18-004442 Tal Simhoni vs. Mimo On The Beach I Condominium Association, Inc. Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, February 26, 2019.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of religion or national origin in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

S TATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

TAL SIMHONI,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 18 - 4442

MIMO ON THE BEACH I CONDOMINIUM

ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case came before Administrative Law Judge John G.

Van Laningham for final hearing by video teleconference at sites

in Tallahassee and Miami, Florida, on November 5 , 20 1 8 . A

supplemental hearing was conducted by telephone on November 27,

201 8 , wi th participants at multiple locations.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Tal Simhoni, pro se

Post Office Box 964

New York, New York 10018

For Respondent: Melissa A. O'Connor, Esquire

PeytonBolin, PL

3343 West Commercial Boulevard, Suite 100

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully

discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her religion or

national origin i n violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

PRELIMINARY STA TEMENT

In a Housing Discrimination Complaint filed with the

Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") on or around

September 27 , 201 7 , Petitioner Tal Simhoni alleged that

Respondent Mimo on the Beach I Condominium Association, Inc.,

had engaged in unlawful housing discrimination based on religion

or national origin by depriving her of access to common

facilities or services.

FCHR investigated Ms. Simhoni's claims and, on August 7,

201 8 , issued a Notice of Determination of No Cause wh ich

dismissed the complaint she had filed on the grounds that

reasonable cause did not exist to believe that a discriminatory

housing practice had occurred. Thereafter, Ms. Simhoni filed a

Petition for Relief, which FCHR transmitted to the Division of

Adm inistrative Hearings ("DOAH") on August 22 , 201 8 .

The final hearing took place on November 5 , 201 8. A

supplemental hearing session was held on November 27, 2018, for

the limited purpose of letting Ms. Simhoni call as witnesses two

City of Miami Beach empl oyees . In a case spanning both days,

Ms. Simhoni testified on her own behalf and presented three

additional witness es : Jimmy McMillan, Miguel Romero, and

Marisel Santana . She also submitted a large notebook full of

documents, which (with the exception o f a New York Times

article), was admitted as Petitioner's Composite E xhibit 1 .

Respondent called one witness, Arlyn M. Mendoza, the current

president of its Board of Directors. Respondent's Exhibits R1

through R4, R20 through R22, and R26 were admitted into evidence

as well.

The final hearing transcripts were filed on December 27,

2018, and January 28, 2019. Each side submitted a proposed

recommended order, and these have been considered .

Ms. Simhoni filed a number of post - hearing motions.

Instead of r uling on each motion individually, the undersigned

notes that all relevant evidence was carefully reviewed, as were

all of the parties' respective arguments. Allegations,

arguments, and evidence not specifically addressed herein were

not overlooked but, r ather, were rejected as irrelevant,

unpersuasive, or contrary to the greater weight of the credible

evidence. Any pending motion that requests relief inconsistent

with the foregoing statement or with any portion of the balance

of this Recommended Order is , to the extent of such

inconsistency, hereby denied; to the extent not denied, the

motions are granted.

Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the Florida

Statutes refer to the 20 1 8 Florida Statutes.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner Tal Simhoni ("Simhon i"), a Jewish woman who

identifies the State of Israel as her place of national origin ,

at al l times relevant to this action owned Unit No. 212 in Mimo

on the Beach I Condominium (the "Condominium") , which is located

in Miami Beach, Florida . She purchased this unit in 2009 and a

second apartment (Unit No. 203) in 2010. Simhoni has resided at

the Condominium on occasion but her primary residence, at least

as of the final hearing, was in New York City.

2. The Condominium is a relatively small community

consisting of two buildings comprising 28 units. Respondent

Mimo on the Beach I Condominium Association , Inc.

("Association") , a Florida nonprofit corporation, is the entity

responsible for operating and managing the Condominium and,

specifically, the common elements of the Condominium property .

Governing the Association is a Board of Directors (the "Board"),

a representative body whose three members, called "directors,"

are elected by the unit owners.

3. Simhoni served on the Board for nearly seven years.

From July 2010 until April 2011 , she held the office of vice -

president, and from April 2011 until June 1, 2017, Simhoni was

the president of the Board.

4. Simhoni's term as president was cut sh ort when, in

May 2017, she and the other two directors then serving with her

on the Board were recalled by a majority vote of the

Condominium's owners. The Association, while still under the

control of the putatively recalled directors, rejected the vote

and petitioned the Department of Business and Professional

Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares, and Mobile

Homes ("DBPR"), for arbitration of the dispute. By Summary

Final Order dated June 1, 2017, DBPR upheld the recall vote and

ordered that Simhoni, Marisel Santana, and Ca rmen Duarte be

removed from office, effective immediately.

5. The run - up to the recall vote entailed a campaign of

sorts to unseat Simhoni, which, as might be expected, caused

friction between neighbors. Without gett ing into details that

aren't important here, it is fair to say that, generally

speaking, the bloc opposed to Simhoni believed that she had

poorly managed the Condominium, especially in connection with

the use of Association funds. Some of Simhoni's critic s were

not shy about voicing their opinions in this regard, which ÏÏ

understandably ÏÏ led to hard feelings. Simhoni vehemently

disputes the charges of her critics and, clearly, has not gotten

over her recall election de feat, which she blames on false,

unfair , and anti - Semitic accusations against her.

6. This is a case of alleged housing discrimination

brought under Florida's Fair Housing Act (the " Act " ) .

Specifically, Simhoni is traveling under section 760.23(2),

Florida Statutes, which makes it "unlawful to discriminate

against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of

sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or

facilities in connection therewith , because of race, color,

national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or r eligion. "

(Emphasis added) . The applicable law will be discussed in

greater detail below. The purpose of this brief, prefatory

mention of the Act is to provide context for the findings of

fact that follow.

7. The principal goal of section 760.23(2) is to prohibit

the denial of access to housing based on discriminatory animus.

Simhoni, however, was not denied access to housing. She is, in

fact, a home owner. C ontrary to what some might intuit , the Ac t

is not an all - purpose anti - discriminat ion law or civility code ;

it does not purport to police personal disputes, quarrels, and

feuds between neighbors, even ugly ones tinged with, e.g.,

racial or religious hostility. To the extent th e Act authorizes

charges based on alleged post - acquisition discrimination, such

charges must involve the complete denial of services or

facilities that are available in common to all owners as a term

or condition of ownership ÏÏ the right to use common areas , for

example, pursuant to a declaration of condominium. Moreover,

the denial of access to common services or facilities logically

must result from the actions of a person or persons, or an

entity, that exercises de facto or de jure control over access

to the services or facilities in question.

8. This is important because, while Simhoni believes that

she was subjected to anti - Semitic slurs during her tenure as

Board president, the fact is that her unfriendly neighbors ÏÏ none

of whom then held an office on the Board ÏÏ were in no position to

(and in fa ct did not) deny Simhoni access to common services and

facilities under the Association's control, even if their

opposition to her presidency were motivated by discriminatory

animus (which wasn't proved). As president of the Board ,

Simhoni wound up on the receiving end of some uncivil a nd

insensitive comments, and a few of her neighbors seem strongly

to dislike her . Simhoni was hurt by this . That impolite, even

mean, comments are not actionable as unlawful housing

discrimination under section 760.23(2) is no stamp of approval;

it merely reflects the relatively limited scope of the Act.

9. Simhoni has organized her allegations of discrimination

under six categories. M ost of these allegations do not

implicate or involve the deni al of common services or

facilities, and thus would not be sufficient to establish

liability under the Act, even if true. For that reason, it is

not necessary to make findings of fact to the granular level of

detail at which the charges were made.

10. T he Mastercard D ispute. As Board president, Simhoni

obtained a credit card for the Association , which she used for

paying common expenses and other Association obligations such as

repair costs . In applying for the card, Simhoni signed an

agreement with the issuer to personally guarant ee payment of the

Association's account. It is unclear whether Simhoni's actions

in procuring th is credit card were undertaken in accordance with

the Condominium's By - Laws , but there is no evidence suggesting

that Simhoni was forced, encouraged, or even asked to co - sign

the Association's credit agreement; she seems, rather, to have

volunteered .

11. Simhoni claims that she used personal funds to pay

down the credit card balance, essentially lending money to the

Association. She alleges that the Association has failed to

reim burse her for these expenditures, and she attributes this

nonpayment to anti - Semitism.

12. There appears to be some dispute regarding how much

money , if any, the Association actually owes Simhoni for common

expenses. The merits of her claim for repayment are not

relevant in this proceeding, however, because there is

insufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a

finding that the Association has withheld payment based on

Simhoni's religion or national origin.

13. Equally , if not more important , is the fact that

Simhoni's alleged right to reimbursement is not a housing

"service" or "facility" available in common to the Con dominium's

owners and residents . Nonpaym ent of the alleged debt might

constitute a breach of contract or support other causes of

action at law or in equity , but these would belong to Simhoni as

a creditor of the Association, not as an owner of the

Condominium . In short, the Association's allege d nonpayment of

the alleged debt might give Simhon i good legal grounds to sue

the Association for, e.g., breach of contract or money had and

received ÏÏ but not for housing discrimination .

14. The Estoppel Certificate. On September 20, 2017, when

she was under contract to sell Unit No. 212, Simhoni submitted a

written request to the Association for an estoppel certificate,

pursuant to section 718.116(8) , Florida Statutes . By statute,

the Association was obligated to i ssue the certificate within

ten business days ÏÏ by October 4, 2017, in this instance . Id.

The failure to timely issue an estoppel letter results in

forfeiture of the right to charge a fee for preparing and

delivering t he certificate. § 718.116(8)(d), Fla . Stat .

15. The Association missed the deadline, issuing the

certificate one - week late, on October 11, 2017; it paid the

prescribed statutory penalty for this tardiness, refunding the

preparation fee to Simhoni as required. Simhoni attributes the

delay to anti - Semitism.

16. It is debatable whether the issuance of an estoppel

letter is the kind of housing "service" whose deprivation, if

based on religion, national origin, or an other protected

criterion, would support a claim for unlawful discrimination

under the Act. The undersigned will assume for argument's sake

that it is such a service . Simhoni's claim nonetheless fails

because (i) the very statute that imposes the deadline

recognizes that it will not always be met and provides a penalty

for noncompliance, which the Association paid; (ii) a brief

delay in the issuance of an estoppel letter is not tantamount to

the complete deprivati on thereof; and (iii) there is , at any

rate, insufficient persuasive evidence that the minimal delay in

issuing Simhoni a certificate was the re sult of discriminatory

animus .

17. Pest Control. Pest control is not a service that the

Association is requir ed to provide but, rather, one that may be

provided at the discretion of the Board. During Simhoni's

tenure as Board president, apparently at her urging, the

Association arranged for a pest control service to treat all of

the units for roaches, as a commo n expense, and the apartments

were sprayed on a regular basis. If the exterminator were

unable to enter a unit because, e.g., the resident was not at

home when he arrived, a locksmith would be summoned to open the

door, and the owner would be billed indiv idually for this extra

service.

18. After Simhoni and her fellow directors were recalled,

the new Board decided , as a cost - control measure, to discontinue

the pest control service, allowing the existing contract to

expire without renewal. Owners were notified that, during the

phaseout, the practice of calling a locksmith would cease. If

no one were home when the pest control operator showed up, the

unit would not be sprayed, unless the owner had left a key with

the Association or made arrangements for someone else to open

his door for the exterminator.

19. By this time, Simhoni's principal residence, as

mentioned, was in New York. Although she knew that the

locksmith option was no longer available, Simhoni failed to take

steps to ensure that the pest control operator would have access

to her apartment when she wasn't there. Consequently, Simhoni's

unit was not sprayed on some (or perhaps any) occasions during

the phaseout.

20. Simhoni blames anti - Semitism for the missed pest

control visits, but the greater weight of the evidence fails to

support this charge. Simhoni was treated the same as everyone

else in connection with the pest control service. Moreover,

Simhoni was not completely deprived of access to pe st control,

which would have been provided to her if she had simply made

arrangements to permit access to her unit.

21. Short - term R entals. Article XVII of the Condominium's

Declaration of Condominium ("Declaration"), titled Occupancy and

Use Restrict ions, specifically regulates leases. Section 17.8

of the Declaration provides, among other things, that the

Association must approve all leases of units in the Condominium,

which leases may not be for a term of less than one year. In

other words, the Declaration prohibits short - term, or vacation,

rentals, which are typica lly for periods of days or weeks.

22. Short - term rentals can be lucrative for owners,

especially in places such as Miami Beach that attract tourists

who might be interested in alternatives to traditional hotel

lodgings. On the flip side, however , shor t - term rental activity

is not necessarily welcomed by neighboring residents, who tend

to regard transients as being insufficiently invested in

preserving the peace , quiet, and tidy appearance of the

neighborhood. At the Condominium, the question of whethe r or

not to permit short - term rentals has divided the owners into

competing camps .

23. Simhoni is in favor of allowing short - term rentals .

Accordingly, w hile she was Board president, the Association did

not enforce the Declaration's prohibition of this activity. (It

is possible, but not clear, that the Association was turning a

blind eye to short - term rentals even before Simhoni became a

director.) This laissez - faire approach did not sit well with

everyone; indeed, dissatisfaction with short - term renta ls

provided at least some of the fuel for the ultimately successful

recall effort that cost Simhoni her seat on the Board. After

Simhoni and the rest of her Board were removed, the new

directors announced their intent to enforce the Declaratio n's

ban on s hort - term rentals.

24. Simhoni alleges that the crackdown on short - term

rentals was an act of religion - based housing discrimination.

Her reasoning in this regard is difficult to follow, but the

gist of it seems to be that the Association is selectively

enforcing the ban so that only Simhoni and other Jewish owners

are being forced to stop engaging in short - term rental activity;

that the prohibition is having a disparate impact on Jewish

owners; or that some owners are harassing Simhoni by making

complain ts about her to the City of Miami Beach in hopes that

the City will impose fines against her for violating municipal

restrictions on short - term rentals.

25. The undersigned recognizes that a neutral policy such

as the prohibition of short - term rentals co nceivably could be

enfo rced in a discriminatory manner, thus giving rise to a

meritorious charge under the Act. Here, however, the evidence

simply does not support Simhoni's contentions. There is

insufficient evidence of disparate impact, disparate treat ment,

selective enforcement, harassment, or discriminatory animus in

connection with the Association's restoration of the short - term

rental ban. To the contrary, the greater weight of the evidence

establishes that the Association is trying to stop short - t erm

rentals at the Condominium for a perfectly legitimate reason,

namely that a majority of the owners want section 17.8 of the

Declaration to be given full force and effect.

26. The Feud w ith Flores. Simhoni identifies Mr. and

M s . Flores as the worst of her antagonists among her neighbors.

As advocates of the recall, these two were fierce critics of

Simhoni. The Floreses reported Simhoni to the City of Miami

Beach for engaging in short - term rentals without the required

business ta x receipt, in violation of the municipal code. At a

code enforcement hearing, Mr. Flores gave Simhoni the finger.

27. None of this, however, amounts to housing

discrimination because the Flores es ' actions did not completely

deprive Simhoni of common fac ilities or services, even if such

actions were motivated by anti - Semitism, which the greater

weight of the evidence fails to establish. Indeed, there is no

persuasive evidence that the Floreses ever had such control over

the Condominium's facilities or se rvices that they could have

denied Simhoni access to them.

28. Simhoni argues in her p roposed r ecommended o rder,

apparently for the first time, that the Flores es ' conduct

created a "hostile housing environment." Putting aside the

legal problems with this belatedly raised theory, the Flores es '

conduct was not sufficiently severe and pervasive, as a matter

of fact, to support a "hostile environment" claim. Nor is t here

sufficient persuasive evidence in the record to support a

finding that the Floreses acted in concert with the Board to

harass Simhoni, or that the Board acquiesced to the Flores es '

conduct.

29. Roof Repairs. Simhoni alleges that the Association

f ailed to repair the area of the roof over her unit, which she

claims was damaged in Hurricane Irma, and that the Association

has refused to make certain repairs inside her unit, which she

asserts sustained interior water damage as a result of roof

leaks. Simhoni asserts that , using Association funds, the

Association not only repaired other portions of the roof, but

also fixed interior damages similar to hers, for the benefit of

non - Jewish owners.

30. The greater weight of the persuasive evidence shows,

however, that the roof over Simhoni's unit is not damaged, and

that the Association never instruc ted the roofing contractor not

to make needed repairs. Simhoni , in short, was not denied the

service of roof repairs.

31. As for the alleged damage t o Simhoni's unit,

section 7.1 of the Declaration provides that repairs to the

interior of a unit are to be performed by the owner at the

owner's sole cost and expense. The evidence fails to establish

that the interior damage of which Simhoni complains fal l s

outside of her duty to repair.

32. Because this is a housing discrimination case, and not

a legal or administrative proceeding to enforce the terms of the

Declaration, it is neither necessary, nor would it be

appropriate, for the undersigned to adjudicate fully the

question of whether the Association is obligated to repair

Simhoni's unit as a common expense. Here, i t is sufficient to

find (and it is found) that section 7.1 of the Declaration

affords the Association a legitimate, nonpretextual,

nondiscriminatory reason to refuse , as it has, to perform the

interior repairs that Simhoni has demanded.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

33 . DOAH has personal and subject matter jurisdictio n in

this proceeding pursuant to s ections 120.569 and 120.57(1),

Florida Statutes.

34 . Under the Act , it is unlawful to discriminate in the

sale or rental of housing. Specifically, s ection 760.23 (2)

prohibits th e following acts and practices :

It is unlawful to discriminate against any

person in the terms, conditions, or

privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,

or in the provision of services or

facilities in connection therewith, because

of race, color, national origin, sex,

handicap, familial sta tus, or religion.

35. Section 760.23(2) is patterned after section 804(b) of

the federal Fair Housing Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 360 4(b ).

Accordingly, the same legal analysis applies to each, see, e.g. ,

Philippeaux v. Apartment Investment and Management Co. , 598 Fed.

Appx. 640, 643 (11th Cir. 2015), and the decisions of federal

courts interpreting and applying the analogous federal laws

provide persuasive guidance in determining whether a violation

of the Act has occurred. See Dornbach v. Holley , 854 So. 2d

211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

36. The burden of proving that the Association engaged in

unlawful housing discrimination belongs to Simhoni. See, e.g. ,

Loren v. Sasser , 309 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002).

37. In cases involving a claim of housing discr imination,

the complainant has the initial burden of proving a prima facie

case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

Generally speaking, a prima facie case comprises circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory animus, such as proof that the

charged party treated persons outside of the protected class,

who were otherwise similarly situated, more favorably than the

complainant was treated. 1 / Failure to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination ends the inquiry. See Ratliff v. State ,

666 So. 2d 1008, 1012 n.6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996 ), aff'd , 679 So. 2d

1183 ( Fla. 1996)(citing Arnold v. Burger Queen Sys. , 509 So. 2d

958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)).

38. If, however, the complainant sufficiently establishes

a prima facie case, the burden then shifts t o the charged party

to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action. If the charged party satisfies this burden, then the

complainant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that the reason asserted by the charged party is , in fact,

merely a pretext for discrimination. See Massaro v. Mainlands

Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, Inc. , 3 F.3d 1472, 1476 n.6 (11th

Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 808, 115 S. Ct. 56, 130

L. Ed. 2d 15 (1994)("Fair housing discrimination cases are

su bject to the three - part test articulated in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668

(1973)."); Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of HUD, on behalf of Herron v.

Blackwell , 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990)("We agree with the

ALJ th at the three - part burden of proof test developed in

McDonnell Douglas [for claims brought under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act] governs in this case [involving a claim of

discrimination in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act].").

39. To establish a prima facie case of housing

discrimination in a post - acquisition deprivation - of - services

case such as this one, a claimant must prove that she: (i) is

an aggrieved party; (ii) has suffered an injury because of the

alleged discrimination; and (iii) was denied, based on religion

or national origin, the provision of services protected by the

Act, which were available to other homeowners. Savanna Club

Worship Serv. v . Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n , 456 F. Supp. 2d

1223, 1232 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Concerning the third element, the

Act "only applies to those deprivations in the provision of

services which cause a complete denial of access to such

services." Id.

40. Simhoni failed to make a prima facie case because the

evidence she adduced did no t prove that the Association had

completely deprived her of access to services available to the

other unit owners. The burden, therefore, never shifted to the

Association to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrim inatory reason

for its conduct . Nevertheless, the Association did put forward

such explanations where, as with the disputes regarding pest

control and the roof, the allegations raised at least the

possibility that access to protected services might have been

denied. As discussed above, the undersign ed found the

Association's explanations to be credible and nonpretextual.

41. As mentioned, Simhoni argues in her p roposed

r ecommended o rder that the Association is guilty of having

created a hostile housing environment. This theory was not

presented to FCHR in Simhoni's original Housing Discrimination

Complaint dated September 27, 2017. Not surprisingly,

therefore, FCHR did not address the question of whether Florida

law recognizes a claim for hostile housing environment, much

less whether reasonable ca use existed to believe that such a

practice had occurred in Simhoni's case.

42. Simhoni's principal claims of post - acquisition

deprivation of services are on fairly solid legal ground as

cases such as Savanna Club , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 , have

receded from a bright - line rule holding that the federal Fair

Housing Act does not reach discrimination against homeowners.

Whether federal law supports a cause of action for a hostile

housing environment is more controversial. See Lawrence v.

Courtyards at Deer wood Ass'n , 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1146

(S.D. Fla. 2004). A claimant seeking to assert such a novel

cause of action under Florida law should be required to present

his or her case to FCHR for investigation and determination

before seeking further judicial or administrative remedies.

43. Even if the cause of action is available under the

Act, however, and even assuming Simhoni's allegations of a

hostile housing environment are properly before the undersigned,

the charge at issue would fail as a matter of fact. This is

because, to be actionable, a claim for hostile housing

environment must be based on o ffensive behavior that is so

severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of the housing

arrangement and interfere with the claimant's use and enjoyment

of the premises. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v.

Kelly , 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15492, at *25 - *26 (E.D. La.

Jan. 31, 2019). In other words, the offensive conduct must be

analogous to the kind of behavior that would support a hostile

work envi ronment claim of sexual harassment under Title VII.

Id.

44. The conduct at issue in this case was sometimes

impolite and unfriendly, but it never rose to a level of such

extreme offensiveness as to be deemed severe and pervasive. The

Act was not writte n for quotidian disputes between neighboring

homeowners where access to housing (or common amenities) has not

been denied.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that F lorida Commission on Human

Relation s enter a final order finding the Association not liable

for housing discrimination and awarding Simhoni no relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 20 1 9, in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

___________________________________

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675 SUNCOM 278 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Cler k of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 26th day of February, 20 1 9.

ENDNOTE

1 / Alternatively, the complainant's burden may be satisfied with

direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See Trans World

Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston , 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S. Ct. 613,

621, 83 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1985)("[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is

inapplic able where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of

discrimination" inasmuch as "[t]he shifting burdens of proof set

forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the

'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of

direct evidence .'").

COPIES FURNISHED :

Tal Simhoni

Post Office Box 964

New York, New York 10018

(eServed)

Melissa A. O'Connor , Esquire

PeytonBolin, PL

3343 West Commercial Boulevard , Suite 100

Fort Lauderdale , Florida 333 09

(eServed)

Tammy S. Barton , Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla , General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 1 1 0

Tallahassee, Florida 323 99 - 7020

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the righ t to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.