18-006497FL Loving Touch &Quot;Dynamic&Quot; Home, Owned And Operated By Zulia Brenovil, Loving Touch Adult Family Care, Inc. vs. Agency For Persons With Disabilities Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, May 28, 2019.

Summary: Petitioners' license application should be denied by the agency.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

LOVING TOUCH " A BRIGHTER FUTURE "

HOME, OWNED AND OPERATED BY

ZULIA BRENOVIL, LOVING TOUCH

ADULT FAMILY CARE, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No . 18 - 6496FL

AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH

DISABILITIES,

Respondent.

_____ __________________________/

LOVING TOUCH " DYNAMIC " HOME,

OWNED AND OPERATED BY ZULIA

BRENOVIL, LOVING TOUCH ADULT

FAMILY CARE, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 18 - 6497FL

AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH

DISABILITIES,

Respondent.

________________ _______________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

On March 28 and 29, 2019, a final hearing was held in this

matter pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2018).

The hearing took place via video teleconference with sites in

Tallahassee, Florida , and Fort Pierce, Florida. The hearing was

conducted by Administrative Law Judge Robert L. Kilbride of the

Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Trevor S. Suter, Esquire

Agency fo r Persons w ith Disabilities

4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950

For Respondent: Lance O. Leider, Esquire

The Health Law Firm

1101 Douglas Avenue

Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Petitioners ' applications to license their group

ho me facilities should have been approved by Respondent, Agency

for Persons with Disabilities ( " APD " or "Respondent" ).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In December of 20 17, Petitioners submitted licensure

ap plications to Respondent. The applic ations were for new group

homes and were the initial applications for those group homes.

On March 2, 2018, APD notified Petitioner s in writing that each

of Petitioner s' application s for licensure was denied. Taking

exception to this action, Petitioners timely filed requests for

administrative hearings to contest the denial of their

applications.

On December 10, 2018, the matters were referred to the

Division of Administrative Heari ngs ( " DOAH " ) and assigned DOAH

C ase Nos. 18 - 6496FL and 18 - 6497 FL . By O rder of the undersigned,

the matters were consolidated on December 18, 2018.

On March 28 and 29, 2019, a final hearing was held pursuant

to section 12 0.57(1) . Petitioners presente d the testimony o f

their corporate officer Zulia Brenovil and APD employee Cordroy

Charles. APD presented the testimony of Department of Children

and Families ( " DCF " ) employees Tiffany Perry ("Perry") ,

Charlie Parker ("Parker") , Virginia Snyder ("Snyder") , and

Michelle Windfelder ("Windfelder") . Respondent also presented

the testimony of its own employees , Maria Rubin and Cordroy

Charles.

Regarding exhibits considered at th e hearing, Petitioner

withdrew E xhibit 12, and admitted the remaining E xhibi ts 1

through 34 and 39 without objection. Over objection,

Petitioner ' s E xhibit s 40 and 41 were also admitted. The

undersigned asked Petitioners to submit additional documents

post - hearing, which were admitted as Petitioners ' Exhibits 42

through 47.

Respondent admitted E xh ibits 1 through 4 without objection.

Respondent ' s Exhibits 5 through 10 were also admitted over

objection, on the condition that th e undersigned may exclude

third - party statements contain ed in Exhibits 5 through 10,

unless there was an evidentiary basis to consider them. 1/

A T ranscript of the heari ng was filed with DOAH on

April 16, 2019. By agreement of the parties , and a subsequent

extension granted by the undersigned, proposed recommended

orders were due on May 6, 2019. APD timely filed its proposed

recommended order on May 6, 2019. Petitioner filed a proposed

recommended order on May 7, 2019. It was incorrectly labeled as

" Respondent ' s " Proposed Recommend Order. 2/ The proposed

recommended orders from the parties were rev iewed and considered

in the preparation of this Recommended Order.

All statutory references herein are to the 2018 version of

the Florida Statutes, unless otherwise noted.

FINDING S OF FACT

The undersigned makes the following findings of fact:

1. APD is the state agency that licenses foster care

facilities, group home facilities, residential habilitation

centers, and comprehensive transitional education programs.

§ 393.067 , Fla. Stat . APD is charged with reviewing all

applications and ensur ing compliance with the requirements for

licensure. Id.

Stipulated Facts Submitted by the Parties

2. The parties st ipulated to the following facts.

• Loving Touch Dynamic Group Home and Loving

Touch A Brighter Future Group Home are owned

and operat ed by Loving Touch Adult Family

Care, Inc.

• Zulia Brenovil is Loving Touch Adult

Family Care, Inc. ' s sole shareholder.

• Loving Touch ' s applications for

licensure of the A Brighter Future and

Dynamic homes were ultimately complete and

met all require ments for licensure.

However, APD exerc ised its discretion to

deny the a pplications pursuant to

Section 393. 0673(2) (b), Florida Statutes.

The parties dispute whether such discretion

was correctly applied in this case.

• Until the denial of the A Bright er Future

and Dynamic home applications, APD had not

previously denied a license application

submitted by Loving Touch Adult Family Care,

Inc.

• Loving Touch Adult Family Care, Inc., has

never had a license revoked or suspended by

APD.

• The Notice o f License Application

Denial/Administrative Complaint does not

charge Loving Touch Adult Family Care, Inc.,

with making false statements or omitting

material facts in its license application

under Section 393.0635(2)(a)1, Florida

Statutes.

• Loving Touc h Adult Family Care, Inc., also

owns three additional homes licensed by APD:

Loving Touch " My Place, " Loving Touch

" Transition, " and Loving Touch " Unity. " See

also (Pet. Ex s. 24 - 26 .)

• APD renewed the licenses of My Place,

Transition, and Unity after Ma rch 2, 2018.

• APD had previously renewed and/or issued

the licenses of My Place, Transition, and

Unity after the alleged verified findings by

the Florida Department of Children and

Families.

3. Petitioners are the applicants for licensure of t w o

group home facilities. Resp . Ex s . 1 and 3 . Petitioners '

corporate officer and operator is Zulia Brenovil. She prepared

and submitted both group home licensure application s for Loving

Touch " A Brighter Future " Home and Loving Touch " Dynamic " Home

to AP D in December of 2017. Pre - Hr'g Stip. 3.(e); Resp . Ex s . 1

and 3 .

4. Upon receipt, APD reviewed Petitioners ' applications

for licensure and took steps to verify the accuracy of the

information provid ed in the applications. As part of the

review, APD conducted a search of the Department of Children and

Families ( " DCF " ) records on the Florida Safe Families Network.

Resp . Ex. 2, pp. 80 - 81; Resp. Ex. 3, pp. 186 - 197 .

5. APD ' s search of DCF records revealed four DCF reports

that contained verified findings of abuse, neglect, or

exploitation against Brenovil. Resp. Ex s . 6, 7, 8, and 10 .

Those cases are outlined in more detail below.

DCF Case Number 2015 - 147636

6. DCF case number 2015 - 147636 resulted in a verified

finding of maltreatment/threa tened harm against Brenovil. Resp .

Ex. 6, p. 190 . Tiffany Perry was the DCF investigator assigned

to investigat e the allegations in this case. The initial report

to DCF alleged that minor child E.L., a resident of one of

Brenovil ' s group homes, was bein g bullied by other children and

w as not receiving enough food.

7. Perry began her i nvestigation by performing backg round

checks on the pe rsons involved in the report. Perry then

visited Brenovil ' s group home. Perry interviewed all the

children in the home . Perry noted that E.L. ' s bedroom door had

locks on the outside of the door that would allow someone to

lock E.L. inside his bedroom.

8. Initially, Brenovil denied knowing that the locks had

been switched, but Brenovil ultimately admitted t o Perry that

Brenovil ' s maintenanc e man had switched the locks. Resp . Ex. 6,

p. 191 .

9 . Perry verified the findings against Brenovil because

the locks on E.L. ' s bedroom were on the outside of the door and

this allowed E.L. to be locked in his bedr oom. Resp . Ex. 6,

p. 191 . This also resulted in the other children locking E.L.

in his bedroom. Resp . Ex. 6 , p. 191 .

10 . Additionally, if E.L. was locked in his bedroom she

concluded that his ability to quickly and safely escape the

house in the event of an emergency, such as a fire, would be

impaired. Resp . Ex. 6 , p. 191 .

DCF Case Number 2016 - 297713

11 . DCF case number 2016 - 297713 resulted in a verified

finding of maltreatment/inadequate supervision against Brenovil.

Resp . Ex. 7 , pp. 209 - 210 . Charlie Parker was the DCF

investigator assigned to investigate the allegations in this

case.

12. The initial report to DCF alleged that minor child

L.K., a resident of one of Brenovil ' s group homes, was using a

cell phone to send pictures of L.K. cutting herself and to send

other explicit pictures. Resp . Ex. 7 , p. 209 . There was also

an allegation that another minor child resident, O.W., was not

being closely monitored.

13 . Parker began his investigation by visiting

Petitioner s ' grou p home. Upon inspection, Parker found that

L.K. ' s safety plan was not in L.K. ' s file, as required.

14 . Parker testified that L.K. ' s status was " to be seen,

sight and sound. " " Sight and sound " means that L.K. was

supposed to be within sight of the house parents at Petitioners '

group home at all times , and L.K. was n ever to be left

unsupervised.

15 . Parker stated that he made verified findings against

Brenovil because the safety plans for O.W. and L.K. were not

properly located in the group h ome as required, and that staff

members of the group home did not know the contents of the

plans. Brenovil admitted to Parker that she was aware that the

proper information was not available to the staff members at the

group home.

16 . Based on Bre novil ' s comments and Parker ' s

investigation and interviews of other staff members, Parker

closed the case with a verified finding of

maltreatment/inadequate supervision against Brenovil. Resp .

Ex. 7, p. 211 .

DCF Case Number 2017 - 125783

17 . DCF cas e number 2017 - 125783 resulted in five verified

findings of maltreatment/inadequate supervision against

Brenovil. Resp . Ex. 8, pp. 228 - 229 . Virginia Snyder was the

DCF investigator assigned to investigate the allegations in this

case. The initial report to DCF alleged that five minor

children at two of Brenovil ' s group homes were not b eing

adequately supervised. Resp . Ex. 8, pp. 227 - 228 .

18 . Snyder began her investigation by interviewing the

minor children residents of the group homes and the sta ff

members, including Breno vil. Part of the allegations involved a

child not receiving a ride back to the group home. The child

alleged that she called the group home and no one would pick her

up.

19 . Brenovil informed Snyder the staff member at the group

home could not pick the child up, and Brenovil could not pick

the child up because she had taken headache medicine. Brenovil

and Brenovil ' s staff member both admitted to the investigator

that the minor child had been dropped off at another foste r home

without contacting the foster mother of that foster home in

advance.

20 . Snyder verified findings against Brenovil that

children were going between Brenovil ' s group home and another

group home without staff adequately determining or knowing w h ere

the children were going or located. Additionally, one child was

left at a home and neither Brenovil , nor her employees, we re

able to pick the child up.

DCF Case Number 2009 - 146042

21 . DCF case number 2009 - 146042 resulted in a verified

finding of maltreatment/inadequate supervision against Brenovil.

Resp . Ex. 10 , pp. 248 - 249 . In that case , two residents of

Brenovil ' s group home had improper sexual relations, d ue to

inadequate supervision. Resp. Ex. 10 , p. 248 .

Brenovil ' s Response to the DCF Ve rified Findings

22 . Brenovil denied switching or having someone switch the

locks with respect to DCF case number 2015 - 147636.

23 . Brenovil testified that the safety plans for O.W. and

L.K. were properly in the group home during Investigator

P arker ' s investigatio n in DCF case number 2016 - 297713.

24 . Brenovil denied talking to an investigator with

resp ect to DCF case number 2017 - 125783.

25 . Brenovil testified that she submitted both

applications to APD in full in December of 2017. However, the

Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans, submitted as part of

the applications, were dated January 2018. Resp . Ex. 2, p. 23 .

Brenovil did not sign the Comprehensive Emergency Management

Plan until February 16, 2018. Resp . Ex. 2 , p. 37 . S imilarly,

the Sexual Activities Policy, another document submitted as part

of the licensure application, was not s igned by Brenovil until

January 18, 2018. Resp . Ex. 2 , p. 103 .

26 . Similarly, the Sexual Activ ity Policy submitted as

part of A Brighte r Future ' s application for licensure was not

signed by Bre novil until January 18, 2018. Resp . Ex. 4 ,

pp. 184 - 185 .

27 . After being confronted with the late documents,

Brenovil admitted that the completed applications were not

submitted until after De cember of 2017. 3/

28 . As part of the DCF investigati on in case number 2015 -

147636, Perry interviewed Brenovil ' s board m ember, Mr. Phillip

Alexander ("Alexander") . Resp . Ex. 6 , p. 194 . Alexander

informed Perry that the locks had been reversed for y ears.

Resp. Ex. 6 , p. 194 .

29. When confronted with this at the hearing, Brenovil

stated that Alexander did no t make this statement to DCF.

Brenovil later testified that she knew Alexander did not make

that statement because Bre n ovil was present fo r the conversation

between Alexander and Perry. However, on re - direct, Brenovil

acknowledged that she was not present for the conversation

between Alexander and Perry.

30 . Brenovil testified that she voluntarily gave up her

licenses for her DCF lice nsed group homes, and that there had

been no threat of ad ministrative action from DCF.

31 . However, Michelle Windfelder, a DCF licensing

specialist, testified that Brenovil relinquished her l icense s i n

lieu of revocation. Windfelder testified that , because of

problems in Brenovil ' s home, DCF contacted Brenovil and advised

Brenovil that she had the option of relinquishing her license s ,

otherwise DCF was going to revoke the license s . Windfelder

testified that because of the impending revocation by D CF,

Brenovil decided to volunt arily relinquish the license s .

32 . Petitioners offered no compelling or persuasive

evidence to show that APD wrongly denied their license

applications, or abused the discretion afforded to it under

section 393.0673(2) ( b) , Florida Statutes .

33 . The undersigned finds the t estimony and evidence of

the DCF investigators and the DCF licensing specialist more

compelling and credible than that of B r enovil.

34 . Ultimately, the Petitioners did not carry their burde n

of proof to show that APD abused its discretion or when it

denied th eir initial applications .

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

35 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has

jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties to this

proceeding. §§ 120.569, 120 . 57(1), Fla. Stat.

36 . Generally, the applicant for licensure has the burden

of proof to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that it satisfies the requirements for licensur e and is entitled

to receive a license. Dep ' t of Banking & Fin. v . Osborne Stern

& Co . , 670 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1996).

37 . Thus, Petitioners were required to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that their applications for

licensure should have been approved.

Applicable Law and Regulations

3 8 . Section 393.067 sets forth APD ' s responsibilities

regarding application procedures and provider qualifications.

Another section, section 393.0673, outlines factors and

considerations pertaining to licensure.

39 . Section 393.0673(2) provides that the agenc y may deny

an initial application for licensure submitted pursuant to

section 393.067 , if the Department of Children and Family

Services has verified that the applicant is responsible for the

abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a child or the abuse, neglect,

or exploitation of a vulnerable adult. § 3 93.0673(2),

Fla. Stat. 4/

40 . Other provisions of chapter 393 are relevant as well.

These sections strong ly suggest and signal that the a gency must

consider and evaluate key management personnel of the lice nsee

before issuing a license.

41 . F or instance, section 393.067(4), entitled " Facility

licensure , " directs that the application must be under oath and

contain " the name of the person or persons under whose

management or supervision the facility or program will be

conducted. "

42 . Likewise, subsection (5) of that same section requires

that a license may not be issued or renewed if the applicant " or

any manager, supervisor, or staff member " of the direct service

provider has failed background scr eenings as required under

section 393.0655.

43 . It is clear, and the undersigned concludes, that th e

Legislature intended for the a gency to consider the background

and character of individuals who own or intend to operate these

facilities, regardles s of who the actual applicant may be.

44 . In addition to the language of c hapter 393, the

pertinent Florida Administrative Code Rule defines " applicant "

to mean " a person or entity that has submitte d a written

application to the a gency for the purpos es of obtaining an

initial residential facility license or renewing an existing

residential facility license. " Fla. Admin. Code R. 65G -

2.001(2).

45. This language reasonably covers or addresses a

situation where the license would be issued to a corp oration,

but the application is prepared and submitted by a person who

may be closely related to the company.

46 . T he primary legal dispute in these particular case s

revolves around the question of whether or not the DCF findings

against B r enovil , in dividually , should be imputed or attributed

to the corporate applicant ' s. In other words, can the verified

findings against her be considered and used by the a gency to

deny licensure to corporate entities she owns or operates.

47 . Petitioner corpor ations emphatically argue that they

are separate " applicants ," and the findings against B r enovil

individually may not be considered as a basis to reject their

corporate applications under section 393.0673(2) (b).

48 . APD, on the other hand, argues tha t the statute and

rule should be interpreted to allow misconduct and the DCF

findings against B r enovil to be imputed or attributed to the

corporate applicants she owns or operates; therefore , providing

a valid basis to deny their initial applications under

section 393.0673(2) (b).

49 . A related issue concerns whether or not APD is

estopped from rejecting the initial license applications of

these two companies , since they renewed applications for several

other companies owned by B r enovil, despite knowi ng that DCF

verified findings against B r enovil already existed.

Discussion

50 . As the sole operator of the two companies , and the

sole shareholder of their parent corporation, Brenovil prepared,

signed , and submitted the appli cations for both group homes.

Resp . Ex. 2, p. 97; Resp . Ex. 4 , p. 197 . It was clear that

Brenovil would be closely and actively overseeing the operations

of both applicants.

51 . The interp retation of section 393.0673(2) (b) and

Florida Administrative Code Rule 65G - 2.001(2 ) proposed by

Petitioners, particularly , its interpretation of the word

" applicant ," would permit a corporate applicant to seek an

initial license , despite the fact that its sole operator, who

filled out and submitted the application, had previously been

f ound to have verified findings of child neglect or abuse. This

argument is made , despite the fact that it is undisp uted, and

the undersigned finds , that B r enovil would be actively and

closely involved in the day - to - day operations of the applicants.

Statut ory Interpretation Analysis

52 . To accept Petitioners ' argument and ignore B r enovil ' s

previous violations would lead to an illogical result. APD

could not exercise its lawful discretion to deny an initial

licensure for findings of child abuse or neg lect by the

operator , so long as a corporation , formed and owned by the same

operator , is the " applicant. " Under Petitioners ' interpretation

of the word " applicant , " B r enovil could figuratively hide behind

the veil of the corporations. A statute should n ot be construed

or interpreted to bring about an absurd or ridiculous result.

Dep ' t of Rev . v. Sch. Bd . , 62 So. 3d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

53 . Similarly, to interp ret the word as narrowly as

Petitioners suggest would lead to an unreasonable result o r a

manifest incongruity. Vrchota Corp. v. Kelly , 42 So. 3d 319

(Fla. 4th DCA 2010). If consideration of an " applicant " was

limited only to the company actually submitting it s name for a

license, then the a gency would be obligated to overlook and

ignore the past conduct of officers closely related to the

company and actively involved in its operations.

54 . This would lead to an unreasonable result, subjecting

children and other vulnerable young adults to a potentially

unstable or unsafe group home . See also O.I.C.L. v. Dep ' t of

Child . & Fams . , 169 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Th is

unsafe course of action and illogical result was not intended by

the Legislature.

Principles of Corporate Law

55 . Time - honored principles of corporate law als o must be

considered. They indicate that the corporate applicants must be

bound by B r enovil ' s misconduct and the verified findings against

her by DCF.

56 . More specifically , and based on the evidence

presented, the undersigned concludes that B r enovi l was the

" alter ego " of the two corporate applicants. Under the

circumstances in these cases , h er identity cannot be separated

from the corporate applicants .

57. As such, her actions, conduct , and the verified

findings against her sh ould be imputed or attributed by APD to

the corporate applicants as a basis to deny their applications.

There are a myriad of cases addressing and explaining the " alter

ego " concept in a corporate setting. A few case citations make

the point.

58 . For instance, in Sky Cable, LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc. , 886

F.3d 375 (4th Cir . 2018) , the court utilized the " alter ego "

theory of corporate law, and found that a court may disr egard

the corporate identity if it would be inequitable for the c ourt

to uphold a legal distinction b etween the corporation and its

sole member. Id. at 386.

59 . Under Sky Cable , when an entity, such as a corporation

or LLC, is determined to be the alter ego of its sole member,

this finding permits a court to treat the corporate entity as

" identic al " to its member . Id. at 389. Disregarding the

corporate identity under the alter ego theory is particularly

appropriate when a single individual or entity completely

dominates and controls another entity. Id. at 390.

60 . This is precisely wha t h appened in these case s .

B r enovil owned, dominated , and controlled all the Loving Touch

entities, including the new corporate applicants.

61 . When a company is an alter ego of its sole member, the

alter ego and the member are effectively the same en tity. See

also Dehres LLC v. Underwriters at Interest at Lloyds London ,

826 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Phillips v. Englewood

Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S. , Inc. , 13 9

P.3d 639 (Colo. Supreme Court 2006).

Collateral Estoppel

62 . The Loving Touch applicants also argue that collateral

estoppel bars APD from denying their initial applications

because APD renewed licenses for other Loving Touch entities

when it knew , or should have known , that DCF had made verified

findings agai nst B r enovil.

63 . In Zikofsky v. Marketing 10, Inc. , 904 So. 2d 520

( Fla. 4th DCA 2005) , the c ourt explained the concept as follows:

In Florida, collateral estoppel bars re -

litigation of the same issue between the

same parties which has already been

determined by a valid judgment. Stogniew v.

McQueen , 656 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 1995).

Collateral estoppel applies even when a

present and former cause of action are

different and it bars re - litigation of

specific issues -- " that is to say points and

questi ons " -- that were actually litigated and

decided in the former suit. See Gordon v.

Gordon , 59 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 1952); GLA &

Assoc., Inc. v. City of Boca Raton , 855 So.

2d 278, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). " Florida

has traditionally required that there be a

mutuality of parties in order for the

doctrine to apply. Thus, unless both

parties are bound by the prior judgment,

neither may use it in a subsequent action. "

E.C. v. Katz, 73 1 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (Fla.

1999) (quoting Stogniew, 656 So. 2d at 919).

64 . The undersigned is not persuaded or convinced

that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies or

controls the outcome of these cases . The parties are not

re - litigating the same issues, nor is there any previous

ruling or judgment they are bound by.

65. Likewise, the other corporate entities owned by

B r enovil who had their licenses rene wed are not parties to

this action.

66 . Similarly, and as alluded to by APD during the

hearing, those other license matters involved renewals of

existing lic enses. These case s involve initial licensing.

The undersigned is mindful of the fact that license

renewal cases raise fundamentally different property

concepts , arguments, and considerations than initial

licensing cases .

67 . The undersigned conclud es that APD provided

sufficient reasons why its consideration of these initial

applications was fundamentally different and driven by

different considerations than in the case of the renewal

of other group home licenses for Brenovil.

68 . Accordingly, after considering all the facts,

circumstances , and the applicable statutes, rules , and case law,

the undersigned concludes that APD was justified in denying

Petitioners ' applications.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Concl usions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with

Disabiliti es, enter a final order denying the license

applications of Petitioners, Loving Touch " A Brighter Future "

and Loving Touch " Dynamic ."

DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May , 2019 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

ROBERT L. KILBRIDE

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fa x Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 28th day of May , 2019 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ The undersigned did consider relevant statements of third

parties in those documents to the extent they supplemented , or

explained , other admissibl e evidence. § 120.57 (1) (c) ,

Fla. Stat .

2/ As previously directed, the Loving Touch applicants are to be

referred to as Petitioners, not Respondents.

3/ This admission , and other inconsistencies in her tes timony,

raised questions in the mind of the undersigned regardin g her

and the accuracy of her testimony and credibility.

4/ There was no evidence presented by Petitioners to suggest or

prove that these previous verified findings of abuse or neglect

made by DCF against B r enovil had been a ppealed or overturned.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Lance O. Leider, Esquire

The Health Law Firm

1101 Douglas Avenue

Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714

(eServed)

Trevor S. Suter, Esquire

Agency for Persons with Disabilities

4030 E splanade Way , Suite 380

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950

(eServed)

Danielle Thompson

Senior Attorney/Agency Clerk

Agency for Persons with Disabilities

4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 309

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950

(eServed)

Richard Ditschler, Genera l Counsel

Agenc y for Persons with Disabilities

4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950

(eServed)

Barbara Palmer, Director

Agenc y for Persons with Disabilities

4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0950

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Ord er in this case.