18-006752 Matlacha Civic Association, Inc., J. Michael Hannon, Karl R. Deigert, Yolanda Olsen, Robert S. Zarranz, Debra Hall, Melanie Hoff, And Jessica Blanks vs. City Of Cape Coral And Department Of Environmental Protection Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, December 12, 2019.

Summary: Petitioners met their ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that the Project does not comply with all applicable permitting criteria. The City failed to demonstrate its compliance with all applicable permitting criteria and its entitlement to the Permit.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

MATLACHA CIVIC ASSOCIATION,

INC., J. MICHAEL HANNON, KARL R.

DEIGERT, YOLANDA OLSEN, ROBERT

S. ZARRANZ, DEBRA HALL, MELANIE

HOFF, AND JESSICA BLANKS ,

Petitioners , vs.

CITY OF CAPE CORAL AND

DE PARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL Case No. 18 - 6752

PROTECTION ,

Respondents .

/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case on

April 11 and 12, 2019, and on May 10, 2019, in Cape Cora l,

Florida, before Francine M. Ffolkes, an Administrative Law Judge

with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioners:

J. Michael Hannon, Qualified Representative

2721 Clyde Street

Matlacha, Florida 33993

John S. Turner, Esquire

Peterson Law Group

Post Office Box 670

Fort Myers, Florida 33902

For Respondent City of Cape Coral:

Craig D. Varn, Esquire

Amy Wells Brennan, Esquire

Manson Bolves Donaldson Varn, P.A.

106 East College Avenue, Suite 820

Tallahassee, Flor ida 32301

Steven D . Griffin

City of Cape Coral

Assistant City Attorney

P ost Office Box 150027

Cape Coral, Florida 33915 - 0027

For Respondent Department of Environmental Protection:

Kirk Sanders White, Esquire

Department of Environmental Protection

Mai l Station 35

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard,

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3000

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case was whether the Respondent, City of

Cape Coral (City), was entitled to an Individual Environmental

Resource Permit (Permit) that wo uld allow removal of the Chiquita

Boat Lock (Lock) and associated uplands, and installation of a

165 - foot linear seawall in the South Spreader Waterway in Cape

Coral, Florida.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On October 31, 2016, the City submitted an application fo r

the Permit. The Department of Environmental Protection

(Department) announced its intent to issue the Permit to the City

on November 7, 2018.

On December 14, 2018, the Petitioners, Matlacha Civic

Association , Inc. (Association), Karl Deigert, Debra Ha ll,

Melanie Hoff, Robert S. Zarranz, Yolanda Olsen, Jessica Blanks,

and Joseph Michael Hannon, timely filed a joint petition for

administrative hearing. On December 21, 2018, the Department

referred the petition to DOAH to conduct an evidentiary hearing

a nd submit a recommended order.

On February 28 and March 1, 2019, the Department gave notice

of revisions to the intent to issue and draft permit.

The Department filed a motion to strike and/or in limine on

January 4, 2019. On January 18, 2019, the Pet itioners filed

their motion for entry of a partial final order. The major issue

raised by those motions concerned a Consent Order dated

April 19, 1977 (CO 15), between the Department of Environmental

Regulation and GAC Properties, Inc. CO 15 was the reafter amended

o n April 27, 1979. The subject matter of this administrative

proceeding was a proposed agency action to allow removal of the

Lock. The Lock and South Spreader Waterway were first

constructed by GAC Properties, Inc., as a result of the

req uirements of CO 15 , as amended . On March 7, 2019, the motions

were denied without prejudice.

On April 1, 2019, the Department filed an amended second

motion to strike and/or in limine, to which the Petitioners

responded on April 5 , 2019. By O rder dated April 9, 2019,

evidence and argument on certain issues were excluded from this

proceeding. Those issues included potential collateral attacks

on final agency actions and alleged violations of federal law.

The April 9, 2019, Amended Order Limiting Issues is incorporated

herein.

The parties filed their Joint Pre - hearing Stipulation on

April 1, 2019, which attempted to limit the issues for the final

hearing.

At the final hearing, Joint Exhibit 1 was admitted into

evidence. The Petitioners offered the fa ct testimony of Anthony

Janicki, Ph.D., Karl Deigert, Melanie Hoff, Robert S. Zarranz,

Yolanda Olsen, Jessica Blanks, Michael Hannon, Frank Muto, and

Jon Iglehart, and the expert testimony of David Woodhouse, Kevin

Erwin, and John Cassani. The Petitione rs ' Exhibits 18 (a time

series video), 37, 40 (top page), 43, 44, 47, 48, 62 through 68,

76 (aerial video) , 77 (aerial video) , 78 (frame 5), 79 (eight

images), 87, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 129, 132, 141 (not for

truth), and 152 were admitted into evidence. The City presented

the fact testimony of Oliver Clarke and Jacob Schrager, and the

expert testimony of Anthony Janicki, Ph.D. The City ' s Exhibits

1, 2, 9, and 27 were admitted into evidence. The Department

presented the fact testimony of Megan Mills. The Petitioners

proffered Exhibits P - R1, P - R2, and P - R3, which were denied

admission into evidence by Order dated June 21, 2019.

A three - volume Transcript of the hearing was filed with DOAH

on June 3, 2019. Proposed recommended orders were filed by the

parties on July 3, 2019, and have been considered in the

preparation of this Recommended Order. The Petitioners' motion

to exceed page limit that was filed with their proposed

recommended order is granted.

References to Florida Statutes are to the 2019 version,

unless otherwise stated.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the parties' stipulations and the evidence adduced

at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made:

The Parties

1. The Department is the administrative agency of the State

of Flor ida statutorily charged with, among other things,

protecting Florida's water resources. As part of the

Department's performance of these duties, it administers and

enforces the provisions of chapter 373, part IV, Florida

Statutes, and the rules promulgate d thereunder in the Florida

Administrative Code. Pursuant to that authority, the Department

determines whether to issue or deny applications for

environmental resource permits.

2. The City is a Florida municipality in Lee County. The

City ant for the Permit allowing the removal of the is the applic

Lock and installation of a seawall (Project). The Project is

located within the geographic boundary of the City. The South

Spreader Waterway is a perimeter canal separating the City's

canal system from shore line wetlands to the west and south, which

run the length of Matlacha Pass to the mouth of the

Caloosahatchee River at San Carlos Bay. 1/

3. The Association is a Florida non - profit corporation that

was created in 1981. The Association was created to saf eguard

the interests of its members. The Association has approximately

150 members who reside in Matlacha and Matlacha Isles, Florida.

A substantial number of its members have substantial interests in

the use and enjoyment of waters adjacent to and surro unding

Matlacha. The Association's members were particularly interested

in protecting the water quality of the surface waters in the

area.

4. Matlacha is an island community located to the northwest

of Cape Coral, the South Spreader Waterway, and the Lo ck.

Matlacha is located within Matlacha Pass Aquatic Preserve.

Matlacha Pass is classified as a Class II waterbody designated

for shellfish propagation or harvesting, and is an Outstanding

Florida Water (OFW). See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62 - 02.400(17)(b)36;

6 2 - 302.700(9)(h).

5. Petitioner , Karl Deigert , is a resident and property

owner in Matlacha. Mr. Deigert is the president of the

Association. Mr. Deigert’s house in Matlacha is waterfront. He

holds a captain’s license and has a business in which he g ives

sightseeing and ecological tours by boat of the waters around

Matlacha. He fishes in the waters around his property and enjoys

the current water quality in the area. He is concerned that

removal of the Lock would have negative effects on water quali ty

and would negatively impact the viability of his business and his

enjoyment of the waters surrounding Matlacha.

6. Petitioner , Melanie Hoff , is a resident and property

owner in St. James City. St. James City is located to the

southwest of Cape Coral. Ms. Hoff’s property is located within

five nautical miles of the Lock. Ms. Hoff engages in various

water sports and fishes in the waters around her property. She

moved to the area , in part , for the favorable water quality. She

is concerned that remova l of the Lock would negatively impact

water quality and her ability to use and enjoy waters in the

area.

7. Petitioner , Robert S. Zarranz , is a resident and

property owner in Cape Coral. Mr. Zarranz’s house in Cape Coral

is waterfront. He is an avid fi sherman and boater. He is

concerned that removal of the Lock would negatively impact water

quality, and that the quality of fishing in the area would

decline as a result.

8. Petitioner , Yolanda Olsen , is a resident and property

owner in Cape Coral. Ms. Olsen’s house in Cape Coral is

waterfront. She enjoys watersports and birdwatching in the areas

around her property. She is concerned that removal of the Lock

would negatively impact water quality, and that her ability to

enjoy her property and the surr ounding waters would suffer as a

result.

9. Petitioner , Jessica Blanks , is a resident and property

owner in Cape Coral. Ms. Blanks’ house in Cape Coral is

waterfront. She is concerned that removal of the Lock would

negatively impact water quality, and that her ability to enjoy

her property and the surrounding waters would suffer as a result.

10. Petitioner , Joseph Michael Hannon , is a resident and

property owner in Matlacha. Mr. Hannon is a member of the

Association. He enjoys boating, fishing, and kayaking in the

waters surrounding Matlacha. He is concerned that removal of the

Lock would negatively impact water quality, and that his ability

to enjoy his property and the surrounding waters would suffer as

a result.

11. Petitioner , Debra Hall , did not appear at the final

hearing and no testimony was offered regarding her standing.

The Project and Vicinity

12. The Project site is 0.47 acres. At the Lock location,

the South Spreader Waterway is 200 feet wide, and includes a

125 - foot wide upland ar ea secured by two seawalls, the 20 - foot

wide Lock, a 32 - foot wide upland area secured by one seawall, and

23 feet of mangrove wetlands.

13. The Lock is bordered to the north by property owned by

Cape Harbour Marina, LLC, and bordered to the south by mang rove

wetlands owned by the state of Florida. The 125 - foot wide upland

area and the 20 - foot wide Lock form a barrier separating the

South Spreader Waterway from the Caloosahatchee River. The

preponderance of the competent substantial evidence established

that the South Spreader Waterway behind the Lock is not tidally

influenced, but would become tidally influenced upon removal of

the Lock.

Joint Exhibit 1 at p. 46.

14. The City proposes to remove the Lock and one of the

seaw alls, reducing the 125 - foot upland area to 20 feet. The

proposed future condition of the area would include 125 feet of

open canal directly connecting the South Spreader Waterway with

the Caloosahatchee River.

Joint Exhibit 1 at p. 47.

15. The primary purpose of the Lock's removal is to

alleviate safety concerns related to boater navigation. The

Project's in - water construction includes demolition and removal

of the existing Lock, removal of existing fill in the 125 - foot

upland area, removal of existin g seawalls, and construction of

replacement seawalls.

16. The City would employ Best Management Practices (BMPs)

throughout the course of the Project, including sediment and

erosion controls such as turbidity barriers. The turbidity

barriers would be ma de of a material in which manatees could not

become entangled.

17. All personnel involved with the Project would be

instructed about the presence of manatees. Also, temporary signs

concerning manatees would be posted prior to and during all

in - water project activities.

History of the South Spreader Waterway

18. In the mid - 1970's, the co - trustees of Gulf American

Corporation, GAC Properties Credit, Inc., and GAC Properties,

Inc., (collectively GAC) filed for after - the - fact permits from

the Departmen t's predecessor agency (DER), for the large dredge

and fill work project that created the canal system in Cape

Coral.

19. In 1977, DER entered into CO 15 with GAC to create the

North and South Spreader Waterways and retention control systems,

including b arriers. The Lock was one of the barriers created in

response to CO 15.

20. The Spreader Waterways were created to restore the

natural hydrology of the area affected by GAC's unauthorized

dredging and filling activity. The Spreader Waterways collected

and retained surface runoff waters originating from the interior

of Cape Coral's canal system.

21. The South Spreader Waterway was not designed to meet

water quality standards, but instead to collect surface runoff,

then allow discharge of the excess w aters collected over and

through the mangrove wetlands located on the western and southern

borders of the South Spreader Waterway.

22. This fresh water flow was designed to mimic the

historic sheet flow through the coastal fringe of mangroves and

salt ma rshes of the Caloosahatchee River and Matlacha Pass

estuaries. The fresh water slowly discharged over the coastal

fringe until it finally mixed with the more saline waters of the

estuaries. The estuarine environments located west and south of

the Lock re quire certain levels of salinity to remain healthy

ecosystems. Restoring and achieving certain salinity ranges was

important to restoring and preserving the coastal fringe.

23. In 1977 GAC finalized bankruptcy proceedings and

executed CO 15. CO 15 requ ired GAC to relinquish to the state of

Florida the mangrove wetlands it owned on the western and

southern borders of the South Spreader Waterway. This land grant

was dedicated by a warranty deed executed in 1977 between GAC and

the state of Florida.

24. The Petitioners' expert, Kevin Erwin, worked as an

environmental specialist for DER prior to and during the

construction of the Spreader Waterways. Mr. Erwin was DER's main

representative who worked with the GAC co - trustees to resolve the

massive dredge and fill violation and design a system to restore

the natural hydrology of the area.

25. Mr. Erwin testified that the Lock was designed to

assist in retention of fresh water in the South Spreader Waterway.

The fresh water would be retained, slowed down, and allowed to

slowly sheet flow over and through the coastal fringe.

26. Mr. Erwin also testified that the South Spreader

Waterway was not designed to allow direct tidal exchange with the

Caloosahatchee River. In Mr. Erwin's opinion, the South Sprea der

Waterway appeared to be functioning today in the same manner as

originally intended.

Breaches and Exchange of Waters

27. The Department's second amended notice of intent for

the Project , stated that the Project was not expected to

contribute to curre nt water quality violations , because water in

the South Spreader Waterway was already being exchanged with

Matlacha Pass and the Caloosahatchee River through breaches and

direct tidal flow. This second amended notice of intent removed

all references to mi tigation projects that would provide a net

improvement in water quality as part of the regulatory basis for

issuance of the permit. See Joint E xhibit 1 at pp. 326 - 333.

28. The Department's witnesses testified that waters within

the South Spreader Waterw ay currently mix with waters of the

Caloosahatchee River when the Lock remains open during incoming

and slack tides. A Department permit allowed the Lock to remain

open during incoming and slack tides. Department witness, Megan

Mills, the permitting prog ram administrator, testified that she

could not remember the exact date that permit was issued, but

that it had been "a couple years."

29. The location of breaches in the western and southern

banks of the South Spreader Waterway was documented on another

permit's drawings and pictures for a project titled "Cape Coral

Spreader Waterway Restoration." See Cape Coral Ex. 9. Those

documents located three breaches for repair and restoration identified as Breach 16A, Breach 16B, and Breach 20.

30. The mode ling reports and discussion that support the

City's application showed these three breaches connect to

Matlacha Pass Aquatic Preserve. Breach 20 was described as a

connected tidal creek. Breach 16A and 16B were described as

allowing water movement betwee n Matlacha Pass and the South

Spreader Waterway only when relatively high water elevations

occurred in Matlacha Pass or in the South Spreader Waterway.

31. The Department's water quality explanation of "mixing,"

was rather simplistic , and did not conside r that the waterbody in

which the Project would occur has three direct connections with

an OFW that is a Class II water s designated for shellfish

propagation or harvesting. Such a consideration would require

the Department to determine whether to apply th e OFW permitting

standards, and the Class II waters permitting criteria in section

10.2.5 of the Environmental Resource Permit Applicant's Handbook,

Volume I. See Fla. Admin Code R. 62 - 330.302(1)(a) ; 62 - 4.242(2);

and 62 - 302.400(17)(b)36.

32. The Caloosa hatchee River , at its entrance to the South

Spreader Waterway , is a Class III waters restricted for shellfish

harvesting. The mouth of the Caloosahatchee River is San Carlos

Bay, which is a Class II waters restricted for shellfish

harvesting. There was n o evidence that the Department's

regulatory analysis considered that the waterbody in which the

Project would occur directly connects to Class III waters that

are restricted for shellfish harvesting, and is in close

proximity to Class II waters that are re stricted for shellfish

harvesting. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62 - 302.400(17)(b)36. and

62 - 330.302(1)(c). 2/

Total Nitrogen

33. The City' s expert, Anthony Janicki, Ph.D., testified

that nitrogen concentrations in the Caloosahatchee River were

higher than i n the South Spreader Waterway in the years 2017 and

2018. Thus, he opined that if the Lock is removed , water from

the South Spreader Waterway would not negatively impact the

Caloosahatchee River. However, the City's application was

supported by an analys is , with more than a decade of monitoring

data , which showed nitrogen concentration values were comparable

inside t he South Spreader Waterway and i n the Caloosahatchee

River.

34. Dr. Janicki also used the Department's Hydrologic

Simulation Program – FOR TRAN (HSPF) watershed model to estimate

the Total Nitrogen (TN) loading that would enter the

Caloosahatchee River through the Chiquita Lock. Dr. Janicki

estimated that TN loading to the Caloosahatchee River , after

removal of the Chiquita Lock , would amoun t to 30,746 pounds per

year. The Caloosahatchee River is listed as impaired for

nutrients and has a TN Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) that was

set by the Department in 2009 .

35. Dr. Janicki opined that removing the Lock would not

result in adverse impa cts to the surrounding environment. But

the Petitioners obtained his concession that his opinion was

dependent on the City's completion of additional water quality

enhancement projects in the future as part of its obligations

under the Caloosahatchee Estu ary Basin Management Action Plan

(BMAP) for achieving the TN TMDL.

36. Dr. Janicki additionally testified that the potential

TN loading to the Caloosahatchee River did not anticipate an

actual impact to the River ' s water quality because the TN loads

fr om the South Spreader Waterway were already factored into the

2009 TMDL. He essentially testified that the Lock' s removal was

anticipated and was factored into the model when the TMDL was

established in 2009.

37. Thus, the Petitioners proved by a prepon derance of the

competent and substantial evidence that the Department and the

City were not aligned regarding how the City's application would

provide reasonable assurances of meeting applicable water quality

standards.

38. The Petitioners proved by a pr eponderance of the

competent and substantial evidence that the City relied on future

projects to provide reasonable assurance that the removal of the

Lock would not cause or contribute to violations of water quality

standards in the Caloosahatchee River an d the Matlacha Pass

Aquatic Preserve.

39. The Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the

competent and substantial evidence that the Department relied on

a simplistic exchange of waters to determine that removal of the

Lock would not cause or contrib ute to violations of water quality

standards in the Caloosahatchee River and the Matlacha Pass

Aquatic Preserve.

Water Quantity and Salinity

40. The engineering report that supports the City's

application state d that when the Lock is removed , the South

Spreader Waterway behind the Lock will become tidally influenced.

With the Lock removed, the volume of daily water fluxes for the

South Spreader Waterway would increase from zero cubic meters per

day to 63,645 cubic meters per day. At the location of Br each

20, with the Lock removed, the volume of daily water fluxes would

drastically decrease from 49,644 cubic meters per day to eight

cubic meters per day.

41. Dr. Janicki testified that Breach 20 was connected to a

remnant tidal creek that meanders and eventually empties into an

embayment. The evidence demonstrated that the embayment is Punta

Blanca Bay , which is part of the Matlacha Pass Aquatic Preserve.

Dr. Janicki opined that Breach 20 was an area of erosion risk and

sediment transport into downst ream mangroves that would be

significantly reduced by removing the Lock. He explained that

the reductions in flow would result in reductions in velocities

through Breach 20 and in the South Spreader Waterway itself.

42. Mr. Erwin testified that Breach 2 0 was not a "breach." 3/

He described it as the location of a perpendicular intersection

of the South Spreader Waterway with a small tidal creek, which

connected to a tidal pond further back in the mangroves. Mr.

Erwin testified that an "engineered sandba g concrete structure"

was built at the shallow opening to limit the amount of flow into

and out of this tidal creek system. But it was also designed to

make sure that the tidal creek system "continued to get some

amount of water." As found above, Lock re moval would drastically

reduce the volume of daily water fluxes into and out of Breach

20 's tidal creek system .

43. Mr. Erwin also testified that any issues with

velocities or erosion would be exemplified by bed lowering,

siltation, and stressed mangrove s. He persuasively testified,

however, that there was no such evidence of erosion and there

were "a lot of real healthy mangroves."

44. Mr. Erwin opined that removal of the Lock would cause

the South Spreader Waterway to go from a closed, mostly fresh

water system, to a tidal saline system. He described the current

salinity level in the South Spreader Waterway to be low enough to

support low salinity vegetation and not high enough to support

marine organisms like barnacles and oysters.

45. The City' s application actually supports this opinion.

Using the Environmental Fluid Dynamics Code (EFDC) model

developed by Dr. Janicki for this Lock removal project,

comparisons were made describing the salinity distribution within

the South Spreader Waterway. The model was run with and without

the Lock, for both a wet and dry year.

46. Dr. Janicki testified , and the model showed, that

removal of the Lock would result in increased salinity above the

Lock and decreased salinity downstream of the Lock. However, he

generally opined that the distribution of salinities was well

within the normal ranges seen in this area. The City's

application also concluded that the resultant salinities d id not

fall outside the preferred salinity ranges for seagrasses,

oysters, a nd a wide variety of fish taxa. However, Dr. Janicki

did not address specific changes in vegetation and encroachment

of marine organisms that would occur with the increase in

salinity within the South Spreader Waterway.

Secondary Impacts to the Mangrove Wetlands

47. Mr. Erwin testified that the mangroves located on the

western and southern borders of the South Spreader Waterway are

currently in very good health. He additionally testified that

loss of the current fresh water hydraulic head and an incre ase in

salinity within the South Spreader Waterway would negatively

impact the health of the mangrove wetlands.

48. In addition , the City's application stated that

removing the Lock would result in a drop in the water level of

one to one and a half fee t within the South Spreader Waterway.

Mr. Erwin credibly and persuasively testified that a drop in

water level of only a few inches would have negative effects on

the health of mangroves, and that a drop of a foot could result

in substantial mangrove die - off.

49. Mr. Erwin testified that the mangrove wetlands adjacent

to the South Spreader Waterway consist of a variety of plants and

algae in addition to mangroves. He described the wetlands as a

mangrove community made up of different types of mangroves, and

epiphytic vegetation such as marine algae. This mangrove

community provides habitat for a "wide range of invertebrates."

He further testified that these plants and algae uptake and

transform the nutrients that flow over and through the mangrove

wetl ands before they reach the receiving waters. Thus, the

mangrove wetlands on the western and southern borders of the

South Spreader Waterway serve to filter nutrients out of the

water discharged from the Waterway before it reaches Matlacha

Pass and the Cal oosahatchee River.

50. Mr. Erwin's credible and persuasive testimony was

contrary to the City's contention that Lock removal w ould not

result in adverse impacts to the mangrove wetlands adjacent to

the South Spreader Waterway.

51. The City and the Depa rtment failed to provide

reasonable assurances that removing the Lock would not have

adverse secondary impacts to the health of the mangrove wetlands

community adjacent to the South Spreader Waterway.

Impacts to Fish and Wildlife, Including Endangered and Threatened

Species

52. The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission

(FWC) reviewed the City ' s application and determined that if BMPs

for in - water work were employed during construction, no

significant adverse impacts on fish and wildlife were expected.

For example, temporary signs concerning manatees would be posted

prior to and during all in - water project activities, and all

personnel would be instructed about the presence of manatees.

53. The FWC determination only addressed direct impact s

during in - water construction work. The City's application

contained supporting material that identified the major change

resulting from removal of the Lock that may influence fish and

wildlife in the vicinity of the Project , was the opportunity for

move ment to or from the South Spreader Waterway canal system.

Threatened and endangered species of concern in the area included

the Florida manatee and the smalltooth sawfish.

54. The City's application stated that literature review

showed the smalltooth sa wfish and the Florida manatee utilized

non - main - stem habitats, such as sea - wall lined canals, off the

Caloosahatchee River. The City cited studies from 2011 and 2013,

which showed that non - main - stem habitats were important thermal

refuges during the winte r , and part of the overall nursery area

for smalltooth sawfish. The City concluded that removal of the

Lock "would not be adverse, and would instead result in increased

areas of useable habitat by the species."

55. However, the Petitioner's expert witne ss, John Cassani ,

who is the Calusa W aterkeeper, testified t hat there is a

smalltooth sawfish exclusion zone downstream of the Lock.

He testified that the exclusion zone is a pupping area for

smalltooth sawfish, and that rapid salinity fluctuations c ould

negatively impact their habitat.

56. The City also concluded that any impacts to the Florida

manatee would not be adverse , "and would instead result in

increased areas of useable habitat by the species, as well as a

reduction in risk of entrapment o r crushing in a canal lock

system." At the same time, the City acknowledged that

"watercraft collision is a primary anthropogenic threat to

manatees."

57. The City 's literature review included a regional

assessment by FWC's Fish and Wildlife Research Institute (FWRI)

from 2006. Overall, the FWRI report concluded that the mouth of

the Caloosahatchee River, at San Carlos Bay, was a "hot spot" for

boat traffic coinciding with the shift and dispersal of manatees

from winter refugia . The result was a "hig h risk of manatee -

motorboat collisions." In addition, testimony adduced at the

hearing from an 18 - year employee of Cape Harbour Marina, Mr.

Frank Muto, was that Lock removal would result in novice boaters

increasing their speed, ignoring the no - wake and s low - speed

zones , and presenting "a bigger hazard than the [L] ock ever has."

Boater Navigation Concerns

58. Oliver Clarke was the City’s principal engineer during

the application process , and sig ned the application as the City' s

authorized agent. Mr. Cla rke testified that he has witnessed

boater congestion at the Lock. He also testified that lack of

boating experience and weather concerns can exacerbate the boater

congestion issues at the Lock.

59. Petitioners presented the testimony of Mr. Frank Muto,

the general manager of Cape Harbour Marina. Mr. Muto has been at

the Cape Harbour Marina for 18 years. The marina has 78 docks on

three fi nger piers along with transient spots . The marina is not

currently subject to tidal flows and its water depth is b etween

six and a half and seven and a half feet. He testified that they

currently have at least 28 boats that maintain a draft of between

four and a half and six feet of water. If the water depth got

below four feet, those customers would not want to rem ain at the

marina. Mr. Muto further testified that the Lock was in place

when the marina was built, and the marina and docks were designed

for an area with no tidal flow.

60. Mr. Muto also testified that he has witnessed several

boating safety incidents in and around the Lock. He testified

that he would attribute almost all of those incidents to novice

boaters who lack knowledge of proper boating operations and

locking procedures. Mr. Muto additionally testified that there

is law enforcement presence a t the Lock twenty - four hours a day ,

including FWC marine patrol and the City's marine patrol.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standing

61. Section 120.52(13), Florida Statutes, defines a

"party," as a person "whose substantial interests will be

affected by propose d agency action, and who makes an appearance

as a party." Section 120.569(1) provides, in pertinent part,

that "[t]he provisions of this section apply in all proceedings

in which the substantial interests of a party are determined by

an agency."

62. It is well - established that to demonstrate that a

person or entity has a substantial interest in the outcome of a

proceeding, two things must be shown. First, there must be an

injury - in - fact of sufficient immediacy to entitle one to a

hearing. Second, it mu st be shown that the substantial injury is

of a type or nature which the proceeding is designed to protect.

The first has to do with the degree of the injury and the second

with the nature of the injury. See Agrico Chem. Co. v. Dep't of

Envtl. Reg. , 406 So. 2d 478, 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. den. ,

415 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1982).

63. Agrico was not intended as a barrier to the

participation in proceedings under chapter 120 by persons who are affected by the potential and foreseeable results of agency

act ion. See Peace River/Manasota Reg'l Water Supply Auth. v. IMC

Phosphates Co. , 18 So. 3d 1079, 1082 - 10 83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)

("[S]tanding is a legal concept that requires a would - be litigant

to demonstrate that he or she reasonably expects to be affected

by the outcome of the proceedings, either directly or

indirectly." (quoting Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson ,

952 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2006))). Rather, the intent of Agrico

was to preclude parties from intervening in a proceeding where

those parties ' substantial interests are remote and speculative.

See Vill. Park v. Dep't of Bus. Reg. , 506 So. 2d 426, 433 (Fla.

1st DCA 1987).

64. In Reily Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Department of

Environmental Protection , 990 So. 2d 1248 ( Fla. 4th DCA 2008),

t he c ourt found that a challenger to a permit, alleged to adversely affect a nearby water body, met the Agrico test for

standing. The facts upon which the court found standing for the petitioner in that case were comparable to the types of concerns

and iss ues raised by the individual Petitioners in this case.

Therefore, Petitioners Karl Deigert, Melanie Hoff, Robert S.

Zarranz, Yolanda Olsen, Jessica Blanks, and Joseph Michael Hannon

demonstrated their individual standing. Petitioner Debra Hall

did not at tend the hearing and so failed to demonstrate her

individual standing.

65. The Association must prove its associational standing

by satisfying the three - prong test for environmental

associational standing established in Friends of the Everglades,

Inc., v . Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust

Fund , 595 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In Friends of the

Everglades , the c ourt held that an environmental organization

must meet both the two - pronged test for standing of Agrico and

the test for sta nding of associations under Florida Home Builders

Association v. Department of Labor and Employment Security , 412

So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1982)(extended to administrative proceedings

under section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, by Farmworker Rights

Organization v. Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services ,

417 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)).

66. The Association proved its environmental associational

standing by demonstrating: (1) that a substantial number of its

members could substantially be affected by the challenged agency

action; (2) that the agency action it sought to challenge was

within the Association's general scope of interest and activity;

and (3) that the relief it request ed was of the type appropriate

for it to receive on behalf of its members . See St. Johns

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. , 54 So. 3d

1051, 1054 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). The Association's burden was not whether it has or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether

it has presented sufficient proof of injur y to its asserted

interests within the two - prong standing test. See Bd. of Comm'rs

of Jupiter Inlet Dist. v. Thibadeau , 956 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA

2007).

Burden of Proof

67. The Petitioners challenged the issuance of an

individual environmental resour ce permit issued under chapter

373 , Florida Statutes . Therefore, section 120.569(2)(p) govern ed

this proceeding. Under this provision, the permit applicant must

present a prima facie case demonstrating entitlement to the

permit. Thereafter, a third part y challenging the issuance of

the permit has the burden "of ultimate persuasion" and the burden

"of going forward to prove the case in opposition to the . . .

permit." If the third party fails to carry its burden, the

applicant prevails by virtue of its p rima facie case.

68. The standard of proof is a preponderance of the

evidence. See § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. Section 120.569(2)(p)

"clearly contemplates an abbreviated presentation of the applicant ' s prima facie case." Last Stand, Inc., v. Fury Mgmt. ,

Inc. , Case No. 12 - 2574, RO ¶89 (Fla. DOAH Dec. 31, 2012; Fla. DEP

Feb. 7, 201 3 ). The abbreviated presentation occurs because the statute outlines the information that may constitute the

applicant ' s prima facie case, which includes the application and

su pporting materials on which the agency concluded that the

applicant provided reasonable assurances of compliance with

applicable environmental resource permitting (ERP) criteria.

69. This is also a de novo proceeding , designed to

formulate final agency action, and not to review action taken

preliminarily. See Capeletti Bros. v. Dep't of Gen. Servs. ,

432 So. 2d 1359, 1363 - 13 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The de novo

n ature of this proceeding allowed the parties to make changes to

the proposed project and th e draft permit after the Department

had referred the matter to DOAH for adjudication. The Department

filed a second amendment to the intent to issue and draft permit

on March 1, 2019. This second amendment eliminated the

Department's previous finding tha t the City demonstrated

mitigation of adverse water quality impacts through its

achievement of current and future project credits in the BMAP

process. See Joint Exhibit 1 at pp. 329 and 330. Section

120.569(2)(a) provides that once a petition is referred to DOAH for a hearing, "[t]he referring agency shall take no further

action with respect to a proceeding under s.120.57(1), except as

a party litigant, as long as the division has jurisdiction over

the proceeding under s.120.57(1)."

70. As a party litig ant, the Department may not seek to

reacquire jurisdiction over the proposed agency action but may

change its position by agreement of all parties, or by offering

proof in support of its new position at the hearing. See Disc

Vill., Inc. v. Dep't of Corr. , Case No. 92 - 7321 , RO ¶18 (Fla.

DOAH Feb. 26, 1993; Fla. DOC Apr. 6, 1993). An agency's

change of position is neither proposed nor final agency action,

as long as the matter remains pending at DOAH. See Red and White

Invs., Inc. v. Dep' t of Transp. , C ase No. 90 - 4326, RO ¶44 (Fla.

DOAH Nov. 20, 1990).

71. An agency must offer proof in support of the agency's

changed position during the evidentiary proceeding, in order for

the new position to provide the potential basis for a recommended

or final ord er. See Disc Vill., Inc. , RO at ¶18. Thus, the

second amended intent to issue w as a change of position , and not proposed agency action. The Department' s changed position , therefore, was not part of the City's prima facie case as

contemplated by section 120.569(2)(p). See City of W. Palm Beach

v. Palm Beach Cnty . , Case No. 16 - 1861, RO ¶136 (Fla. DOAH

March 31, 2017; Fla. SFWMD May 9, 2017), rev'd. on other grounds ,

253 So. 3d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

Permitting Standard

72. Issuance of the Permit i s dependent upon there being

reasonable assurance s that the Project will meet applicable

statutory and regulatory standards. See § § 373.41 3 (1) and

373.414(1) , Fla. Stat.

73. "Reasonable assurance" means the upfront demonstration

that there is a substant ial likelihood of compliance with

standards, or "a substantial likelihood that the project will be

successfully implemented." See Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Coscan

Florida, Inc. , 609 So. 2d 644, 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).

Reasonable assurance does not require abs olute guarantees that

the applicable conditions for issuance of a permit have been

satisfied. Further, speculation or subjective beliefs are not

sufficient to carry the burden of presenting contrary evidence or

proving a lack of reasonable assurance neces sary to demonstrate

that a permit should not be issued. See FINR II, Inc. v. CF

Indus., Inc. , Case No. 11 - 6495 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 30, 2012; Fla. DEP

June 8, 2012).

74. The City was responsible for establishing its prima

facie case of entitlement to the Per mit by entering into evidence

the complete application files and supporting documentation an d

testimony, and the Department' s notice of intent to issue and

draft permit. The burden of ultimate persuasion was on

Petitioners to prove their case in oppositio n to the Permit by a

preponderance of the competent and substantial evidence.

See Washington Cnty. v. Bay Cnty. & NW Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. ,

Case Nos. 10 - 2983, 10 - 2984, 10 - 10100 (Fla. DOAH July 26, 2012; Fla. NWFWMD Sep. 27, 2012).

75. While a pet itioner bears the ultimate burden, a

petitioner can prevail by illustrating the fai lures inherent in

the applicant' s proposed project. The petitioner need only show

that the applicant and the agency failed to provide reasonable

assurances of compliance wi th the required criteria , and does not

need to demonstrate that the proposed project would harm the

environment. See Id.

76. When the petitioner demonstrates that " specific aspects

of the application are unsatisfactory, " the applicant loses its

presump tion of entitlement to the permit. See Last Stand, Inc.,

v. Fury Mgmt., Inc. , Case No. 12 - 2574, RO ¶90 (Fla. DOAH Dec. 31,

2012; Fla. DEP Feb. 7, 201 3 ). The applicant must then present a

rebutt al case refuting the petitioner' s evidence and

demonstrating reasonable assurance of compliance with all permit

criteria and entitlement to the permit. See § 120.569(2)(p),

Fla. Stat.

ERP Permit Criteria

77. In order to provide reasonable assurances that the

Project will not be harmful to the water resources, th e City must

satisfy the conditions for issuance set forth in rules 62 - 3 30.301

and 62 - 330.302, and the applicable sections of Volumes I and II

of the Environmental Resource Permit Applicant's Handbook.

A. Water Quality

78. Rule 62 - 330.301(1)(e) requires that the City provide

reasonable assurance that the proposed Project:

Will not adversely affect the quality

of receiving waters such that the state

water quality standards set forth in

Chapters 62 - 4, 62 - 302, 62 - 520, and 62 - 550,

F.A.C., including the antid egradation

provisions of paragraphs 62 - 4.242(1)(a) and

(b), F.A.C., subsections 62 - 4.242(2) and

(3), F.A.C., and Rule 62 - 302.300, F.A.C.,

and any special standards for Outstanding

Florida Waters and Outstanding National

Resource Waters set forth in subsect ions

62 - 4.242(2) and (3), F.A.C., will be

violated.

79. Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the competent

and substantial evidence that the Department and the City were

not aligned regarding how the City's application met applicable

water quality standards. The Petitioners proved by a

preponderance of the competent and substantial evidence that the

City relied on future projects to provide reasonable assurance

that the removal of the Lock would not cause or contribute to

violations of water qualit y standards in the Caloosahatchee River

and Matlacha Pass Aquatic Preserve.

80. Such reliance on future projects does not satisfy the

required upfront demonstration that there is a substantial

likelihood of compliance with standards, or "a substantial

likelihood that the project will be successfully implemented."

See Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Coscan Florida, Inc. , 609 So. 2d 644,

648 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Those future projects were part of the

BMAP process under Section 403.067, Florida Statutes, which the

D epartment had recognized and incorporated into its original

intent to issue and draft permit. See Joint Exhibit 1 at p p . 329

and 330. The March 1, 2019, second amen dment eliminated the Department' s previous finding that the City demonstrated

mitigation of adverse water quality impacts through its

achievement of future project credits in the BMAP process.

81. Dr. Janicki tried to avoid using the " BMAP " acronym

because evidence and argument related to that final agency action

w ere excluded from this proce eding at the behest of the

Department without objection from the City. However, the BMAP

implements , over a pproximately 20 year s , the 2009 TN TMDL that

Dr. Janicki testified was calculated with Lock removal as a

consideration. But achievement of the 2009 TN TMDL depends on

the BMAP's future projects, which Dr. Janicki conceded was the

basis for his water quality opinion in this proceeding.

82. The City' s reliance on the BMAP process to satisfy

reasonable assurance for the ERP Permit was further exempli fied

by this argument in its proposed recommended order:

"By operation of section 403.067(7)(b)2.i., Florida Statutes, the

City is presumed to be in compliance with the TMDL requirements."

83. Section 403.067(7)(b)2.i., Florida Statutes, provi des:

A landowner, discharger, or other responsible

person who is implementing applicable

management strategies specified in an adopted

basin management action plan may not be

required by permit, enforcement action, or

otherwise to implement additional mana gement

strategies, including water quality credit

trading, to reduce pollutant loads to attain

the pollutant reductions established pursuant

to subsection (6) and shall be deemed to be

in compliance with this section . (Emphasis

added).

84. Thus, the pre sumptive fact of compliance flows from the

basic fact that a "responsible person" is "implementing

applicable management strategies," i.e., actually implementing

the future projects listed in the adopted BMAP. See § 90.301,

Fla. Stat. The City sought to rely on the presumption of compliance but did not prove the basic factual predicate in this

proceeding. See Id. Contrary to the City's position, the mere

existence of the BMAP final agency action did not satisfy its burden to prove the basic fact from wh ich the presumption of

compliance flow s . See § 403.067(7)(b)2.i., Fla. Stat.

85. Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the competent

and substantial evidence that the Department's new position on

water quality relied on a simplistic exchange of water s. The

Department's water quality explanation did not consider that the

waterbody in which the Project would occur has three direct

connections with an OFW that is a Class II waterbody designated

for shellfish propagation or harvesting , i.e. Matlacha Pass

Aquatic Preserve . Such a consideration would require the

Department to determine whether to apply the OFW permitting

standards, and the Class II waters permitting criteria in section

10.2.5 of the Environmental Resource Permit Applicant's Handbook,

Volum e I. See Fla. Admin Code R. 62 - 330.302(1)(a) ; 62 - 4.242(2);

and 62 - 302.400(17)(b)36.

86. Section 10.2.5 of the Environmental Resource Permit

Applicant's Handbook, Volume I, provides:

3 5

The special value and importance of shellfish

harvesting waters to Flo rida's economy as

existing or potential sites of commercial and

recreational shellfish harvesting and as a

nursery area for fish and shellfish is

recognized by the Agencies. In accordance

with section 10.1.1(d), above, the Agency

shall deny a permit for a regulated activity

located :

* * *

(c) In any class of waters where the location of the activity is adjacent or in

close proximity to Class II waters, unless

the applicant submits a plan or proposes a

procedure that demonstrates that the

regulated activ ity will not have a negative

effect on the Class II waters and will not

result in violations of water quality

standards in the Class II waters.

(Emphasis added).

87. There was no evidence that the Department's regulatory

analysis considered that the wat erbody in which the Project would

occur directly connects to Class III waters that are restricted

for shellfish harvesting , i.e. Caloosahatchee River and San

Carlos Bay; and is in close proximity to Class II waters that are

restricted for shellfish harvest ing , i.e., Matlacha Pass Aquatic

Preserve . See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62 - 302.400(17)(b)36. a nd

62 - 330.302(1)(c). This omission, by itself, is a mandatory basis for denial of the Permit.

B. Water Quantity

88. Rule s 62 - 330.301(1)(a) and (c) require th at the City

provide reasonable assurance that the proposed Project will not

cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters and

adjacent lands; and will not cause adverse impacts to existing

surface water storage and conveyance capabilities.

89. The preponderance of the competent substantial evidence

demonstrated that the volume of flow through Breach 20, an

adjacent tidal creek connected to Matlacha Pass, will drastically

decrease . Mr. Erwin testified that Breach 20 was design ed to

maintain wat er flow to this adjacent tidal creek system. He also

persuasively testified that there was no evidence of erosion at

Breach 20 , and there were currently "a lot of real healthy

mangroves."

90. Since the City's position was that the decrease in flow

volum e and in velocity at Breach 20 would cure a perceived

"erosion" problem, any potential adverse impacts to the tidal

creek system and mangrove wetlands were not addressed. The

undersigned's reasonable inferences from the record evidence are

that the flow i n the adjacent tidal creek system will be

adversely impacted, and those "healthy mangroves" will also be

adversely impacted. See Heifetz v. Dep't of Bus. Reg . ,

475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)("It is the hearing officer's function to consi der all the evidence presented,

resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw

permissible inferences from the evidence, and reach ultimate

findings of fact based on competent, substantial evidence.");

Berry v. Dep't of Envtl. Reg. , 530 So. 2d 101 9, 1022 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1988)("[T]he agency may reject the findings of the hearing

officer only when there is no competent substantial evidence from

which the finding could reasonably be inferred." (citations

omitted) ).

C. Secondary Impacts

91. Rule 62 - 3 30.301(1)(f) requires that the City provide

reasonable assurance that the proposed Project will not cause

adverse secondary impacts to the water resources.

92. Section 10.2.7 of the Environmental Resource Permit

Applicant's Handbook, Volume 1, provides t hat an applicant must

provide reasonable assurance regarding secondary impacts. Those

secondary impacts are regulated in the same manner as direct

impacts and are analyzed using the same criteria.

93. The preponderance of the competent and substantial

e vidence proved that the City failed to provide reasonable

assurance that the secondary impacts from construction,

alteration, and intended or reasonably expected uses of the

Project , will not cause or contribute to violations of water

quality standards , or adverse impacts to the functions of

wetlands or other surface waters as described in section 10.2.2

of the Environmental Resource Permit Applicant's Handbook,

Volume 1.

94. Section 10.2.2 of the Environmental Resource Permit

Applicant's Handbook, Volum e 1, requires that an applicant mu st

provide reasonable assurance that a regulated activity will not

impact the values of wetland and other surface water functions so

as to cause adverse impacts to: (a) the abundance and diversity

of fish, wildlife and li sted species; and (b) the habitat of

fish, wildlife, and listed species. Section 10.2.2.3 requires

the Department to assess impacts on the values of functions by

reviewing the ecologic condition, hydrologic connections,

uniqueness, location, and fish and wildlife utilization of the

wetland or other surface water.

95. Mr. Erwin's credible and persuasive testimony regarding

adverse secondary impacts to the ecological health of the

mangrove ecosystem adjacent to the South Spreader Waterway was in

stark con trast to the City's contention that Lock removal was not

expected to result in impacts to those mangrove wetlands. 4/

96. The credible and persuasive evidence demonstrated that

Lock removal would adversely affect the sm alltooth sawfish and

its nursery ha bitat. The credible and persuasive evidence also

demonstrated that Lock removal would increase the already high

risk of manatee - motorboat collisions by inviting manatees into

the South Spreader Waterway , a non - main - stem refuge , where novice

boaters would present " a bigger hazard than the [ L ] ock ever

has . " 5/

97. The preponderance of the competent substantial evidence

demonstrated that the City failed to provide reasonable

assurances that the Project will not impact the values of wetland

and other surface water functions.

D. Public Interest Test

98. Section 373.414(1)(a), Florida Statutes, requires that

in determining whether a proposed project is not contrary to the

public interest or is clearly in the public interest, the

Department "shall consider an d balance" seven factors. All seven

factors are collectively considered to determine whether, on

balance, a proposed project satisfies the public interest test.

See 1800 Atlantic Developers v. Dep't of Envtl. Reg. , 552 So. 2d

946, 953, 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) , rev. den. , 562 So. 2d 345

(Fla. 1990) ; Last Stand, Inc. v. Fury Mgmt., Inc. ,

Case No. 12 - 2574 (Fla. DOAH Dec. 31, 2012; Fla. DEP Feb. 7, 2013).

99. The seven factors are also found in rule 62 - 3 30 .302, and

provide:

(1) In addition to t he conditions in

rule 62 - 330.301, F.A.C., to obtain an

individual or conceptual approval permit

under this chapter, an applicant must

provide reasonable assurance that the

construction, alteration, operation,

maintenance, repair, removal, and

abandonment o f a project:

(a) Located in, on, or over wetlands or

other surface waters will not be contrary to

the public interest, or if such activities

significantly degrade or are within an

Outstanding Florida Water, are clearly in

the public interest, as determine d by

balancing the following criteria as set

forth in sections 10.2.3 through 10.2.3.7 of

Volume I:

1. Whether the activities will adversely

affect the public health, safety, or welfare

or the property of others;

2. Whether the activities will adversely

affect the conservation of fish and

wildlife, including endangered or threatened

species, or their habitats;

3. Whether the activities will adversely

affect navigation or the flow of water or

cause harmful erosion or shoaling;

4. Whether the activities will adversely

affect the fishing or recreational values or

marine productivity in the vicinity of the

activity;

5. Whether the activities will be of a

temporary or permanent nature;

6. Whether the activities will adversely

affect or will enhance signifi cant

historical and archaeological resources

under the provisions of section 267.061,

F.S.; and

7. The current condition and relative value

of functions being performed by areas

affected by the proposed activities.

100. As found above, the Depa rtment's exchange of waters

position failed to consider the three direct connections to the

Matlacha Pass Aquatic Preserve OFW. This is also important, not

just for the water quality analysis, but for the public interest

test. If the direct or secondary impacts of the Project are in,

or significantly degrade an OFW, then the Project must be

" clearly in the public interest , " to obtain approval. Either

review requires the Department to consider and balance the seven

factors in rule 6 2 - 3 30 .302 (1)(a) .

101. Factor s one and three of the public interest test,

address whether the Project will cause adverse impacts, not

whether adverse impacts are currently occurring and will be cured

by the Project. Also, f actor one does not include a

consideration of non - environment al issues.

102. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding

that the City's claims of navigational public safety concerns

have less to do with navigational hazards , and more to do with

inexperienced and impatient boaters. Even so, the direct im pact

of Lock removal will be to increase navigational access from the

Caloosahatchee River to the South Spreader Waterway.

10 3 . In addition, the preponderance of the evidence also

supports a finding under factor one that there will be adverse

secondary i mpacts to the property of Cape Harbour Marina .

10 4 . Based on the above findings and conclusions, the

Project will adversely affect the public interest factors

associated with wetlands , fish and wildlife , and their habitat

(factors two, four, and seven ). Because the Project will be of a

permanent nature, factor five of the public interest test falls

on the negative side of the balancing test. Factor six is

neutral.

10 5 . T he adverse secondary impacts that fall under factors

one, two, four, five, and se ven outweigh any perceived benefits

under factors one and three. T herefore , after balancing the

public interest factors, it is concluded that the Project fails

the public interest balancing test and should not be approved .

Under either review, the Projec t is contrary to the public

interest , and is not clearly in the public interest .

C O 15 and Res Judicata /Collateral Estoppel

10 6 . Petitioners have maintain ed throughout this

proceeding , the legal position that th e doctrines of res judicata

and collateral estoppel preclude d the Department from considering

the City's application to remove the Lock.

107 . The doctrine of res judicata stands for the principle

that once " a cause of action has been decided by a court of

competent jurisdiction, " the same issue cannot be re - litigated by

the same parties so long as the judgment stands unreversed.

See Selim v. Pan American Airways Corp. , 889 So. 2d 149, 153

(Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The related doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents identical parties from re - litig ating identical issues

that have been determined in a prior litigation. See Burns v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 914 So. 2d 451 , 453 (Fla. 4th DCA

2005) ("Collateral e stoppel bars a claim only when the issues have

been fully litigated and decided in a court of competent

jurisdiction." ).

10 8 . Res judicata applies when four identities are met:

(1) identity in the thing sued for ; (2) identity of the cause of

action ; (3) identity of the parties ; and (4) identity of the

quality in the person for or against whom th e claim is made. See

Topps v. State , 865 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004) (citing

McGregor v. Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia , 162 So. 323, 328

(Fla. 1935)). Thus, before res judicata becomes applicable,

there must have been a final judgement on the mer its in a former

suit. Id.

109 . In this case , CO 15 , as amended , and the 1977 warranty

deed to the state of Florida were not final judgments after

adjudication on the merits , for purposes of the doctrine of res

judicata. Petitioners argue d that res judic ata applie d because

CO 15 as amended was a binding contract involving the same

parties, the same ecosystem, the same science, and the same laws.

However, ev en assuming a binding contract, it did not arise from

a n adjudication that led to a final judgment on the merits.

See Hicks v. Hoagland , 953 S o. 2d 695 , 698 (Fla. 5th DCA

2007)(" For res judicata to apply, there must exist in the prior litigation a ' clear - cut former adjudication ' on the merits. " ).

110 . Even if, CO 15 , as amended , was settlement of a n

enforcement action by DER against GAC , c ontrary to the

Petitioners ' claim, the parties were not the same . The parties

to CO 15 , as amended , w ere GAC and DER. The parties to the

warranty deed were GAC and the state of Florida. Even if the

former DER co nstitutes the same party as the Department , the City

and the Petitioners were not parties to CO 15 , as amended.

See Palm AFC Holdings v. Palm Beach Cnty. , 807 So. 2d 703 (Fla.

4th DCA 2002)(holding that the identity of parties test is not met because the prior decision was between appellants and Palm Beach County while this decision is between appellants and Minto

Communities).

111 . Furthermore, the causes of action were not identical .

The test for whether the cause s of action are identical is

whet her the essential elements or facts necessary to maintain the

suit are the same. See Leahy v. Batmasian , 960 So. 2d 14 (Fla.

4th DCA 2007). This case involved a third party challenge to the Department's notice of intent to issue the Permit for Lock

remov al. CO 15 , as amended , involved resolving GAC's massive

dredge and fill violation as described by Mr. Erwin during the

hearing. The facts , i ssues , and causes of action were not the

same. See Id.

112 . In conclusion, the doctrines of res judicata and

c ollateral estoppel d id not apply to preclude the Department from

considering the City's application to remove the Lock. Most

importantly, there was no prior proceeding that led to a final

judgment on the merits, which is required to invoke the doctrines

i n the first place. In addition, the elements were not met with

regard to the identity of parties, causes of action, facts, and

issues.

Attorney's Fees

113 . In their p roposed r ecommended o rder, Petiti oners

sought an award of attorney's fees and costs und er section

120.595(1)(d) . Petitioners argued that the City and the

Department participated in this proceeding, initiated by

Petitioners' challenge, for an "improper purpose ," as that term

is defined in section 120.595(1)(e).

114 . Section 120.595(1)(e) d efines "improper purpose " as

"participation in a proceeding pursuant to s. 120.57(1) primarily

to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous purpose

or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, licensing, or

securing the approval of an acti vity."

115 . Although the findings and conclusions of this

Recommended Order are not favorable to the City and the

Department , no "improper purpose" under s ection 120.595(1)(e) is

found. Simply losing a case at trial is insufficient to

establish a friv olous purpose in the non - prevailing party, let

alone a n improper purpose. See Schwartz v. W - K Partners ,

53 0 So. 2d 456 , 458 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (For an award of attorney's fees, the trial court must make a finding that there

was a complete absence of a ju sticiable issue raised by the

losing party.) .

Summary

116 . Petitioners met their ultimate burden of persuasion to

prove that the Project does not comply with all applicable

permitting criteria. The City failed to demonstrate its

compliance with all appl icable permitting criteria and its

entitlement to the Permit.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fac t and Conclusions of

Law, it is,

RECOMMENDED that :

1. T he Department of Environmental Protection enter a final

order denying Individual Envi ronmental Resource Permit Number

244816 - 005 to the City of Cape Coral for removal of the Chiquita

Boat Lock .

2. The final order d eny Petitioners' request for an award

of attorney's fees and costs .

DONE AND ENTERED this 1 2 th day of December , 2019 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

FRANCINE M. FFOLKES

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 1 2 th day of December, 2019.

ENDNOTE S

1/ References throughout this proceeding to the "estuary" or the

"Caloosahatchee estuary" include the Matlach a Pass,

Caloosa ha tchee River, and San Carlos Bay. "[I]t's all one piece

basically." Janicki, Tr. p . 846, lines 8 - 13.

2/ Id.

3 / Mr. Erwin defined a "breach" in two ways. First, as a natural

opening that has been exacerbated by man, so that velocities are

increased causing erosion, bed lowering and widening . Second, a

section actually dug out by man that allows water to flow in an

unnatural manner into adjacent wetlands. Erwin, Tr. p. 557,

lines 13 - 25.

4/ y over that of The decision to accept one expert's testimon

another expert , is a matter within the sound discretion of the

administrative law judge ( ALJ ) and cannot be altered absent a

complete lack of competent substantial evidence from which the

finding could be reasonably inferred. See Collier Me d . C tr. v.

State, Dep ' t of HRS , 4 62 So. 2d 83, 85 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) . T he

sufficiency of the facts required to form the opinion of an expert must normally reside with the expert, and any purported deficiencies in such facts relate to the weight of the ev idence,

a matter also exclusively within the province of the ALJ as the

trier of the facts. See Gershanik v. Dep ' t of Prof 'l Reg . , 458

So.2d 302, 305 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984), rev. den. 462 So. 2d 1106

(Fla. 1985).

5/ ere is competent It is the case law of Florida that if th

substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings, then it is

irrelevant that there may also be competent substantial evidence

to support a contrary finding. See Arand Const r . Co. v. Dyer ,

592 So. 2d 276, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The a ppellate courts of Florida have also observed that the evidence presented at an administrative hearing may support two inconsistent findings and have concluded that, in such cases, "it is the hearing officer's

role to decide the issue one way or the other. " Heifetz , 475 So.

2d at 1281.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Craig D. Varn, Esquire

Manson Bolves Donaldson Varn, P.A.

Suite 820

106 East College Avenue

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Kirk S. White, Esquire

Department of Environmental Protection

Mail Stati on 35

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3000

(eServed)

Steven D. Griffin, Esquire

City of Cape Coral

Post Office Box 150027

Cape Coral, Florida 33915

(eServed)

Amy Wells Brennan, Esquire

Manson Bolves Donaldson Varn, P.A.

Suite 300

109 North Brush Street

Tampa, Florida 33602

(eServed)

John S. Turner, Esquire

City of Vero Beach

1053 20th Place

Post Office Box 1389

Vero Beach, Florida 32961

(eServed)

J. Michael Hannon

2721 Clyde Street

Matlacha, Florida 33993

(eServed)

Lea Cran dall, Agency Clerk

Department of Environmental Protection

Douglas Building , Mail St ation 35

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3000

(eServed)

Justin G. Wolfe, General Counsel

Department of Environmental Protection

Douglas Building, Ma il St ation 35

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3000

(eServed)

Noah Valenstein, Secretary

Department of Environmental Protection

Douglas Building

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3000

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIG HT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.