18-006308GM Palm Beach Farms Rural Preservation Committee, Llc vs. Palm Beach County, Florida Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, January 8, 2020.

Summary: Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Ordinance 2018-031 was not in compliance with the Palm Beach County Comprehensive Plan.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

PALM BEACH FARMS RURAL

PRESERVATION COMMITTEE, LLC ,

Petitioner,

vs.

Case No. 18 - 6 308G M

PALM BEACH COUNTY , FLORIDA,

Respondent,

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case

on November 18, 2019, in West Palm Beach, Florida, before

E. Gary Early, a designated administrative law judge of the

Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Benjam in Crosby, Qualified Representative

Palm Beach Farms Rural Preservation

Committee, LLC

7425 Wilson Road

West Palm Beach, F lorida 33413

Troy W Klein, Esquire

Law Office of Troy W. Klein, P.A.

Suite 1B, Barristers Bu ilding

1615 Forum Place

West Palm Beach, F lorida 33401

For Respondent: Kim Phan, Esquire

Jason Tracey, Esquire

Palm Beach County Attorney's Office

Suite 359

300 North Dixie Highway

West Palm Beach, F lorida 33401

STAT EMENT OF THE ISSUE S

Whether Palm Beach County Ordinance 2018 - 031 (“Ordinance”)

is internally inconsistent with Palm Beach County’s 1989

Comprehensive Plan (“Comprehensive Plan”) , and is , therefore ,

not “in compliance” with section 163.3177(2), Florida Sta tutes

(2018); and whether the Ordinance fails to establish meaningful

and predictable standards for the use and development of land or

for the content of more detailed land development and use

regulations as required by section 163.3177(1), Florida Statute s

(2018). 1/

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On October 31 , 2018, Respondent, Palm Beach County, Florida

(“County”) , adopted the Ordinance, amend ing the Comprehensive

Plan (“ Plan Amendment ”) to revise the Future Land Use Element

( “ FLUE ” ) applicable to r esidential f uture l and u se designations.

On November 29, 2018, Petitioner , Palm Beach Farms Rural

Preservation Committee, LLC (“Petitioner”), filed a Petition for

Formal Administrative Hearing with the Division of

Administrative Hearings (“Division”) challenging the Plan

Amendme nt pursuant to section 163.3184 . The County filed a

Motion to Dismiss the Petition on December 20, 2018 , which was

granted, in part, on January 18, 2019, with leave to amend.

On February 1, 2019, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition

for Forma l Administrative Hearing (“Amended Petition”) in which

it alleged that the Ordinance renders the Comprehensive Plan

internally inconsistent, contrary to secti on 163.3177(2) , and

that the Ordinance fails to establish meaningful and predictable

standards for the use and development of land or for the content

of more detailed land development and use regulations , contrary

to section 163.3177(1) . The Amended Petition establishes the

issues in dispute in this proceeding.

Over a period of months, the parties en gaged in a vigorous

motion practice, which included motions to disqualify three

consecutively assigned administrative law judges. Motions filed

regarding Judge Suzanne Van Wyk and Judge Francine Ffolkes were

granted. A motion filed regarding the undersig ned was denied.

On October 8, 2019, after three previous continuances and a

short period of abeyance, and after a telephonic conference at

which both parties agreed on the dates, the final hearing was

scheduled for November 18 and 19, 2019.

Dispositio n of motions and notices filed prior to

November 14, 2019 , is reflected in the docket. On November 14,

2019, after being unable to cooperatively work together to

prepare a joint pre - hearing stipulation as required by the

January 7, 2019, Order of Pre - hear ing Instructions and the

October 12, 2019, Fourth Procedural Order , the parties each

filed a Unilateral Pre - hearing Stipulation . Since the pre -

hearing statements were unilateral, they were, by definition,

not stipulations. Therefore, the “stipulated” or “admitted”

facts are not accepted.

On November 14, 2019, the County filed a Motion in Limine,

which was amended on November 15, 2019 (“Motion in Limine”).

The Motion in Limine sought the exclusion of Dorothy Wilkin s as

Petitioner’s expert witness . On S eptember 26, 2019, Judge

Ffolkes entered her Order Granting [Petitioner’s] Motion for

Continuance of Final Hearing, which required, among other

provisions, that “Petitioner shall disclose any expert witness

it intends to present at the final hearing within 10 days of the

date of this Order.” The basis for the Motion in Limine was

Petitioner’s alleged failure to disclose Ms. Wilkins as an

expert at any time after Judge Ffolkes’s Order and prior to the

filing of Petitioner’s Unilateral Pre - Hearing Stipulatio n . The

Motion in Limine also sought to exclude issues first raised in

Petitioner’s Unilateral Pre - hearing Stipulation Position

Statement from consideration at the hearing on the basis that

the issues, including the issue of whether the Ordinance was

suppo rted by appropriate data and analysis as required by

section 163.3177(1)(f), were not previously pled.

The final hearing was convened on November 18, 2019, as

scheduled.

At 8:10 a.m. on the morning of the final hearing,

Petitioner filed a Motion for Continuance of Final Hearing . The

Motion for Continuance was taken up at the commencement of the

hearing. After full consideration of the Motion for

C ontinuance, including argument of counsel, t he motion was

denied for reasons that were explained on the record .

T he Motion in Limine was then taken up. Petitioner

acknowledged that at no time after Judge Ffolkes’ s September 26,

2019 , Order Granting Continuance of Final Hearing did Petitioner

disclose any expert witness it intended to present at the final

h earing until it filed its Unilateral Pre - hearing Stipulation on

November 14, 2019, one business - day before the start of the

final hearing . The Motion to exclude the testimony of Dorothy

Wilkins was , therefore , granted, as discussed on the record.

Ruling on the other matter s raised in the Motion in Limine was

reserved pending the introduction of evidence going to issues

other than those pled. The remaining issues raised in the

Motion in Limine are now ripe for disposition.

In its Motion in Limine, the Co unty noted that the issue of

whether the Ordinance was “based upon relevant and appropriate

data and an analysis” as required by section 163.3177(1)(f) was

not pled in the February 1, 2019 , Amended Petition for Formal

Administrative Hearing or in any subse quent pleading, and was

not identified by Petitioner as a potential issue until the

filing of its November 14, 2019 , Unilateral Pre - hearing

Stipulation. Issues of pleading and notice are not suspended in

growth management cases. Moreover, there was no ev idence

submitted by Petitioner on the issue of the sufficiency of the

data and analysis supporting the Ordinance, and the issue was

not included for consideration in Petitioner’s [Proposed] Final

Order. Th us, the Motion in Limine as to “data and analysis” is

granted, and the standard in section 163.3177(1)(f) is not at

issue in this proceeding.

The Motion in Limine also objected to consideration of the

issue of whether “the creation of specific overlays for the

rural enclaves are not achievable without consent of all

affected property owners.” That issue appears to have arisen in

the context of a privately - initiated comprehensive plan

amendment that was abandoned at some time prior to the subject

County - initiated Plan Amendment . The only statutory requ irement

for landowner consent in chapter 163, though not explicitly

cited in pleadings filed by either party, is section

163.3248(2), which provides, in pertinent part, that:

Upon written request by one or more

landowners of the subject lands to designate

lands as a rural land stewardship area, or

pursuant to a private - sector - initiated

comprehensive plan amendment filed by, or

with the consent of the owners of the

subject lands , local governments may adopt a

future land use overlay to designate all or porti ons of lands classified in the future land use element as predominantly agricultural, rural, open, open - rural, or a

substantively equivalent land use, as a

rural land stewardship area . . . .

(emphasis added).

This case does not involve a private - sector - initiated

comprehensive plan amendment. Furthermore, the issue was not

included for consideration in Petitioner’s [Proposed] Final

Order. Thus, the Motion in Limine as to landowner consent is

granted.

At the final hearing, Petitioner offered the testimo ny of

Benjamin Crosby. Petitioner ’s Exhibits PBF 2 1A through PBF 21G

were received in evidence.

The C ounty offered testimony of Lisa Amara Van Horn , its

principal planner, who was accepted as an expert in land

planning ; Patricia Behn , its planning direc tor; Santhosh Samuel,

its senior server manager; Joanne Keller, its director of land

development ; and Wendy Hernandez, its principal site planner ,

who was accepted as an expert in site planning . Respondent’s

Exhibits 1 , 2, 4 through 10, 13 through 21, 23, 26, 27, 31 , and

32 were received in evidence.

A two - volume Transcript of the proceedings was filed on

December 9 , 2019. Petitioner and Respondent timely filed

Proposed Recommended Orders, which have been carefully

considered by the undersigned in the preparation of this

Recommended Order.

FINDING S OF FACT

The Parties and Standing

1. Petitioner is a Florida limited liability corporation.

Petitioner submitted written comments, recommendations, or

objections to the C ounty on October 30, 2018, during t he period

of time between the transmittal hearing and the adoption of the

Plan Amendment .

2 . The County is a political subdivision of the State of

Florida, with the duty and responsibility to adopt and maintain

a comprehensive growth management plan pur suant to section

163.3167.

3 . The County exercises land use planning and zoning

authority throughout unincorporated Palm Beach County.

4 . The Ordinance is a countywide, County - initiated

Comprehensive Plan Text Amendment that would revise the FLUE to

mo dify provisions for r esidential f uture l and u se designations.

5 . On July 13, 2018, the County Planning Commission

conducted a properly noticed public hearing to review the

proposed Plan Amendment and made recommendations to the Palm

Beach County Board of County Commissioners (the “Board”)

pursuant to c hapter 163, Part II. One member of the public

spoke in support of the amendment. The staff report that

contained staff analysis regarding consistency with the

Comprehensive Plan was made available to the P lanning Commission

prior to its deliberation.

6 . On July 20, 2019, Petitioner served a letter regarding

the proposed Plan Amendment on Melissa McKinlay, Mayor and

member of the Board. July 20, 2019 , was three days prior to the

date of the transmittal he aring for the proposed Plan Amendment .

There was no evidence that the comments were received by

Respondent on or after the date of the transmittal hearing.

7 . The July 20, 2019, letter stated that Petitioner

“represents property owners located within the Palm Beach Farms

plat in communities known as the Pioneer Road Neighborhood, the

Gun Club Road Neighborhood, Monmouth Estates, and the Ranchette

Road Neighborhood . . . . [Petitioner] has been active since

early 2011 seeking to preserve the rural chara cter of these

communities.” Despite the foregoing, there was no competent

substantial evidence adduce d at the hearing to substantiate that

Petitioner represented owners of property in any neighborhood

other than the Pioneer Road neighborhood .

8 . On July 23, 2018, the Board conducted a public hearing

to review the recommendations of the Planning Commission , and

authorized transmittal of the proposed Plan Amendment to the

state land planning agency and review agencies pursuant to

c hapter 163, Part II. The Board further directed staff to work

with residents in the rural enclaves and to return with stronger

language at the adoption hearing. Ten members of the public

spoke in support of the Plan Amendment . There was no evidence

that Petitioner, or any other person, spoke or presented written

comments at the transmittal hearing in opposition to the Plan

Amendment . The staff report and analysis regarding consistency

with the Comprehensive Plan was made available to the Board

prior to its deliberation.

9 . Th e s tate l and p lanning a gency issued a letter dated

August 31, 2018 , stating that t he Agency “identified no comment

related to important state resources and facilities within the

Department’s authorized scope of review that would be adversely

impacted by th e amendment if adopted.” There were no other

state agency comments received regarding the Plan Amendment .

10 . Subsequent to the transmittal public hearing, County

staff worked with representatives from the Pioneer Road

neighborhood and revised the langu age of the Residential Future

Land Use amendment.

11 . On October 29, 2018, Petitioner sent a letter

regarding the proposed Plan Amendment to M ayor McKinlay, service

of which was apparently accepted by Denise Neiman, County

Attorney. The evidence suggest s that service was made on

October 30, 2018, prior to the adoption of the Plan Amendment .

12 . On October 31, 2018, the Board adopted the Ordinance.

The staff report and analysis regarding consistency with the

Comprehensive Plan was made available to the Board prior to its

deliberation. Five members of the public spoke in support of

the Plan Amendment . There was no evidence that Petitioner, or

any other person, spoke or presented written comments in

opposition to the Plan Amendment , other than the Octobe r 29,

2018 , letter described above .

Existing Conditions

13 . The Pioneer Road neighborhood is approximately

550 acres of mostly R ural R esidential property , interspersed

with properties used for non - intensive commercial uses , such as

plant nurseries and landscaping services. The Pioneer Road

neighborhood contains between 175 and 220 developed home sites ,

many of which engage in light - scale personal agricultural uses

(e.g., fruit trees, gardens, chickens, etc.) . The neighborhood

is served by private pota ble water wells and septic tanks.

14 . The Pioneer Road Area includes the Pioneer Road

neighborhood , the Gun Club Road neighborhood , and surrounding

low density R ural Residential enclave neighborhoods, and is but

one of several neighborhood areas potentia lly affected by the

Plan Amendment . Other rural neighborhood areas affected by the

Ordinance include the State Road 7/Lantana Road Area and the

Hyopluxo Road Area, each of which i nclud e a number of rural

enclaves.

The Plan Amendment

15 . The Plan Amen dment is intended to revise the FLUE to

modify provisions for the Future Residential Land Use

designations . The Amendment, as described in the staff Final

Report , is designed to :

Recognize that there are Rural Residential

areas within the Urban Suburban Tier that

provide a valuable contribution to the housing

diversity and lifestyle choices in the County.

Establish that Agricultural Residential zoning

is consistent with the urban residential

future land use designations in the County.

Recognize and support agricultural operations

within residential future land use

designations, including supporting the

cultivation of agriculture and keeping of

livestock.

Provide addit ional specificity on the non - residential use location requirements in

residential land use designations to ensure

protection of residential neighborhoods.

Allow Residential Multifamily Zoning on

parcels with Medium Residential, 5 units per

acre, future land use for properties using the

Tr ansfer of Development Rights or Workforce

Housing Programs.

16 . The Plan Amendment applies countywide, and not to a ny

specific neighborhood or property . Current neighborhood plans

are considered when there are site - specific amendments.

17 . As related to Rural Residential enclaves, the Plan

Amendment “will establish policy statements to direct growth

away from those areas, or towards their edges,” and “will

establish that the AR Zoning district is consistent with th e

urban residential zoning districts.” The Plan Amendment is also

designed to “[r]ecognize and support agricultural operations

within residential future land use designations, . . . including

in the Urban Suburban Tier,” and restrict commercial vehicle

ac tivity and more intensive non - residential uses in

residentially zoned areas except along major thoroughfares.

Petitioner’s Challenge

18 . In its Amended Petition, Petitioner stated that the

following amendments to the Comprehensive Plan “appear to

reco gnize the existence and offer protection for the

continuation of these Rural Residential Enclaves”:

REVISE Policy 2.2.1 - p: Rural Enclaves in

Urban Service Area Application of Rural

Standards . The County recognizes that there

are long established rural res idential

enclave communities and homesteads in

locations within the Urban/Suburban Tier that

have Low Residential future land use

designation. The County supports the

continuation of those rural areas in order to

encourage a high quality of life and

lifes tyle choices for County residents. In

addition, within these areas In the

Urban/Suburban Tier , the County may apply the

ULDC standards for rural residential

development as follows:

1. in low density areas in Urban Residential

future land use categories ;

2. on parcels presently used for

agricultural purposes; or

3. on parcels with a Special Agricultural

future land use category.

NEW Policy 2.2.1 - w : The County shall adopt

specific overlays in the Comprehensive Plan

and/or Unified Land Development Code to

protect the character of rural enclaves

identified though the neighborhood planning

process. [2 / ]

19 . Comprehensive Plan Policy 2.2.1 - j, which is unchanged

by the Plan Amendment , provides that:

Table 2.2.1 - j.1 establishes the consistent

resident ial zoning and planned development

district for the Residential Future Land Use

Designations. In addition, within the

Urban/Suburban Tier of the Glades Tier, the

Agricultural Residential and Agricultural

Production zoning districts are consistent

with all residential future land use

designations.

20 . As amended, Table 2.2.1 - j.1 provides as follows:

Table 2.2.1 - j.1

Residential Future Land Use - Zoning Consistency 1

Future Land Use Consistent Zoning

Designation Zoning District

Planned Develo pment

Agricultural AGR AGR - PUD

Reserve

Rural AR 4 , RE 5 RR - PUD, MHPD,

Residential RVPD

Western AR PUD

Communities

Residential

Low Residential AR 4 , RE, RT, PUD , TND, MHPD

RTS, RS

Medium AR 4 , RE, RT, PUD , TND, MHPD

Residential RS, RTU, RM/RH 2

High Reside ntial AR 4 , RE, RT , PUD , TND, MHPD

RS, RM , RH

Congregate RM PUD, TND, TMD,

Living MUPD, MXPD 3

Residential 3

21 . The disputes raised in the Amended Petition were in

“[t]he footnotes and caveats ” to Table 2.2.1 - j.1, which “ will

permit significant increase s in future density, intensity and

designs in a manner that will permanently and negatively alter

the historic rural and unique character of these neighborhoods.”

As pled, “ the following three provisions completely undermine

any effort to preserve the Rur al Residential Enclaves”:

REVISE Table 2.2.1 - j.1 Residential Future

Land Use – Zoning Consistency: Note No. 2

(RM District) : The RM district is consistent

with the MR - 5 designation only for those

areas properties that were zoned RM or RH

prior to the Plan’s August 31, 1989 adoption or are 3 acres utilizing the Transfer of

Development Rights and/or Workforce Housing

Program .

REVISE Table 2.2.1 - j.1 Residential Future

Land Use – Zon ing Consistency: Note No. 4

(AR Zoning) A lot with AR that was legally

subdivided shall be considered a conforming

lot. Properties with AR zoning with a

residential future land use designation in

the Urban/Suburban Tier are not required to

rezone when subdividing for a residential use

provided that the newly subdivided densi ty is

a maximum of 1 unit per acre, or when

developing a non - residential use that is

allowed in AR.

Policy 2.2.1 - n N on - Residential Uses

Criteria. NEW Subsection (5). More intense

non - residential uses may be allowed in

residential zoning districts alon g major

thoroughfares and roadways that are not

residential streets.

22 . In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner alleged that

the following deletion renders the Ordinance inconsistent with

the Comprehensive Plan, and inconsistent with the Plan

Amendmen t :

4. DELETE Language from FLUA Regulation

Section

Land Development Regulations in the Urban

Service Area, Urban/Suburban Tier. The

County may apply the ULDC standards for rural

residential areas in the Urban/Suburban Tier

in low density areas in the Res idential

future land use designations which are used

for agricultural purposes, or on parcels with

a Special Agricultural (SA) land use

category.

Areas within the Urban Service Area/Suburban

Tier may be suitable for agricultural use

throughout the implemen tation period of the

Plan. It is not the intent of the Plan to

encourage premature urbanization of these

areas; however, agricultural uses are

expected to convert to other uses consistent

with the Plan when those agricultural uses

are no longer economicall y viable.

Agricultural uses permitted in the

residential land use designation must be

compatible with the protection of the

residential lifestyle and quality of life.

a. Table 2.2 . 1 - j.1 , footnote 2

23 . In its Amended Petition, Petitioner alleged that

revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 2 , is inconsistent with new

Policies 2.2.1 - w and 2.2.1 - p of the Plan Amendment . However, in

his testimony, Mr. Crosby focused exclusively on the alleged

inconsistency with Policy 2.2.1 - w, not mentioning or otherwise

offer ing evidence regarding inconsistency with Policy 2.2.1 - p .

24 . As amended, revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 2 ,

applies only to “RM/RH” zoning district s , and provides that

“ [t] he RM district is consistent with the MR - 5 [Medium

Residential/5 units per ac re] designation only for those

properties that were zoned RM [Residential Multifamily] or RH

[Multifamily Residential High Dens ity] prior to the Plan’s

August 31, 1989 adoption, or when properties of 3 or more acres

in size within an MR - 5 designation quali fy for a higher density

through the Transfer of Development Rights and/or Workforce

Housing Program density bonus programs.” The plain language of

revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 2 , establishes that it applies

only to the MR - 5 future land use designatio n, and only to

properties that were either zoned as RM or RH before August 31,

1989, or that qualify for the listed density bonus programs.

25 . The three - acre threshold was established to prevent

single lots in established MR - 5 neighborhoods from incre asing

density out of character with the neighborhood. Prior to the

amendment of footnote 2, if a property owner proposed new

development on property with an MR - 5 land - use designation and

more than three acres of land and proposed to utilize Transfer of

De velopment Rights or the Workforce Housing Program for a density

increase, the property owner was limited to a Planned Unit

Development (PUD). The amendment allows the application of the

density bonus in an RM zoning district. Revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l,

f oo tnote 2 , is designed to foster infill development on MR - 5

designated parcels that may be too small to be developed as a

PUD. Furthermore, footnote 2 does not bypass the requirements of

the Land Development Code Article 5 Density Bonus Programs, and

applic ants are still required to comply with those application

review and approval processes.

26 . Finally, Petitioner’s expressed concern is the effect

of the Plan Amendment on AR designated rural enclave communities

such as the Pioneer Road neighborhood. A mended footnote 2 does

not apply to A R zoning districts.

27 . Petitioner failed to prove, beyond fair debate, that

revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 2 , is inconsistent with the

Comprehensive Plan, including new P olic y 2.2.l - w , or that it

improperly incr eases density. Furthermore, Petitioner, having

failed to offer any evidence as to revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l,

footnote 2’s , inconsistency with revised Table 2.2.1 - p, failed to

meet its burden with regard to that element of its Amended

Petition.

b. Table 2. 2.1 - j.1, footnote 4

28 . In its Amended Petition, Petitioner alleged that

revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 4 , is inconsistent with new

Policies 2.2.1 - w and 2.2.1 - p of the Plan Amendment . However, in

his testimony, Mr. Crosby focused exclusively on the a lleged

inconsistency with Policy 2.2.1 - w, not mentioning or otherwise

offering evidence regarding inconsistency with Policy 2.2.1 - p.

29 . Petitioner argues that the footnote allows property

owners to immediately subdivide their property to one unit per

ac re without review, rezoning , or going through the typical

process if they are in the AR zoning district.

30 . As to the alleged inconsistency with new Policy

2.2.1 - w, neither footnote 4, nor any other provision of the Plan

Amendment , creates a specific overlay that can be compared for

consistency with the authority for, but not the implementation

of, the creation of future overlays. Petitioner failed to

demonstrate, through competent, substantial evidence, that

revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 4 , is in consistent with new

Policy 2.2.1 - w of the Plan Amendment .

31 . As to the alleged inconsistency between revised Table

2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 4 , and new Policy 2.2.1 - p, the evidence

demonstrated that the County implemented the Managed Growth Tier

System to pro tect viable existing neighborhoods and communities,

and to direct the location and timing of future development

within five geographically specific Tiers -- Urban/Suburban,

Exurban, Rural, Agricultural Reserve, and the Glades.

32 . Table 2.2.1 - g.l of the FLUE establishes maximum density

for Residential Future Land Use Designations.

33 . The lowest density designation in the Urban/Sub urban

Tier is Low Residential, one unit per acre (LR - 1) designation ,

which allows up to one unit per acre.

34 . Accord ing to existing Table 2.2.1 - j.l, the AR zoning

district is not currently consistent with Low Residential (LR),

Medium Residential (MR), and High Residential (HR) Future Land

Use Designations.

35 . As set forth in Table III.C, LR, MR , and HR Future Land

Us e Designations are allowed within the Urban/Suburban and Glades

Tiers.

36 . Through a review of County records, it was determined

that there were thousands of acres of land currently zoned AR in

the Urban/Suburban Tier. Thus, under the existing tiered l and

use designations, those AR zoned parcels were inconsistent with

the Comprehensive Plan.

37 . Accordingly, the Plan Amendment revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l

to add AR zoning districts as being allowable in LR, MR , and HR

Future Land Use Designations, thus ma king AR zoning districts

consistent in the Urban/Suburban Tier.

38 . Revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 4 , applies to AR

zoning districts within the Rural Residential (existing), and the

LR, MR , and HR Future Land Use Designations (added).

39 . The requi rement for AR zoned properties to rezone with

a maximum LR - 1 density of one unit/acre is eliminated because

such properties, with the proposed Plan Amendment , will be

consistent with LR, MR , and HR Future Land Use Designations

within the Urban/Suburban Tie r and , thereby , maintain their

agricultural residential uses .

40 . Proposed Policy 2.2.1 - p recognizes that there are

established rural residential enclaves within the Urban/Suburban

Tier that have an LR Future Land Use Designation, and affirms the

County ’s support of the continuation of those rural areas.

Allowing properties with LR Future Land Use Designations to

subdivide up to one unit/acre does not increase density, as the

LR Future Land Use Designation currently allows up to one

unit/acre without the Plan Amendment. Policy 2.2.1 - p is

unchanged in establishing that the County may apply its Uniform

Land Development Code (“ ULDC ”) standards for rural residential

development in low density and agricultural future land use

categories.

41 . Petitioner fail ed to prove, beyond fair debate, that

revised Table 2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 4 , is inconsistent with the

Comprehensive Plan, including new Polic y 2.2.l - w, that it

improperly increases density, or that any existing County

subdivision regulations would not apply. Furthermore,

Petitioner, having failed to offer any evidence as to revised

Table 2.2.1 - j.l, footnote 4’s , inconsistency with revised Table

2.2.1 - p, failed to meet its burden with regard to that element of

its Amended Petition.

c. Policy 2.2.1 - n.5.

42 . Revised Policy 2.2.1 - n.5. is designed to direct more

intense non - residential uses allowed in residential areas to

residential streets.

43 . In its Amended Petition and Mr. Crosby’s test imony,

Petitioner alleged that revised Policy 2.2.1 - n.5. is inconsistent

with new policy 2.2.1 - w regarding the adoption of specific

overlays to protect “the character of individual rural enclaves

identified through the neighborhood planning process.”

4 4 . As indicated previously, the Plan Amendment did not

create a specific overlay to compare for consistency with the

authority for, but not the implementation of, the creation of

future overlays.

45 . Revised Policy 2.2.1 - n.5. is designed to direct

all owable non - residential uses to the periphery of residential

communities “along” the major thoroughfares, which is not the

same as “in proximity” to major thoroughfares. Pursuant to

proposed Policy 2.2.1 - n.5., local residential streets are not to

be subjec t to commercial vehicle activity (other than home

businesses), and more intense non - residential uses in

residentially - zoned areas will be limited to those with access to

major thoroughfares. The more restrictive language is intended

to protect residential neighborhoods in any Managed Growth Tier.

46 . Revised Policy 2.2.1 - n.5. cannot be read in isolation

from other provisions of Policy 2.2.1 - n, including the existing

requirements that non - residential uses, when being permitted, be

consistent with the Comp rehensive Plan, and that their density

and intensity be comparable and compatible with the adjoining

residential area, and revised Policy 2.2.1 - n.6., which requires

conditions of approval of the non - residential uses “to ensure

compatibility with surroundin g residences.”

47 . Petitioner failed to prove, beyond fair debate, that

revised Policy 2.2.1 - n.5. is inconsistent with the Comprehensive

Plan, including new Policy 2.2.l - w.

d. Deleted Language

48 . Petitioner failed to offer any evidence as to the

language deleted from the FLUA Regulation Section to demonstrate

that it rendered the Plan Amendment inconsistent with the

Comprehensive Plan. Petitioner therefore failed to meet its

burden with regard to that element of its Amended Petition.

County’s Ev idence

49 . The County introduced competent, substantial

testimonial and documentary evidence that t he Plan Amendment is

consistent with the Comprehensive Plan FLUE, Section I.C.

“ County Directions , ” paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, and 15 . The Plan

Amendment p rom ot es the protection of established neighborhoods ,

foster s agriculture uses , establishes that existing rural

neighborhoods within the Urban / S uburban Tier cannot be replaced ,

and will manage growth in a manner to protect these areas. The

County demonstrated that the Plan Amendment is designed and

intended to direct growth towards activity nodes and centers and

along major thoroughfares , and promote redevelopment and urban

infill in appropriate areas of the County.

50 . The County introduced competent, subs tantial

testimonial and documentary evidence that the proposed Plan

Amendment is consistent with the Comprehensive Plan FLUE,

Section II., Objective 1.1 “ Manage d Growth Tier System ” by

maintaining a variety of housing and lifestyle choices,

enhancing exist ing communities, protecting land for agriculture,

and providing oppo r tunities for agriculture.

51 . The County introduced competent, substantial

testimonial and documentary evidence that the proposed Plan

Amendment is consistent with the Comprehensive Pla n FLUE,

Section II., Objective 1.2 “Urban/Suburban Tier - Urban Service

Area,” Policy 1.2 - a by protecting the character of rural

enclaves through the promoti on of agriculture and home - based

commercial uses that are compatible with the neighborhood s ,

while directing increased density away from the center of rural

neighborhoods.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

52 . The Division has jurisdiction over the subject matter

and parties hereto pursuant to sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and

163. 3184(5), Florida Statutes (2019) .

S tanding

53 . To have standing to challenge or support a plan

amendment, a person must be an affected person as defined in

section 163.3184(1)(a).

54 . An “affected person” includes “persons owning

property, residing, or owning or operating a business w ithin the

boundaries of the local government whose plan is the subject of

the review; [and] owners of real property abutting real property

that is the subject of a proposed change to a future land use

map.”

55 . The extent to which an organization is an “ affected

person” was analyzed by Judge Donald R. Alexander as follows:

In Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc. et al.

v. Department of Community Affairs et al. ,

DOAH Case No. 03 - 2164GM (DOAH March 30,

2004; DCA July 16, 2004), 2004 Fla. ENV

LEXIS 239, the Dep artment concluded that

“the definition of ‘affected person’ makes

no distinction between different

classifications of businesses,” and that an

affected person need not “have the trappings

of ‘traditional’ business activities.” Id.

at *6. Therefore, the l ack of traditional business amenities such as a telephone

number, occupational license, or office is

not necessary to establish standing. It

went on to hold that activities such as

“participation in local government

activities in furtherance of [the entit y's]

declared corporate purpose” and “involvement

by the [affected person] in the local

planning process” were sufficient to satisfy

the statute. Id. at *8. Using these

liberal standards, it is concluded that while [Petitioner] does not operate a

busines s in the classic sense, and its

declared corporate purpose is unknown, it is

occasionally involved in the local planning

process. Therefore, it is arguably an

affected person within the meaning of the

statute.

Payne v. City of Miami , DOAH Case No. 04 - 2 75 4GM (Fla. DOAH

May 16, 2006; Fla. DCA June 22, 2006).

56 . Petitioner has alleged standing as an association

acting on behalf of the interests of its members. In its

Amended Petition, Petitioner asserted that it:

was established in 2011 for the purpose o f

conducting business and representing the

interests of its members, including those

who own certain real property within The

Pioneer Road Neighborhood. Both operating

as an incorporated entity business, and

acting on behalf of its members, Petitioner

has participated in growth management, land

use, and zoning issues impacting The Pioneer

Road Neighborhood since 2011, including

participation in hearings on comprehensive

plan and land use amendments affecting The

Pioneer Road Neighborhood, including

interes ts in infrastructure, recreation,

natural resources and other interests

protected by the existing Comprehensive Plan

and Section 163.3177, Florida Statutes,

which are at issue in this case as set forth

below. Petitioner brings this action on

behalf of its elf as a business and on behalf

of its members, who own real property in The

Pioneer Road Neighborhood near and proximate

to areas subjected by the Plan Amendments.

Petitioner seeks to protect the integrity of

Palm Beach County’s environmental resources

a nd quality of life for Palm Beach County

residents, including the interest of its

members in protecting resources and managing

growth in Palm Beach County in and around

The Pioneer Road Neighborhood.

57 . At the final hearing, Petitioner failed to introd uce

any evidence of its corporate existence , or the purposes for

which it was allegedly created . There were no articles or

bylaws offered. There was nothing from the Division of

Corporations. Even under the liberal standard espoused by Judge

Alexander, there was little in the way of an evidentiary basis

upon which to find that Petitioner is a “person” under the law,

or that that it operated a business in Palm Beach County.

Nonetheless, a review of the docket, which was made subject to

official recogniti on at the hearing, reveals enough information

upon which Petitioner’s corporate existence may be inferred.

For example, the June 17, 2019, request for Mr. Crosby to serve

as Petitioner’s Qualified Representative included a resolution

adopted by Petitioner ’s Board of Directors , which included

information regarding its establishment and purpose. Similarly,

Petitioner’s motions to disqualify presiding a dministrative l aw

j udges filed on September 20, 2019 , and October 11, 2019,

included affidavits from a mana ging member of the corporate

entity. Mr. Crosby’s testimony included information

substantiating Petitioner’s corporate formation and purposes.

Finally, Respondent, in its Proposed Recommended Order, stated

that “Petitioner Palm Beach Farms Rural Preserva tion is a

limited liability company in Florida.”

58 . T here was evidence , primarily as identified above, to

substantiate the allegations of Petitioner’s membership

vis - à - vis the Pioneer Road neighborhood . At least three

members, Mr. Crosby, Joseph R. Byrne, and Caroljean C. Cushman ,

were identified by name in various pleadings and testimony. The

evidence adduced at the hearing is sufficient to demonstrate

Petitioner ’ s associational standing under Florida Home Builders

Association v. Departme nt of Labor and Employment Security ,

412 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1982), and its progeny.

59 . A written comment , bearing Petitioner’s name on the

printed letterhead and the signature of Mr. Byrne, its c hairman ,

was submitted in opposition to the proposed Plan Am endment on or

about October 30, 2019, the day prior to the adoption hearing.

Thus, Petitioner met that element of the definition of “ affected

person ” within the meaning of the statute.

Standards

60 . Section 163.3184 governs the process for adoption of

c omprehensive plan amendments.

61 . “In compliance” means “consistent with the

requirements of sections 163.3177, 163.3178, 163.3180, 163.3191,

163.3245, and 163.3248, with the appropriate strategic regional

policy plan, and with the principles for guiding development in

designated areas of critical state concern and with part III of

62 . Section 163.3177(1) provides, in pertinent part, that

“ [t] he [comprehensive] plan shall establish meaningfu l and

predictable standards for the use and development of land and

provide meaningful guidelines for the content of more detailed

land development and use regulations.”

63 . Section 163.3177(2) provides, in pertinent part, that

“ [t] he several elements of the comprehensive plan shall be

consistent.”

64 . The C ounty ’s determination that the Plan Amendment is

“in compliance” is presumed correct and must be sustained if the

determination of compliance is “fairly debatable.” See

§ 163.3184(5)(c), Fla. Sta t. Petitioner bears the burden of proving beyond fair debate that the challenged Plan Amendment is

not in compliance.

65 . The term “fairly debatable” is not defined in

chapter 163, but the Florida Supreme Court held in Martin County

v. Yusem , 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997), that “[t]he fairly

debatable standard is a highly deferential standard requiring approval of a planning action if reasonable persons could differ

as to its propriety.” Id. at 1295. Where “ there is evidence in

support of both sides of a comprehensive plan amendment, it is difficult to determine that the [local government’s] decision

was anything but ‘fairly debatable.’” Martin Cnty . v. Section

28 P’ship, Ltd. , 772 So. 2d 616, 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

66 . Despite the foregoing, i t is e qually clear that the

mere existence of contrav ening evidence is not sufficient to

establish that a land planning decision is “fairly debatable.”

It is firmly established that:

[E] ven though there was expert testimony

adduced in support of the City ’ s case , that

in and of itself does not mean the issue is

fairly debatable. If it did, every zoning

case would be fairly debatable and the City

would prevail simply by submitting an expert

who testified favorably to the City ’ s

position. Of course that is not th e case.

The trial judge still must determine the

weight and credibility factors to be

attributed to the experts. Here the final

judgment shows that the judge did not assign

much weight or credibility to the City ’ s

witnesses.

Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Cor p. , 371 So. 2d 154 , 159 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1979).

67 . The Comprehensive Plan and its amendments are

legislative decisions. Coastal Dev. of N. Fla. v. City of

Jacksonville , 788 So. 2d 204, 208 - 209 (Fla. 2001). It is well -

established that all provisions of a comprehensive plan be read

in pari materia and harmonized so that each provision is given

effect. § 163.3187(5)(d) , Fla. Stat. ; Katherine ’ s Bay, LLC v.

Fagan , 52 So. 3d 19, 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

68 . “A compliance determination is not a determination of

whether a comprehensive amendment is the best approach available

to a local government for achieving its purposes.” Furthermore,

“[i]n a compliance determination, the motives of the local

government are not relevant.” Pacetta, LLC v. Town of Ponce

In let , DOAH Case No. 09 - 1231GM, R.O. ¶¶ 65 - 66 (Fla. DOAH

Mar. 20, 2012; Fla. OEO June 19, 2012).

69 . As to the weight to be given testimony in this case,

the County offered substantial and credible testimony of expert s

in land planning and site plannin g, a long with that of other

Coun t y employees. Petitioner offered the testimony of

Mr. Crosby, an educated and informed, but lay , witness. As

established by the First District Court of Appeal:

Lay witnesses may offer their views in land

use cases about ma tters not requiring expert

testimony. Metro. Dade County v.

Blumenthal , 675 So. 2d 598, 601 (Fla. 3d DCA

1995). For example, lay witnesses may testify about the natural beauty of an area

because this is not an issue requiring

expertise. Blumenthal , 675 So. 2d at 601.

Lay witnesses ’ speculation about potential

“traffic problems, light and noise

pollution,” and general unfavorable impacts

of a proposed land use are not, however,

considered competent, substantial evidence.

Pollard v. Palm Beach County , 560 So. 2d

1358, 1359 - 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Similarly, lay witnesses’ opinions that a

proposed land use will devalue homes in the

area are insufficient to support a finding

that such devaluation will occur. See City

of Apopka v. Orange County , 299 So. 2d 657,

659 - 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (citation omitted). There must be evidence other than the lay witnesses ’ opinions to support such

claims. See BML Invs. v. City of

Casselberry , 476 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1985); City of Apopka , 299 So. 2d at

660.

K atherine ’ s Bay, LLC v. Fagan , 52 So. 3d at 30.

70 . The standard of proof to establish a finding of fact

is preponderance of the evidence. See § 120.57(1)(j), Fla.

Stat.

Compliance with the Community Planning Act

71 . Petitioner disputed that the Plan Amendment was in

compliance with the Community Planning Act as follows:

a. Whether the Plan Amendment s render the

County’s Comprehensive Plan internally

inconsistent with the duly adopted 1989

Comprehensive Plan, as amended, and is,

therefore, not “in co mpliance” with Section

163.3177(2), Fla. Stat.

b. Whether the Plan Amendment s establish

meaningful and predictable standards for the

use and development of land and provides

meaningful guidelines for the content of

more detailed land use and development

regulations as required by Section

163.3177(1), Fla. Stat.

a. Internally Inconsistent

72 . As set forth in the Findings of Fact herein,

Petitioner did not prove beyond fair debate that the Plan

Amendment created any internal inconsistencies wi th the cit ed

provisions of the C omprehensive P lan .

73 . A plan amendment creates an internal inconsistency

when it conflicts with an existing provision of the

Comprehensive Plan. Petitioner not only failed to prove beyond

fair debate that the Plan Amendment is i nternally inconsistent

with the Comprehensive Plan, but also failed to prove beyond

fair debate that it is internally inconsistent with any other

new or revised provision of the Plan Amendment .

74 . The County presented competent, substantial , and

persuas ive evidence that the Plan Amendment promotes and is

consistent with the County ’ s directions, goals, objectives , and

policies.

b. Meaningful and Predictable Standards

75 . As set forth in the Findings of Fact herein, Petitioner

did not prove , beyond fa ir debate , that the Comprehensive Plan

Amendment failed to establish meaningful and predictable

standards for the use and development of land and provide

meaningful guidelines for the content of more detailed land

development and use regulations.

76 . Pet itioner failed to prove, beyond fair debate, that

revised Table 2.2.1 - j.1, footnote 2 , serves to increase density,

or is otherwise inconsistent with new Policy 2.2.1 - w, or with any

other provision of the Comprehensive Plan. Revised Table 2.2.1 -

j.l does no t change any existing future land use designations.

Moreover, there is no specific overlay created in new Policy

2.2.1 - w to support a finding of inconsistency. In addition,

Petitioner failed to demonstrate that revised Table 2.2.1 - j.1,

footnote 2 , applie s to the Pioneer Road neighborhood, the effect

of which forms the basis of Petitioner’s concerns, and the

evidence demonstrates that it will not.

77 . Petitioner failed to prove, beyond fair debate, that

revised Table 2.2.1 - j.1, footnote 4 , is inconsis tent with new

policy 2.2.1 - w, or with any other provision of the Comprehensive

Plan. There is no specific overlay created in new Policy 2.2.1 - w

to form a basis for a determination of inconsistency. There was

competent, substantial evidence that the subdi vision process

regulations must be met before any subdivision can be

implemented, and that rezoning does not affect density.

78 . Petitioner failed to prove, beyond fair debate , that

revised Policy 2.2.1 - n.5. is inconsistent with new P olicy

2.2.1 - w., o r with any other provision of the Comprehensive Plan.

There is no specific overlay created in new Policy 2.2.1 - w to

form a basis for a determination of inconsistency. Furthermore,

Policy 2.2.1 - n, as revised, includes six criteria that must be

met before non - residential uses are permitted in residential

areas, including that they may only be located along major

thoroughfares and roadways, and must be consistent and compatible

with surrounding residences.

79 . The County presented competent, substantial , and

persuasive evidence that the Plan Amendment establishes

meaningful and predictable standards for the use and development

of land and provide s meaningful guidelines for the content of

more detailed land development and use regulations to promote the

Cou nty ’ s directions, goals, objectives , and policies.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

80 . On December 19, 2019, Respondent filed a Motion for

under the authority of section s 120.569(2)(e) and 120.595(1),

Fl orida Statutes. On December 30, 2019, Petitioner filed a

Response to the Motion.

81 . This case took well over a year from start to finish,

though less than a year from the date of the Amended Petition.

Petitioner’s counsel withdrew, and the case was held in abeyance

for several months. Each party was a movant for the

disqualification of a presiding officer. The time for

disposition of this case , though lengthy, is not supportive of

the merits of the Motion .

Section 120.569(2)(e)

82 . Section 1 20.569(2)(e) , provides that:

(e) All pleadings, motions, or other papers

filed in the proceeding must be signed by the

party, the party’s attorney, or the party’s

qualified representative. The signature

constitutes a certificate that the person has

read the pleading, motion, or other p aper and

that, based upon reasonable inquiry, it is

not interposed for any improper purposes,

such as to harass or to cause unnecessary

delay, or for frivolous purpose or needless

increase in the cost of litigation. If a

pleading, motion, or other paper i s signed in

violation of these requirements, the

presiding officer shall impose upon the

person who signed it, the represented party,

or both, an appropriate sanction, which may

include an order to pay the other party or

parties the amount of reasonable ex penses

incurred because of the filing of the

pleading, motion, or other paper, including a

reasonable attorney’s fee.

83 . Respondent has identified no specific pleading, motion,

or paper that was interposed for an improper purpose. Rather,

Respondent’s Motion is based on its assertion that the proceeding

as a whole was brought for an improper purpose.

84 . A frivolous claim is not merely one that is likely to

be unsuccessful. Rather, it must be so clearly devoid of merit

that there is little, if any, prospect of success. French v.

Dep ’ t of Child. & Fams. , 920 So. 2d 671, 679 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

clear legal justification can be shown for the filing of the

paper.’” Procacci Commer. Re alty v. Dep’t of HRS , 690 So. 2d

603, 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), citing Mercedes Lighting &

Electrical Supply v. State, Dep’t of Gen. Servs. , 560 So. 2d 272,

278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). To determine whether a proceeding was initiated for an improper purpose, t he trier of fact must use an objective standard to determine if the filing was based on

reasonably clear legal justification. Procacci , 690 So. 2d at

608 n.9.

85 . Based upon a full review and consideration of the

record in this proceeding, and applyin g an objective standard

regarding pertinent facts and applicable law, the undersigned

finds that the allegations of fact in this case, and the

application of the law as asserted by Petitioner , though

ultimately lacking in proof, were not so devoid of merit as to

infer an improper purpose under section 120.569(2)(e).

Section 120.595 (1)

86 . Section 120.595 (1), provides, in pertinent part, that:

(1) CHALLENGES TO AGENCY ACTION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 120.57(1). —

* * *

(b) The final order in a proceeding p ursuant

to s. 120.57(1) shall award reasonable costs

and a reasonable attorney’s fee to the

prevailing party only where the nonprevailing

adverse party has been determined by the

administrative law judge to have participated

in the proceeding for an improp er purpose.

(c) In proceedings pursuant to s. 120.57(1),

and upon motion, the administrative law judge

shall determine whether any party

participated in the proceeding for an

improper purpose as defined by this

subsection. In making such determination,

the administrati ve law judge shall consider

whether the nonprevailing adverse party has

participated in two or more other such

proceedings involving the same prevailing

party and the same project as an adverse

party and in which such two or more

proceedings the nonprevail ing adverse party

did not establish either the factual or legal

merits of its position, and shall consider

whether the factual or legal position

asserted in the instant proceeding would have

been cognizable in the previous proceedings.

In such event, it s hall be rebuttably

presumed that the nonprevailing adverse party

participated in the pending proceeding for an

improper purpose.

(d) In any proceeding in which the

administrative law judge determines that a

party participated in the proceeding for an

imp roper purpose, the recommended order shall

so designate and shall determine the award of

costs and attorney’s fees.

(e) For the purpose of this subsection:

1. “Improper purpose” means participation in

a proceeding pursuant to s. 120.57(1)

primarily to harass or to cause unnecessary

delay or for frivolous purpose or to

needlessly increase the cost of litigation,

licensing, or securing the approval of an

activity.

87 . Petitioner has not, as acknowledged in the Motion,

participated in two or more procee dings involving Respondent and

the same project as an adverse party.

88 . For the reasons set forth in the analysis of section

120. 5 69(2)(e), and b ased upon a full review and consideration of

the record in this proceeding, the undersigned finds that the

f acts of this case, and the application of the law as asserted by

Petitioner , though ultimately lacking in proof , were not made for

an improper purpose as defined in section 120.595(1)(e)1.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclu sions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic

Opportunity enter a final order determining that the Plan

Amendment adopted by Palm Beach County as Ordinance 2018 - 031 , on

O ctober 31, 2018, is “in compliance,” as that term is defined by

sect ion 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes ; and that Petitioner’s

challenge was not brought for an improper purpose as defined in

section 120.569(2)(e) , Florida Statutes, or section 120.595(1),

Florida Statutes .

DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of J anuary , 20 20 , i n

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

E. GARY EARLY

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Fi led with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 8th day of J anuary , 20 20 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ Except as otherwise provided herein, all references to the

Florida Statutes are to the 2018 version, which was in effect

when the Plan Amendment wa s adopted.

2 / The Plan Amendment did not create a specific overlay, and the

policy established in (unchal lenged) Policy 2.2.1 - w does not

form a basis for a determination of inconsistency. The Palm

Beach County Unified Land Development Code defines an “overlay

zoning district” as “a set of zoning regulations for a defined

area , which are required either in ad dition to the standard

zoning district ’ s regulations or in lieu of those regulations.

Overlay zoning is used to protect the character of an area of

special concern or to encourage new development subject to

additional controls. ” O verlays are created thro ugh a separate

Plan Amendment . Neither Policy 2.2.1 - j nor Policy 2.2.1 - w

supersede the separate overlay adoption process. Policy 2.2.1 - j

and Table 2.2.1 - j.1 are not inconsistent with Policy 2.2.1 - w or

any other identified provision of the Comprehensive P lan.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Denise Neiman, Esquire

Palm Beach County

Suite 601

301 North Olive Avenue

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

Kim Phan, Esquire

Palm Beach County Attorney's Office

Suite 359

300 North Dixie Highway

West Palm Beach, Florida 33 401

(eServed)

Benjamin Crosby

Palm Beach Farms

Rural Preservation Committee, LLC

7425 Wilson Road

West Palm Beach, Florida 33413

(eServed)

Troy W. Klein, Esquire

Law Office of Troy W. Klein, P.A.

Suite 1B, Barristers Building

1615 Forum Place

West Pa lm Beach, Florida 33401

(eServed)

Jason Tracey, Assistant County Attorney

Palm Beach County Attorney's Office

Suite 359

300 North Dixie Highway

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(eServed)

William Chorba, General Counsel

Department of Economic Opportunity

Caldwell B uilding , MSC 110

107 East Madison Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 4128

(eServed)

Ken Lawson, Executive Director

Department of Economic Opportunity

Caldwell Building

107 East Madison Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 4128

(eServed)

Taya Orozco, Agency Clerk

Department of Economic Opportunity

Caldwell Building

107 East Madison Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 4128

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.