19-002092 Nassau County School Board vs. Phyllis Alderman Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, September 9, 2019.

Summary: Respondent has a right to challenge her termination through a chapter 120 proceeding, and the School Board had no lawful basis to terminate her employment, when she was not terminated based on cause or a reduction in force. Recommend reinstatement.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

NASSAU COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 19 - 2092

PHYLLIS ALDERMAN,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case is presented for consider ation before

Administrative Law Judge Lisa Shearer Nelson on a stipulated

record submitted by the parties.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: J. Ray Poole, Esquire

Nassau County School Board

1201 Atlantic Avenue

Fernandina Beach, Florida 3203 4

For Respondent: Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire

Meyer, Brooks, Blohm and Hearn, P.A.

131 North Gadsden Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE S

Whether PetitionerÓs substantial interests are affected by

the decision of t he Nassau County School Board (School Board) to

eliminate her paraprofessional position, and whether the School

BoardÓs decision to terminate her was lawful.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On May 10, 2018, the Superintendent of the School Board

issued his recomme ndation regarding the assignment of non -

instructional personnel for the 2018 - 2019 school year.

Petitioner, Phyllis Alderman (Petitioner or Ms. Alderman) was

not assigned to a school within the school district. On

March 19, 2019, Ms. Alderman filed a Peti tion for Administrative

Hearing with the School Board, alleging that whether she has a

property interest in her employment, and whether she was

terminated from her position for just cause are ultimate facts

in dispute. On April 18, 2019, the School Board forwarded the

Petition for Administrative Hearing to the Division of

Administrative Hearings for the assignment of an administrative

law judge.

The case was originally scheduled for hearing to take place

on June 11, 2019. At the request of both parties, t he hearing

was continued and rescheduled for August 6, 2019. The School

Board filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, which

was denied by Order dated July 12, 2019.

The parties filed a Joint Pre - hearing Stipulation on

July 29, 2019, and on Jul y 30, 2019, filed a Joint Motion for

Status Conference. In the request for a status conference, the

parties advised that they believed that they had stipulated to

the essential underlying operative facts in this case necessary

for an administrative law ju dge to decide the ultimate factual

and legal issues set forth in paragraphs G and H of the Pre -

hearing Stipulation, and that an evidentiary hearing was not

necessary. They requested a status conference to discuss

canceling the hearing and submitting propo sed recommended orders

based on the facts to which the parties have stipulated. A

telephone conference was conducted, 1/ after which an Order

Canceling Hearing and Proceeding on Stipulated Record was issued

on July 31, 2019. The final hearing was canceled and the

parties were directed to file stipulated exhibits by August 2,

2019, and proposed recommended orders no later than August 19,

2019.

Joint Exhibit 1 and RespondentÓs Exhibits numbered 1 and 2

were filed August 2, 2019. On August 16, 2019, Responde nt filed

an Unopposed Motion to Add Stipulated Exhibits to add

RespondentÓs Exhibits numbered 3 and 4 to the stipulated record,

which was granted by Order dated August 16, 2019. The parties

timely filed their Proposed Recommended Orders, which have been

c onsidered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.

All references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2017

codification, unless otherwise specified.

FINDING S OF FACT

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, as recited in

their Joint Pre - hearing Stat ement, and the Stipulated Record

submitted by the parties, the following facts are found:

1. Respondent was an educational support employee for

Petitioner from the 1999 - 2000 school year through the 2017 - 2018

school year, during which time she received an nual performance

evaluations of satisfactory or higher.

2. Her evaluation for the 2017 - 2018 school year, signed by

her supervisor on April 6, 2018, recommended another evaluation

in 12 months.

3. RespondentÓs position is covered by the Collective

Bargain ing Agreement Between the School Board of Nassau County,

Florida, and the Nassau Educational Support Personnel

Association (CBA), which provides in Article VII(C): ÐUpon

completion of the probationary period as provided herein, and

during the term of the employeeÓs normal work year, he/she shall

not be terminated except for just cause.Ñ

4. Respondent became a post - probationary employee in

August 2000.

5. Respondent worked as a paraprofessional assigned to the

guidance department of West Nassau High Schoo l (WNHS) from at

least the 2011 - 2012 school year through the 2017 - 2018 school

year, not as an instructional paraprofessional.

6. In April 2018, WNHS Principal Curtis Gaus met with

Respondent and told her that her position would be phased out as

of the end of the 2017 - 2018 school year.

7. Principal Gaus did not state that RespondentÓs position

was being terminated for a reason stated in the CBA, nor that

RespondentÓs employment was being ter minated due to districtwide

lay offs made for financial reasons.

8. Respondent was not given written notice that her

employment was being terminated for reasons outlined in the CBA,

nor was she terminated for any such reason.

9. Respondent was not relieved of her duties at the end of

the 2017 - 2018 school year as part of a reduction in the nu mber

of employees on a district wide basis for financial reasons.

10. Superintendent Burns has never recommended to

Petitioner that Respondent be terminated for just cause or for

any other reason, nor has Petitioner itself taken off icial

action to terminate PetitionerÓs employment.

11. Petitioner did not file a petition to terminate

RespondentÓs employment, stating the specific reasons Respondent

was being terminated, or otherwise comply with the requirements

of Florida Administrati ve Code Rule 28 - 106.2015.

12. Respondent did not pursue arbitration or file a

grievance, as permitted under the CBA. Petitioner has not

identified what specific provision of the CBA Respondent could

identify to support a grievance, if filed.

13. The part ies stipulated to the existence of certain

portions of the CBA, but did not provide context that informs

the scope of some of the provisions cited.

14. Of particular relevance to this proceeding are the

provisions contained in Article IV (Grievance Proc edure);

Article V (Vacancies, Transfers and Reduction of Personnel); and

Article VII (Discipline of Employee). The pertinent portions of

each are quoted below, with those portions to which the parties

stipulated designated by italics , and those provision determined

by the undersigned to be particularly relevant designated by

being underscored .

15. Article IV provides, in pertinent part:

ARTICLE IV Î GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

A. GENERAL

The purpose of this procedure is to secure,

at the lowest possible administ rative level,

resolution of any dispute which may arise

concerning the proper interpretation and

application of this contract. Both parties

agree that these procedures will be kept as

informal and confidential as may be

appropriate at any level of the pro cedure.

1. Time limits. The time limits as called

for herein shall be considered the maximum

time limits to be used for grievance

processing. Extensions may be granted by

mutual agreement at level one or two. Each

party shall attempt to expedite griev ance

processing.

* * *

4. Processing. Grievances not timely filed

or processed to the next step by the

grievant, shall be considered settled.

Grievances not timely responded to shall

permit processing to the next step.

* * *

6. Requirements.

a. A grievance shall be filed in a timely

manner and shall be an alleged violation,

misapplication, or misinterpretation of a

specific article or section of this

Agreement . . . .

* * *

B. Procedures

* * *

4. Step III

Step III (Mediation of Termination)

a. If the subject of the grievance is

termination as the result of unsatisfactory

evaluation [See Article VII section F] and

the grievant is dissatisfied with the

response at Step II or if no response is

timely give n, the grievant may, within

ten (10) wor king days, notify the office of

the Superintendent using the districtÓs

grievance form, that s/he is requesting

grievance mediation by the Federal Mediation

and Conciliation Service (FMCS).

* * *

e. Restrictions and Limitations

1) Evidence not produced in Step I or II by

a party shall not be offered in mediation.

2) The judgment of the evaluator leading to

the rating shall not be mediated. However,

the process may be subject to review.

3) The mediator shall not have the power to

recommend an addition to, subtraction from,

or alteration of the terms of the agreement

or to recommend the alteration of the

evaluation results of the grievant.

4) The mediator shall only have the

authority to mediate the termination issue

presented for mediation by the part ies and

shall not have the power or authority to

create or alter the issue of the parties or

the issue as perceived by each party.

5) The employment of the grievant shall not

be extended beyond the end of the contract

year as the result of the time requir ed for

the grievance and mediation procedure .

f. The final results of the mediation

process shall be presented to the School

Board for its final decision. The decision

of the School Board shall be final unless

appealed by the grievant to Step III B,

Bin ding Arbitration.

Step III b (Binding Arbitration)

a. 1) If the grievant is dissatisfied with

the response at Step II or if no response is

timely given, the grievant may within

ten (10) working days notify the

Superintendent using the DistrictÓs

grievanc e form, that the grievance is being

arbitrated.

* * *

e. Restrictions and Limitations of

Arbitration

1) Evidence not produced in Step I or II by

a party shall not be offered in Arbitration.

2) The Arbitrator shall not have the power

to add to, subtra ct from, or alter the terms

of the grievant. In the case of a

termination grievance the arbitrator shall

not have the power to extend employment

beyond the term of the affected employment

year for the grievantÓs classification.

( e mphasis added).

16. Ar ticle V of the CBA addresses Vacancies, Transfers

and Reduction of Personnel. The relevant sections provide as

follows:

F. Reduction in Personnel

1. Reduction in force shall take place when

the Superintendent of Schools:

a. Announces that a reduction i n force is

to take place.

b . Determines and announces the type of

reduction to take place as:

1) System - wide

2) Building - wide

3) Departmentally

4) Any combination of 1), 2), and 3) herein

by title and/or position

c. Notifies any employee or employees that

an employee or group of employees is being

dismissed under this provision.

17. Finally, Article VII of the CBA addresses discipline of

employees. It provides in pertinent part:

B. A person employed after the effective

date of this Agreement shal l serve a

probationary period of 365 calendar days.

During such probationary period he/she

serves at the pleasure of the Board and may

be disciplined and/or terminated at the

discretion of the Board without further

recourse.

C. Upon completion of the pro bationary

period and during the term of the employeeÓs

normal work year, he/she shall not be

terminated except for just cause.

D. Provided that in lieu of termination and

with the written consent of the employee,

the employee may be returned to probationa ry

status.

E. The judgment of the evaluator in the

performance appraisal of an employee shall

not be subject to the grievance procedure of

this Agreement.

F. In the event a non - probationary employee

is terminated as a result of unsatisfactory

evaluation , such termination shall be

subject to the grievance procedure of this

Agreement.

G. 1. The Board/Superintendent reserve the

right to take disciplinary action, up to and

including dismissal, against any employee

based on the seriousness of the offense and

the employeeÓs record.

18. The CBA does not address non - renewal of year - to - year

employees outside the context of discipline or a reduction in

force announced by the Superintendent.

19. Article XII of the CBA provides that the CBA Ðshall

supersede any rules, regulations or practices of the Board which

will be contrary to or inconsistent with the terms of this

agreement.Ñ It does not by its terms supersede any rights

created by statute.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

20. DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matt er and the

parties to this proceeding pursuant to sections 120.569,

120.57(1), and 1012.40 , Florida Statutes .

21. Neither party addressed who bears the burden of proof

or what the burden is for this proceeding, either in the Joint

Pre - h earing Statement or in their Proposed Recommended Orders.

Given that Petitioner is the party that has taken action to

terminate Respondent, it bears the burden of proof, by a

preponderance of evidence. § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.

22. The first issue to be determined is w hether this case

can be decided in this forum or whether the CBA eliminates that

avenue of redress. Section 120.569(1) provides that Ð[t]he

provisions of this section apply in all proceedings in which the

substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency,

unless the parties are pr oceeding under s. 120.573 or

s. 120.574. Sections 120.573 and 120.574 provide the procedures

for mediation and summary hearings, respectively. Educational

units, such as school boards, are considered ÐagenciesÑ as

def ined in section 120.52(1)(a) and (6). Seiden v. Adams , 150

So. 3d 1215, 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Sublett v. Dist. Sch.

Bd. of Sumter Cnty. , 617 So. 2d 374, 377 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

While there are exceptions to the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA) fo r educational units listed in section 120.81,

proceedings such as this one are not among those exceptions.

23. The School Board contends that Respondent was required

to file a grievance as outlined in the CBA, and cannot proceed

under the APA. However, b y its terms, the CBA does not negate

RespondentÓs statutory right to challenge her termination

through an administrative hearing. Moreover, the CBA does not

specifically address non - renewal of employees at the end of a

school year. Article V of the CBA a ddresses reduction in

personnel, but the process outlined requires an announcement by

the Superintendent of Schools that a reduction in force is to

take place, along with the type of reduction to occur. There is

no evidence or stipulation by the parties t hat such an

announcement ever took place.

24. In addition, Article IV, section A(6), which outlines

the requirements to file a grievance, specifies that a grievance

Ðshall be an alleged violation, misapplication, or

misinterpretation of a specific artic le or section of this

Agreement.Ñ The grievance form requires that the employee

identify the Article and Section grieved. While Petitioner

contends that the elimination of RespondentÓs position should

have been resolved through the grievance process, it has not

identified the specific provision of the CBA Ms. Alderman would

cite when she was not terminated for cause or for a reduction in

force.

25. The School Board cites Sickon v. School Board of

Alachua County , 719 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), for th e

premise that there is no right to a section 120.57(1) hearing in

this case. In Sickon , a school teacher sought a hearing to

challenge her assignment as assistant band director, as opposed

to band director, at the high school where she taught.

Assignmen t of either position would be considered as

Ðsupplemented dutiesÑ to the duties assigned as a teacher, and

were independent of her professional services contract.

26. Ms. Sickon also received a performance appraisal that

she successfully grieved through the process provided by the

collective bargaining agreement, but sought to challenge the

band assignment through a chapter 120 proceeding. The school

board denied her request, stating that she had no property

interest in the supplemental appointment beyo nd the current

year, and no other substantial interest was affected. The First

District agreed, stating that Ms. Sickon would be entitled to a

hearing under the APA if non - renewal of her Ðsupplemental

dutiesÑ affected or determined substantial interests w ithin the

meaning of sections 120.52(12), 120.569, and 120.57(1). The

court stated that whether Ms. Sickon had a substantial interest

must be determined by examining substantive law, to see whether

the purported injury was one the substantive law meant to

protect. 719 So. 2d at 363. The rights that she alleged were

affected were conferred by the collective bargaining agreement.

The court held that the redress for violations of rights arising

under a collective bargaining agreement must be pursued in the

manner contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement,

stating, Ð[i]n the absence of any contrary language in the

collective bargaining agreement or countervailing public policy,

we hold that the parties must pursue the procedures established

by the collective bargaining agreement rather than turn to the

Administrative Procedures Act, when only rights created by the

collective bargaining agreement are at issue .Ñ 719 So. 2d at

365 (emphasis added).

27. By contrast, Respondent relies on the Fifth Dist rict

decision in Sublett v. District School Board of Sumter County ,

617 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). In Sublett , a maintenance

department employee was terminated based on charges of sexual

abuse of his daughter. Although the criminal charges were

dism issed, apparently the Superintendent of Schools had been

advised that Mr. Sublett was guilty notwithstanding the failure

to prosecute him. Mr. Sublett was advised by letter that the

Superintendent would recommend his termination, and Sublett

sought a sect ion 120.57(1) hearing.

28. As is the case here, the school district had a

collective bargaining agreement covering support personnel. The

collective bargaining agreement in Sublett stated, Ðnothing

contained herein shall be construed to deny or restrict to any

employee such rights as he/she may have under Florida State laws

or other applicable laws or regulations. The rights granted to

employees hereunder shall be deemed to be in addition to those

provided elsewhere.Ñ The school board asserted that the

collective bargaining agreement barred Mr. SublettÓs right to an

administrative hearing, but the Fifth District disagreed,

relying in part on Public Employees Relations Commission v.

District School Board of De Soto County , 374 So. 2d 1005 (Fla.

2d DCA 197 9), which held, Ð[w]e feel that it is clear that the

legislature did not intend to permit a public employer to

negotiate a collective bargaining agreement in which it

relinquishes a statutory duty or in which its employees

relinquish statutory rights. The agreement may add to statutory

rights and duties, but may not diminish them.Ñ 374 So. 2d at

1015.

29. After careful consideration, Ms. AldermanÓs case is

more in line with Sublett and PERC v. District School Board of

De Soto County than it is with Sicko n . In Sickon , the

employeeÓs alleged substantial interest involved a supplemental

assignment for a particular school year, not her employment

itself. In this case, the subst antial interest at stake is

Ms. AldermanÓs livelihood. In addition, the First Di strict held

in Sickon that the employee was limited to the procedures in the

collective bargaining agreement because the rights at issue were

created by that agreement. The same cannot be said here.

30. In addition, the CBA here supersedes rules,

regula tions and policies of the S chool B oard, but does not

supersede a statutory right. Given the L egislatureÓs enactment

of section 1012.40, the substantial interest at issue is not

created by the CBA, but by the L egislature. Accordingly, it is

found that Res pondent is permitted to seek redress through a

section 120.57(1) hearing.

31. The second issue that must be addressed is whether the

School Board had authority to terminate RespondentÓs employment.

Section 1012.40 sets the standard by which the termina tion must

be measured, and provides in pertinent part:

(2)(a) Each educational support employee

shall be employed on a probationary basis

for a period to be determined through the

appropriate collective bargaining agreement

or by district board rule in ca ses where a

collective bargaining agreement does not

exist.

(b) Upon successful completion of the

probationary period by the employee, the

employeeÓs status shall continue from year

to year unless the district school board

superintendent terminates the em ployee for

reasons stated in the collective bargaining

agreement, or in district school board rule

in cases where a collective bargaining

agreement does not exist, or reduces the

number of employees on a districtwide basis

for financial reasons.

(c) In th e event a district school board

superintendent seeks termination of an

employee, the district school board may

suspend the employee with or without pay.

The employee shall receive written notice

and shall have the opportunity to formally

appeal the termin ation. The appeals process

shall be determined by the appropriate

collective bargaining process or by district

school board rule in the event that there is

no collective bargaining agreement.

( e mphasis added).

32. There is no dispute that Respondent w as not a

probationary employee, was not terminated for cause, and was not

terminated as part of a districtwide reduction in force. In

fact, the parties stipulated that Superintendent Burns never

recommended to the School Board that Respondent be terminate d,

and the School Board never took official action to terminate her

employment. In short, the basis for her termination is not

contemplated by section 1012.40 or by the CBA.

33. Petitioner takes the position that during the school

year, a non - probatio nary support employee may only be dismissed

for cause, but that Ðupon expiration of their annual contracts,

PetitionerÓs non - probationary employees Î including Respondent Î

were subject to non - reappointment at will.Ñ However, the CBA

never expressly provi des that employment is subject to non -

reappointment at will. Petitioner points to two provisions in

support of its position, both dealing with the process for

grieving a termination. However, both of those provisions

address the grievance procedure itsel f, to be used after a

decision to terminate has been communicated to the employee.

There is no express statement in the CBA that would alert an

employee that their employment may be ended with no explanation

at the end of the school year.

34. Moreover, such an interpretation appears to conflict

with the language of section 1012.40, which provides that once an

employee meets his or her probationary period, the employeeÓs

status Ðshall continue from year to year.Ñ The crux of this

case, then, rests on th e meaning of this phrase. Petitioner

contends that there is no requirement to continue employment past

any school year. Respondent counters that Ðshall continue from

year to yearÑ means that an educational support employee who

successfully serves the pre scribed probationary period is no

longer subject to annual non - reappointment without cause, but

rather, is automatically renewed each year unless the

requirements of section 1012.40(2)(b) are met.

35. If PetitionerÓs interpretation were to prevail, then

there would be no reason for the language Ðshall continue from

year to year.Ñ Statutes should be interpreted to give meaning to

every phrase, and to take into account the context in which each

phrase is used. Fla. DepÓt of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint F la.

Parks, LLC , 986 So. 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008); Jones v. ETS of New

Orleans, Inc. , 793 So. 2d 912, 914 (Fla. 2001).

36. The meaning of the statute is clear. However, should

there be any doubt, the legislative history reinforces that when

created, the staff analysis supports this interpretation.

Legislative staff summaries may be consulted when interpreting a

statute, and the relevant summaries have been included as

exhibits in the record without objection. Am. Home Assur. Co. v.

Plaza MatÓls Corp. , 9 08 So. 2d 360, 368 - 69 (Fla. 2005)

( Ðlegislative history . . . is a basic and invaluable tool of

statutory constructionÑ).

37. Section 1012.40 represents the re - enactment of section

231.3605, Florida Statutes, when the Florida Education Code was

transferr ed from chapters 228 through 246 to chapters 1000

through 1013, in 2002. § 715, ch. 2002 - 387, Laws of Fla.

Section 231.3605 was created in 1994. § 1, ch. 94 - 195, Laws of

Fla. The bill leading to its creation comprised three sections:

one creating sect ion 231.3605, one amending section 231.434

(authorizing rules for provision of annual leave) to include

educational support employees, and one providing an effective

date. The title for chapter 94 - 195 provides in part: ÐAn act

. . . providing for employm ent of educational support employees;

providing definitions; providing for probationary status and

continued employment. Ñ

38. Chapter 94 - 195 was a committee substitute for House

Bill 751 (HB 751). The Final Bill Analysis and Economic Impact

Statement fo r HB 751 states in pertinent part:

I. SUMMARY:

This bill would define and provide

guidelines for the continued employment of

educational support employees (such as

teacher aides and assistants, department

personnel, and clerical employees.) The

bill wou ld provide for a probationary period

after which an educational support employee

must be annually rehired unless terminated

for reasons statement in a collective

bargaining agreement or in school board

rules. . . .

II. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS :

* * *

b. EFFECT OF PROPOSED CHANGES:

* * *

After the employee successfully completes

the probationary period, the school board

would be required to rehire the employee

each year . However, the superintendent

would have the authority to terminate the

employment of an educational support

employee for reasons stated in a collective

bargaining agreement or for reasons provided

in school board rule if there is no

collective bargaining agreement. The

superintendent would also have the authority

to terminate the emplo yment of educational

support employees if the number of employees

is reduced on a district - side basis for

financial reasons . (emphasis added).

39. The explanation in the final bill analysis is

inconsistent with PetitionerÓs interpretation of section 10 12.40,

and supports the most reasonable reading of the section.

40. It is undisputed that Respondent was not terminated for

any reason outlined in the C BA or as a result of a district wide

reduction in force. It is also undisputed that the School Board

did not affirmatively act to terminate her employment using the

process provided in section 1012.40, but rather, that someone

simply chose not to renew her employment. Based on the record

presented, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that it had a lawful

b asis for terminating RespondentÓs employment.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Nassau County School Board enter

a f inal o rder reinstating Respondent to her prior status as a

non - prob ationary educational support employee with back pay and

all other lost benefits she would have received had she not been

improperly terminated.

DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September , 2019 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

LISA SHEARER NELSON

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 9th day of September , 2019 .

ENDNOTE

1/ Due to the undersignedÓs unavailability, the telephone status

conference was conducted by Senior Administrative Law Judge

E. Gary Early.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Tho mas W. Brooks, Esquire

Meyer, Brooks, Blohm and Hearn, P.A.

131 North Gadsden Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

J. Ray Poole, Esquire

Nassau County School Board

1201 Atlantic Avenue

Fernandina Beach, Florida 32034

(eServed)

Kathy Burns, Supe rintendent

Nassau County School Board

1201 Atlantic Avenue

Fernandina Beach, Florida 32034 - 3403

Matthew Mears, General Counsel

Department of Education

Turlington Building, Suite 1244

325 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

(eServed)

NOT ICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.