18-000248 Pinellas County Sheriff&Apos;S Office vs. Jayne A. Johnson Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, July 16, 2018.

Summary: Petitioner's decision to terminate Respondent for misuse of her position and unauthorized use of automated resources was appropriate.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

PINELLAS COUNTY SHERIFF'S

OFFICE,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 18 - 0248

JAYNE A. JOHNSON,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

On March 23, 2018, Administr ative Law Judge Hetal Desai, of

the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), held a final

hearing in St. Petersburg, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Paul Grant Rozelle, Esquire

Pinellas County Sheriff's Office

107 50 Ulmerton Road

Largo, Florida 33778

For Respondent: Craig L. Berman, Esquire

Berman Law Firm, P.A.

Suite 706

111 Second Avenue Northeast

St. Petersburg, Florida 3370 1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this matter is whether the Pinellas County

SheriffÓs Office properly dismissed Respondent from her

employment.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On December 15, 2017, Petitioner, Pinellas County SheriffÓs

Office (PCSO), determin ed that Respondent, Jayne Johnson, engaged

in prohibited conduct in violation of the Civil Service Act and

SheriffÓs Office General Order 3 - 1.1. Specifically, PCSO found

Respondent in violation of Rule 5.4, Duties and Responsibilities;

Rule 5.5, Obedience to Laws and Ordinances; and Rule 3.18,

Unauthorized Use of Automated Systems. On the sam e day, the PCSO

notified Respondent that it was terminating her employment.

On December 19, 2017, Respondent timely appealed her

termination to the PCSO, pursuant to the Pinellas County Civil

Service Act, section 9. On January 12, 2018, the Pinellas County

SheriffÓs Civil Service Board referred the matter to DOAH where

it was assigned and set for hearing.

The PSCO filed a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction on

March 8, 2018; Respondent did not file a written response. This

motion was heard during the pre - hearing conference on March 19,

2018. The undersigned denied the motion and entered a written

Order on March 20, 2018.

At the March 19 , 2018, pre - hearing conference, the parties

also discussed procedural aspects of the final hearing, such as

order of presentation, the burden of proof and submission of

joint exhibits. The parties stipulated to a number of ÐAdmitted

Facts,Ñ which have been incorporated into this Recomm ended Order.

During the final hearing, the PCSO presented the testimony

of Pinellas County Sheriff Bob Gualtieri (the Sheriff) and

Respondent. Respondent did not have any additional witnesses,

but testified on her own behalf. The parties offered Joint

E xhibits 1 through 23, which were admitted in evidence.

At the close of the March 23 , 2018, final hearing, the

parties waived the 10 - day timeframe to file pro posed recommended

orders (PROs) and , instead , requested a deadline of 30 days after

the receipt of the hearing transcript to file post - hearing

submittals.

A Transcript of the final hearing was filed with DOAH on

May 11, 2018. Both parties timely filed PROs on Ju ne 11, 2018.

The PROs have been duly considered in preparing this Recommended

Order.

FI NDING S OF FACT

Parties

1. Petitioner is a public entity commanded by Bob

Gualtieri , the Sherif f of Pinellas County, whose authority is set

forth in chapter 89 - 404, as amended by chapter 90 - 395, Laws of

Florida, entitled the Pinellas County SheriffÓs Civil Service

System (the ÐCivil Service ActÑ).

2. The PCSO is responsible for providing law enforcement

and other services within Pinellas County, Florida, including

child protection investigative services.

3 . As part of his responsibilities, the Sheriff i s

authorized to impose discipline upon PCSO employees and members

who are found to have violated PCSO rules and regulations. He is

the final decision - maker for all terminations.

4 . At all times pertinent to this case, Respondent was

employed by the PCSO as a supervisor in the Child Protection

Investigation (CPI) d ivision.

5 . Although there was no evidence of RespondentÓs job

description, the parties stipulated that as part of her position,

Respondent was re quired to comply with all PCSO rules,

regulati ons, general orders, an d standard operating procedures,

as well as the laws of the State of Florida .

6. At the time of her termination, Respondent had been

employed by the PCSO for approximately 17 years.

The PCSOÓs Investigation of Respondent

7. Pertine nt to this proceeding, the PCSOÓs General Orders

include the following:

Rule 5.4 Duties and Responsibilities

Rule 5.5 Obedience to Laws and Ordinances

Rule 3.18 Unauthorized Use of Automated Systems

8 . In August 2017, the Sheriff received a letter fr om

Circuit Court Judge Jack Helinger (judge) informing the Sheriff

that Respondent had authored an Ðevaluation letterÑ of a parent

that had been offered as part of a custody dispute. RespondentÓs

evaluation letter indicated that she had interviewed the ch ildren

involved in the custody dispute, and that the children had

informed Respondent that the mother Ðsmokes weed and drinks while

pregnantÑ and the motherÓs boyfriend made Ðcigarettes with green

stuffÑ and drank alcohol. The evaluation letter also noted that

the children preferred the fatherÓs home because there they did

not get yelled at or threatened. The evaluation letter to the

judge concluded:

While it is the courtÓs decision regarding

custodial matters and visitation, I would

strongly recommend no t only therapy for each

child but also random urinalysis for the

mother and her husband, especially concerning

in light of motherÓs current pregnancy.

* * *

I would have to support fatherÓs home as the

safer environment for the children based on

t he information gathered from the childrenÓs

point of view .

9. When the letter was offered at the custody hearing, the

mother and the motherÓs attorney were unaware the children had

been evaluated by Respondent. Upon further inquiry into the

evaluation b y the judge, it was disclosed that Respondent was a

friend of the fatherÓs mother - in - law, and Respondent had

conducted the evaluation Ðpro bonoÑ as a favor to this friend.

10. The judge wrote to the Sheriff:

I am highly concerned about this situation.

It was done with the appearance of a formal

CPI investigation. Certainly, I and [the

motherÓs attorney] were led to believe that

until I inquired further. I question whether

a CPI investigator can conduct an independent

evaluation/investigation in your o ffice.

Most certainly this was not an independent

unbiased letter. It originated from the

relationship between [Respondent] Ms. Johnson

and [the fatherÓs relative].

Fortunately, because all of this was

disclosed in the middle of the Final Hearing,

it wa s not used against the mother. It

certainly appeared to me that it was intended

to be used for the benefit of the father

without disclosure of Ms. JohnsonÓs position

with the Pinellas County SheriffÓs Office or

her relationship to this case.

11 . Upon re ceipt of the judgeÓs letter, the Sheriff

referred the matter to the PCSOÓs Professional Standards Bureau,

which in turn filed a complaint with the PCSOÓs Administrative

Investigations division (IA).

12 . The IA staff investigated the matter as a complaint of

misconduct in violation General Order 3 - 1.1, Rule and

Regulation 5.4 pertaining to duties and responsibilities.

13. T he PCSO General Orders describe an ad ministrative

review board (ARB), which is a Ðchain - of - commandÑ review boa rd

that resolves issues of fact and makes recommendations to the

Sheriff regarding the disposit ion of disciplinary matters.

14. A fter the ARB completes its fact - finding role, it

presents its conclusions to the Sheriff, who makes a decision as

to whether to concur with the ARBÓ s findings and to determine a

final disciplinary action.

15. The ARB met on December 14, 2017, regarding the

investigation of Respondent. The ARB members reviewed the IA

file on Respondent, questioned Respondent, and gave Respondent an

opportunity to mak e a statement.

1 6. A fter reviewing the ARBÓs findings and recommendations,

the Sheriff made the decision to terminate Respondent, finding

her guilty of violating Rule 5.4. He also found she had

committed additional violations of Rule 5.5, pertaining to

o bservance and obedience to the law, and Rule 3.18, pertaining to

the unauthorized use of automated systems.

17. The SheriffÓs unrefuted testimony was that he would

have terminated Respondent based solely on the violation of

Rule 5.4 .

18 . When asked a bout other employees who had been

disciplined for violation of Rule 5.4, the Sheriff testified

there had been no other employee with conduct comparable to

RespondentÓs conduct .

19. Respondent put forth a spe cific employee as a

comparator, who was also f ound guilty of violating Rule 5.4, but

was disciplined with a suspension. That employee, however, was

disciplined for chronic neglect of duties, not for abusing her

position and performing duties without authorization. As such ,

the undersigned finds ther e were no similarly situated employees

who were treated differently.

Violation of Rule 5.4, Duties and Responsibilities

20 . Rule 5.4 states:

Duti e s a nd R e sponsibilit i e s Ï The p r im a r y

re spo n sibili t y of a ll S h er i ffÓ s O f f i c e

p er sonn e l is to be a w ar e o f th e ir a ssi g n e d

duti es a nd re sponsibiliti e s. All p er sonn e l

a r e a l w a y s su b j ec t to du t y a nd ar e r e sponsible

f or t a ki n g p r ompt a nd ef f ec tive a c t ion within

the s c ope of th e ir duti e s a nd a biliti e s

wh e n e v e r re qui r e d.

21 . Based on the stipulation of facts and Respond entÓs own

testimony at the hearing, it is clear that there are no disputed

facts as to RespondentÓs conduct regarding the evaluation of the

children at the PCSO, or her creation and submittal of the

evaluation letter .

22 . There was no open child protecti on investigation

against the mother, nor did the PCSO authorize Respondent to

evaluate the children or investigate the mother.

23 . Respondent interviewed the children while on duty on

PCSO property, using PCSO equipment . Later, Respondent met with

the m other of the children , and used PCSO staff to research the

mother. T his meeting took place on PCSO property during her

regular shift and was not authorized or related to PCSO business.

24. Even though she led the judge and mother to believe she

was actin g within her capacity as a PCSO employe e, RespondentÓs

conduct relating to the evaluation and preparation of the

evaluation letter was unauthorized and outside the scope of her

duties. She abused her position, using it to influence a custody

proceeding, a nd did so for personal r easons as a favor to a

friend.

25 . Based on the competent substantial evidence presented

at the final hearing , the prepond erance of the evidence proves

Respondent violated Rule 5.4 .

Violation of Rule 5.5, Obedience to Laws and Ord inances

26. Rule 5.5 states:

Obedience to Laws and Ordinances Î Agency

personnel shall observe and obey all laws and

ordinances. Members are required to

personally report all violations which have

resulted in their arrest or their non - duty

related involv ement as a suspect in any

criminal action to their supervisor without

delay. Upon returning to their first duty

shift, they must complete an inter - office

memorandum reporting the incident to the

Administrative Investigation Division.

27. The PCSO Ós dete rmination that Respondent violated

Rule 5.5 was based on the premise that Respondent was a

Ðmandatory reporter,Ñ and that she committed a felony when she

failed to refer a lleged a buse rep orted to her by the children to

the Department of Children and Famil ies (DCF) central abuse

hotline, pursuant to section 39.201, Florida Statutes (2017) . 1/

28 . As an initial matter, the PCSOÓs labeling of Respondent

as a Ðmandatory reporterÑ at the hearing ( and in its PRO ), is

misleading. Technically everyone is a Ðmanda tory reporterÑ for

child abuse. 2/ Section 39.201(1)(a) requires Ð [a] ny person

who knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that a child is

abused . . . by a parent . . . shall report such knowledge or

suspicion toÑ the DCF hotline . ( E mphasis added .) The statute

does not impose a special duty to report abuse on child

protective investigators.

29 . Section 39.205 provides penalties relating to the

failure of reporting child abuse. It states in relevant part,

39.205 Penalties relating to reporting of

child abuse, abandonment, or neglect. Ï

(1) A person who is required to report known

or suspected child abuse, abandonment, or

neglect and who knowingly and willfully fails

to do so, or who knowingly and willfully

prevents another person from doing so,

commits a felony of the third degree,

punishable as provided in s. 775.082,

s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

30. Although the Sheriff testified he found Respondent

guilty of a Rule 5.5 violation because he believed Resp ondent had

committed a felony, there was no convincing evidence Respondent

Ðknowingly and willfullyÑ failed to report known or suspected

child abuse.

31. ÐAbuseÑ is defined as:

[A] ny willful act or threatened act that

results in any physical, mental, or sexual

abuse, injury, or harm that causes or is

likely to cause the childÓs physical, mental,

or emotional health to be significantly

impaired. Abuse of a child includes acts or

omissions. Corporal discipline of a child by

a parent or legal custodian for disciplinary

purposes does not in itself constitute abuse

when it does not result in harm to the child.

§ 39.01(2), Fla. Stat.

32. There was no evidence at trial that the childrenÓs

physical, mental, or emotional health was or was likely to be

signifi cantly impaired. Moreover, other than the childrenÓs

hearsay statements in the evaluation letter, there was no

evidence that the mother was actually smoking marijuana or

drinking alcohol in front of the children or endangering her

unborn child. Although exposure to a controlled substance can

constitute harm under the statute, it can only be established by

evidence that the parentÓs alcohol or substance abuse is

Ðextensive, abusive, and chronic.Ñ £ 39.01(30)(g)2., Fla. Stat.

33. Respondent did suggest in her evaluation letter that

the judge require urinalysis of the mother, but there was no

evidence Respondent believed the children she interviewed were

being abused or harmed as defined by chapter 39. Thus, there was

insufficient evidence that Responden t had committed a felony.

34. The PCSO failed to meet its burden in proving

Respondent violated Rule 5.5 .

Violation of Rule 3.18, Unauthorized Use of Automated Systems

35. Rule 3.18 states in relevant part:

Rule 3.18 Unauthorized Use of Automated

Syste ms

* * *

b. Members may only use computer equipment

as authorized in General Orders.

36. During the course of her unofficial evaluation and her

interaction with the mother, Respondent asked a subordinate to do

a check on the mother on the Fl orida Safe Families Network

(FSFN), which is a secure database containing confidential and

sensitive information.

37 . The FSFN is an Ðautomated systemÑ governed by a user

agreement with D CF . It is not to be used out of curiosity or to

obtain information for personal use.

38 . T he preponderance of t he competent substantial evidence

presented at the final hearing, establishes Respondent violated

Rule 3.18 .

Rules of Conduct and Disciplinary Scoring

39. PCSO General Order 10 - 2 covers discipline and ranks

certain violations of the PCSO rules.

40 . PCSO General Order 10 - 2 ranks offenses from Level 1 to

Level 5, with Level l offenses being the lea st severe and Level 5

offenses being the most severe.

41 . Rule s 5.4 and 5.5 are level 5 violation s .

42 . Rule 3.1 8 is a level 3 violation.

43 . The General Orders set forth a procedure for assigning

poin ts for each sustained violation and provide a table

indicating the range of punishment depending on the total points

scored.

44 . The disciplinary scoring applicable to Respondent's

case are calculated as follows: Level 5 violations constitute

50 points for the first infraction, and ten additional points for

subsequent infraction s; and the level 3 violation is an

additional 15 points.

45 . Under PCSO General Order 10 - 2, termination is the

appropriate maximum discipline if the violation(s) total 50 -

points or more.

46. A score of over 50 point s warrants a minimum discipline

of suspension of five to 15 day s.

47. For example, for violations totaling a 60 - point score

an employee must be d iscipline d with a seven - day suspension, but

can receive a maximum discipline of termination; for a 75 - point

violatio n the minimum discipline is a ten - day suspension with a

maximum discipline of termination.

48. The Sheriff was within his discretion to terminat e

Respondent based on his finding of the Rule 5.4 violation alone ,

which would be assessed 50 points and warrants a range of

discipline from a five - day suspension to termination.

49. Based on the disciplinary scoring calculatio ns, a

violation of Rule 5.4 (50 points) and Rule 3.18 (15 points) would

total 65 points.

50. The minimum disciplinary action for a 65 - point

violation calculation is seven days; the maximum disciplinary

action is termination.

51. Consequently, the PCS O met its burden of establishing

sufficient grounds to terminate Respondent from her position as a

child protection investigation supervisor.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

52. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction

over the parties and subject matt er of this appeal proceeding

pursuant to section 120.65(6), Florida Statutes and the Civil

Service Act. 3/

53. As an initial matter, Respondent argues the Sheriff had

an insufficient basis to terminate her for violations of Rules 5.5

and 3.18. In this adm inistrative proceeding, however, the

undersigned is not bound by the conclusion s or factual findings of

the AI investigators , the ARB , or the Sheriff . Similarly, the

undersigned gives no deference to the Sheriff Ós acceptance and

amendment of the ARBÓs rec ommendation.

54. Accordingly, whether the PCSO produced sufficient

competent substantial evidence to meet its burden of proof in this

Ðde novoÑ administrative proceeding is based on and measured by

all the evidence and testimony adduced during the final hearing.

See § 120.057(1)(k), Fla. Stat.

55. Similarly, the undersigned may disregard unproven or

unsupported evidence that was previously considered. Instead, a

new e videntiary record was established based on th e relevant

evidence and witness testim ony developed during the final hearing.

56. Regarding the evidence at trial, a number of sworn

statements taken as part of the IAÓs investigation were offered as

joint exhibits at the hearing. These statements, however, are

out - of - court statements and ar e clearly hearsay. See

§ 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Under the Administrative Procedure

Act, Ð[h]earsay evidence may be used for the purpose of

supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be

sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be

admissible over objection in civil actions.Ñ See § 120.57(1)(c),

Fla. Stat. Consequently, the undersigned makes no findings of

fact based solely on these out - of - court statements.

57 . The burden of proof in this proceeding is governed by

the preponderance of the evidence standard. See § 120.57(1)(j),

Fla. Stat. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as Ðthe

greater weight of the evidenceÑ or evidence that Ðmore likely

than notÑ tends to prove a certain proposition. See S. Fla. Water

M gmt. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC , 139 So. 3d 869, 872 n.1 (Fla. 2014)

( citing to BlackÓs Law Dictionary 1301 (9th ed. 2009) , defining

a preponderance of the evidence as Ð[t]he greater weight of the

evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of

w itnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most

convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not

sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is

still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one sid e

of the issue rather than the other.Ñ).

58. The burden is on the party asserting the affirmative of

the issue. DepÓt of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla.

1st DCA 1981); see also DepÓt of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. &

Investor Prot. v. Osborne Stern & Co. , 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla.

1996)(ÐThe general rule is that a party asserting the affirmative

of an issue has the burden of presenting evidence as to that

issue.Ñ). Therefore, the PCSO, as the party seeking to take

disciplinary action on Respo ndent, carries the ultimate burden of

persuasion in this administrative matter.

59. The Civil Service Act, section 8(3), defines the scope

of this proceeding and limits the issues to be decided to the

following:

1) Determine whether the aggrieved membe r

engaged in conduct prohibited by section 6 or

by a departmental rule promulgated by the

Sheriff;

2) Determine whether the action taken against

the aggrieved member is consistent with action

taken against other members; and

3) Make findings of fact an d state a

conclusion as specified in subsection (6).

60. Section 6 of the Civil Service Act requires the

undersigned to recommend the Civil Service Board Ðeither sustain,

modify, or not sustain the action being appealed.Ñ

61. Turning to the first issu e of whether Respondent

violated PCSO rules, for the reasons stated in t he finding of

facts, the undersigned finds the PCSO demonstrated, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent engaged in conduct

prohibited by the Civil Service Act, section 6, and General

Order 3 - 1. Specifically, the PCSO proved that Respondent

violated Rule 5.4, Duties and Responsibilities, and Rule 3.18,

Unauthorized Use of Automated Systems.

62. As for the second issue relating to consistency of the

discipline as compared with other PCSO employees, t he PCSO

demonstrated that the Sheriff exercised his authority, within the

disciplinary range authorized by General Order 10 - 2, to terminate

RespondentÓs employment.

63. There was no evidence the PCSO had disciplined other

me mbers differently based on the same circumstances or similar

violations. Although Respondent argued another employee had also

been found guilty of violating Rule 5.4., but given less harsh

discipline, the conduct of that employee involved the lack of

perf ormance of duties, not abuse of the position.

64. In employment discrimination cases, courts have held

that for allegations of disparate discipline, the fact - finder

must consider Ð whether the employees are involved in or accused

of the same or similar c onduct and are disciplined in different

ways. Ñ See White v. Dixie , No. 17 - 11123, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS

18581, at *18 (11th Cir. July 9, 2018) (finding in discriminatory

discipline case the comparatorÓs performance deficiencies were

not of the same quantity or quality as the plaintiff employee to

permit comparison) .

65. There was no evidence in the record that any other

employee engaged in similar conduct -- using his or her PCSO

authority, skills and resources to influence a legal proceeding

as a favor for a friend. As such, the termination of Respondent

was not inconsistent with the discipline taken against other

members.

66. Finally, the undersigned concludes that the Civil

Service Board should sustain the SheriffÓs decision to dismiss

Respondent for cau se under the Civil Service Act. RespondentÓs

violations of Rules 5.4 and 3.18 total 65 points under the

disciplinary scale set forth in General Order 10 - 2. The

discipline range for 65 points includes termination. Therefore,

the Sheriff was authorized to terminate RespondentÓs employment

based on her violations of PCSOÓs rules and regulations.

67. In conclusion, the PCSO met its burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the competent, substantial evidence that

Respondent violated Civil Service Act, sectio n 6, and General

Order 3 - 1 . Therefore, the Sheriff had ÐcauseÑ to dismiss

Respondent. The PCSO also proved that there were no similarly

situated comparators and the discipline the Sheriff elected to

impose Î - termination -- was appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Pinellas County SheriffÓs

Office, enter a final order finding:

Respondent, Jayne A. Johnson, violated Rules 5.4 and 3.18,

and sustaining the SheriffÓs decisi on to terminate Respondent from

her employment with the Pinellas County SheriffÓs Office.

DONE AND ENTERED this 1 6 th day of July, 2018 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

HETAL DESAI

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 1 6 th day of July , 20 18 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ All references to Florida Statutes and PCSO rules,

regulations, and orders are to the 2017 versions unless otherwise

stated.

2 / The statute was significantly amended in 2003, but previously

stated in relevant part:

(1) Any person, including, but not limited

to, any:

(a) Physician, osteopathic physician,

medical examiner, chiropractic physician,

nurse, or hospital personnel engaged in the

admission, examination, care, or treatment of

persons;

(b) Health or mental health professio nal

other than one listed in paragraph (a);

(c) Practitioner who relies solely on

spiritual means for healing;

(d) School teacher or other school official

or personnel;

(e) Social worker, day care center worker,

or other professional child care, foste r

care, residential, or institutional worker;

(f) Law enforcement officer; or

(g) Judge, who knows, or has reasonable

cause to suspect, that a child is abused,

abandoned, or neglected by a parent, legal

custodian, caregiver, or other person

responsible for the child's welfare shall

report such knowledge or suspicion to the

department in the manner prescribed in

subsection (2).

§ 39.201, Fla. Stat (2002). The current version does require

certain reporters to provide their names to the hotline staff,

su ch as doctors, social workers, law enforcement officers, and

judges. § 39.201(1)(d), Fla Stat. There was nothing in the

record indicating that anyone else from the PCSO or the judge

involved in the custody case or this appeal contacted the DCF

Hotline.

3/ This proceeding is governed by the Civil Service Act and

implementing procedural rules authorized by the P CSO Civil

Service Boar d . When a PCSO employee exercises his or her right

to an appeal hearing, the Civil Service Board can elect to hear

the app eal itself or refer the case to DOAH to conduct the appeal

hearing, Ðaccording to the rules followed by DOAH in accordance

with Florida Statutes.Ñ Rules 4 and 5, PCSO Civil Service Board

Rules of Procedure. When , as in this case, DOAH conducts the

appeal hearing, the Administrative Law Judge enters a recommended

order and the PCSO Civil Service Board renders the final

determination. Rule 7, PCSO Civil Serv. Bd. Rules of Procedure.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Craig L. Berman, Esquire

Berman Law Firm, P.A.

Suite 706

111 Second Avenue Northeast

St. Petersburg, Florida 33701

(eServed)

Paul Grant Rozelle, Esquire

Pinellas County Sheriff's Office

10750 Ulmerton Road

Largo, Florida 33778

(eServed)

Carole S anzeri, Esquire

Pinellas County AttorneyÓs Office

315 Court Street, Sixth Floor

Clearwater, Florida 33756

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be file d with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.