17-005208 Carlos F. Villaverde vs. City Of Orlando Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, July 18, 2018.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove that he was terminated from employment because of national origin, disability, and in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity.

S TATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CARLOS F. VILLAVERDE,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 17 - 5208

CITY OF ORLANDO,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Administrative Law Judge D. R. Alexander c onducted a hearing

in this matter on April 3, 2018, in Orlando, Florida, and a

continued hearing by telephone on April 6, 2018.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Keith L. Hammond, Esquire

Law Office of Keith L. Hammond, P.A.

Su ite 1200

250 North Orange Avenue

Orlando, Florida 32801

For Respondent: Wayne L. Helsby, Esquire

Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A.

Suite 100

1477 West Fairbanks Avenue

Winter Park, Florida 32789

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether Petitioner was terminated unlawfully

from employment by the City of Orlando (City) on the basis of his

national origin and disability, and in retaliation for engaging

in a p rotected activity.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On January 23, 2017, Petitioner filed his charge of

discrimination in the form of a Technical Assistance

Questionnaire for Employment Complaints (TAQ) with the Florida

Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The TAQ alleged that he

had been terminated from employment as a reserve police officer

by the City because of his national origin (Hispanic), disability

(injuries suffered in an on - the - job motor vehicle accident), and

in retaliation for engaging in a protected ac tivity (filing a

workers Ó compensation claim). On July 20, 2017, the FCHR issued

its Determination: No Reasonable Cause (Determination) , in which

it determined that no reasonable cause existed to believe that an

unlawful employment practice had occurred. Petitioner then filed

a Petition for Relief on September 18, 2017, 1/ and the matter was

referred by the FCHR to the Division of Administrative Hearings

on September 21, 2017, to resolve the dispute.

At the hearing, Petitioner testified on his own behal f and

presented the testimony of seven witnesses. Petitioner Ó s

Exhibits 1 through 9 were accepted in evidence. Respondent

presented the testimony of one witness. Respondent Ó s Exhibits 1

through 9 were accepted in evidence. Finally, Joint Exhibits 1

and 2 were accepted in evidence.

A two - volume Transcript of the hearing has been prepared.

Both parties filed proposed recommended orders (PROs) on June 25,

2018, which have been considered in the preparation of this

Recommended Order.

FINDING S OF FACT

1. P etitioner is a 55 - year - old male of Hispanic (Cuban)

heritage. He worked full - time as a police officer with the City

until 2011, when he resigned his full - time status and was granted

permission to begin working as a reserve officer.

2. Reserve officers are appointed by and serve at the

discretion of the Chief of Police. Only retiring or resigning

sworn officers with at least ten or more years of consecutive

service and in good standing can be members of the reserve unit.

Currently, around two dozen res erve officers work for the City.

A reserve officer must be a sworn law enforcement officer and

able to exercise law enforcement authority and make arrests. If

a reserve officer is unable to perform law enforcement functions,

the Chief of Police will exer cise his authority to withdraw his

or her reserve status.

3. Reserve officers have no employment or promotion rights.

In addition to their contract assignment, they must satisfy a

volunteer commitment by working at least 12 hours per month in

either a p atrol first - responder assignment or pre - approved

special assignment. However, the volunteer commitment does not

apply to reserve officers working at the Orlando International

Airport (Airport). If a reserve officer is unable to fulfill

this 12 - hour requi rement, the Chief of Police will exercise his

authority to withdraw his or her reserve status.

4. Beginning in January 2012, Petitioner worked exclusively

as an Airport Specialist at the Airport on successive one - year

contracts. Reserve officers working at the Airport are called

Temporary Employee Police Reserve Officers (TEPROs). The TEPRO

program was initiated by the City in 2012 and is designed to

augment the number of police officers working at the Airport.

This is because the Airport law enforcemen t contingent has been

understaffed for many years. 2/

5. TEPROs have arrest powers, wear uniforms, carry a gun

and taser, and are required to take police action just like full -

time law enforcement officers.

6. The Greater Orlando Airport Authority (GO AA) contracts

with the City to provide law enforcement services at the Airport

and reimburses the City for salaries and equipment of full - time

officers and TEPROs. Therefore, TEPROs cannot be assigned to any

other division in the Police Department. Appro ximately 70 to

80 officers, including command staff, full - time officers, and

TEPROs on one - year contracts, work in the Airport Division

(Division). When the events herein occurred, the number of

TEPROs working at the Airport was capped at nine.

7. In January 2012, Petitioner entered into his first

Temporary/Seasonal Employment Contract with the City, whereby the

City agreed to employ Petitioner in the Police Department as a

TEPRO for one year from January 2012 through January 2013. At

that time, Petit ioner was capable of performing the full duties

of a law enforcement officer without accommodation. Petitioner

was not hired for any particular assignment and could be assigned

to any number of posts throughout the Division.

8. In March 2013, March 2014, January 2015, and

January 2016, Petitioner entered into new employment contracts

with the City, whereby the City agreed to hire Petitioner as a

TEPRO for one year. The last contract was executed on

January 13, 2016, and ran through January 13, 2017. 3/ When he

signed each contract, Petitioner was capable of performing the

full duties of a law enforcement officer without accommodation.

9. On September 8, 2016, Petitioner was injured in an on -

the - job accident at the Airport. He had pulled over a taxicab

for a traffic stop when another vehicle struck his police car

from behind, driving Petitioner underneath the dashboard and

pinning him there while pushing his car into the taxicab he had

stopped.

10. The accident required Petitioner to undergo cervical

f usion of his C - 6 and C - 7 vertebrae in February 2017 and damaged

his ulnar nerve causing numbness in his right hand. He still

experiences severe pain in his back and neck on a daily basis.

11. Petitioner Ó s injuries limit his ability to perform

manual ta sks for extended periods. His musculoskeletal functions

are substantially limited, and he cannot sit or stand for

prolonged periods. The range of movement in his neck is also

substantially limited. He is restricted from pushing or pulling

any amount of weight, and from lifting more than ten pounds.

12. As of April 2018, or 15 months after his last contract

expired, these medical conditions still existed and prevented

Petitioner from performing the job duties of a full - time police

officer, such as carry ing a weapon, making arrests, responding to

calls, assisting other officers, and taking other police

enforcement action. Unfortunately, there is still no definitive

ti metable for a full recovery.

13. Although the City had the discretion to immediately

t erminate Petitioner Ó s contract when the accident occurred, it

permitted him to assess the injury and address the medical

issues. A few weeks after the accident, Petitioner requested an

accommodation that would permit him to go on light duty. His

request was approved. The City Ó s policy is to allow full - time

officers to remain on light duty for no more than twelve months;

they then are required to be medically retired or terminated from

employment unless the Chief of Police, at his discretion,

authorizes a nother six - month extension. While he was not sure,

the Deputy Chief of Police believed this policy did not apply to

reserve officers.

14. Petitioner returned to work on October 13, 2016, in a

light - duty capacity because of restrictions imposed by his

phy sician. As noted above, these restrictions prevent Petitioner

from responding to a situation that could escalate and require

him to take police action.

15. From October 13, 2016, through January 16, 2017 (or

three days after his contract expired), Petiti oner worked in a

light - duty capacity in Ð district 285. Ñ District 285 is the

nomenclature for a police officer position in the Division Ó s

office at the Airport that takes walk - up calls for matters such

as stolen vehicles or answering calls from outside or within the

Airport for general questions. The office is manned by an

officer 24 hours per day, seven days per week. If the officer is

on light duty, he works in plain clothes, does not carry a

firearm, and, pursuant to Police Department policy, cannot ta ke

police enforcement action. District 285 refers to the position

during the day shift, while district 185 refers to the position

during the night shift. The position cannot be filled by a

civilian.

16. At least one officer must fill each shift (day a nd

night) at the front desk of the office. The position is filled

by a mix of full - time officers and TEPROs, a few of whom from

time to time may be on light duty. If an officer on light duty

works the front desk, this would enable an officer with no

rest rictions to be assigned to a patrol position. If a full - time

or reserve officer without restrictions works the front desk, he

or she is required to respond to calls for service and take

police action for any incidents that may arise.

17. From October 1 3, 2016, to January 16, 2017, Petitioner

worked one to three shifts per week (ten hours per shift) in the

front desk position.

18. Officers on light duty are required to submit an

Alternative Duty Update (Update) every 30 days in order to remain

on light duty and to continue to work. On December 14, 2016,

Petitioner provided the City with an Update in order to remain on

light duty. The Update indicated that he still had work

restrictions (no pushing, pulling, or lifting anything over ten

pounds, limited bending, no overhead work, and changing his

seated or standing position every 30 to 60 minutes); his

physician recommended surgery (which was approved by Risk

Management on January 18, 2017, and performed the following

month); and there was no estimated da te for his return to full

duty. After the surgery, Petitioner would be in no - duty and

light - duty status until the recovery was complete. The Chief of

Police approved his alternative duty request on January 3, 2017.

This allowed Petitioner to finish out his one - year contract,

which expired ten days later. Contrary to Petitioner Ó s

suggestion, the Update did not constitute a request for an

accommodation under a new contract.

19. On or about January 6, 2017, Petitioner was informed by

his direct supervisor , Lieutenant Boos, that the City would not

be offering him a new employment contract after his current

contract expired a week later. When told that his contract would

not be renewed, Petitioner did not request an extension of his

light duty, a transfer t o a light - duty position downtown, a leave

of absence, or any other accommodation. Also, he did not ask the

City to reconsider offering him a new contract. When he asked

Lieutenant Boos if there was a reason why it was not renewed, his

supervisor responde d Ð no, Ñ and Petitioner was told that the City

just wanted to exercise its right not to renew the contract.

20. Neither Lieutenant Boos, nor the commander of the

Division, Captain DeSchryver, knew the exact reason for this

action; they knew only that the Deputy Chief had told

Captain DeSchryver not to renew the contract. According to

Captain DeSchryver, he recommended that the City renew the

contract, but after reviewing the matter, the City decided it

needed a full - time officer at the Airport. Petitio ner filed his

TAQ with the FCHR a few weeks later. Even then, he did not

suggest a specific accommodation.

21. At the time his contract was not renewed, Petitioner

was unable to exercise law enforcement authority or make arrests.

The City could not assi gn Petitioner to the district 285 position

for another 12 months because there was no timetable for his

return to full duty. Also, the City needed all positions at the

Airport staffed by as many full - duty officers as possible who

were capable of performin g the essential functions of the job.

As explained by the Deputy Chief, the City needed to have

Ð a number of full - body officers out there to work the calls and

to assist each other and to keep everybody at the airport safe, Ñ

and not to just have a certai n number of officers assigned to the

Airport, even if they could not perform the essential functions

of the job.

22. The Deputy Chief went on to explain that Ð it was

decided that we would take another course of action and terminate

the contract and get a full - body person at the airport. Ñ He also

testified that the City Ð needed a full - fledged officer out there

[at the Airport] Ñ ; Ð we needed an officer who could do the full

job of a police officer Ñ ; Ð we just need to have as many full - time

officers or full - se rvice officers as we can Ñ ; and by hiring a

full - time reserve officer, that would give him Ð a full - time

officer out there who can respond to any kind of call out there

and also assist the other officers out there to handle anything

that comes up. Ñ The Chie f of Police added that Ð it Ó s really a

waste of taxpayers Ó money to keep someone on contract in light -

duty status when they cannot perform the function of a reserve

officer or TEPRO. Ñ

23. Petitioner contends the statements of the Chief of

Police and Depu ty Chief fall within the category of Ð the most

blatant remarks, Ñ whose intent could be nothing other than direct

evidence of discrimination. However, this testimony is not

evidence of discrimination, given the fact that Petitioner Ó s

latest Update in mid - D ecember 2016 indicated that he faced

impending major surgery, he had numerous doctor - imposed physical

limitations, and there was no timetable on when, if ever, he

would return to full - duty status.

24. For the first time, in his PRO, Petitioner contends

t hat, as an accommodation, the City should have : (a) executed a

new contract and assigned him to the district 285 position for

another year, or (b) executed a new contract with a different

reserve unit and transferred him to a light - duty position in

anothe r division. In essence, Petitioner argues that the City

should have given him another one - year contract , even though he

was awaiting major surgery (which was performed the following

month) and would be on light - duty or no - duty status for an

indefinite per iod of time. Indefinite light duty or no duty is

not a reasonable accommodation.

25. If the TEPRO contract was renewed, transfer to another

light - duty position in another division was not possible. As a

contract employee with GOAA, Petitioner could no t be transferred

to another division. If Petitioner signed a new contract with

another reserve unit, it would be a burden on the City, and an

unreasonable accommodation, to assign him to a light - duty

position for an indefinite period of time. As it turns out,

Petitioner would have been on light - duty or no - duty status for

the duration of the renewed contract. Assuming another contract

was executed in January 2018, Petitioner would still be on light

duty as of April 2018, with no timetable for returning to full

service, if ever. In sum, assuming that Petitioner Ó s injury

constitutes a disability, there was no reasonable accommodation

that the City could have offered.

26. Petitioner was replac ed by another reserve officer,

Don Luezzi, a white male, who f ormerly worked in the Airport

Division before he retired and expressed interest in an Airport

Specialist position. In 2017, the City also hired Izzy

Hernandez, a Cuban, as a TREPRO. His contract was renewed in

2018.

27. Even though his contract was not renewed, Petitioner

remained a reserve officer, serving at the pleasure of the Chief

of Police. To retain reserve status, however, Petitioner was

required to file Updates on his medical status. On April 2,

2017, Petitioner submitted an Update, advising t hat he remained

in no - work status (due to his recent surgery) and that his next

follow - up appointment was scheduled on June 1, 2017.

28. On June 26, 2017, Petitioner was issued a Return to

Duty Notice (Notice), advising him that his reserve status would

be revoked effective September 8, 2017, if he was not able to

return to full duty by that date. A Notice is an administrative

form letter that is generated and issued automatically to all

employees who are on alternative - duty status or medical leave for

the preceding six m onths.

29. From January 2017 through July 2017, Petitioner was

unable to work any off - duty jobs as a reserve officer because of

his medical condition and work restrictions. During this same

time period, he was unable to work as a patr ol first - responder or

in a pre - approved special assignment as a law enforcement

officer. He did not identify any reasonable accommodation which

would have allowed him to do so.

30. On July 26, 2017, Petitioner Ó s reserve status was

withdrawn , effective im mediately , by the Chief of Police on the

advice of counsel and because Petitioner was unable to fulfill

the requirements of the reserve unit. Actually, the reserve

status could have been revoked earlier because Petitioner was

unable to fulfill the require ments of the reserve unit,

specifically the requirement that he volunteer 12 hours per month

as a law enforcement officer.

31. The withdrawal of Petitioner Ó s reserve status occurred

six months after the TAQ was filed, was not considered by the

FCHR, and is not a relevant issue. Assuming arguendo that it is

a relevant consideration in the case, there is no evidence that

this action was taken for discriminatory reasons.

32. Petitioner is not precluded from re - applying for

reserve status or as a TEPRO onc e he is able to perform the

functions of a law enforcement officer and fulfill the

requirements of the reserve unit.

33. Petitioner contends the City treated another TEPRO,

Kathy Tomas, a white female, more favorably than him by offering

her a new one - y ear contract while she was on light duty.

Ms. Tomas suffered an on - the - job injury on March 18, 2017, while

attempting to arrest an unruly JetBlue passenger who was refused

boarding because of too many carry - on bags. At the time, she was

working under a one - year contract that expired in January 2018.

Because of a fractured elbow and torn rotator cuff suffered

during the arrest, Ms. Tomas went on light duty after the

incident. After the elbow injury was resolved, she had surgery

performed on her rotator cuff, and, as of April 2018, still

remained on light duty.

34. In September 2017, the City entered into new contracts

with all of its TEPROs, including Ms. Tomas, in order to

effectuate a pay raise. New contracts were necessary because the

existing con tracts provided for a set pay rate, and without a new

contract, the new pay rate could not be implemented.

35. If Ms. Tomas is unable to return to full duty at the

expiration of her current contract in September 2018, the City

will not enter into a new employment contract with her. Although

her accommodation was longer, Ms. Tomas received the exact same

accommodation as Petitioner.

36. Petitioner was not treated less favorably than other

employees who were similarly situated, based on his national

orig in or perceived disability.

37. In his PRO, Petitioner asserts the December 14 Update

is the protected activity that forms the basis for the

retaliation charge. On the other hand, the City Ó s PRO asserts

the only protective activity identified by Petition er is his TAQ

filed in March 2017. (The TAQ was actually filed on January 23,

2017, not in March 2017.) However, both assertions miss the

mark, as the TAQ alleges the protected activity is Petitioner Ó s

filing of a workers Ó compensation claim. The exact date on which

he filed his claim is not of record, but an email indicates that

Petitioner spoke with the Ð workers Ó comp case manager Ñ on

September 14, 2016, or eight days after he was injured. Resp.

Ex. 1. In any event, the TAQ trumps the other assertion s and is

the only protected activity that has been considered. There is

no evidence that the filing of the workers Ó compensation claim

was in any way related to the non - renewal of the TEPRO contract.

38. The City Ó s decision to not renew the contract was not

based on Petitioner Ó s heritage (Cuban), disability, or in

retaliation for him filing a workers Ó compensation claim.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

39. Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that the City committed an unlawful empl oyment

practice. See § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. Here, Petitioner

alleges he was discharged from employment on account of his

Hispanic origin and disability, and in retaliation for filing a

workers Ó compensation claim. He also alleges that the City

Ð neve r engaged in any interactive process to discuss whether a

reasonable accommodation would enable [him] to perform the

essential functions of [his] position beyond [his] termination

date. Ñ

40. Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, makes it an

unlawful e mployment practice for an employer to discharge any

individual because of his national origin or handicap, while

section 760.10(7) prohibits retaliation for engaging in a

protected activity.

41. The Florida Civil Rights Act (Act) is patterned after

feder al law. Therefore, reliance on federal decisions in

interpreting the Act Ó s provisions is appropriate.

42. Petitioner has the burden of proving a prima facie case

of discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence. Where

direct evidence is lacking, o ne seeking to prove discrimination

must rely on circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent,

using the three - part shifting burden of proof pattern established

in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

43. Where, as here, no di rect evidence of discrimination

exists, to establish a prima facie case of national origin

discrimination, Petitioner must prove that: 1) he is a member of

a protected class; 2) he was subjected to an adverse employment

action; and 3) his employer treated similarly - situated employees,

who were not members of the same protected class, more favorably.

Wilson v. B/E Aero., Inc. , 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004).

44. Petitioner is a member of a protected class (Hispanic)

and was subjected to an adverse e mployment action. As previously

found, however, he failed to prove that the City treated

similarly - situated employees who were not members of the

protected class more favorably. Therefore, his claim of national

origin discrimination must fail.

45. Pet itioner also contends he was discriminated against

on the basis of his disability in two ways: by the City Ó s non -

renewal of his contract; and by the City Ó s failure to provide a

reasonable accommodation. In his PRO, he also contends his

reserve status was withdrawn because of his disability. As

previously found, however, the withdrawal of his reserve status

occurred seven months after the TAQ was filed, was not raised in

the Petition for Relief filed on September 18, 2017, and is

beyond the scope of this proceeding.

46. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based

on a failure to accommodate, Petitioner must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence: 1) that he is a disabled person;

2) that he is a qualified individual; and 3) that he was

dis criminated against by way of the City Ó s failure to provide a

reasonable accommodation. McKane v. USB Fin. Servs. , 363 Fed.

Appx. 679, 680 (11th Cir. 2009).

47. Petitioner bears the burden of identifying an

accommodation and demonstrating that it allows him to perform the

job Ó s essential functions. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc. , 257

F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). The employer Ó s duty to provide

a reasonable accommodation is not triggered until the claimant

makes a specific demand for an accommodation. Gaston v.

Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc. , 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir.

1999). Petitioner did not request any accommodation when his

contract expired. At hearing, he argued that he should have been

offered a new TEPRO contract, or alternatively, a n ew contract as

a reserve officer in another division. Under either scenario, he

would remain on light duty or no duty for an indefinite period of

time, with no timetable for returning to full duty, if ever. An

indefinite extension of light duty is not a reasonable

accommodation and would place an undue hardship on the City.

Frazier - White v. Gee , 818 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2016); Rio

v. Runyon , 972 F. Supp. 1446, 1458 (S.D. Fla. 1997). A qualified

person with a disability must be able to perform the essential

functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Dickey v. Dollar Gen. Corp. , 351 Fed. Appx. 389, 391 (11th Cir.

2009). Therefore, even if Petitioner can demonstrate that he is

disabled and qualified for the position, he cannot sa tisfy the

requirement that the City failed to offer him a reasonable

accommodation.

48. In his TAQ, Petitioner argues that the City did not

engage him in an Ð interactive process Ñ concerning a reasonable

accommodation. Where a claimant does not or canno t demonstrate a

reasonable accommodation, the employer Ó s lack of investigation

into reasonable accommodation is unimportant. Willis v. Conopco,

Inc. , 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997).

49. Petitioner also contends the contract was not renewed

because of his disability. Contrary to his assertion, there is

no direct evidence of discrimination. As previously found, the

testimony of the Chief of Police and Deputy Chief do not

constitute Ð only the most blatant remarks Ñ that can only be

construed as eviden ce of discrimination. Where direct evidence

of discrimination by the City because of a disability is lacking,

as here, Petitioner must prove, by circumstantial evidence, that:

1) he has a disability; 2) he was qualified for the job with or

without an acc ommodation; and 3) he was discriminated against on

the basis of his disability. D Ó Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. ,

422 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005).

50. Even assuming that he has a disability, Petitioner

failed to demonstrate that he could perform th e essential

functions of the job, with or without an accommodation. The

record shows that when his contract was not renewed, Petitioner

was facing major surgery the following month; the estimated

recovery time was at least six months to a year; he had no

timetable for returning to full - time duty, if ever ; and existing

medical restrictions prevented him from performing the regular

duties of a law enforcement officer. As late as April 2018,

Petitioner faced more surgery, and the same medical restrictions

re mained in place.

51. Even if Petitioner established a prima facie case, his

claim also must fail for another reason: he did not rebut the

City Ó s legitimate, non - discriminatory reason for his discharge,

namely, he could not fulfill the requirements of a full - time

police officer and he had no timetable for returning to full - time

status, if ever. The burden is on Petitioner to prove

Respondent Ó s stated reason was mere pretext for unlawful

discrimination. Here, there was no evidence that the City Ó s

action was taken for a discriminatory reason. The disability

claim must fail.

52. Finally, there is no evidence, direct or

circumstantial, that the City did not renew the contract because

Petitioner filed a workers Ó compensation claim.

53. In summary, the al legations in the TAQ must fail.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is ,

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations

enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief, with

prejudice.

DONE AN D ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2018 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

D. R. ALEXANDER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 18th day of July, 2018 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ In its PRO, the City contends for the first time the Petition

for Relief was not timely filed. The FCHR Ó s Determination was

issued on July 20, 2017. It stated, among other things, that the

Determination Ð will become final if Complainant does not file a

Petition for Relief within 35 days, and the Commission will

dismiss the co mplaint. Ñ The Petition for Relief was filed on

September 18, 2017, or more than 35 days after the Determination

was issued. See § 760.11(6), Fla. Stat. ( Ð A n administrative

hearing pursuant to paragraph (4)(b) must be requested no later

than 35 days after the date of determination of reasonable cause

by the commission . Ñ ). However, in his PRO, Petitioner Ó s counsel

points out that the Determination mailed to his office was

returned to the FCHR as Ð Undeliverable. Ñ The PRO represents that

counsel eventually contacted the FCHR on September 15, 2017, and

a second Determination was emailed to counsel on September 18,

2018. The Petition for Relief was filed the same day. The FCHR

has not raised timeliness as an issue in this case, and it played

no role in its p reliminary investigation and determination.

2/ In January 2017, there were approximately 20 police officer

slots budgeted by the G reater Orlando Airport Authority that were

not filled.

3/ Although the contract reflects an expiration date of

Januar y 13, 2017, Mr. Villaverde testified his last day of work

was January 16, 2017.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

Dionna Littl e, Esquire

City of Orlando

400 South Orange Avenue

Orlando, Florida 32801

(eServed)

Keith L. Hammond, Esquire

Law Office of Keith L. Hammond, P.A.

Suite 1200

250 North Orange Avenue

Orlando, Florida 32801

(eServed)

Wayne L. Helsby, Esquire

Allen, Norto n & Blue, P.A.

Suite 100

1477 West Fairbanks Avenue

Winter Park, Florida 32789

(eServed)

Marc A. Sugarman, Esquire

Allen Norton & Blue, P.A.

Suite 100

1477 West Fairbanks Avenue

Winter Park, Florida 32789 - 7108

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Coun sel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4074 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommende d Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.