17-004868RU Harold Rudisill And Patricia Rudisill vs. Department Of Business And Professional Regulation Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Thursday, December 21, 2017.

Summary: Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Respondent's approval of timeshare developers' requests to provide purchasers with required documentation via a website link amounts to an unadopted rule or an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

HAROLD RUDISILL AND PATRICIA

RUDISILL,

Petitioners,

vs. Case No. 17 - 4868RU

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case

on October 26, 2017, via video teleconference at sites in

Tallahassee and Tampa, Florida, before Garnett W. Chisenhall, a

duly - designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of

Administ rative Hearings (ÐDOAHÑ).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Tyson J. Pulsifer, Esquire

Finn Law Group, P.A.

Suite 104

7431 114th Avenue

Largo, Florida 33773

For Responde nt: Megan S. Silver, Esquire

Robin E. Smith, Esquire

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE S

Does the Department of Business and Professional

Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares and Mobile

HomesÓ (Ðthe DivisionÑ) , approval of timeshare developersÓ

requests to provide purchasers with a public offe ring statement

via a website link amount to an unadopted rule within the

meaning of section 120.52 (8)(a) , Florida Statutes ( 2017) . 1/

Also, does the DivisionÓs approval of timeshare developersÓ

requests to provide purchasers with public offering statements

via a website link amount to an invalid exercise of delegated

legislative authority within the meaning of section

120.52(8)( c).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On August 25, 2017, Harold and Patricia Rudisill (Ðthe

RudisillsÑ) filed a petition alleging that the Division Ós

decision to allow timeshare developers to provide a public

offering statement ( a Ðpublic offering statementÑ or a ÐPOSÑ)

via a website link to timeshare purchasers amount s to an

unadopted rule. The Rudisills also alleged that the DivisionÓs

de cision enlarged, modified, or contravened the specific law to

be implemented. As stated in the petition:

The crux o f both claims brought herein is

that the Timeshare Act requires []

developers to ÐdeliverÑ and ÐfurnishÑ

purchasers the POS, yet [the Divisi on] has

approved the practice of allowing developers

to inform purchasers where they can find the

POS on the internet in lieu of delivering or

furnishing the POS; advising purchasers

where they can find the POS on the internet

is not the same as furnishing and delivering

the POS as required by Florida Law.

After convening a telepho nic status conference on

August 30, 2017, the undersigned issued a n otice scheduling the

final hearing to occur on September 18, 2017.

In response to an ÐUnopposed Motion to Continue Final

HearingÑ filed on September 6, 2017, the undersigned issued an

Order on Se ptember 7, 2017, canceling the final h earing .

On September 18, 2017, the undersigned issued an Order

rescheduling the final hearing to occur on October 26, 2017, by

video teleconference at sites in Tallahassee and Tampa, Florida.

As noted in the Pre - hearing Stipulation, the Division made

relevancy objections to PetitionersÓ E xhibits 13, 15, 18 through

22, and 25. After the final hearing, the undersigned conclu ded

that those objections we re well - taken and thus exclude s the

aforementioned exhibits from consideration. However, the

undersigned accepted PetitionersÓ E xhibits 1 through 12, 14, 16,

17, 23, 24 , and 26 through 29 into evidence.

There were no obje ctions to the DivisionÓs exhibits, and

all of them were accepted into evidence.

The final hearing was held as scheduled on October 26,

2017, and the T ranscript was filed on November 13, 2017.

The parties filed timely Pr oposed Final Orders on

Novembe r 27, 2017, that were carefully considered in the

preparation of this Final Order.

FINDING S OF FACT

The following findings of fact are based on exhibits

accepted into evidence, admitted facts set forth in the pre -

hearing stipulation, and matters subject to official

recognition.

Relevant Statutes and Rules Pertaining to Timeshares

1. Chapter 721 of the Florida Statutes is known as the

ÐFlorida Vacation Plan and Timesharing ActÑ (Ðthe ActÑ) .

§ 721.01, Fla. Stat.

2. The Florida Legislature intends for the Act to

Ð[p]rovide full and fair disclosure to the purchasers and

prospective purchasers of timeshare plans.Ñ § 721.02(3), Fla.

Stat.

3. The Division is the state agency responsible for

enforcing the Act.

4. Section 721.10(1), Florida Statutes, provi des that a

purchaser 2 / can cancel a contract to purchase a timeshare

interest Ðuntil midnight of the 10 th calendar day following

whichever of the following days occur later: (a) The execution

date; or (b) The day on which the purchaser received the last o f

all documents required to be provided to him or her . . . . Ñ

(emphasis added) .

5. Section 721.10(1) further provides that Ð[t]his right

of cancellation may not be waived by any purchaser or by any

other person on behalf of the purchaser. Furthermore , no

closing may occur until the cancellation period of the timeshare

purchaser has expired .Ñ

6. A Ðpublic offering statementÑ is the term describing a

single - site timeshare plan or a multisite timeshare plan,

including any exhibits attached thereto as required by sections

721.07, 721.55, and 721.551.

7. Section 721.07(6)(a) requires that a timeshare

developer Ðshall furnish each purchaserÑ with Ð[a] copy of the

purchaser public offering statement text in the form approved by

the division for delive ry to the purchasers.Ñ (emphasis added) .

Florida Administrative Code Rule 61B - 39.004(1) provides that Ða

developer of a single - site timeshare plan shall deliver to every

purchaser of the single - site timeshare p lan a single - site

purchaser POS .Ñ (emphasis added).

8. Rule 61B - 39.004(1) mandates that a public offering

statement shall contain:

(a) A copy of the single - site registered

public offering statement text as prescribed

in Section 721.07(5), Florida Statutes, and

Rule 61B - 39.003, F.A.C.;

(b) A copy o f the exhibits prescribed

in Sections 7 21.07(5)(ff)1., 2., 4., 5., 8.,

and 16., Florida Statutes, as applicable.

Pursuant to S ection 721.07(6)(b) and

Section 721.07(5)(ff)19., Florida Statutes,

if the single - site is one created as a

tenancy - in - com mon, the purchaser shall

receive the document or documents creating

the tenancy - in - common, including at a

minimum a Declaration of Covenants,

Conditions and Restrictions; and

(c) Any other exhibit that the developer

has filed with the division pursuant t o

Section 721.07(5), Florida Statutes, and

Rule 61B - 39.0 03, F.A.C., which the

developer is not requir ed but elects to

include in the purchaser POS pursuant to

Section 721.07(6)(d), Florida Statutes.

9. In short, a public offering statement contains all o f

the documents that a timeshar e developer is required to give to

a purchaser. Its purpose is to appri s e a purchase r of

everything that he or she needs to know about a timeshare. As a

result, a public offering statement can be as much as 100 pages

long.

10. Section 721.07(3)(a)1 . requires that :

A ny change to an approved public offering

statement filing shall be filed with the

division for approval as an amendment prior

to becoming effective. The division shall

have 20 days after receipt of a proposed

amendment to approve or cite deficiencies in

the proposed amendment. If the division

fails to act within 20 days, the amendment

will be deemed approved.

11. The Division allows timeshare developers to provide

purchasers with a POS through Ðalternative media.Ñ As set forth

in r ule 61B - 39.008(1),

Developers may provide purchasers with the

option of receiving all or any portion of a

single - site or multi - site purchaser POS

through alternative media in lieu of

receiving the written materials in the

format prescribed in Rule 61B - 39.004 or 61B -

39.006, F.A.C., as applicable. The

purchaserÓs choice of the delivery method

shall be set forth in writing on a separate

form which shall also disclose the system

requirements necessary to view the

alternative media, w hich form shall be

signed by the purchaser. The form shall

state that the purchaser should not select

alternative media unless the alternative

media can be viewed prior to the 10 day

cancellation period. The alternative media

disclosure statement shall b e listed on the

form receipt for timeshare documents in the

manner prescribed in DBPR Form TS 6000 - 7,

Receipt for Timeshare Documents, or DBPR

Form TS 6000 - 7, Receipt for Multisite

Timeshare Documents, as both of which are

referenced in Rule 61B - 39.003, F. A.C.

12. Rule 61B - 39.001(1) defines Ðalternative mediaÑ as Ðany

visually or audibly perceptible and legible display format which

may require the use of a device or a machine to be viewed,

includ ing CD - ROM, microfilm, electronically transferred data,

c omputer disk, computer or electronic memory, cassette tape,

compact disk or video tape.Ñ

13. Rule 61B - 39.008(3) provides that :

Prior to delivery of the purchaser POS

through alternative media, the developer

must submit to the division a copy of the

pur chaser POS through the alternative

med ia proposed to be used by the developer

together with an executed certificate,

using the form prescribed in DBPR Form TS

6000 - 8, the Certificate of Identical

Documents, referenced in Rule 61B - 39.003,

F.A.C., certifying th at the portion of the

purchaser POS delivered through the proposed

alternative media is an accurate

representation of and, where practical,

identical to the corresponding portion of

the written purchaser POS.

Facts Specific to the Instant Case

14. Ora nge Lake Country Club, Inc. (ÐOrange Lake Country

ClubÑ) , is the ÐdeveloperÑ within the meaning of secti on

721.05(1) for the timeshare plans known as Orange Lake Country

Club Villas, a Condominium (ÐOrange LakeÑ) ; Orange Lake Country

Club Villas III (ÐOran ge Lake IIIÑ) ; and Orange Lake Country

Club Villas IV, a Condominium (ÐOrange Lake IVÑ). The

aforementioned timeshare plans shall be collectively referred to

as the ÐOrange Lake Timeshare Plans.Ñ

15. The Orange Lake Timeshare Plans are Ðsingle - site

times hare plansÑ as defined by rule 61B - 39.001(13).

16. Via letters dated April 24, 2015, Orange Lake and

Orange Lake III filed amendments to their alternative media

disclosure statements with the Division.

17. In addition to providing for purchasers to receive

documents such as the POS in writing or via CD - ROM, t he amended

alternative media disclosure statements gave purchasers the

option of receiving documents through the internet at

http://orangelake.com/legaldocuments/index.php .

18. The amended alt ernative media disclosure statement s

contain ed a notice that a PDF reader and one of three web

browsers (Internet Explorer 9 or above, Google Chrome, or

Firefox) we re required.

19. The amended alternative media disclosure statements

instruct ed purchaser s how to access documents through the link:

Ʊ Open the link, http://orangelake.com/

legaldocuments/index.php . i n your web

browser.

Ʊ Enter the user name: ho EX liday and

password: welcome!

Ʊ Follow the following steps:

Step 1: Please select the link to your

resort.

Step 2: Please select the Condominium,

if applicable.

Step 3: Please select the State where

you purchased.

Step 4: Please select the Public

Offering Statement.

20. Via letters dated April 28, 2015, the Division

approved the amended alternative media disclosure statements

Ðfor filing and use in the timeshare plan.Ñ

21. Before retiring, Mr. Rudisill worked as a regional

service manager for York International. He oversaw 50 service

technicians and sales engineers.

22. Mr. Rudisill used a computer at work and had an e - mai l

address associated with his position a t York International.

23. Mr. Rudisill acquired h is first home computer 35 to

40 years ago and has owned a home computer ever since. He

currently has an e - mail address and internet access via three

dif ferent web browsers.

24. Ms. Rudisill has no reported employment history . She

uses a home computer and has an e - mail address.

25. The Rudisills maintain a permanent residence in

Georgia but travel to Florida for vacations.

26. Between 2002 and 2015, the Ru disills purchased

approximately 11 timeshare interests for use as vacation

residences .

27. Neither Mr. Rudisill nor Ms. Rudisill read any of the

public offering statements associated with the aforementio ned

timeshare purchases.

28. Ms. Rudisill consi ders she and her husband to be well -

versed with the process of pu rchasing timeshares.

29. On June 14, 2015, the Rudisills executed purchase

agreements to acquire week 32 for unit 5280 at Orange Lake and

week 29 for unit 87911 at Orange Lake III .

30. These purchases were made so that they would have

vacation residence s .

31. Both acquisitions utilized the alternative media

disclosure statements that had been approved by the Div ision on

April 28, 2015.

32. A s noted above, the Rudisills had the op tion to

receive documents in written format, via a CD - ROM, or through a

website link.

33. The Rudisills placed their initials next to a box

indicating they agreed to accept documents electronically via a

link to http://orangelake.com/legaldocuments/ .

34. On June 14, 2015, the Rudisills executed doc uments

pertaining to the Orange Lake and Orange Lake III timeshares

stating that Ð[t]he undersigned acknowledges that the items

listed below have been received and the timeshare plans and

specifications have been made available for inspection.Ñ The

aforementioned items included ÐPubl ic Offering Statement Text.Ñ

35. However, neither Mr. Rudisill nor Ms. Rudisill ever

attempted to access the link provided to them by the Orange Lake

Country Club.

36. Neither Mr. Rudisill nor Ms. Rudisill ever asked for

the documents to be provided in a differen t format.

37. The Rudisill s initiated the instant litigation in

order to cancel the purchase agreements. They cannot afford the

timeshares and are unable to t ravel.

38. There is no allegation that Orange Lake Country Club

coerced the Rudisills in to purchas ing the timeshares at issue or

took advantage of them in any way.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

39. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties to and the

subject matter of this proceeding. §§ 120.56 and 120.57(1),

Fla. Stat.

40. The Rudisills have raised two issues. The first

concerns whether the DivisionÓs approval of timeshare

developersÓ requests to provide purchasers with a public

offering statement via a website l ink amount s to an unadopted

rule . The second issue concerns whether the DivisionÓs approval

of timeshare developersÓ requests to provide purchasers with

public offering statements via a website link amount s to an

invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority .

41. Because the undersigned expressed uncertainty during

the final hearing as to whether the Rudisill s have standing to

raise the aforementioned arguments, the undersigned will address

the standing issue prior to considering the merits of the

R udisillsÓ arguments. See generally Ferreiro v. Phila. Indem.

Ins. Co. , 928 So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)(noting that

Ð[t]he issue of standing is a threshold inquiry which must be

made at the outset of the case before addressing whether the

case is pr operly maintainable as a class action.Ñ).

The Rudisills Have Not Demonstrated an Injury in Fact

42. In order to have standing to challenge the validity of

an administrative rule, a person must be Ðsubstantially

affectedÑ by the rule in question. £ 1 20.56(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

43. As the First District Court of Appeal has observed,

[t]o establish standing under the

Ðsubstantially affectedÑ test, a party must

show: (1) that the rule or policy will

result in a real or immediate injury in

fact; and (2) tha t the alleged interest is

within the zone of interest to be protected

or regulated. Jacoby v. Fla. Bd. of Med. ,

917 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2005).

Off. of Ins. Reg. v. Secure Enters., LLC. , 124 So. 3d 332,

336 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2013; see also Fla. Me d. AssÓn, Inc. v. DepÓt

of ProfÓl Reg. , 426 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1983).

44. With regard to the second prong of the substantially

affected test, chapter 721 and the rules implementing the

provisions therein are clearly in tended to protect purc hasers

of timeshares. Thus, the Rudisills satisf y the zone of

interest test. See generally Televisual CommcÓns v . DepÓt of

Labor & Emp. Sec./Div. of WorkersÓ Comp. , 667 So. 2d 372,

374 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1995)(concluding that Ð[t]he hearing officer

correctly noted that TVC was not a health care provider affected

by section 440.13(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), but failed

to recognize that TVC was indeed affected by the proposed rule

which has the collateral effect of regulating TVCÓs industry.Ñ) .

45. Ho wever, the Rudisills fail to demonstrate that they

have suffer ed a real or immediate injury in fact.

46. The Rudisills argue that they have been prevented from

exercising their right under section 721.10(1) to cancel the

contracts at issue because they never received all of the

documents that Orange Lake Country Club was required to provide

to them.

47. However, there is no allegation that the Rudisills

were prevented from viewing the public offering statement s or

that their ability to do so was impair ed in any way.

48. Therefore, to whatever extent that the Rudisills have

been injur ed, that injury was not due to Orange Lake Country

Club making the public offering statement s available to them via

a website link , or to the DivisionÓs approval of tha t

Ðalternative mediaÑ means of delivery . In fact, Orange Lake

Country Club was merely complying with the Rudisills Ó selection

to have the public offering statement provided to them in that

manner as oppose d to in written format or via a CD - ROM.

See generally Off. o f Ins. Reg. v. Se cure Enters., LLC , 124 So.

3d at 339 ( holding that Ð[a]ppellee has no protected economic

right that has been impaired by the rules and forms at issue.Ñ).

49. In the alternative, even if the Rudisills could

demonstrate t hat they have standing, they fail ed to demonstrate

that the Division has utilized an unadopted rule or that rule

61B - 39.001(1) amounts to an invalid exercise of delegated

legislative authority.

The Division Has Not Utilized an Unadopted Rule

50. The Rud isills argue that the Division utilizes an

unadopted rule by allowing timeshare developers to provide

public offering statements via a website link.

51. The resolution of this issue turns on whether a

website link is included within the rule 61B - 39.001 de finition

of Ðalternative media.Ñ

52. The aforementioned rule defines Ðalternative mediaÑ as

Ðany visually or audibly perceptible and legible display format

which may require the use of a device or a machine to be viewed,

includ ing CD - ROM, microfilm, el ectronically transferred data,

computer disk, computer or electronic memory, cassette tape,

compact disk or video tape.Ñ

53. The plain language of rule 61B - 39.001 strongly

suggests that it was written in a broad manner so that it would

encompass a wide variety of formats and not need to be amended

as technology advanced. A website link unquestionably falls

under the portion of rule 61B - 39.001 describing Ðany visually or

audibly perceptible and legible display format which may require

the use of a device or a machine to be viewed . . . . Ñ A

website link is a visually perceptible display format that can

be viewed through the use of a computer, smart phone, or any

other device capable of connecting to the internet.

54. In other words, interpreting rule 61B - 39.001 to

include a website link does not place upon the rule an

interpretation that is not readily apparent from its plain

language. While the Rudisills obviously take issue with the

fact that rule 61B - 39.001 does not expressly refer to the

internet or website links, such a hypertechnical level of

precision is not required in rulemaking. See generally

St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. DepÓt of HRS , 553 So. 2d 1351,

1354 (Fla. 1 st DCA 1989)(stating that Ð[a]n agency

interpretation of a statute which si mply reiterates the

legislatureÓs statutory mandate and does not place upon the

statute an interpretation that is not readily apparent from its

literal reading , nor in and of itself purport to create rights,

or require compliance, or to otherwise have the direct and

consistent effect of the law, is not an unpromulgated rule,

and actions based upon such an interpretation are permissible

without requiring an agency to go through rulemaking.Ñ )

(emphasis added) .

The Division Has Not Committed an Unlawful Exer cise of Delegated

Legislative Authority

55. Rule 61B - 39.001 identifies section 721.07 as one of

the laws it implements.

56. Section 721.07(6)(a) requires that a timeshare

developer Ðshall furnish each purchaserÑ with Ð[a] copy of the

purchaser public offering statement text in the form approved by

the division for delivery to the purchasers.Ñ (emphasis added) .

57. According to the Rudisills, providing a public

offering statement via a website link is not the same as

furnishing or delivering the pub lic offering statement.

Therefore, the Rudisills argue that interpreting rule 61B -

39.001 Ós definition of Ðalternative mediaÑ to include website

links causes the rule to be invalid . See § 120.52(8)(c), Fla.

Stat. (defining an Ðinvalid exercise of delegate d legislative

authorityÑ to include a rule that Ðenlarges, modifies, or

contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented.Ñ).

58. Without a doubt, the Rudisills and the Division could

refer to many different dictionaries and cite numerous

definitio ns of ÐfurnishÑ and ÐdeliveryÑ to support their

respective arguments as to whether interpreting rule 61B - 39.001

to include website links contravenes the section 721.07(6)(a)

reference s to ÐfurnishÑ and Ðdelivery.Ñ

59. In general, courts defer to an agen cyÓs interpretation

of a statute administered by that agency unless the agencyÓs

interpretation is clearly erroneous or unreasonable. West

Flagler Assocs . v. DepÓt of Bus. & ProfÓl Reg., Div. of Pari -

Mutuel Wagering , 139 So. 3d 419 , 421 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2014 ).

C ourts will not defer to such an interpretation if no special

agency expertise was applied.

6 0 . Regardless of whether the DivisionÓs interpretation of

section 721.07(6)(a) is owed any deference, the undersigned

concludes without hesitation that the Di visionÓs interpretation

of the section 721.07(6)(a) references to ÐfurnishÑ and

ÐdeliveryÑ does not enlarge, modify, or contravene the statute.

6 1 . The Rudisills essentially argue that a timeshare

developer must physically ÐfurnishÑ and ÐdeliverÑ a publ ic

offering statement in order to be in compliance with section

721.07(6)(a).

6 2 . Given that the internet has become a ubiquitous

feature of modern life, adopting the hypertechnical

int erpretation favored by the Rudisills would serve no logical

end. Se e generally DepÓt of Bus. & ProfÓl Reg., Div. of Pari -

Mutuel Wagering v. Investment Corp. , 747 So. 2d 374, 385 (Fla.

1999)(noting that Ðthe majority opinion below and respondents

advocate a hypertechnical interpretation of section 120.565

which serves no l ogical end.Ñ ).

6 3 . Moreover, the Rudisills have made no allegation that

Orange Lake Country Club did anything improper when it sold the

timeshares at issue, and the Rudisills stated that they

initiated the instant litigation in order to cancel the purch ase

agreements . The undersigned declines to adopt a hypertechnical

interpretation of section 721.07(6)(a) in order to assist the

Rudisills with disavowing valid contracts. See generally

Brunelle v. Norvell , 433 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1983)( stating

Ð[w]e decline to assist appellant in avoiding extradition by

giving a hypertechnical interpretation to the statute.Ñ).

ORDER

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is ORDERED that the rule challenge initiated by Harold

and Patri cia Rudisill be dismissed.

DONE AND ORDERED this 2 1st day of December , 2017 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

G. W. CHISENHALL

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

T allahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 2 1st day of December, 2017 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ Unless stated otherwise, all statutory reference s will be to

the 2017 version of the Florida Statutes.

2 / Section 721.05(3 0 ), Florida Statutes, defines a ÐpurchaserÑ

as Ðany person, other than a developer, who by means of a

voluntary transfer acquires a legal or equitable interest in a

timeshare pla n other than as security for an obligation.Ñ

COPIES FURNISHED:

Megan S. Silver, Esquire

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

(eServed)

Robin E. Smith, Esquire

Department of Busine ss &

Professional Regulation

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

(eServed)

Jason L. Maine, General Counsel

Department of Business and

Professional Regulation

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

(eServed)

Tyson J. Pulsifer, Esquire

Finn Law Group, P.A.

Suite 104

7431 114th Avenue

Largo, Florida 33773

Michael David Finn, Esquire

Finn Law Group, P.A.

Suite 104

7431 114th Avenue

Largo, Florida 33773

(eServed)

Ernest Reddick, Chief

Anya Grosenbaugh

Departme nt of State

R. A. Gray Building

500 South Bronough Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0250

(eServed)

Ken Plante, Coordinator

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee

Room 680, Pepper Building

111 West Madison Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1400

(eSer ved)

Kevin Stanfield, Director

D ivision of Condominiums,

Timeshares , and Mobile Homes

Department of Business &

Professional Regulation

Capital Commerce Center

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

(eServed)

Jonathan Zachem, Secretar y

Department of Business &

Professional Regulation

Capital Commerce Center

2601 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 2202

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicia l review pursuant to section 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing the original notice of administrative a ppeal with the

agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within

30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy of

the notice, accompanied by any filing fees prescribed by law,

with the clerk of the District Court of Appeal in th e appellate

district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a

party resides or as otherwise provided by law.