18-006195RU Renaissance Charter School, Inc. vs. The School Board Of Palm Beach County, Florida Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Tuesday, March 12, 2019.

Summary: School Board's interpretation of section 1006.12 and its form requesting information on safe-school officers constitute unadopted rules; denial of charter school's request for such officers constitutes inequitable treatment of charter schools.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

RENAISSANCE CHARTER SCHOOL ,

INC.,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 1 8 - 6195 R U

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH

COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

FINAL ORDER

Th is case came before Administrative Law Judge ( " ALJ " )

John G. Van Laningham for final hearing by video teleconference

at sites in Tallahassee and West Palm Beach, Florida, on

January 8, 2019 .

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Stephanie Alexander, Esquire

Tripp Scott, P.A.

200 West College Avenue, Suite 216

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Levi Williams, Esquire

Law Offices of Levi Williams, P.A.

12 Southeast 7th Street, Suite 700

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

For Respondent : Sean Fahey, Esquire

Melissa M. McCartney, Esquire

A. Denise Sagerholm, Esquire

The School Board of Palm

Beach County, Florida

Post Office Box 1923 9

West Palm Beach, Florida 33431

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE S

The issue s to be decided are : (i) whether Respondent ' s

interpretation of section 1006.12 , Florida Statutes ÏÏ namely,

that charter school operators such as Petitioner, rather than

school boards and superintendents , are obligated to assign

" safe - school officers " to police charter school facilitie s ÏÏ

constitutes an unadopted rule; (ii) whether Respondent ' s form,

which solicits information from charter schools regarding their

safe - school officers, const itutes an unadopted rule; and

(iii) whether Respondent ' s denial of Petitioner ' s request for

the assignment of safe - school officers to its charter schools

constitutes inequitable treatment of charter schools as public

schools .

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On November 19, 201 8 , Petitioner Renaissance Charter School ,

Inc., filed with the Division of Administrative He arings ( " DOAH " )

its Petition to Invalidate Agency Action Based on Unadopted School

Board Rules and/or for Contravening the Charter Statute Under

§§ 1002.33(7)(b) & 20(b), Florida Statutes. Traveling under

section 120.56(4) , Florida Statutes , Petitioner alleges that

Respondent T he School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida, has

violated section 120.54(1)(a) by unlawfully applying as rules

(i) an agenc y statement of general applicability to the effect

that section 1006.12 requires charter schools to establish self -

assigned safe - school officers at their campuses and (ii) a form

that solicit s information from charter schools concerning their

compliance with section 1006.12, as Respondent interprets that

statute. Separately, pursuant to section 1002.33(7)(b),

Petitioner has brought to DOAH a dispute stemming from

Respondent's denial of Petitioner's request that Respondent

perform its dut y under the plain language of section 1006.12 to

assign safe - school officers to Petitioner's charter school

facilities. Respondent filed a comprehensive Answer to these

charges on January 7, 2019.

The final hearing took place on January 8, 2019. The pa rties

stipulated to all the relevant facts , and, without objection, the

following exhibits were received in evidence: Petitioner's

Exhibits 1 though 5 , 8, 10, 20 through 23, and 25; and

Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 3, 6, and 8 through 17. No

witnesses were called.

The final hearing transcript was filed on January 14 , 201 9 .

Both parties timely submitted p roposed f inal o rders, which were

due on February 4, 201 9 , and these were considered in preparing

this Final O rder.

U nless otherwise indicated, citations to the official

statute law of the S tate of Florida refer to Florida Statutes

201 8 .

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner Renaissance Charter School, Inc. ( " RCS " ), is

a nonprofit Florida corporation that operates six charter

schools located within the Palm Beach County School District

(the " District " ) . The District is a constitutionally created

political subdivision of the state whose geographic jurisdiction

( " district region " ) is Palm Beach County . 1 / As used herein, the

term " district administration " will refer generally and

collectively to the district school officers, officials , and

employees through whom the District acts.

2. Respondent T he School Board of Palm Beach County,

Florida ( the " Board " ), is the collegial body established under

the Florida Constitution to operate, control, and supervise all

free publi c schools within the District. 2 / Its members are

elected to office by the voters of the District.

3. The Board is the " sponsor " of RC S ' s charter schools.

As a sponsor, the Board is empowered to exercise a form of

regulatory jurisdiction over all charter school s within the

District . The Board ' s sponsorship authority includes the power

to deny the renewal of, or terminate, a charter agree ment . 3 /

4. Although owned and operated by private interests,

charter schools are public schools. As such, c harter schools

receive a portion of the public funds appropriated to

educational purposes . These funds follow students, so that a

particular charter school ' s share of available funds is based

upon its student enrollment. Funding sources include , among

other things, " categorical program funds " appropriated by the

Florida Legislature to specific purposes, of which charter

schools are entitled to a proportionate share. Financial

resources flow to charter schools through th e ir sponsors, which

are required to make timely payments to the charter schools

within their respective district regions.

5. In an immediate response to the infamous mass shooting

that took place at a high school in Parkland, Florida, on

February 14, 2018, the Florida Legislature enacted the Marjory

Stoneman Douglas Public Safety Act (the " Safety Act " ), which was

signed into law and took effect less than one month after the

outrage, on March 9, 2018. Among other features , the Safety Act

impose s new obligations regarding the stationing of " safe - school

officers " ( " SSOs " ) at all public school facilities. SSOs must

be certified law enforcement officers except that, in

circumstances not shown to exist in this case, regular employees

who qualify for appointment as " school guardians " may also serve

as SSOs .

6. There is no dispute in this case that , under the Safety

Act , one or more SSOs must be assigned to each charter school

facility in the District, including RCS ' s six schools. The

question is, whose duty is it to assign SSOs to charter schools ?

The Board ' s answer , clearly expressed in word and dee d , is this :

It ' s not our job ; rather, the obligation falls to each charter

school to arrange police protection for its own campus, as

though each charter school were a school district unto itself.

Indeed, failing that, the charter school will be in violation of

the Safety Act.

7. Accordingly, the Board has not assigned SSOs to the

charte r schools in the District . 4 / Nor, apart from paying

charter schools their respective proportionate shares of a

categorical appropriation for school safety called the Safe

Schools Allocation , which preexisted the Safety Act , has the

Board provided any funds to cover the cost of police protection .

8. By letter dated March 1 4, 2018, R CS ' s security director

sent a letter to the District requesting that the Board provide

a full - time SSO to each of R CS ' s charter schools in the district

region. T he District denied this request via a reply letter

dated March 28, 2018, which stated that RC S would need to look

to " the governing board of the six Renaissance Charter Schools

operating in " Palm Beach County " for assistance [in]

implementing the Safety Act or for providing the " SSOs .

9. On April 4, 2018, the Board adopted a resolution

declaring its opposition to the deployment of district employees

as school guardians, thereby manifesting an intent ion to rely

exclusively on school police or other certified law enforcement

officers for the protection of students and school personnel .

By this resolution, the Board exercised its discretion, under

the Safety Act, to opt the District out of partic ipation in the

Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program ( " Guardian Program " ) .

10. In August 2018, R CS submitted a request for mediation

services to the Florida Department of Education ( " DOE " ) pursuant

to section 1002.33(7)(b) . Specifically, R CS wanted DOE to

mediate the ongoing dispute between R CS and the Board over the

responsibility for assigning police officers to charter schools

in accordance with the Safety Act. The Board refused to

mediate. Thus, by letter dated August 27, 2018, the

comm issioner notified the parties of her decision that the

dispute " cannot be settled through mediation " and " may be

appealed to an administrative law judge appointed by the

Division of Administrative Hearings. "

11. Thereafter, R CS sent a letter dated Septe mber 12,

2018, to the School District Chief of Police asking to enter

into negotiations with the School District Police Department for

the provision of police officers to its facilities through a

cooperative agreement. As of the final hearing, some four

months later, R CS had received no response from the district

administration.

1 2 . On or about October 3, 2018, district administrati ve

staff prepared a survey using Google Forms that was sent by

email to each charter school in the District with the subjec t

line, " TIME - SENSITIVE REQUEST Re: Safe - School Officers. " The

email contained a link to an online form , titled " Charter School

Safe - School Officers FY19 " (the " Form " ). Recipients were

instructed to " complete this form by noon on Thursday,

October 4, 20 18. "

1 3 . The survey consisted of six queries. Three were dual

choice, yes/no questions that would be answered by selecting the

appropriate radio button. Three others required the re cipient

to type in a short answer. The five questions that " required "

an answer were marked with an asterisk.

1 4 . The form solicited the following information:

Provide your school name.* [Your answer]

Do you have a safe - school officer on your

campus?* [Yes/No]

Is the safe - school officer on your campus

Monday Î Frida y during all school hours?*

[Yes/No]

If not, please identify the safe - school

officer ' s schedule. [Your answer]

Is the safe - school officer armed?* [Yes/No]

Provide the name of the agency that employs

the safe - school officer.* [Your answer]

1 5 . The Board maintains that completion of the survey was

" optional " and that no charter school has suffered, or will

suffer, any adverse consequences for failing to provide a timely

response. The Board has n ot adopted the Form as a rule pursuant

to the rulemaki ng procedure prescribed in the Administrative

Procedure Act.

16. More broadly, the Board has not adopted any rules

implementing the Safety Act , nor has it codifi ed the statement ,

which it has clearly embraced, that charter schools in the

district region are required by law independently to arrange, on

their own authority, police protection for their own campuses .

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1 7 . DOAH has personal and subject matter jurisdiction

in these proceedings pursuant to sections 120.5 6 and

1002.33(7)(b) .

1 8 . As a n operator of charter schools in Palm Beach

County, R CS is substantially affected by the Board ' s statement

concerning charter schools ' obligations under the Safety Act

vis - à - vis the assignment of SSOs . R CS was substantially

affected, as well, by the Form, which the Board used to solicit

information from the charter schools in the District about their

SSOs . Thus, R CS has standing under section 120.56 to challenge

the alleged unadopted rules at issue.

19. A s a separate and independent basis for maintaining

this action, R CS has standing under section 1002.33(7)(b) to

seek an administrative resolution of its dispute with the Board

over who has the duty to arrange for police protection of

charter school facilit ies in the District, a dispute which

relat es to RC S ' s approved charter s and involves the equitable

treatment of R CS ' s charter schools as public schools.

20. The statute at the heart of this case is

section 1006.12. As amended by the Safety Act, this section

provides , in full , as follows:

Safe - school officers at each public school. Ï

For the protection and safety of school

personnel, property, students, and visitors,

each district school board and school

district superintendent shall partner with

law enforcement agencies to establish or

assign one or more safe - school officers at

each school facility within the district by

implementing any combination of the

following options which best meets the needs

of the school district:

(1) Est ablish school resource officer

programs, through a cooperative agreement

with law enforcement agencies.

(a) School resource officers shall undergo

criminal background checks, drug testing,

and a psychological evaluation and be

certified law enforcement o fficers, as

defined in s. 943.10(1), who are employed by

a law enforcement agency as defined in

s. 943.10(4). The powers and duties of a

law enforcement officer shall continue

throughout the employee ' s tenure as a school

resource officer.

(b) School resource officers shall abide by

district school board policies and shall

consult with and coordinate activities

through the school principal, but shall be

responsible to the law enforcement agency in

all matters relating to employment, subject

to agreemen ts between a district school

board and a law enforcement agency.

Activities conducted by the school resource

officer which are part of the regular

instructional program of the school shall be

under the direction of the school principal.

(c) Complete men tal health crisis

intervention training using a curriculum

developed by a national organization with

expertise in mental health crisis

intervention. The training shall improve

officers ' knowledge and skills as first

responders to incidents involving stude nts

with emotional disturbance or mental

illness, including de - escalation skills to

ensure student and officer safety.

(2) Commission one or more school safety

officers for the protection and safety of

school personnel, property, and students

within the school district. The district

school superintendent may recommend, and the

district school board may appoint, one or

more school safety officers.

(a) School safety officers shall undergo

criminal background checks, drug testing,

and a psychological eval uation and be law

enforcement officers, as defined in

s. 943.10(1), certified under the provisions

of chapter 943 and employed by either a law

enforcement agency or by the district school

board. If the officer is employed by the

district school board, the district school

board is the employing agency for purposes

of chapter 943, and must comply with the

provisions of that chapter.

(b) A school safety officer has and shall

exercise the power to make arrests for

violations of law on district school board

p roperty and to arrest persons, whether on

or off such property, who violate any law on

such property under the same conditions that

deputy sheriffs are authorized to make

arrests. A school safety officer has the

authority to carry weapons when performing

his or her official duties.

(c) A district school board may enter into

mutual aid agreements with one or more law

enforcement agencies as provided in

chapter 23. A school safety officer ' s

salary may be paid jointly by the district

school board and the la w enforcement agency,

as mutually agreed to.

(3) At the school district ' s discretion,

participate in the Coach Aaron Feis Guardian

Program if such program is established

pursuant to s. 30.15, to meet the

requirement of establishing a safe - school

officer.

(4) Any information that would identify

whether a particular individual has been

appointed as a safe - school officer pursuant

to this section held by a law enforcement

agency, school district, or charter school

is exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a),

A rt. I of the State Constitution. This

subsection is subject to the Open Government

Sunset Review Act in accordance with

s. 119.15 and shall stand repealed on

October 2, 2023, unless reviewed and saved

from repeal through reenactment by the

Legislature.

( Underlining and boldface added) .

21. Section 1006.12 places upon " each district school

board and school district superintendent " the obligation to

" partner with law enforcement agencies " for the specific purpose

of " establish[ing] or assign[ing] one or more safe - school

officers at each school facility within the district. " The

prescribed goal must be met by (i) establishing school resource

officer ( " SRO " ) programs; (ii) appointing school safety officers

( " SOs " ); (iii) participating in the Guardian Program; or

(iv) any combination of the se options, whichever solution " best

meets the needs of the school district. " T o be clear, however,

t his case does not require a determination of what all the term

" establish or assign " entails. Specifically, it is not

necessary to decide whether (and possibly also to what extent)

the duty to " establish or assign " includes the duty to pay for

the services of the SSOs so established or assigned . While

disputes concerning this fi nancial obligation might someday be

ripe for adjudication, the narrower question of law on which

every issue in this case turns (except for whether the Form is

an unadopted rule) is , simply, who must satisfy the duty to

" establish or assign " SSOs at charter schools .

22. The plain and obvious answer to th is pivotal question

is: the district school board and district superintendent. As

used in the Florida Education Code , which comprises all of

Title XLVIII and includes section 1006.12, th e meanings of these

terms ÏÏ " district school board " and " school district

superintendent " ÏÏ are as certain and free from doubt as any

statutory language is ever likely to be. A " district school

board " is obviously a school boar d established under the Florida

Constitution , which mandates that one such body of elected

constitutional officers exist in each school district . Art. IX,

§ 4, Fla. Const. Likewise, a " school district superintendent "

is , clearly , a superintendent of schools , i.e., the

constitutional o fficer who serves as a school board ' s chief

administrator, the person responsible for overseeing the day - to -

day operations of a district school system. Art. IX, § 5, Fla.

Const.; see Hollis v. Sch . Bd. of Leon Cnty. , 384 So. 2d 661,

664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980 ) . Plainly, under section 1006.12, the

school board and the superintendent share the responsibility of

establishing or assigning SSOs to the schools in their district ,

including charter schools . J ust as clearly , it is not the

responsibility of a charter school operator to take this action .

23. The foregoing conclusion s follow logically and

directly from the clear and definite meaning of the statute,

which , being unambiguous as a matter of law, provides no

occasion for res orting to the rules of statutory interpretation.

See, e.g. , State v. Peraza , 259 So. 3d 728, 2018 Fla. LEXIS

2448, at * 5 (Fla. Dec. 13, 2018). Because section 1006.12

plainly and unambiguously answers the " who question " that the

parties have presented, there should be no reason to explain why

in greater detail. But , as this is a first - impression question

of statew ide interest , the undersigned will examine the Board ' s

arguments more closely .

24. The Board insists that a literal reading of

section 1006.12 yields a " readily apparent " " statutory ma ndate , "

which can be " simpl[y] reiterat [ed] " as a statement that " school

districts are not required to establish or assign [SSOs] at

charter schools . " Resp . ' s PFO at 14. The problem with this

position is that such a mandate, if it exists, is certainly not

readily apparent from a literal reading of the statute, which,

in fact, literally says the opposite. The Board is forced to

take this contrarian position t o avoid conceding that its

interpretation of section 1006.12 is an unadopted rule . The

conclusion that the Board has violated section 120.54 (1)(a) is

inescapable, however, as will be discussed below.

25 . Indeed, t he Board itself seems unconvinced t hat

s ection 1006.12 is unambiguous because, while insisting that the

statute literally relieves school boards of any responsibility

for assigning SSOs to charter schools, the Board simultaneously

argues that section 1006.12 must be read in conjunction with

othe r statutes it asserts are " in pari materia " ÏÏ that is, which

address the same subject as section 1006.12 . 5 / The Board ' s

reliance on the doctrine of in pari materia , which is a rule of

statutory interpretation, is inconsistent with the notion that

section 1006.12 is clear and unambiguous , as t he doctrine of in

pari materia is used to clarify the uncertain meaning of an

ambiguous statute, not to confuse or change the definite meaning

of a statute whose language is clear. Consequently , if

section 1006.12 cle arly stated that each charter school must

establish or assign SSOs to its own facility, there would be no

need to mention the in pari materia principle, much less to

apply it.

26. The best the Board can hope to accomplish with the

doctrine of in pari mate ria is to demonstrate that , despite its

apparently plain meaning, section 1006.12 suffers from a latent

ambiguity that can be seen only when it is read in the light of

other statutes dealing with the same topic. As t he Florida

Supr eme Court recently observed, resort to the rule of in pari

materia construction is sometimes necessary " to determine

whether [another, purportedly related statute] creates an

ambiguity not otherwise apparent on the face of [the statute

whose meaning is at issue ]. " Peraza , 2018 Fla. LEXIS 2448 ,

at * 8. Such an ambiguity would arise if the related statutes,

applied literally, were to " abrogate " or " negat[e] " each other.

Id. at 10.

27. The Board contends that sections 1002.33(17)(b) and

1011.62(15) , Florid a Statutes, create just such a problem when

considered in conjunction with section 1006.12. Section

1002.33(17)(b) deals with charter school funding and provides,

as relevant, that " [c]harter schools whose students or programs

meet the eligibility criteria in law are entitled to their

proportionate share of categorical program funds included in the

total funds available in the Florida Education Finance Program

by the Legislature. " Section 1011.62(15) , in turn, codifies the

Safe Schools Allocation, which is a categorical program fund.

It was enacted in 2017, one year ahead of the Safety Act. See

Ch. 2017 - 116, § 4, at 26, Laws of Fla. The Safety Act , passed

in 2018, amended section 10 1 1.62(15) as follows:

(15) SAFE SCHOOLS ALLOCATION. Ï A safe

schoo ls allocation is created to provide

funding to assist school districts in their

compliance with s. 1006.07 ss. 1006.07 -

1006.148 , with priority given to

implementing the district ' s establishing a

school resource officer program pursuant to

s. 1006.12. Each school district shall

receive a minimum safe schools allocation in

an amount provided in the General

Appropriations Act. Of the remaining

balance of the safe schools allocation, two -

thirds sha ll be allocated to school

districts based on the most recent official

Florida Crime Index provided by the

Department of Law Enforcement and one - third

shall be allocated based on each school

district ' s proportionate share of the

state ' s total unweighted ful l - time

equivalent student enrollment. Any

additional funds appropriated to this

allocation in the 2018 - 2019 fiscal year to

the school resource officer program

established pursuant to s. 1006.12 shall be

used exclusively for employing or

contracting for sc hool resource officers,

which shall be in addition to the number of

officers employed or contracted for in the

2017 - 2018 fiscal year.

Ch. 2018 - 3, § 29, at 50 , Laws of Fla.

28. The Board argues that because charter schools receive

a proportionate share of the Safe Schools Allocation, and

because " each charter school must [ ÏÏ but only for one year ÏÏ ] use

a portion of its safe schools allocation funds exclusively for

employing or contracting for " SROs, it " follows that the charter

school is responsible for employing or contracting for SRO s.

Otherwise, a charter school would not receive funds exclusively

for that purpose. " Resp . ' s PFO at 17. The Board ' s conclusion

does not logically follow from the stated premises.

29. First, the sentence added to section 10 1 1.62(15)

regarding " additional funds " appropriated to the SRO program for

fiscal year ( " FY " ) 2018 - 2019 addresses a one - time state

expenditure , which was merely part of that year ' s Safe Schools

Allocation ÏÏ a categorical program whose purposes include, but

are not limited to , providing funds for the establishment

of SSOs. It is highly unlikely , inconceivable even , that

the legislature meant to negate the plain language of

section 10 06.12 ÏÏ which might remain in force for years, if not

decades ÏÏ with a budgetary proviso applicable by its terms to a

single, restricted - use appropriation.

30. Second, the record does not support the Board ' s

assertion that , if the school district were responsible for

assigning SSOs to charter schools, then " charter schools [would

be required to] turn around and give a portion of [their

FY 2018 - 2019 Safe Schools Allocation share] right back to the

school district , " because th e district must " pass through any

share [of the additional funds appropriated to the SRO program]

to charter schools. " Resp . ' s PFO at 18. None of the statutes

involved appears to prohibit a district from holding back those

" additional funds " appropriated exclusively to the SRO program

for FY 2018 - 2019. But even if charter schools were required to

" give back " to their sponsors a portion of their FY 2018 - 2019

Safe Schools Allocation so that such funds could be used by the

districts to employ SROs, at most t h ese transactions would

constitute a temporary inefficiency , and a mere inefficiency is

a far cry from actual language in a funding statute abrogating

the plain meaning of section 1006.12.

31. Third, according to the plain language of

section 1006.12, SROs (and S Os , too ) must be certified law

enforcement officers ( " LEOs " ) . This means that SROs and SOs

cannot be private " security officers " licensed by the Department

of Agriculture and Consumer Services pursuant to chapter 493 ,

Florida Statutes . See § 4 93.6101(19), Fla. Stat. And, i n

contrast to private security officers, LEOs must be employed by

a law enforcement agency . (A district school board becomes a

law enforcement agency when, and to the extent , it employs

LEOs . ) A law enforcement agency or " employing agency " is :

[A] ny agency or unit of government or any

municipality or the state or any political

subdivision thereof, or any agent thereof,

which has constitutional or statutory

authority to employ or appoint persons as

officers. The term also i ncludes any

private entity which has contracted with the

state or county for the operation and

maintenance of a nonjuvenile detention

facility.

§ 943.10(4), Fla. Stat.

32. There is no language in section 10 1 1.62(15), or any

other statute or constitution al provision, that explicitly gives

private charter schools ÏÏ which, unlike school districts, are not

political subdivisions of the state ÏÏ the authority to employ or

appoint full - time, active duty LEOs. 6 / The undersigned rejects

as unthinkable the idea that the legislature would confer an

essentially governmental authority upon private entities by

implication from the language of a budgetary proviso applicable

to a one - shot safe - schools appropriation. As a matter of law,

charter schools, being private e ntities, simply cannot employ

LEOs, unless and until the legislature clearly grants them

the authority to do so. Thus, it does not follow from

section 10 1 1.62(15), as amended by the Safety Act, that charter

schools are r esponsible for employing LEOs.

33. For similar and additional reasons, the undersigned

rejects the argument that section 10 1 1.62(15) implicitly

authorizes charter schools to contract for the services of LEOs.

It is not entirely clear whether, and seems doubtful that, in

the absence of specific statutory authority, private entities

may l egally enter into private agreements with law enforcement

agencies to provide them the exclusive services of on - duty

police officers , whose obligations are supposed to run to the

public at large. 7 / But, assuming such agreements are lawful,

imagine the burden that would be created if the more than 650

charter schools in Florida 8 / were required to negotiate separate

contracts with sheriff ' s offices and police departments around

the state. While, as explained above, it would be a mistake to

throw over the plain language of section 1006.12 merely to avoid

a possible temporary inefficiency arising by operation of the

funding statutes, it would be folly to do so and thereby create

the enormous systemic burden that hundreds of contract

negotiations would entail ÏÏ now , and potentially for years to

come.

34. Finally, and most important, nothing in the actual

language of sections 1011.62(15) and 1002.33(17)(b) can

reasonably be read as negating or abrogating the plain meaning

of section 1006.12 and the requirement, so clearly stated

therein, that school boards and superintendents establish or

assign SSOs at each school facility within their jurisdictions,

including charter school facilities. There is simply no

ambiguity - creating contradiction between these statutes. All

can be implemented as written without " harmonization. "

35. The Board argues that section 1002.33(16) is in pari

materia with section 1006.12 as well. Section 1002.33(16)

broadly exempts charter schools from all provisions of the

Florida Education Code and then enumerates specific exceptions

to this general exemption, those being the statutes with which

charters schools " s hall be in compliance. " Among the statutes

that charter schools must obey are those " pertaining to student

health, safety, and welfare. " § 1002.33(16)(a)5., Fla. Stat.

There is no dispute that section 1006.12 is such a statute. RCS

agrees that it must " be in compliance " with section 1006.12.

36. From this undisputed premise, the Board argues that

" the way [for charter schools] to be in compliance with the

statute is to ' partner with law enforcement agencies to

establish or assign one or more [SSOs] at each school

facility. '" Resp . ' s PFO at 21. This argument begs the question

because it assumes , without establishing, that the phrase " each

school board and school district superintendent " means and

includes " each charter school " ÏÏ the very point of conte ntion.

37. To comply with a statute, a person need do no more

than that which the statute requires of him or her; no one is

required to perform a duty that the law imposes upon someone

else. Section 1006.12 places the duty to assign SSOs upon " each

dist rict school board and school district superintendent , " not

on charter schools. No language in section 1002.33(16)(a)5 .

contradicts the plain meaning of section 1006.12. Nor, when the

two statutes are read together, doe s any latent ambiguity

emerge.

38. As RCS points out, section 1002.33(16)( c) delivers the

coup de grâce to the Board ' s " compliance " argument, if not the

Board ' s entire argument on the responsibility for assigning

SSOs . This section provides that " [t]he duties assigned to a

district sc hool superintendent apply to charter school

administrative personnel " and " [t]he duties assigned to a

district school board apply to a charter school governing board "

for purposes of the following four statutes:

[1]. Section 1012.22(1)(c), relating to

com pensation and salary schedules.

[2]. Section 1012.33(5), relating to

workforce reductions.

[3]. Section 1012.335, relating to

contracts with instructional personnel hired

on or after July 1, 2011.

[4]. Section 1012.34, relating to the

substantive requir ements for performance

evaluations for instructional personnel and

school administrators.

§ 1002.33(16)(c)1. - 2., Fla. Stat. (making reference to

§ 1002.33(16)(b)4. - 7.). Thus, as section 1002.33(16)(c) shows,

when (and to the extent) the legislature intends to require

charter schools to perform duties assigned to school boards or

superintendents, it not only knows how to express this intent

clearly, but also has a t hand a ready statutory vehicle for just

such an expression, a vehicle which predated th e Safety Act.

That the legislature declined to add section 1006.12 to the list

of statutes deemed applicable to charter school managers ÏÏ

insofar as they assign duties to school boards and

superintendent s, anyway ÏÏ is a persuasive indication that the

legislature intended not to place these duties upon charter

schools.

39. The Board pushes back against the plain import of

section 1002.33(16)(c) with a lengthy argument whose gist is

that the statutes listed in paragraph (c) are not the only on es

which (implicitly) obligate charter schools to the same extent

that school boards and superintendents are (explicitly)

obligated ; rather, all the statutes with which charter schools

must comply , including section 1006.12, requir e charter school

operators to stand in the shoes of school boards and

superintendents , as far as duties assigned to school boards and

superintendents are concerned . This argument is not persuasive.

40. For one thing, the legislature singled out the four

statutes identified in paragraph (c) for the plainly evident

purpose of enlarging the meaning of each of those statutes ÏÏ and

only those statutes. If the legislature had meant to exten d the

reach of all the statutes excepted from the general exemption

provided in section 1002.33(16), it would not have mentioned

only the four, but would have made reference to all.

4 1 . For another, by making charter schools responsible for

duties assigned to school board s and superintendents, as it did

in section 1002.33(16)(c), the legislature effectively increased

charter schools ' autonomy with regard to the personnel - related

matters addressed in the four statutes identified in

paragraph (c). On the flip side, this par ticular legislative

decision necessarily decreased the power of the school boards

to control and supervise the charter schools in relation to

these matters. This realignment of the balance of power is

clearly and unambiguously expressed in the statute.

4 2 . I t should be remembered , however, that school boards

derive their power to control and supervise the public schools

in their districts from the state constitution. While a statute

which unambiguously assigned to charter schools the independent

duty to appoint their own SSOs might well be constitutional , 9 /

the fact that school board members and superintendents are

constitutional officers affords a good reason for construing an

ambiguous statute (which section 1002.33(16)(c) is not ) strictly

in favor of conserving the power of school boards and

superintendents, not liberally so as to erode such power. Thus,

for this additional reason, the Board ' s liberal interpretation

of section 1002.33(16)(c) must be rejected.

43. To wrap up the discussion of the doctrine of in pari

materia , a brief look at the whole of section 1006.12 is in

order, for the sake of completeness. One thing that is

impossible to miss is the statute ' s use of t he term " school

district. " This term is as clear as a bell and obviously means

the district region (for most districts, this is a county), the

district administration (i.e., school employees and officials,

including the school board and superintendent), the district

school system, or some combination of these, depending on the

context in which the term appears.

44. Thus, where the first sentence of section 1006.12

directs the school board and superintendent to implement any

combination of the options for establishing or assigning SSOs

" which best meets the needs of the school district, " the clear

meaning of the term " school district " is district school system .

In other words, the statute plainly mandates , not a patchwork of

approaches, but the implementation of a coherent, integr ated,

districtwide solution , which places the needs of the whole

school system ahead of the needs of, e.g., one school. The

Board ' s argument that " school district , " as used here , means " a

charter school " in those situations where (as the Board would

have it) the charter school operator is obligated to perform the

duties of the school board and superintendent is unconvincing.

45. In section 1006.12(3), the decision to participate in

the Guardian Program is committed to the " school district ' s

discretion. " In this context, the term " school district "

unambiguously refers generally to the district administration,

and , in particular , to the person or persons who will take the

decision on behalf of the school district. Clearly, the statute

requires that the entire district school system either

participate, or not participate, in the Guardian Program. Just

as clearly, conversely, the sta tute does not contemplate that

indi vidual charter schools , in the exercise of autonomous

discretion, might employ armed school guardians in districts

where, as in Palm Beach County, the local school board has

decided to opt out of participation in the Guar dian Program.

Had the legislature intended to give charter schools such

discretion, it would have said so.

46. Section 1006.12(4) requires " local law enforcement

agenc[ies], school district[s], [and] charter school[s] " to

treat as exempt from the Public Records Law any information that

would identify SSOs. G iven the side - by - side placement of these

terms, this provision supplies direct proof that the legislature

actually did not intend to conflate school districts and charter

schools , or use the term " sc hool district " loosely as a synonym

for " charter school . " Further, because subsection (4) contains

the only specific mention of charter schools, to credit the

Board ' s interpretation of section 1006.12 , one would have to

imagine that the legislature saw no need to use the term

" charter school " anywhere in the statute where the critical

responsibilities concerning SSOs are set forth, despite

intending to place those responsibilities on charter school

operators, but then got specific in relation to the secondary

concern (in comparison , that is, to the statute ' s raison d ' être)

of public records. This is unlikely.

47. In sum, after a thorough study of the statute ' s plain

language, including a review of related statutes at the Board ' s

req uest to determine whether some latent ambiguity exists, the

undersigned concludes that section 1006.12 clearly and

unambiguously requires school boards and superintendents ÏÏ not

charter school operators ÏÏ to " establish or assign " SSOs, with

the assistance of local law enforcement agencies, to every

public school within their respective jurisdictions, including

charter schools.

48. RCS alleges that the Board ' s statement that charter

schools must establish or appoint their own SSOs is an unadopted

rule. Th e undersigned agrees.

49 . The term " rule " is defined in section 120.52(16) to

mean " each agency statement of general applicability that

implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes

the procedure or practice requirements of an agency and includes

any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any

information not specifically required by statute or by an

existing rule. The term also includes the amendment or repeal

of a rule. " As the First D CA explained:

The breadth of the defini tion in Section

120.52(1[6]) indicates that the legislature

intended the term to cover a great variety

of agency statements regardless of how the

agency designates them. Any agency

statement is a rule if it " purports in and

of itself to create certain rig hts and

adversely affect others, " [State, Dep ' t of

Admin. v.] Stevens , 344 So. 2d [290,] 296

" by [its]

own effect to create rights, or to require

compliance, or otherwise to have the direct

and consistent effect of law. " M cDonald v.

Dep ' t of Banking & Fin. , 346 So. 2d 569, 581

(Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

State Dep ' t of Admin. v. Harvey , 356 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1977); see also Jenkins v. State , 855 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2003); Amos v. Dep ' t of HRS , 444 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA

19 83). Accordingly, to be a rule:

[A] statement of general applicability must

operate in the manner of a law. Thus, if

the statement ' s effect is to create

stability and predictability within its

field of operation; if it treats all those

wi th like cases equally; if it requires

affected persons to conform their behavior

to a common standard; or if it creates or

extinguishes rights, privileges, or

entitlements, then the statement is a rule.

Fla. Quarter Horse Racing Ass ' n, Inc. v. Dep ' t of Bus. & Prof ' l

Reg. , Case No. 11 - 5796RU, 2013 Fla. Div. Adm in . Hear. LEXIS 558,

at * 37 - 38 (Fla. DOAH May 6, 2013), aff ' d , Fla. Quarter Horse

Track Ass ' n v. Dep ' t of Bus. & Prof ' l Reg. , 133 So . 3d 1118

(Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

50 . Because the definition of the term " rule " expressly

includes statements of general applicability that implement or

interpret law, an agency ' s interpretation of a statute that

gives the statute a meaning not readily apparent from its

literal reading and purports to create rights, requir e

compliance, or otherwise have the direct and consistent effect

of law, is a rule, but one which simply reiterates a statutory

mandate is not. Id. at * 39 - 40; see also Grabba - Leaf, LLC v.

Dep ' t of Bus. & Prof ' l Reg., Div. of Alcoholic Bevs. & Tobacco ,

257 So. 3d 1205, 1208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)(simple reiteration of

what is " readily apparent " from the text of a law fall s within

rulemaking exception); State Bd. of Admin. v. Huberty , 46 So. 3d

1144, 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Beverly Enters . - Fla . , Inc. v.

Dep ' t of HRS , 573 So. 2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); St. Francis

Hosp., Inc. v. Dep ' t of HRS , 553 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1989).

51 . Agency rulemaking is not discretionary under the

Administrative Procedure Act. See § 120.54(1)(a), Fla. Stat.;

Dep ' t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh. v. Schluter , 705 So. 2d 81, 86

(Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (The " legislature ' s intention [was] to remove

from agencies the discretion to decide whether or not to adopt

rules. " ). Each agency statement meeting the definition of a

ru le under s ection 120.52(16) must be adopted " as soon as

feasible and practicable. " § 120.54(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

52 . Section 120.56(4) authorizes any substantially

affected person to seek an administrative determination that an

agency statement which has no t been adopted by the rulemaking

procedure is nevertheless a " rule " as defined in section 120.52

and , hence , violates section 120.54(1)(a). The statutory term

for such a rule - by - definition is " unadopted rule, " which i s

defined in section 120.52(20).

53 . If the petitioner proves at hearing that the agency

statement is an unadopted rule, the agency then has the burden

of overcoming the presumptions that rulemaking was both feasible

and practicable. In this regard, section 120.54(1)(a)1.

provides as foll ows:

Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible unless

the agency proves that:

a. The agency has not had sufficient time

to acquire the knowledge and experience

reasonably necessary to address a statement

by rulemaking; or

b. Related matters are not suffici ently

resolved to enable the agency to address a

statement by rulemaking.

Section 120.54(1)(a)2. provides as follows:

Rulemaking shall be presumed practicable to

the extent necessary to provide fair notice

to affected persons of relevant agency

procedures and applicable principles,

criteria, or standards for agency decisions

unless the agency proves that:

a. Detail or precision in the establishment

of principles, criteria, or standards for

agency decisions is not reasonable under the

circumstan ces; or

b. The particular questions addressed are

of such a narrow scope that more specific

resolution of the matter is impractical

outside of an adjudication to determine the

substantial interests of a party based on

individual circumstances.

54 . The Board ' s interpretation of section 1006.12 gives

the statute a meanin g that is not readily apparent from a

literal reading of its terms ; indeed, for the reasons set for th

above, it is the undersigned ' s conclusion that the Board ' s

statement actually contravenes the plain language of the

statute. Th us, th e Board ' s interpretive statement, which is

generally applicable to all charter schools in the District and

does not fall within the " simple reiteration " exception to

rulemaking, meets the definition o f a rule.

5 5. The Board has made no attempt to prove (or even to

argue) that it would have been infeasible or impracticable to

adopt the Board ' s interpretation of section 1006.12 as a rule.

Thus, feasibility and practicability are presumed.

56. Accordin gly, the Board ' s statement concerning the

meaning of section 1006.12 ÏÏ namely that, under this statute, it

is the duty of a charter school operator to establish or appoint

its own SSOs, for neither the school board nor the

superintendent has any obligations in this regard ÏÏ is an

unadopted rule.

57. RCS argues that the Form is also an unadopted rule

because it solicits information not specifically required by

statute or an existing rule. Once again, the undersigned

agrees.

58. As a matter of fact, t he Form solicited information

from charter schools regarding SSOs. As a matter of law, n o

statute or rule specifically requires charter schools to provide

this particular information to their sponsors. For these

reasons, the Form clearly falls within sec tion 120.52(16) ' s

definition of a ru le, as applied according to its literal

meaning .

59. The Board contends that the Form is not a rule because

the failure to complete and return the " survey " was , and is , not

a disciplinable offense. Although s ection 120 .52(16) does not

make an exception for forms that can be ignored with impunity ,

the undersigned can see how a form truly of no consequence might

lack the force of law necessary to make a rule out of a

statement.

60. Suppose, for example, that a school board were to send

a Google Forms survey to charter school operators soliciting

their opinions as to whether the school district should opt out

of the Guardian Program. Strictly speaking , such a survey would

be a " form " of " any " kind that " solic its any information not

specifically required by " law. Yet, t his hypothetical form does

not " feel " like a rule given the nature of the information

sought ÏÏ not, at least, without more, e.g. , a simultaneous

directive that the failure to provide a response t o the survey

would be grounds for sanction.

61. What distinguishes this case , however, is that the

information solicited by the Form ÏÏ i.e., details regarding the

charter school ' s SSO(s) ÏÏ is highly relevant to a determination

of the substantial interests of each charter school to whom it

was sent, especially when viewed in light of the Board ' s

interpretation of section 1006.12 as imposing upon charter

schools the duty to est ablish or assign their own SSOs. As most

recipient s of the Form surely must have n oticed , the Board was

essentially asking if the charter school was in compliance with

(the Board ' s understanding of) section 1006.12 ÏÏ a statute that

addresses no less than student health, safety, and welfare.

62. This latter point is particularly significant because,

a s a sponsor , any school board may terminate a charter agreement

immediately , even before a hearing takes place, if it finds

" facts and circumstances indicating that an immediate and

serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter

school ' s students exists. " § 1002.33(8)(c), Fla. Stat. It

takes no imagination, therefore, to see the threat implied in

the Form.

63. There is no evidence in the instant record that the

Board has ever expressly threatened to terminate a charter

agreement for the operator ' s failure to establish or assign an

SSO. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Board has

ever expressly assured a charter school operator that such

drastic action would not be taken. The bottom line is that the

Form is not truly without consequence; it seeks information that

the Board could rely upon as grounds for terminat ing a charter

agreement , potentially without a ffording a pre - deprivation

hearing . Accordingly, it is concluded t hat the Form is an

unadopted rule.

64. Section 1002.33(7)(b) provides that any dispute

relating to a charter agreement then in force " may be appealed

to " DOAH if the commissioner of education determines, as here,

" that the dispute cannot be settled through mediation. " In

such proceedings, " [t]he administrative law judge has final

order authority to rule on issues of equitable treatment of

the charter school as a public school " and " any other matter

regarding . . . section [1002.33] " except for the d enial,

nonrenewal, or termination of a charter agreement.

§ 1002.33(7)(b), Fla. Stat.

65. RCS has brought to DOAH a h earable issu e under

section 1002.33(7)(b), namely the dispute arising from the

Board ' s denial of RCS ' s request that the Board assign SS Os to

its school facilities in the District . Because the Board has

established or assigned SSOs at the facilities of traditional

public schools but not at charter public schools, its refusal to

honor RCS ' s request raises an issue of equitable treatment of

charter schools as public schools. The commissioner has

determined that this particular dispute cannot be settled

through mediation.

66. The Board argues that RCS has failed to satisfy a

" condition precedent " to this administrative proceeding because

RCS did not exhaust the alternative dispute resolution ( " ADR " )

process available under the charter agreement. The ADR section

of the agreement, however, is by its plain terms " [s]ubject to

the applicable provision s of Fla. Stat. § 1002.33. " Section

1002.33(7)(b) does not require that contractual ADR remedies be

fully exhausted before seeking DOE mediation or " appealing " to

DOAH when and if mediation results in an impasse. Further, the

charter agreement ' s ADR proces s is voluntary ; contractual

disputes " may be resolved " thereby " unless otherwise directed or

provided for in " section 1002.33(7)(b). Finally, the ADR

process at issue is applicable to contractual disputes, whereas

the matter at hand arises from a dispute over a statutory

mandate. In short, RCS ' s avoidance of the ADR process does not

bar it from proceeding under section 1002.33(7)(b).

67. On the merits, RCS has proved its case. As discussed

at length above, section 1006.12 clearly and unambiguously

impos es upon the Board and the superintendent, not upon RCS and

other charter school operators, the duty to establish or assign

SSOs at charter school facilities. The Board ' s refusal to

assign SSOs to RCS ' s charter school facilities per RCS ' s

request, as the Board has done for traditional public schools,

is a violation of section 1006.12 and constitutes inequitable

treatment of the charter schools as public schools.

68. Having determined that the Board ' s interpretation of

section 1006.12 and its Form are unadopted rules that violate

section 120.54(1)(a), an order must be entered a gainst the

Board , pursuant to section 120.595(4), for reasonable costs and

reasonable attorney ' s fees, " unless the agency demonstrates that

the statement [s are] required by the Federal Government to

implement or retain a delegated or approved program or to meet a

condition to receipt of federal funds. " No such demonstration

was made.

69. Section 1002.33(7)(b) provides that the

" administrative law judge shall award the prevailing party

reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred during the mediation

process, administrative proceeding, and any appeals, to be paid

by the party whom the administrative law judge rules against. "

As the prevailing party, RCS is entitled to such an award.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is ORDERED that :

1. The Board ' s statement concerning the meaning of

section 1006.12 ÏÏ namely that, under this statute, it is the duty

of a charter school operator to establish or appoint its own

SSOs, because neither the school board nor the superintendent

has any obligations in this regard ÏÏ is an unadopted rule in

violation of section 120.54(1)(a).

2. The Board ' s Form titled " Charter School Safe - School

Officers FY19 " is an unadopted rule in violation of

section 120.54(1)(a).

3. The Board ' s refusal to assign SSOs to RCS ' s charter

school facilities per RCS ' s request, as the Board has done for

traditional public schools, is a vi olation of section 1006.12

and constitutes inequitable treatment of the charter schools as

public schools.

4 . RCS shall have 30 days from the date of this Final

Order within which to file a motion for attorney ' s fees and

costs, to which motion (if filed) RCS shall attach appropriate

affidavits (attesting , e.g., to the reasonableness of the fees

and costs ) and the essential documentation support ing the claim,

such as time sheets, bills, and receipts.

DONE AND ORDERED this 12th day of March , 201 9 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County , Florida.

S

___________________________________

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 12th day of March , 201 9 .

ENDNOTES

1 / Art. IX, § 4, Fla. Const.; § 1.01(8), Fla. Stat.; C.L. v.

State , 693 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

2 / Art. IX, § 4(b), Fla. Const.

3 / For purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, the charter

contract is a "license," a term defined in chapter 120 as "a

franchise, permit, certification, registration, charter , or

similar form of authorizati on required by law." § 120.52(10),

Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). That said, a charter contract

under section 1002.33 undeniably resembles a consensual

agreement, in form at least; therefore, it is possible that a

charter contract constitutes a hybrid inst rument under which the

parties perform in dual capacities, as regulator (or agency) and

licensee, and also as offeror and offeree. The undersigned need

not (and does not) exclude the possibility that a cause of

action for damages or equitable relief might accrue in favor

of a sponsor or a charter school for breach of the charter

contract. What is certain, and relevant, is that under

section 1002.33(8), school districts, as charter school

sponsors, are delegated the power to regulate.

4 / To be precise, t he statement above is true for all charter

schools except "conversion" charter schools, which are charter

schools that started out as traditional public schools and later

converted. The Board has posted SSOs at conversion charter

schools. None of RCS's s chools is a conversion charter school,

however, and, to avoid the need to return to this distinction,

the term "charter school," as used in this Final Order, is

intended to refer only to "non - conversion" charter schools.

5 / As the Florida Supreme Court has explained:

[It is a] well - settled rule that, where two

statutes operate on the same subject without

positive inconsistency or repugnancy, courts

must construe them so as to preserve the

force of both without destroying their

evident intent, if possible. It is an

accepted maxim of statutory construction

that a law should be construed together with

and in harmony with any other statute

relating to the same subject matter or

having the same purpose, even though the

statute s were not enacted at the same time.

Mann v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 300 So. 2d 666, 668

(Fla. 1974)(footnotes omitted); see also, e.g. , Mehl v. State ,

632 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1993)(separate statutory provisions

that are in pari materia should be co nstrued to express a

unified legislative purpose); Lincoln v. Fla. Parole Comm'n ,

643 So. 2d 668, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)(statutes on same subject

and having same general purpose should be construed in pari

materia).

6 / This is not a situation where, wit h the agreement of an

employing agency, a private entity might hire an off - duty police

officer to provide security services "on the side."

7 / Relatedly, section 1006.12(2)(c) states that "[a] district

school board may enter into mutual aid agreements wit h one or

more law enforcement agencies as provided in chapter 23." Such

agreements, it will be noted, must be made "between two or more

law enforcement agencies." § 23.1225(1)(a), Fla. Stat. As used

in section 23.1225, Florida Statutes, "the term 'law e nforcement

agency' means any agency or unit of government that has

authority to employ or appoint law enforcement officers, as

defined in s. 943.10(1)." § 23.1225(1)(d), Fla. Stat. Charter

schools are not law enforcement agencies and, therefore, cannot

e nter into mutual aid agreements.

8 / The undersigned takes official recognition of the public

record of DOE titled Charter Schools , which is available online

at http://www.fldoe.org/schools/school - choice/charter - schools

(last visited March 10, 2019). Thi s record states that "the

number of charter schools in Florida has grown to over 655 in

2017 - 18."

9 / The undersigned expresses no opinion either way on this

point.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Stephanie Alexander , Esquire

Tripp Scott , P.A.

200 West College Avenue , Suite 2 16

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Levi Williams , Esquire

Law Offices of Levi Williams , P.A.

12 Southeast 7th Street , Suite 70 0

Fort Lauderdale , Florida 33 30 1

(eServed)

Sean Fahey , Esquire

Melissa M. McCartney , Esquire

A. Denise Sagerholm , Esquire

The School Board of Palm

Beach County, Florida

Post Office Box 19239

West Palm Beach , Florida 3 3431

(eServed)

JulieAnn Rico, General Counsel

The School Board of Palm

Beach County, Florida

Post Office Box 19239

West Palm Beach, Flor ida 33431

(eServed)

Donald E. Fennoy II, Ed.D, Superintendent

The School Board of Palm

Beach County, Florida

3300 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C - 316

West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 - 5869

Matthew Mears , General Counsel

Department of Education

Turlington Building , Suite 1244

325 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

(eServed)

Richard Corcoran, Commissioner of Education

Department of Education

Turlington Building, Suite 1514

325 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

( eServed)

Ernest Reddick, Program Administrator

Anya Grosenbaugh

Florida Administrative Code and Register

Department of State

R. A. Gray Building

500 South Bronough Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0250

(eServed)

Ken Plante, Coordinator

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee

Room 680, Pepper Building

111 West Madison Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1400

(eServed)

Judy A. Bone, Esquire

Department of Education

Turlington Building, Suite 1244

3 25 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 323 99 - 0400

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing the original notice of appeal with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by

filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of

Appeal, First District, or wit h the District Court of Appeal in

the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of

appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to

be reviewed.