18-001939 Jennifer Nicole King vs. Advantage Realty And Mng, Inc., And Housing Authority Of Flagler County Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, August 30, 2018.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents violated Florida Fair Housing Act by engaging in discriminatory housing practices.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

JENNIFER NICHOLE KING,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 18 - 1939

ADVANTAGE REALTY AND MANAGEMENT,

INC., AND HOUSING AUTHORITY OF

FLAGLER COUNTY,

Respondents.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

An administrative hearing was conducted in this case on

June 19, 2018, in Bunnell, Florida, before James H. Peterson,

III, Administrative Law Judge with the Division of

Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Jennifer N ichole King, pro se

10 Pier Lane

Palm Coast, Florida 32164

For Respondent Advantage Realty and Management, Inc.:

Dymitri Belkin, pro se

Advantage Realty and Management, Inc.

4861 Palm Coast P arkway Northwest, Unit 1

Palm Coast, Florida 32137

For Respondent Housing Authority of Flagler County:

Rhonda Stringer, Esquire

Saxon Gilmore & Carraway, PA

201 E ast Kennedy B oulevard , S uite 600

Tampa, Florida 33602

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respo ndents , Housing Authority of Flagler County

and Chris Beyrer, Executive Director of the Housing Authority of

Flagler County (collectively, the Authority) ; and Advantage

Realty and Management, Inc. and Dymitri Belkin (collectively,

Advantage) , discriminated against Petitioner Jennifer Nichole

King (Petitioner) based on her race by engaging in

discriminatory terms and conditions, discriminatory statements,

and steering, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act,

c hapter 760, Florida Statutes.

PRELIMINARY S TATEMENT

Petitioner filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint

(Complaint) with the Florida Commission on Human Relations

(FCHR), which was received by FCHR on September 1, 2017, against

the Authority and Advantage, claiming she was the victim of

discriminat ion because of her race. Following an investigation

of PetitionerÓs allegations, FCHR issued a Notice of

Determination (No Cause) finding that there was no probable

cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had

occurred in violation of c hapt er 760. Petitioner then timely

filed a Petition for Relief (Petition) with FCHR on April 13,

2018. FCHR transmitted the Petition to the Division of

Administrative Hearings on April 13, 2018, for the assignment of

an a dministrative law judge to conduct a n administrative

hearing.

At the final hearing, the parties jointly offered FCHRÓs

determination on the Complaint, which was received into evidence

as Joint Exhibit 1. Petitioner testified on her own behalf and

offered 30 exhibits, received into evidence as PetitionerÓs

Exhibits A13, A14, D14, A15 through C15, E15 through J15, C16

through F16, I16 through M16, O16, A17 through D17, G17, H17,

J17 , and V17. The Authority presented the testimony of the

AuthorityÓs Executive Director, Chris Beyrer, and offer e d

17 exhibits, received into evidence as XR - 1 through XR - 4, R - 1

through R - 6, R - 11 through R - 13, R - 32, R - 38, R - 41 , and R - 42.

During the final hearing, Petitioner announced that neither

Mr. Belkin nor Advantage Realty and Management, Inc. engaged in

discri minatory conduct against her, effectively dismissing them

as parties. Therefore, Mr. Belkin did not offer testimony.

However, one of AdvantageÓs witnesses, a repairman from VK

Services, provided brief testimony.

The proceedings were recorded, but no tran script was

ordered. The parties were given until July 19, 2018, to file

their proposed recommended orders. Respondent timely filed its

Proposed Recommended Order, which has been considered in

preparing this Recommended Order. Petitioner did not file a

p roposed recommended order.

FINDING S OF FACT

1. Petitioner is an African - American female who is a

participant in the AuthorityÓs Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher

Program (Section 8 Program).

2. On April 8, 2013, Petitioner moved from the Pinellas

County H ousing AuthorityÓs Section 8 Program to the AuthorityÓs

Section 8 Program. The Authority did not transfer Petitioner

into its Section 8 Program, but rather administers PetitionerÓs

Section 8 voucher for the Pinellas CountyÓs Housing Authority in

accordanc e with the federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD)

regulations.

3. The essence of PetitionerÓs claim against the Authority

is that, because of her race, the Authority, and its executive

director, Chris Beyer, steered her away from homes in

predominate ly white areas and told her she needed to look for

homes in the Ðprojects.Ñ According to Petitioner, when she

inquired about certain homes in nicer, predominantly white

areas, Chris Beyer told her that people like her did not qualify

for that type of hous ing. She also suggested that, because of

discrimination based on her race, the Authority allowed

Advantage, and/or the owners of the housing units that she

rented under the Section 8 Program, to continue to receive rent

and raise rental rates, even though the Authority knew that

repairs required for habitability were not being made. The

evidence, as outlined in the Findings of Fact below, does not

support PetitionerÓs claims against the Authority.

4. During her orientation process for Section 8 services

in Flagler County, Petitioner completed the AuthorityÓs voucher

briefing process, which included both an oral briefing and an

information packet. The subjects covered by the briefing

information and documentation included family and owner

obligations and responsibilities; the housing selection process;

a list of the AuthorityÓs resources for locating housing, which

included areas outside of poverty or minority concentrated

areas; the AuthorityÓs process for determining the amount of

housing assistance paym ent for the family and maximum rent; and

a list of participating realtors that manage properties for

various owners participating in the Section 8 Program.

5. After Petitioner completed the voucher briefing

process, on April 18, 2013, the Authority issued Petitioner a

Housing Choice Voucher.

6. In July 2013, Petitioner independently , and

voluntarily , located a potential rental unit at 49 Raintree

Place, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Raintree Place unit), and

submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the

Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease for

the unit. The Raintree Place unit was a four bedroom , detached

single - family home constructed in 2006. The proposed rent for

the unit was $1,000.00 per month , with a required sec urity

deposit of $1,500.00.

7. The Authority inspected the unit, determined that it

passed the housing quality standards, and that the rent was

reasonable. The Authority then approved the unit and executed a

Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract with the owner, or

ownerÓs agent, to pay housing assistance to the owner on behalf

of Petitioner.

8. On May 29, 2014, the owner of the Raintree Place unit

filed an eviction action against Petitioner for nonpayment of

rent. At a subs equent mediation, the part ies to the eviction

action entered a stipulation agreement on July 2, 2014, which

required Petitioner, among other things, to vacate the unit by

July 31, 2014. The stipulation agreement also provided that if

Petitioner timely performed all of the terms an d condition s of

the stipulation agreement, then the owner agreed to dismiss the

eviction case.

9. On July 31, 2014, Petitioner timely vacated the

Raintree Place unit as agreed, thereby avoiding a judgment for

possession against her. Thereafter, on August 6, 2014, the

Authority issued Petitioner a new Housing Choice Voucher to

locate another rental unit.

10. In August 2014, Petitioner independently , and

voluntarily , located another potential unit located at

92 Ulysses Trail, Palm Coast, Florida 32164 (Uly sses Trail

unit). Petitioner submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for

this unit to the Authority, along with a copy of the proposed

dwelling lease. This unit was a four bedroom, detached single -

family home constructed in 2002. The proposed rent for the unit

was $1,200.00 per month , and the security deposit was $1,500.00.

11. The Ulysses Trail unit was owned by Serghei Potorac.

Mr. Potorac hired Advantage to manage the unit. Advantage

managed the Ulysses Trail unit until September 6, 2017.

12. The Authority inspected the Ulysses Trail unit and

determined that it passed the housing quality standards and that

the proposed rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved

the unit and executed a HAP contract with the owner, or the

ownerÓs agent, Advan tage, to pay housing assistance to the owner

on behalf of Petitioner.

13. Petitioner and her family moved into the Ulysses Trail

unit on September 1, 2014.

14. During PetitionerÓs tenancy , the own er of the Ulysses

Trail unit received various notices for city code violations

because of PetitionerÓs failure to maintain the property in

accordance with local city codes or ordinances. The alleged

violations included overgrown lawn, failing to screen outside

trash containers, and accumulation of trash on the property. As

a result, the city assessed fines against the owner totaling

over $800. 00.

15. On July 8, 2015, Advantage sent Petitioner a seven - day

notice to cure , demanding that she pay the outstanding fines.

16. Petitioner ultimately either corrected , or agreed to

correct, the violations. As a result, the city waived the

outstanding fines. A fter conferring with the owner, Petitioner

and Advantage advised the Authority that the owner would not

proceed against Petitioner.

17 . On July 13, 2015, the Au thority conducted an annual

inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. The unit passed the

inspection but there were some issues that the Authority felt

needed to be addressed. Therefore, on July 13, 2015, Robert

Beyrer, the PetitionerÓs housing counselor at the Authority,

sent Advantage an email regarding those issues.

18. The next year, on July 12, 2016, the Authority

conducted its next annual inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit.

Because of some noted deficiencies, the unit did not initially

pass inspecti on. Th e Authority sent correspondence to Advantage

detailing the deficiencies that needed correction by August 12,

2016. Thereafter, Advantage provided the Authority with an

invoice from VK Services showing that the deficiencies had been

timely corrected .

19. During the time period from July 2015 through

October 2016, the Authority rece ived copies of at least four

three - day notices that Advantage had delivered to Petitioner for

failing to timel y pay rent. With respect to a three - day notice

delivered to Petitioner on October 11, 2016, the owner

subsequently filed an eviction action on October 20, 2016.

During a court - ordered mediation, the parties entered into a

Stipulation Agreement dated November 10, 2016.

20. When Petitioner failed to comply with the November 10,

2016 , Stipulation Agreement, Advantage filed an affidavit on

February 2, 2017, on behalf of the owner, seeking a judgment for

possession. That same day, without advising the Authority of

the ongoing eviction action, Petitioner asked the Auth ority to

conduct a special inspection of the Ulysses Trail unit. During

the AuthorityÓs inspection, the Authority found that the unit

failed the inspection as a result of various deficiencies

attributed to both the owner and Petitioner.

21. The next da y, on February 3, 2017, the court entered a

final judgment for possession against Petitioner, and the court

clerk issued a writ of possession. In response, Petitioner

filed a motion to stay the execution of the writ, claiming,

among other things, that Adv antage failed to repair items as

agreed in the November 10, 2016 , Stipulation Agreement. In the

meantime, the unit was re - inspected by the Authority on

February 27, 2017, and the inspector found that some of the

deficiencies had been addressed but there r emained some that

still needed to be corrected. On March 14, 2017, the Authority

did a final inspection of the unit and determined that the

remaining deficiencies had been addressed by both Advantage and

Petitioner.

22. Following two hearings on Petition erÓs motion in the

eviction case, the court granted PetitionerÓs motion to stay and

vacated the final judgment. The court also reduced PetitionerÓs

portion of the rent due for the months of January and

February 2017 based on its findings regarding the out standing

repairs. Further court orders reflect that Advantage ultimately

addressed the disputed repairs and that Petitioner was ordered

to pay full rent for the months of March and April 2017. The

Authority was not a party and did not appear in the evict ion

proceedings.

23. Thereafter, the owner gave Petitioner notice and

advised the Authority that PetitionerÓs lease would not be

renewed, and that Petitioner would need to vacate the unit by

August 31, 2017. The Authority subsequently sent

correspondence s to Petitioner explaining what she needed to do

in order to be eligible to move to another location with

continued housing assistance from the Authority.

24. Petitioner timely vacated the Ulysses Trail unit and

was issued a new voucher by the Authority on September 1, 2017,

that could be used for a new rental unit. On October 13, 2017,

Petitioner sent Robert Beyrer an email stating:

Good Morning,

Can you email the list of realtors that you

have. I misplaced ours with all the moving

about. Also I am g oing to need to request

an [] extension of my voucher. Do we need to

sign anything?

Thank,

Jen King

25. In response, Robert Beyrer sent Petitioner another

copy of the list of participating realtors in Flagler County

previously provided to her by the Aut hority during her initial

voucher briefing. The Authority, through Robert Beyrer, also

granted PetitionerÓs request for an extension of her voucher

until December 1, 2017.

26. On October 30, 2017, Petitioner sent Robert Beyrer

another email advising tha t she was having difficulty finding

another unit. By email, Robert Beyrer responded by further

extending the expiration date of her voucher until December 31,

2017, and counseling her on various sources where she might find

available units, stating:

There are rentals out there. I am not sure

who you are speaking with. I would continue

to contact the landlords on the

participating realtors list, check the local

newspaper weekly, and check Zillow.com for

reputable property management companies.

We have be en leasing people up with your

voucher size in your price range. I will

continue to keep my eyes open for you!

27. Petitioner independently and voluntarily located a

potential rental unit located at 10 Pier Lane, Palm Coast,

Florida 32164 (Pier Lane uni t) and, on December 27, 2017,

submitted a Request for Tenancy Approval for this unit to the

Authority, along with a copy of the proposed dwelling lease for

the unit.

28. The Authority inspected the Pier Lane unit and

determined that it passed the housing quality standards and that

the proposed rent was reasonable. The Authority then approved

the unit and executed a HAP contract with the owner, or ownerÓs

agent, to pay housing assistance to the owner on PetitionerÓs

behalf.

29. On February 1, 2018, Petiti oner moved into the Pier

Lane unit. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner was

residing at the Pier Lane unit and the Authority was paying HAP

payments to the owner on behalf of Petitioner under a HAP

Contract with the owner.

30. At the hearing, Pe titioner maintained that the crux of

her housing discrimination complaint was actually based on

racially discriminatory statements allegedly made to her by

Chris Beyrer. Petitioner alleged that Chris Beyrer said to her,

among other things, ÐYou cannot liv e by the canals; they do not

rent to people like you.Ñ Petitioner testified that she took

Chris BeyrerÓs statements to mean that she could not rent a unit

by the canals because they do not rent to black people or people

of color. Petitioner admitted, how ever, that Chris Beyrer never

referenced or otherwise indicated that race was the underlying

reason or motive when he made the alleged statements.

31. Chris Beyrer denied making the alleged discriminatory

statements attributed to her by Petitioner, or a ny other

racially discriminatory statements. Ms. Beyer explained that

any housing suggestions to Petitioner would have been on the

type of unit Petitioner could afford to rent based on the amount

of her reported household income and rental subsidy.

Ms. B eyerÓs testimony was credible and is accepted.

32. Rather than showing racial discrimination against

Petitioner in the AuthorityÓs administration of the Section 8

Program, the evidence showed that, as a Section 8 participant in

Flagler County, Petitioner was and is free to locate or choose

an eligible rental unit anywhere in the AuthorityÓs jurisdiction

and submit the proposed rental unit to the Authority for

approval.

33. Further, at the hearing, Petitioner withdrew any claim

that Advantage had unlawfull y discriminated against her because

of her race by failing to make requested repairs or by providing

false repair records for the Ulysses Trail unit to the

Authority. Specifically, Petitioner stated at the hearing that

she did not believe Advantage had en gaged in any discriminatory

conduct towards her, and was rescinding her housing

discrimination complaint against Advantage. Nevertheless, near

the close of the hearing, one of AdvantageÓs witne sses, a

repair man from VK Services, provided brief testimony c onfirming

that he had personally made the repairs at the Ulysses Trail

unit, as indicated in the various invoices provided by Advantage

to the Authority. The testimony is credited.

34. Finally, despite PetitionerÓs claims that the

Authority also discrimi nated against her by allowing Advantage

to raise rents and continuing to pay HAP to the owner during the

years of her tenancy at the Ulysses Trail unit while unaddressed

deficiencies existed, Petitioner admitted that she voluntarily

chose to accept the own erÓs proposed rental increases and

repeatedly renewed her lease with the owner. The evidence

further showed that Petitioner wa s always free under the

Section 8 Program to reject lease rental increases and relocate

to a new unit of her choice with continue d housing assistance

from the Authority.

35. In sum, the evidence does not support PetitionerÓs

claim that, because of racial discrimination, the Authority

steered her to only certain rental units, that the Authority

allowed rent increases despite lack of repairs, that there were

discriminatory statements made against her, or that Advantage

was complicit in the alleged discrimination.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

36. The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of th is

proceeding. §§ 120.569, 120 .57(1), and 760.20 Î 760.37,

Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Y - 4.016 and 60Y - 8.001.

37. The AuthorityÓs Section 8 Program is governed by its

Section 8 Administrative Plan, and various other federal laws

and regulations.

38. Advantage, acting as management agent for the owner of

Ulysses Trail unit, is required to comply with the terms of the

HAP Contract.

39. Petitioner and the owners of units rented under the

Section 8 Program are governed by the Lease and the mandatory

Sec tion 8 Tenancy Addendum (Part C of the HAP Contract).

40. As a participant in the program, Petitioner is subject

to the AuthorityÓs Section 8 Program family obligations, the

AuthorityÓs Administrative Plan, and other Authority and federal

Section 8 Progra m requirements.

41. PetitionerÓs claim is brought under FloridaÓs Fair

Housing Act (the Act), which is codified in s ections 760.20

through 760.37, Florida Statutes . 1/

42. Among other things, the Act makes certain acts

Ðdiscriminatory housing practicesÑ a nd gives the Commission the

authority, if it finds (following an administrative hearing

conducted by an administrative law judge) that a Ðdiscriminatory

housing practiceÑ has occurred. If such a finding is made, the

Act further authorizes the Commission t o issue an order

Ðprohibiting the practiceÑ and provide Ðaffirmative relief from

the effects of the practice, including quantifiable damages and

reasonable attorneyÓs fees and costs.Ñ § 760.35(3) (b), Fla.

Stat.

43. Under the Act, it is unlawful to discr iminate in the

sale or rental of housing. Section 760.23 states, in pertinent

part:

(1) It is unlawful to refuse to sell or

rent after the making of a bona fide offer,

to refuse to negotiate for the sale or

rental of, or otherwise to make unavailable

or deny a dwelling to any person because of

race, color, national origin, sex, handicap,

familial status, or religion.

(2) It is unlawful to discriminate against

any person in the terms, conditions, or

privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,

or in the p rovision of services or

facilities in connection therewith, because

of race, color, national origin, sex,

handicap, familial status, or religion.

(3) It is unlawful to make, print, or

publish, or cause to be made, printed, or

published, any notice, state ment, or

advertisement with respect to the sale or

rental of a dwelling that indicates any

preference, limitation, or discrimination

based on race, color, national origin, sex,

handicap, familial status, or religion or an

intention to make any such prefere nce,

limitation, or discrimination.

44. The Act is modeled after the federal Fair Housing Act.

Accordingly, federal case law involving housing discrimination

is instructive and persuasive in interpreting section 760.23.

Loren v. Sasser , 309 F.3d 1296, 1300 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002);

Dornbach v. Holley , 854 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); cf .,

Winn - Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Reddick , 954 So. 2d 723, 728 (Fla.

1st DCA 2007) , rev. denied 967 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007),

(discussing the same rule of construction in th e context of the

Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, §§ 760.01 - 760.11, Fla. Stat.) .

45. Petitioner has the burden of establishing facts to

prove a prima facie case of discrimination. U.S. Dep Ó t of Hous .

and Urban Dev . v. Blackwell , 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990).

46. As developed in federal cases, a prima facie case of

discrimination may be established by statistical proof of a

pattern of discrimination, or on the basis of direct evidence

which, if believed, would prove the existence of discrimination

without inference or presumption. 2/ Usually, however, as in this

case, direct evidence is lacking and one seeking to prove

discrimination must rely on circumstantial evidence of

discriminatory intent, using the shifting three - part Ðburden of

proofÑ patte rn established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green ,

411 U.S. 792 (1973).

47. Under the three - part burden of proof pattern developed

in McDonnell Douglas :

First, [Petitioner] has the burden of

proving a prima facie case of discrimination

by a preponderan ce of the evidence. Second,

if [Petitioner] sufficiently establishes a

prima facie case, the burden shifts to

[Respondent] to Ðarticulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasonÑ for its action.

Third, if [Respondent] satisfies this

burden, [Petitioner ] has the opportunity to

prove by preponderance that the legitimate

reasons asserted by [Respondent] are in fact

mere pretext.

Blackwell , 908 F.2d at 870, citing Pollitt v. Bramel ,

669 F. Supp. 172, 175 (S.D. Ohio 1987)(federal Fair Housing Act

claim)(q uoting McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802, 804 ) .

48. The pertinent provisions of the Act at issue are

subsections (1) through (3) of section 760.23, quoted above.

Applying the shifting of burden analysis, in order to establish

the elements for a prima fa cie case of discrimination involving

unlawful steering in violation of s ection 760.23(1), a

petitioner must show that: (1) he or she belongs to a class of

persons whom the Florida Fair Housing Act protects from unlawful

discrimination because of race, col or, national origin, sex,

disability, familial status, or religion; (2) he or she made a

bona fide offer to respondent; (3) he or she was qualified,

ready, willing, and able to buy or rent consistent with the

terms and conditions of respondent at the time of the alleged

act of discrimination; (4) respondent refused to sell or rent to

petitioner; and (5) after respondent refused to sell or rent to

petitioner, respondent sold or rented to a less qualified person

from a comparable class of persons.

49. In ord er to establish the elements for a prima facie

case involving discriminatory terms and conditions in violation

of s ection 760.23(2), a petitioner must establish that: (1) he

or she belongs to a class of persons whom the Florida Fair

Housing Act protects fr om unlawful discrimination because of

race, color, national origin, sex, disability, familial status,

or religion; (2) he or she was qualified, ready, willing, and

able to receive services or use facilities consistent with the

terms, policies and procedure s of respondent; (3) he or she

requested the services or use of facilities, or attempted to use

facilities consistent with the terms and conditions, policies,

and procedures established by respondent for all persons who are

qualified or eligible for servic e s or use of facilities; and

(4) respondent, with knowledge of petitionerÓs protected class,

willfully failed or refused to provide services to petitioner or

permit use of the facilities under the same terms and conditions

that were applicable to all perso ns who were qualified or

eligible for services or use of the facilities.

50. For a prima facie case of discriminatory statements in

violation of Section 760.23(3), a petitioner must establish

that: (1) he or she belongs to a class of persons whom the

Flo rida Fair Housing Act protects from unlawful discrimination

because of race, color, national origin, sex, disability,

familial status, or religion; (2) respondent made, printed, or

published, or caused to be made, printed, or published a

discriminatory sta tement or advertisement; (3) petitioner

personally read or heard the statement, notice, or

advertisement, or inquired about the availability of a dwelling;

and (4) respondent confirmed the intent to indicate or express a

preference or limitation based on p etitionerÓs protected class,

or the facts and circumstances provided a credible basis for

inferring the intent of respondent.

51. It is undisputed that Petition er is African - American

and be longs to a class of persons that the Florida Fair Housing

Act prot ects from unlawful discrimination because of race. In

addition, Petitioner demonstrated that she applied for and was

qualified to receive services under the Section 8 Program.

Therefore, it is evident that Petitioner met some of the

elements required f or a prima facie case under subsections

760.23(1) - (3). There is lack of evidence, however, to support

other elements required for a prima facie case under those

provisions or the Act.

52. PetitionerÓs conclusion that statements made by

Respondent Chris Beyrer or other alleged actions of the

Authority involving PetitionerÓs participation in the

AuthorityÓs Section 8 Program were discriminatory towards

Petitioner or her family based on PetitionerÓs race were wholly

insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

in housing. Rather than being supported by the evidence,

PetitionerÓs allegations of racial discrimination are based

solely on her speculation and self - serving belief. Mere

speculation or self - serving belief on the part of a compla inant

concerning motives of a respondent is insufficient, standing

alone, to establish a prima facie case of intentional

discrimination. See Lizardo v. DennyÓs, Inc. , 270 F.3d 94, 104

(2d Cir. 2001)(ÐPlaintiffs have done little more than cite to

their mis treatment and ask the court to conclude that it must

have been related to their race. This is not sufficient.Ñ).

53. Even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case,

it is found that the AuthorityÓs administration of PetitionerÓs

rentals under the Section 8 Program and interactions with

Petitioner, were non - pretextual, non - discriminatory, and

otherwise consistent with applicable standards and regulations.

54. Further, at the final hearing, Petitioner effectively

withdrew her claims against Advantag e.

55. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be

dismissed.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition an d

Complaint.

DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August , 2018 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

JAMES H. PETERSON, III

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee P arkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 30th day of August , 2018 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ Unless otherwise indicated, all referen ces to the Florida

Statutes, Florida Administrative Code, and federal laws are to

the current versions which have not substantively changed since

the time of the alleged discrimination.

2/ For instance, an example of direct evidence in an age

discriminat ion case would be the employer's memorandum stating,

ÐFire [petitioner] Î he is too old,Ñ clearly and directly

evincing that the plaintiff was terminated based on his age.

See Early v. Champion Int'l Corp. , 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th

Cir. 1990).

COPIES F URNISHED:

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

Rhonda E. Stringer, Esquire

Saxon, Gilmore, & Carraway, P.A.

Suite 600

201 East Kennedy Boulevard

Tampa, Florida 33602

(eServed)

Advantage Realty and MNG, Inc.

Unit 1

4861 Palm Coast Parkway Northwest

Palm Coast, Florida 32137

Dmitriy Belkin

Unit 1

4861 Palm Coast Parkway Northwest

Palm Coast, Florida 32137

(eServed)

Jennifer Nichole King

10 Pier Lane

P alm Coast, Florida 32164

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit w ritten exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.