18-005292 Debbie Smith vs. Escambia Community Clinic (Ecc) D/B/A Community Health Northwest Florida Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, February 15, 2019.

Summary: Even if it were to be concluded that Petitioner had established a prima facie case of discrimination, Respondent had a non-discriminatory reason for discharging her.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEBBIE SMITH,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 18 - 5292

ESCAMBIA COMMUNITY CLINIC (ECC) ,

d/b/a COMMUNITY HEALTH NORTHWEST

FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was conducted on

December 3, 2018, in Pensacola, Florida, before Garnett W.

Chisenhall, a duly designated Administrative Law Judge of the

Division of Administrative Hearings (ÐDOAHÑ).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Debbie C. Smith , pro se

Apartment 14B

2800 North Ninth Avenue

Pensacola, Florida 32503

For Respondent: Elmer C. Ignacio, Esquire

Sniffen & Spellman, P.A.

123 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether R espondent committed an unlawful

employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner Debbie

Smith (ÐMs. SmithÑ) based on her age, disability, race, and/or

religion.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Ms. Smith filed a complaint of discrimination on March 1,

2018, w ith the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Ðthe

CommissionÑ) , alleging the Escambia Community Clinic , d/b/a

Community Health Northwest Florida (ÐECCÑ) , violated the Florida

Civil Rights Act of 1992 (ÐFCRAÑ) .

On August 18, 2018, the Commission determine d there was no

reasonable cause to conclude that an unlawful employment practice

had occurred:

[Ms. Smith] was hired by [ECC], a community

health center, as a patient access

representative. [Ms. Smith] stated that she

reported to [ECC]Ós health center to begin

training for her new job, but she was

terminated that same day. [ECC] submitted

affidavits from its site manager and its

chief employee services officer which state

that [Ms. Smith] walked off the jobsite

without informing anyone and failed to

retur n. [ECC]Ós employee handbook indicates

that this is grounds for discipline. The

investigation did not reveal other employees

who engaged in similar conduct. [Ms. Smith]

alleged that she was subjected to disparate

treatment based on her race, color, reli gion,

age, and disability. [Ms. Smith] fails to

prove a prima facie case because she failed

to provide evidence of similarly situated

comparators outside her protected class who

were treated more favorably or any other

evidence of discrimination. Also,

[Ms. Smith] alleged that she was harassed.

[Ms. Smith] fails to prove a prima facie case

because [Ms. Smith] failed to allege that she

suffered any severe or pervasive conduct. In

addition, [Ms. Smith] alleged that [ECC]

retaliated against her. [Ms. Smi th] fails to

prove a prima facie case because she was not

engaged in a protected activity as described

in Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes.

Ms. Smith responded by filing a Petition for Relief with the

Commission on October 2, 2018, and the Commission referred the

case to DOAH that same day.

Via a Notice of Hearing , issued on October 15, 2018, the

undersigned scheduled the final hearing to occur in Pensacola,

Florida, on December 3, 2018.

The final hearing was commenced as scheduled and was

completed that day. Ms. Smith testified on her own behalf and

presented testimony from Penelope McCants, Andrea Nutt, Alexis

Pineda, Krissy Smith, Angie Brewer, Vicki Merold, Linda Edwards,

Tom Anderson, Vanidy Stromas, Darlene Roberts, and Glenda

Humphreys. ECC presented testimony from Teresa Cline, Cathy

OÓSullivan, and Sunny Notimoh.

ECCÓs Exhibits 1 and 2 , which ECC pre - marked as A and B

respectively, were accepted into evidence. Ms. SmithÓs

Exhibits 1, 4, and 5 were accepted into evidence. Ms. Smith

file d a Proposed Recommended Order on December 13, 2018.

The T ranscript from the final hearing was filed on

December 19, 2018.

On December 2 6, 2018, ECCÓs counsel filed a m otion

requesting that the deadline for proposed recommended orders be

extended by 14 days to January 16, 2019. The undersigned issued

an Order on D ecember 27, 2018, granting the m otion. The

aforementioned Order further specified that Ms. Smith could file

a response to ECCÓs Proposed Recommended Order by January 28,

2019.

On January 15, 2019, ECCÓs counsel filed a m otion seeking

to extend the deadline for proposed recommended orders to

January 18, 2019. The undersigned issued an Order on January 17,

2019, granting the Motion but specified that Ðno further

extensionsÑ would be granted Ðabsent extraordinary

circumstances.Ñ Ms. SmithÓs deadline for responding to ECCÓs

Proposed Recommended Order was extended to January 28, 2019.

ECC filed its Proposed Recommended Order on January 18,

2019. After receiving two extensions, Ms. Smith resp onded to

ECCÓs Proposed Recommended Order on February 11, 2019.

The undersigned considered all of the post - hearing

submittals in the preparation of this Recommended Order.

FINDING S OF FACT

Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the

final h earing and the entire record in this proceeding, the

following Findings of Fact are made:

The Parties

1. Ms. Smith is African American and was 61 years old at

the time of the final hearing.

2. Ms. Smith is blind in her right eye and has low vision

in her left eye. She has been receiving disability benefits

since March of 2018.

3. Ms. Smith is Baptist.

4. Ms. Smith has an associateÓs degree in medical office

administration and a bachelorÓs degree in health care

administration. At the time of th e final hearing, she was

pursuing a masterÓs degree in criminal justice from the

University of West Florida and was expecting to graduate in 2019.

5. In addition to her educational pursuits, Ms. Smith

participates in a supported work program sponsored b y the

National Caucus for Black Age (Ðthe NCBAÑ). The NCBA is a

training organization that places seniors in nonprofit

organizations so they can obtain experience that will lead to a

permanent job. Participants in the NCBAÓs training program must

conduct at least two job searches a week and graduate from the

program when they obtain a permanent job.

6. Prior to the events at issue in this proceeding, the

NCBA had placed Ms. Smith with Big Brothers and Big Sisters, and

she was working as an administrative assistant and being trained

to be a case worker.

7. ECC is a federally funded health center that serves the

uninsured and underinsured through approximately 15 different

locations in Escambia and Santa Ros a Counties . 1 /

8. Ms. Smith lacks health care i nsurance and has received

treatment at ECC for 20 years.

The Events Leading to Ms. SmithÓs Discharge from ECC

9. At some point during the first quarter of 2017,

Ms. Smith learned that ECC was hiring in order to staff four or

five new offices in Escambi a County.

10. On March 13, 2017, Ms. Smith interviewed for a patient

access representative (ÐPARÑ) position with ECC. A PAR works the

front desk at an ECC facility by greeting patients, placing their

demographic information into a computer system, coll ecting co -

pays, and registering patients to see a physician.

11. The first two weeks of a PARÓs employment are devoted

to training. ECC prefers for PAR s to work 40 hours a week during

that training period. However, that amount of work is not

guaranteed. The number of hours depends on how much training a

new PAR needs and whether an experienced PAR is available to

provide training.

12. After the training period, PARs work on an Ðas neededÑ

or ÐPRNÑ basis. If a full - time position at ECC becomes

availa ble, then a PAR is eligible to apply for that position.

13. Teresa Cline supervised ECCÓs PARs at the time relevant

to the instant case and hired Ms. Smith to fill a PAR position on

a PRN basis.

14. Ms. Smith was under the mistaken impression that she

would be on PRN status for the two - week training period and then

working full - time.

15. Ms. Smith reported to an ECC clinic for her first day

of work on the morning of April 3, 2017. Ms. Smith began her

workday by training with two women who were working as PARs that

morning, one of whom was Alexis Pineda.

16. After observing the duties of a PAR for 30 to 40

minutes, Ms. Smith received an employee handbook, was

photographed for an identification badge, and toured the

facility.

17. While Ms. Smith was touring the facility, Ms. Pineda

told Ms. Cline that she had concerns about working with

Ms. Smith. According to Ms. Pineda, Ms. Smith had visited ECC as

a patient at some point in the months preceding April 3, 2017,

and had been very disruptive in t he presence of other patients.

18. Nevertheless, Ms. Pineda ultimately told Ms. Cline that

she was willing to work with Ms. Smith.

19. Ms. Cline and Cathy OÓSullivan, ECCÓs employment and

benefits manager at the time, met with Ms. Smith and notified he r

about the concerns regarding the aforementioned incident.

Ms. Cline and Ms. OÓSullivan assured Ms. Smith that any issues

would be resolved in a professional manner.

20. Ms. Smith rigorously denied that she was the person who

caused the disruption . 2 /

21. Ms. Smith also learned during the meeting with

Ms. Cline and Ms. OÓSullivan that she would only be working 12

hours a week during her training period and that she would be on

PRN status after her training was complete.

22. This news was very ups etting to Ms. Smith because she

was unsure that she could survive on the income generated from 12

hours of work , per week. Therefore, Ms. Smith asked Ms. Cline at

approximately noon , on April 3, 2017, if she could contact her

former supervisor at the NCBA about re - entering that program.

Ms. Cline granted her request and walked Ms. Smith to the back

door of the ECC facility.

23. Ms. Smith got into her car and left the ECC facility.

24. Ms. Smith did communicate with her former supervisor at

the NCBA bu t did not return to the ECC on April 3, 2017.

Ms. Smith believed that she had permission from Ms. Cline to make

direct physical contact with her former supervisor and that

Ms. Cline was not expecting her to return to ECC that day . 3 /

25. However, Ms. C line was under the impression that

Ms. Smith was going to simply call her former supervisor from the

ECC facility and then return to her PAR training. After waiting

10 to 15 minutes for Ms. Smith to return, Ms. Cline walked

outside the ECC facility and w as unable to find Ms. Smith.

26. Ms. Cline then conferred with Cathy OÓSullivan, ECCÓs

director of training. Because Ms. Cline had not intended to give

Ms. Smith permission to leave ECC for the rest of the day,

Ms. Cline and Ms. OÓSullivan concluded t hat Ms. Smith should be

discharged for abandoning her job.

27. ECCÓs handbook provides that Ð[e]mployees who stop

and/or leave work before their scheduled end of shift without

authorization of their supervisor will be regarded as abandoning

their job an d are subject to disciplinary action.Ñ

The Events Following Ms. SmithÓs Discharge

28. Ms. Smith reported to work at ECC on the morning of

April 4, 2017, and went to Ms. ClineÓs office to reiterate that

she was not the patient who Ms. Pineda accuse d of being

disruptive . Ms. Smith then learned from Ms. Cline and Ms.

OÓSullivan that she had been discharged for leaving without

permission the previous day.

29. After demanding to speak with someone in a higher

position at ECC, Ms. Smith met with Sunn y Notimo h, the head of

ECCÓs Human Resources Department . Ms. Smith thought ECC had no

grounds for discharging her, but Ms. Notimo h responded by stating

that leaving without permission was unacceptable . 4 /

30. ECC did not rescind its decision to discharge

Ms. Smith.

31. Ms. Smith was able to re - enter the work program

sponsored by the NCBA the week after her discharge from ECC.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

32. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the

subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to sections 1 20.569

and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2016), 5 / and Florida Administrative

Code Rule 60Y - 4.016(1).

33. The State of Florida, under the legislative scheme

contained in sections 760.01 - 760.11, Florida Statutes,

incorporates and adopts the legal principles a nd precedents

established in the federal anti - discrimination laws specifically

set forth under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq.

34. Section 760.10 prohibits discrimination Ðagainst any

individual with res pect to compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individualÓs race,

color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital

status.Ñ £ 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

35. Florida courts have determined that federal

discrimination law should be used as guidance when construing the

FCRA. See Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC , 18 So. 3d 17,

21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Brand v. Fla. Power Corp. , 633 So. 2d 504,

509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

36. Ms. Smith has the burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that ECC committed an unlawful employment

practice. See EEOC v. JoeÓs Stone Crabs, Inc. , 296 F.3d 1265,

1273 (11th Cir. 2002)(noting that a claimant bears the ultimate

burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer

intentionally discriminated against the employee);

§ 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.

37. A party may prove unlawful race discrimination by

direct or circumstantial evidence. Smith v. Fla. DepÓt of Corr. ,

Case No. 2:07 - cv - 631 (M.D. Fla. May 27, 200 9) , 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 44885 (M.D. Fla. 2009). Direct evidence is evidence that,

Ðif believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without

inference or presumption.Ñ Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Mil.

Coll. , 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997 ). Direct evidence

consists of Ðonly the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be

nothing other than to discriminateÑ on the basis of an

impermissible factor. Carter v. City of Miami , 870 F.2d 578, 582

(11th Cir. 1989).

38. There is no direct evid ence that ECCÓs discharge of

Ms. Smith resulted from unlawful discrimination based on her

race, religion, disability, or age. That is not uncommon because

Ðdirect evidence of intent is often unavailable.Ñ Shealy v. City

of Albany , 89 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, those

who claim to be victims of intentional discrimination Ðare

permitted to establish their cases through inferential and

circumstantial proof.Ñ Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth. , 128 F.3d

337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997).

39. To prove unl awful discrimination by circumstantial

evidence, a party must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.

If successful, this creates a presumption of discrimination.

Then the burden shifts to the employ er to offer a legitimate,

non - discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

If the employer meets that burden, the presumption disappears and

the employee must prove that the legitimate reasons were a

pretext. Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. A m., LLC , 18 So. 3d 17, 25

(Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Facts that are sufficient to establish a

prima facie case must be adequate to permit an inference of

discrimination. Id.

40. Under the f ramework established in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) , one generally

establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating

that: (a) she is a member of a protected class; (b) she was

qualified for the position held; (c) she was subjected to an

adverse employment action; and (d) other similarly - situated

employees, who are not members of the protected group, were

treated more favorably. ÐWhen comparing similarly situated

individuals to raise an inference of discriminatory motivation,

the individuals must be similarly situated in all rel evant

respects . . . . Ñ Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm. , 372 F.3d 1250,

1273 (11th Cir. 2004).

41. With regard to her claims of discrimination based on

race and religion, Ms. Smith has demonstrated that she is a

member of a protected class. As noted a bove, she is African

American and Baptist. See Love v. Escambia Cnty . Bd. of Cnty .

Comm Ó r , Case No. 17 - 0 564 (Fla. DOAH May 24, 2017; Fla. FCHR

August 17, 2017)(concluding that the first, second, and third

prongs of petitionerÓs religious discrimination ca se had been met

because petitioner was Christian, qualified for the position, and

terminated by Escambia County).

42. Ms. Smith also demonstrated that she was qualified for

the PAR position and her discharge from ECC amounted to an

adverse employment ac tion.

43. However, Ms. Smith presented no persuasive evidence

demonstrating that similarly - situated people of other races

and/or religions were treated more favorably. In other words,

she did not demonstrate that similarly - situated people of other

race s and/or religions were able to violate provisions of ECCÓs

handbook without being discharged. Thus, Ms. Smith failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race or

religion.

44. The failure to demonstrate that others received mor e

favorable treatment from ECC also undermined Ms. SmithÓs effort

to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Rather

than establishing that one is over a certain age and thus part of

a protected class, the Commission has explained that a petiti oner

must demonstrate that he or she was treated differently than

similarly situated individuals of a different age, as opposed to

a younger age:

With regard to the need to establish that

Petitioner lost the position to a ÐyoungerÑ

person, we note that it has been stated,

ÐCommission panels have long concluded that

the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and its

predecessor law the Human Rights Act of 1977,

as amended, prohibited age discrimination in

employment on the basis of any age Ðbirth to

death.Ñ See G reen v. ATC/VANCOM Management,

Inc. , 20 F.A.L.R. 314 (1997), and Simms v.

Niagra Lockport Industries, Inc. , 8 F.A.L.R.

3588 (FCHR 1986). A Commission panel has

indicated that one of the elements in

determining a prima facie case of age

discrimination is t hat Petitioner is treated

differently than similarly situated

individuals of a ÐdifferentÑ age, as opposed

to a ÐyoungerÑ age. See Musgrove v. Gator

Human Services, c/o Tiger Success Center, et

al. , 22 F.A.L.R. 355, at 356 (FCHR 1999).

The Commission has concluded that, unlike the

federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA), the age of 40 has no significan ce in

the interpretation of the Florida Civil

Rights Act of 1992. See Green , at 315.

Williams v. Sailorman, Inc., d/b/a PopeyeÓs

Chicken and B iscuits , FCHR Order

No. 04 - 037 (June 2, 2004). Accord, Coffy v.

PorkyÓs Barbecue Restaurant , FCHR Order

No. 05 - 053 (May 18, 2005), Johnson vee of

Life, Inc. , FCHR Order No. 05 - 087 (July 12,

2005), and Bean v. Department of

Transportation , FCHR Order No. 05 - 107

(September 23, 2005).

Marchinko v. The Wittemann Company, LLC , Case No. 05 - 2062 (Fla.

DOAH Nov. 1, 2005), rejected in part Case No. 2005 - 00251 ( Fla.

FCHR Jan. 10, 2006).

45. As for Ms. SmithÓs disability discrimination claims, a

prima fa cie case of disability discrimination differs from the

general McDonnell Douglas framework in that the first element

requires a petitioner to demonstrate that he or she is actually

disabled or regarded as disabled. Stewart v. Happy HermanÓs

Cheshire Bridg e, Inc. , 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997).

46. In that regard, Florida Courts construe the FCRA in

conformity with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (Ðthe

ADAÑ). McCaw Cellular Comm . of Fla., Inc. v. Kwiatek , 763 So. 2d

1063, 1065 (Fla. 4 th DCA 1999).

47. As for whether one is ÐdisabledÑ within the meaning of

the FCRA and the ADA, the Second District Court of Appeal has

explained that :

As a general rule, a physical or mental

impairment is not automatically a

Ð disability Ñ under the ADA. T oyota Motor

Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams , 534 U.S. 184,

195, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002);

AlbertsonÓs Inc. v. Kirkingburg , 527 U.S.

555, 565 - 66, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518

(1999); Wimberly v. Sec. Tech. Group, Inc. ,

866 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

Instead, to constitute a Ð disability Ñ under

the ADA, the impairment at issue must

Ð substantially limit Ñ a major life activity

of the petitioner. AlbertsonÓs , 527 U.S. at

565; Wimberly , 866 So. 2d at 147. The term

Ð substantially limits Ñ mea ns Ð [u]nable to

perform a major life activity that the

average person in the general population can

perform Ñ or Ð [s]ignificantly restricted as to

the condition, manner or duration under which

an individual can perform a particular major

life activity as co mpared to the condition,

manner and duration under which the average

person in the general population can perform

that same major life activity. Ñ 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(j)(1)(2005). In determining whether

an impairment Ð substantially limits Ñ a major

life ac tivity, courts should also consider

the nature and severity of the impairment,

the expected duration of the impairment, and

the expected long - term impact of the

impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).

Ð Major life activities Ñ are defined as

Ð functions such as caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,

hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and

working. Ñ 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). With

respect to the major life activity of

working, the term Ð substantially limits Ñ

means Ð significantly restric ted in the

ability to perform either a class of jobs or

a broad range of jobs in various classes as

compared to the average person having

comparable training, skills and abilities.

The inability to perform a single, particular

job does not constitute a su bstantial

limitation in the major life activity of

working. Ñ 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

Lenard v. A.L.P.H.A. ÐA Beginning,Ñ Inc. , 945 So. 2d 618,

621 - 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

48. Ms. Smith testified that she is legally blind but

offered no testimony as to how her limited vision substantially

limits a major life activity. In fact, Ms. SmithÓs testimony

indicated that she drives a car. However, ECC d id not dispute

that Ms. Smith is disabled .

49. E ven if it were to be concluded that Ms. Smith

est ablish ed prima facie cases of discrimination based on age,

race, religion, and /or disability, ECC had a legitimate, non -

discriminatory reason for discharging her. As noted above,

Ms. Cline was under the impression that Ms. Smith abandoned her

PAR positio n, and ECCÓs handbook specifies that abandonment is a

basis for discharge. 6 /

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations issue a final order dismissing Peti tionerÓs Petition

for Relief.

DONE AND ENTERED this 1 5 th day of February , 2019 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

G. W. CHISENHALL

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

12 30 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 15th day of February , 2019 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ ECC is now known as Commun ity Health of Northwest Florida.

2 / Because Ms. PinedaÓs allegation was not the basis for

Ms. SmithÓs discharge from ECC, resolution of that conflicting

testimony has no bearing on whether ECC committed an unlawful

employment practice.

3 / As additio nal justification for why she did not return to ECC

on April 3, 2017, Ms. Smith testified that it Ðwas stormingÑ and

that she was too distraught to function effectively.

4 / Toward the end of her meeting with Ms. Notimah, Ms. Smith

pulled out her cell ph one and announced that their conversation

had been recorded. Ms. Notimo h responded by stating Ms. SmithÓs

action was illegal and demanded that Ms. Smith turn over her

phone. Ac cording to Ms. Smith, Ms. Notimo h prevented her from

leaving Ms. Notimo hÓs off ice until Ms. Smit h began calling 911.

Ms. Notimo h testified that she never detained Ms. Smith in her

office. Whether Ms. Notimo h detained Ms. Smith in her office

appears to be irrelevant to resolution of the instant case

because Ms. Smith had already be en discharged when she returned

to ECC on April 4, 2017. However, to whatever extent that this

allegation is relevant to assessing whether ECC committed an

unlawful employment practice, the testimony is insufficient to

establish the severe or pervasive co nduct associated with

harassment or a hostile work environment. See DepÓt of Child. &

Rams. v. Shapiro , 68 So. 2d 298, 303 - 04 (Fla. 4 th DCA

2011)( stating that with regard to a hostile work environment

claim , Ð[h]arassment is actionable when it is sufficie ntly severe

or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and

create s a discriminatorily abusive working environment.Ñ).

5 / Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references will be to

the 2016 version of the Florida Statutes.

6 / There was conflicting testimony as to whether Ms. Cline gave

Ms. Smith permission to call her previous supervisor or to leave

ECC in order to directly confer with her previous supervisor.

However, the undersignedÓs role is not to evaluate whether ECC

cor rectly determined that Ms. Smith abandoned her PAR position.

Also, the undersigned is not to assess whether ECCÓs decision to

discharge Ms. Smith was appropriate under the circumstances.

Instead, the undersignedÓs role is limited to determining whether

E CCÓs discharge of Ms. Smith was improperly motivated by her age,

race, religion, or disability.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

Elmer C. Ignacio, Esquire

Sniffen & Spellman, P.A.

123 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Debbie C. Smith

Apartment 14B

2800 North Ninth Avenue

Pensacola, Florida 32503

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commis sion on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exc eptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.