was not

at all similar to Ms. FergusonÓs. CTIÓs investigation showed

that Mr. Highfill and Mr. Lazenby had a disagreement in the

workplace that neither handled appropriately, but that there was

no conduct that constituted a hostile work environment. In

contrast, Ms. Ferguson was found to have engaged in intimidating

and hostile behavior in the ladiesÓ room against a coworker, a

mere two days after the companyÓs c hief o perating o fficer had

told her in Ðcrystal clearÑ terms that such conduct would not be

tolerated and would lead to termination. Moreover, Mr. Highfill

did receive appropriate discipline for his actions. He was

required to complete a 30 - day development course to try to

improve his management skills, and when they did no t

sufficiently improve, he was demoted to a non - supervisory

position. In short, Mr. HighfillÓs case is not a proper

comparator , and Petitioner has fallen short of establishing her

prima facie case. See Robinson v. Colquitt EMC , 651 Fed.

Appx. 891 (11 th C ir. June 2, 2016) (summary judgment for the

employer affirmed in race discrimination action where the

plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of a proper

comparator).

40 . Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner established a

prima facie case of discrimination, Respondent presented

persuasive documentary and testimonial evidence that it

terminated Ms. Ferguson because of its reasonable belief she had

engaged in intimidating and hostile behavior against a coworker,

and not because of her race. As such, CTI has met its burden to

establish legitimate, non - discriminatory business reasons for

its decision to terminate Ms. FergusonÓs employment.

41 . Petitioner did not present any credible evidence that

RespondentÓs reason for terminating her was a pre text for

discrimination. Petitioner expressed her belief that her

termination was unfair, and that RespondentÓs investigation

leading to her termination was incomplete, but disagreement with

the employerÓs decision falls short of the showing necessary to

establish pretext. Chambers v. Walt Disney World Co. ,

132 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1366 (M.D. Fla. 2001). Even showing that

an employer breached an internal policy does not amount to a

showing of pretext. Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group,

Inc. , 509 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11 th Cir. 2007). Courts Ðdo not sit

as a super - personnel department that examines an entityÓs

business decisions.Ñ Chapman v. AI Transport , 229 F.3d 1012,

1033 (11 th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citations omitted).

42 . ÐThe ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact

that the [employer] intentionally discri minated against the

[employee] remains at all times with the [employee].Ñ Texas

DepÓt of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253. In this

case, Petitioner failed to meet her burden.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful

Employment Practice filed against Respondent.

DONE AND ENTERED this 2 4th day of March , 2017 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

W. DAVID WATKINS

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 30 60

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 2 4th day of March , 2017 .

ENDNOTE

1/ Three documents were attached to PetitionerÓs Proposed

Recommended Order. Those documents consist of a photograph, and

two pages of Facebook postings. None of these documents were

offered by Petitioner at the final hearing, nor was leave granted

by the undersigned for Petitioner to late - file exhibits.

Accordingly, those documents are not received in evidence.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Meti J. Ferguson

200 Crete Court

St. Augustine, Florida 32084

(eServe d)

Amy Reisinger Turci, Esquire

FordHarrison LLP

225 Water Street, Suite 710

Jacksonville, Florida 32202

(eServed)

Peter R. Corbin, Esquire

FordHarrison LLP

225 Water Street, Suite 710

Jacksonville, Florida 32202

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommende d Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.