19-002521EC In Re: Alex Diaz De La Portilla vs. * Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, May 26, 2020.

Summary: Advocate failed to demonstrate that candidate for legislative office overvalued his residence or should have reported campaign contributions as "loans" for purposes of financial disclousre statute.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

I N R E : A LEX D IAZ D E L A P ORTILLA , Case No. 19 - 2521EC

Respondent .

/

R ECOMMENDED O RDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing w as co nducted in this case on

October 16, 2019, and February 24, 2020, via video teleconference from sites

in Miami and Tallahassee, Florida, before Lawrence P. Stevenson, a duly -

designated Administrative Law Judge (ÑALJÒ) of the Division of

Administrative Hearings.

A PPEARANCES

For Advocate: Melody A. Hadley, Esquire

Elizabeth A. Miller, Esquire

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

For Respondent: Benedict P. Kuehne, Esquire

Kuehne Davis Law, P.A.

Suite 3350

100 Southeast 2 n d Street

Miami, Florida 33131

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE S

The issues are whether Respondent, Alex Diaz de la Portilla, committed

the violation alleged in the Ethics CommissionÔs Order Finding Probable

Cause, dated January 30, 2019, i.e., filing an inaccurate CE Form 6, ÑFull

and Public Disclosure of Financial InterestsÒ (ÑForm 6Ò) , for the year 2016,

and, if so, what penalty should be imposed for the violation.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On January 30, 2019, the Commission on Ethics (ÑCommissionÒ) entered

an Orde r Finding Probable Cause finding that there was probable cause to

believe that Respondent, as a candidate for the Florida Senate, violated

Article II, Section 8, Florida Constitution, and section 112.3144, Florida

Statutes, by filing an inaccurate Form 6 f or the year 2016.

The Order Finding Probable Cause did not make specific factual

allegations beyond asserting the conclusion that Respondent filed an

inaccurate Form 6. However, the Order Finding Probable Cause stated that

its finding was Ñ[b]ased on the preliminary investigation of the complaint and

on the recommendation of the CommissionÔs Advocate.Ò

The Report of Investigation submitted by the CommissionÔs investigator,

A. Keith Powell, on December 4, 2018, made the following relevant findings:

(1) Th e complaint in this matter was filed by

Mr. Juan - Carlos Planas of Miami, Florida, who

alleges that the Respondent, a candidate for

Florida State Senate District 40, Alex Diaz de la

Portilla, violated the Code of Ethics for Public

Officers and Employees. Th e RespondentÔs bid for

the Florida State Senate District 40 seat ended on

July 25, 2017, when he was defeated in the

Republican primary.

(2) The Complainant alleges that the Respondent

failed to make accurate disclosures on his 2016 CE

Form 6, Full and Pu blic Disclosure of Financial

Interests È as to his assets, liabilities, and/or net

worth.

* * *

(5) The Department of State, Division of Elections

online records confirm that between May 8, 2017,

and July 20, 2017, the Respondent personally

contributed $ 443,500 to his campaign. However, as

of May 25, 2017 Ð the date the Respondent chose for

his reporting date Ð he had only loaned his

campaign $50,000. This was in two loans of $25,000

each, on May 8 and May 25, according to Division

of Elections online records . The Respondent did not

report these loans as liabilities on the CE Form 6

he filed as a candidate and the only bank account

he disclosed at the time held a reported $2,536. [ 1 ]

* * *

(6) In his disclosure the Respondent listed the

following assets:... a home located at 1519 S.W.

19th Street in Miami, valued at $603,357È.

(7) The Dade County Property AppraiserÔs website

lists the 2017 market value of the RespondentÔs

home (located at 1519 S.W. 19th Street in Miami)

as $338,929, which is $264,428 below t he value

reported by the Respondent in his disclosure.

The AdvocateÔs Recommendation, dated December 12, 2018, includes the

following under the heading ÑAnalysis Ò :

[A]ccording to Department of State, Division of

ElectionsÔ records, Respondent personally

c ontributed $50,000 in the form of two $25,000

loans to his campaign on May 8 and 25, 2017. The

term ÑloanÒ indicates that the funds are expected to

be paid back and the loan falls under the term

Ñaccounts/notes receivableÒ which is an asset.

Respondent did not list either loan as an asset.

Respondent did list a home located at 1519 S.W.

19th Street, Miami, Florida as an asset valued at

$603,357. The instructions for the CE Form 6 on

how to value assets provide, ÑReal property may be

valued at its market va lue for tax purposes, unless

a more accurate appraisal of its fair market value

is available.Ò The Dade County Property

AppraiserÔs website lists the homeÔs 2017 market

1 The complaint questioned the sourcing of the funds used by Respondent to make th e loans

to his campaign. The source of RespondentÔs funds was not an issue in this case.

value at $338,929 which is $264,428 below the

value reported by Respondent on his discl osure.

[Citations to the investigative record omitted.]

The Advocate recommended that ÑThere is probable cause to believe that

Respondent violated Article II, Section 8, Florida Constitution, and Section

112.3144, Florida Statutes, by filing an inaccurate CE Form 6, ÓFull and

Public Disclosure of Financial Interests,Ô for the year 2016.Ò

Respondent timely requested a formal administrative hearing to contest

the Order Finding Probable Cause. On May 15, 2019, the Commission

forwarded the case to the Divisio n of Administrative Hearings for the

scheduling and conduct of a formal hearing. The case was initially set for

hearing on July 24 and 25, 2019. One continuance was granted and the

hearing was rescheduled for October 16 and 17, 2019.

On October 8, 2019, t he parties filed a Joint Prehearing Stipulation. In its

position statement, the Advocate named the three allegations then being

contested by the parties: whether Respondent properly listed two investment

accounts as assets on his Form 6 2 ; whether Responde nt should have listed

the two $25,000 loans to his campaign as assets on his Form 6; and whether

Respondent properly v alued the real property at 1519 S outhwest 19th Street

in Miami on his Form 6. However, the Advocate stated that these three

allegations we re only ÑexamplesÒ of the inaccuracies contained in

RespondentÔs Form 6, raising the possibility that other allegations might

arise at the final hearing.

At the outset of the final hearing, the undersigned inquired whether the

Advocate believed she was pe rmitted to introduce new factual allegations

against Respondent at the final hearing. The Advocate stated that this was

2 This allegation was abandoned by the Advocate at the start of the formal hearing.

indeed the AdvocateÔs position. The Advocate characterized events leading up

to the Report of Investigation as a Ñpreliminary investigat ion.Ò The Advocate

stated that the open - ended nature of the Order Finding Probable Cause

meant that any available facts establishing that Respondent filed an

inaccurate Form 6 could be used against Respondent at the final hearing,

whether or not such facts had been alleged in a charging document prior to

the hearing. The Advocate characterized the discovery process of this

proceeding as a continuation of the ÑinvestigationÒ and asserted that if

discovery revealed new factual grounds to allege that Responden t had filed

an inaccurate Form 6, those facts could be introduced at the final hearing.

The undersigned informed the parties that administrative due process

would not allow the Advocate to introduce new factual allegations at the final

hearing. The hearin g would go forward on the two allegations of which

Respondent had been given fair notice: the failure to list the two $25,000

campaign loans as assets and the alleged overvaluation of RespondentÔs

residence on Form 6.

The hearing went forward on that bas is, over the AdvocateÔs objection and

in spite of the AdvocateÔs attempt to inject the issue of whether Respondent

was the sole owner of the property at 1519 S outhwest 19th Street in Miami,

an issue that was mentioned in neither the Report of Investigation nor the

AdvocateÔs Recommendation. The raising of the new issue at trial

necessitated a continuance of the hearing and a round of briefing before the

case could be rescheduled and completed on February 24, 2020.

At the hearing, the Advocate presented th e testimo ny of Respondent,

Alex Diaz de la Portilla; Anabel Castillo, a realtor/broker who provided

Respondent with a valuation of his residence; Brent Sparkman, a certified

public accountant (ÑCPAÒ); A. Keith Powell, a Senior Investigator for the

Commissi on; Kristi Willis, Bureau Chief of Election Records in the Division of

Elections; and D ae na Richardson, Assistant Director for the Residential

Division of the Miami - Dade Property Appraiser. The AdvocateÔs Exhibits 2

through 4, 7, 9, 11 through 13, 15, 25, 26, 28, 29, and 34 through 49 were

admitted into evidence. 3 Respondent presented the testimony of CPA

Anthony Brunson and offered no additional exhibits into the record.

The four - volume Transcript of the hearing was filed at the Division of

Administrative Hearings on March 9, 2020. The parties jointly requested

three extensions of the time for filing p roposed r ecommended o rders, all of

which were granted. Pursuant to the Third Order Granting Extension, the

parties timely filed their Proposed Recommended Or ders on April 13, 2020.

On April 20, 2020, Respondent filed a mot ion to strike paragraphs 76

and 164 through 169 of the AdvocateÔs Proposed Recommended Order on the

ground that they improperly attempted again to inject the issue of

RespondentÔs ownership of the property located at 1519 S outhwest

19th Street in Miami. In its response to the motion, the Advocate again

asserts a right to raise new matters learned in discovery regardless of

whether they were included in the Order Finding Probable Cause or the

documents incorporated therein. RespondentÔs motion to strike is G RANTED

and paragraphs 76 and 164 through 169 of the AdvocateÔs Proposed

Recommended Order are stricken. The undersigned declines to expand the

3 Several of the AdvocateÔs admitted exhibits were portions of Advocate Exhibit 33, which

was not admitted in its entirety. Advocate Exhibit 34 was Bates stamped page 239 of

Advocate Exhibit 33. Advocate Exhibit 35 was Bates stamp ed page 241 of Advocate

Exhibit 33. Advocate Exhibit 36 was Bates stamped page 242 of Advocate Exhibit 33.

Ad vocate Exhibit 37 was Bates stamped page 240 of Advoca te Exhibit 33. Advocate

Exhibit 38 was Bates stamped pages 255 through 257 of Advocate Exhibit 33. Advocate

Exhibit 39 was Bates stamped pages 243 through 250 of Advocate Exhibit 33. The documents

origi nally submitted as Advocate Exhibits 34 through 41 were renumbered as Advocate

Exhibits 40 through 47 and admitted into evidence.

issues for decision beyond the reporting of the two $25,000 campaign loans

and the valuation of RespondentÔs residence.

All references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2017 edition, unless

otherwise noted.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the

fo llowing Findings of Fact are made:

1. Article II, Section 8(a) , Florida Constitution , provides that all elected

constitutional officers and candidates for such offices must file full and public

disclosure of their financial interests. Section 112.3144(1) p rovides that all

persons required by Article II, Section 8 to file a full and public disclosure of

their financial interests must file that disclosure with the Commission.

2. The Commission has promulgated Form 6 as the means by which

officers and candidat es are to make full and public disclosure of their

financial interests. Fla. Admin. Code R. 34 - 8.002.

3. Respondent was a candidate in the 2017 special election to fill the seat

for State Senate District 40 and was therefore required to file a Form 6.

Resp ondent served as his own campaign treasurer and completed the Form 6

without the assistance of an attorney or CPA. Respondent attested that he

read and understood the accompanying instructions to the Form 6.

Respondent also attested that he read and unders tood the requirements of

chapter 106, Florida Statutes, regarding campaign financing.

4. Respondent was an experienced political candidate in 2017, having

served in the Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Senate.

5. The 2016 version of Form 6 was in effect at the time of RespondentÔs

candidacy and was the version that he executed on May 26, 2017, and filed

with the Commission on May 30, 2017.

6. Form 6 comprises six parts: Part A, Net Worth; Part B, Assets; Part C,

Liabilities; Part D, Income; Part E, Interests in Specified Businesses; and

Part F, Training. The instant case concerns RespondentÔs reporting under

Part B, Assets.

7. The instructions for Part B provided as follows, in relevant part, under

the heading ÑAssets Individually Valued at More Than $1,000Ò:

Describe, and state the value of, each asset you had

on the reporting date you selected for your net

worth in Part A, if the asset was worth more than

$1,000 and if you have not already included that

asset in the aggregate value of your household

goods and personal effects. Assets include, but are

not limited to, things like interests in real property;

cash; stocks; bonds; certificates of deposit; interests

in businesses; beneficial interests in trusts; money

owed you; bank accounts; Def erred Retirement

Option Program (DROP) accounts; and the Florida

Prepaid College PlanÈ.

8. Form 6 also included instructions on ÑHow to Value Assets,Ò which

provided as follows, in relevant part:

-- Value each asset by its fair market value on the

date us ed in Part A for your net worth.

* * *

-- Real property may be valued at its market value

for tax purposes, unless a more accurate appraisal

of its fair market value is available.

* * *

-- Accounts, notes, and loans receivable: Value at

fair market val ue, which generally is the amount

you reasonably expect to collect.

9. The instructions for Part A of the 2016 Form 6 instructed the filer to

Ñ[r]eport your net worth as of December 31, 2016, or a more current date, and

list that date. This should be the same date used to value your assets and

liabilities.Ò RespondentÔs Form 6 listed his net worth as of May 25, 2017, the

day before he executed the form. Therefore, his assets and liabilities were

also counted as of May 25, 2017.

T HE C AMPAIGN ÑL OANS Ò

10. Candidates for elective office are required to electronically submit

reports to the Division of Elections (ÑDivisionÒ) disclosing campaign

contributions received and/or campaign expenditures via the DivisionÔs

electronic filing system (ÑEFSÒ). £ 106.0705, Fla. Stat. The Division provides

candidates with a handbook to guide them in submitting reports through the

EFS.

11. After Respondent filed his appointment of campaign treasurer and

designation of campaign depository for the special electi on for Senate

Di strict 40, the Division sent him a letter, dated May 4, 2017, to inform him

that his first campaign treasurerÔs report would be due on June 12, 2017.

12. On or about June 12, 2017, Respondent electronically submitted a

Campaign TreasurerÔs Report covering the period from May 8 to June 8,

2017.

13. The Campaign TreasurerÔs Report form includes a summary page with

total amounts of contributions and expenditures for the reporting period.

Under the ÑContributionsÒ column, the form lists two categories of

contri bution s : monetary and in - kind. Monetary contributions are divided into

two subcategories: ÑCash & ChecksÒ and ÑLoans.Ò RespondentÔs report listed

$22,500 in cash and checks and $50,000 in loans.

14. The details of the Campaign TreasurerÔs Report show that Respondent

made two $25,000 contributions to his campaign, one on May 8, 2017, and

one on May 25, 2017, that he identified as loans on the report.

15. Section 106.011(5)(a), Florida Statutes, defines ÑcontributionÒ as a

Ñ gift, subscription, conveyance, dep osit, loan, payment, or distribution of

money or anything of value, including contributions in kind having an

attributable monetary value in any form, made for the purpose of influencing

the results of an election or making an electioneering communication. Ò

16. The term ÑloanÒ is not defined by chapter 106 or chapter 112. For such

a term of common usage, the definition in BlackÔs Law Dictionary is

sufficient: Ñ A thing lent for the borrower's temporary use, esp., a s um of

money lent at interest.Ò As noted ab ove, the instructions for the CommissionÔs

Form 6 state that a loan should be valued Ñat fair market value, which

generally is the amount you reasonably expect to collect.Ò

17. Section 106.08(1)(a) provides that no person may, in any election,

make contri butions in excess of $1,000 to a candidate for legislative office.

Section 106.08(1)(b) provides that the $1,000 limitation does not apply to

contributions by a candidate to his or her own campaign.

18. Respondent testified as to his understanding of the c ampaign finance

reporting requirements. He understood that he was not limited to $1,000 in

making contributions to his own campaign. However, he believed that the

Division under no circumstances allows any person, even the candidate

himself, to report a co ntribution in excess of $1,000. Respondent believed that

in order to contribute more than $1,000 to his own campaign, he was required

to report the excess amount as a loan on his Campaign TreasurerÔs Report.

19. Kristi Willis, Bureau Chief of Election Reco rds for the Division,

testified that candidates are not required to report contributions to their own

campaigns in excess of $1,000 as loans.

20. Respondent offered no statutory support for his belief that he was

required to report the two $25,000 contrib utions as loans.

21. Respondent did not list the two $25,000 contributions as assets on the

2016 Form 6 that he filed on May 26, 2017. The Advocate contends that these

contributions should have been reported on Form 6 as assets because they

were loans.

22 . Respondent testified that, although he characterized them as ÑloansÒ

to his campaign, he had no expectation of recovering either of the $25,000

contributions. RespondentÔs campaign was not established as a corporation or

limited liability company with a separate existence from Respondent. He

considered the campaign to be his alter ego and believed that he had

essentially ÑlentÒ the money to himself. He had no intention of creating an

obligation on the part of his campaign to repay him. He could not sue hi mself

for repayment of the loan. RespondentÔs intention at all times was to spend

the money in pursuit of the State Senate District 40 seat.

23. In the same Campaign TreasurerÔs Report that included RespondentÔs

two $25,000 loans, Respondent listed a total of $22,500 in contributions from

other sources. Thus, RespondentÔs campaign was more than two - thirds self -

funded for the period of May 8 to June 8, 2017.

24. Though only the two $25,000 contributions were at issue in this

proceeding for the time period co vered by RespondentÔs Form 6, Respondent

in fact contributed 17 times to his State Se nate campaign between May 8

and July 20, 2017, for a total of $443,500. Each of the 17 contributions was

labeled a loan on RespondentÔs campaign finance reports. Responden t made

four contributions totaling $262,000 on or after July 18, 2017, for an election

to be held on July 25, 2017.

25. All other contributions to RespondentÔs campaign amounted to

$52,750. In other words, RespondentÔs campaign for State Senate District 40

was more than 89 percent self - funded by loans from Respondent to his

campaign.

26. Respondent could have had no reasonable expectation of collecting

these loans unless he chose to spend no money on the campaign, which would

have defeated the purpose of m aking the loans.

27. The special primary election for State Senate District 40 was held on

July 25, 2017. Respondent was eliminated from the race.

28. In a form memorandum dated August 9, 2017, Ms. Willis informed

Respondent that as an eliminated candidate , he must dispose of all funds on

deposit in his campaign account within 90 days of the special primary

election, pursuant to section 106.141. Ms. Willis stated that RespondentÔs

final expenditure report would have to be filed via the EFS no later than

Oct ober 23, 2017.

29. RespondentÔs final expenditure report indicates that between July 21,

2017 and August 3, 2017, the campaign spent $127,577.90. Most of these

expenditures consisted of payments to campaign workers and sums for

postage, media, and legal se rvices. The report shows Ñloan reimbursementsÒ

to Respondent of $1,000 on July 28, 2017, and of $3,000 on August 3, 2017.

Respondent could not recall the details of these relatively minor

reimbursements at two yearsÔ remove d from the events, but believed t hat

they must have been repayments for specific expenditures he had made on

behalf of the campaign.

30. The report shows that on September 29, 2017, long after the last

expenditures to pay for goods and services to the campaign were recorded on

August 3, 2 017, Respondent gave himself Ñloan reimbursementsÒ totaling

$36,785.69, presumably to reduce the campaign account to zero as required

by section 106.141.

31. The Advocate suggests that by characterizing his contributions as

loans, Respondent was giving him self priority when it came to the

disbursement of surplus campaign funds. Section 106.11(6) provides:

(6) A candidate who makes a loan to his or her

campaign and reports the loan as required by

s. 106.07 may be reimbursed for the loan at any

time the camp aign account has sufficient funds to

repay the loan and satisfy its other obligations.

32. In a campaign that was almost entirely self - funded, it makes little

sense that Respondent would characterize his contributions as ÑloansÒ for the

purpose of obtaini ng repayment priority prior to the election, particularly

when nearly 57 percent of those contributions were made in the week before

the election. Again, Respondent could have expected repayment only if he

chose to stop spending money on his campaign, whic h would raise the

question, why make the loans in the first place?

33. Whether or not he labeled contributions to his own campaign Ñloans,Ò

Respondent already had post - election priority by virtue of section 106.141(2),

which provides:

(2) Any candidate re quired to dispose of funds

pursuant to this section may, before such

disposition, be reimbursed by the campaign, in full

or in part, for any reported contributions by the

candidate to the campaign.

34. It is noted that the total reimbursements Respondent took after he

was eliminated from the State Senate election amounted to less than one -

tenth of the amount he ÑlentÒ to the campaign.

35. In summary, Respondent reported contributions to his own campaign

as loans because he misunderstood the re porting requi rements of

chapter 106. He did not report those contributions on his Form 6 because

they were not actual loans in any real sense. If the Commission insists that

RespondentÔs characterization of his campaign contributions should govern

this proceeding, then it is found that the fair market value of those loans, i.e.,

the amount that Respondent could have reasonably expected to collect, was

zero.

T HE R EAL P ROPERTY V ALUATION

36. On Part B of his Form 6, Respondent listed as an asset ÑReal Property

located at 1519 S.W. 19 StreetÒ and stated that the value of this asset was

$603,357.

37. Respondent testified that this property was his residence. It was

purchased by his parents in 1964. Respondent grew up in the home and now

owns it.

38. It is undisputed that th e Miami - Dade Property Appraiser established

the 2017 market value for tax purposes of RespondentÔs property at $338,929.

The Advocate contends that this is the number Respondent should have used

as the value of the asset and that Respondent violated Articl e II, Section 8,

Florida Constitution, and section 112.3144 b y submitting an inaccurate

Form 6.

39. The instructions for Form 6 advise the filer that Ñ[r]eal property may

be valued at its market value for tax purposes, unless a more accurate

appraisal of i ts fair market value is available.Ò This language establishes that

reporting the value of a property at its market value for tax purposes is the

default option, operating as a safe harbor for the reporting individual in

terms of the CommissionÔs compliance criteria.

40. Respondent understood that he could have reported the Miami - Dade

Property AppraiserÔs number and been done with it. However, Respondent

testified that the political climate in Miami - Dade County was such that he

could expect rivals to go over his campaign finance and public disclosure

filings with a fine - tooth comb , looking for anything t hat could be used against

him. He testified that the Complainant in the instant case had filed previous

complaints against him and was acting as legal counsel for one of

RespondentÔs opponents in the special election.

41. Respondent testified that the Miami - Dade Property Appraiser had

historically undervalued residential properties for taxation purposes to

ensure that senior citizens could afford to stay in the ir homes. Respondent

decided to comply with the spirit of the law by obtaining a more realistic

valuation of his home, in part to forestall baseless allegations by his political

enemies that he had undervalued his home by reporting the Property

AppraiserÔs number.

42. Anabel Castillo is a real estate salesperson and broker in Miami. She

worked as a legislative assistant to Respondent off and on between 1996 and

2010. Respondent phoned Ms. Castillo and asked her to perform a

comparative market analysis (ÑCMA Ò) , to determine the market value of his

home. Respondent knew and trusted Ms. Castillo. He also knew that

Ms. Castillo was familiar with his neighborhood and his residence.

43. Respondent testified that he knows little about the real estate

business and r elied on Ms. CastilloÔs judgment as to the valuation of his

home. Before Ms. Castillo undertook her valuation, Respondent made sure

she understood that he wanted a thorough valuation. He asked her to

physically visit the comparable properties, not just loo k at them online. He

wanted her to drive around the neighborhood and learn the prices houses

were fetching.

44. Ms. Castillo agreed with RespondentÔs opinion that the Miami - Dade

Property Appraiser undervalued residential properties. Ms. Castillo testified

that Respondent did not tell her why he wanted a valuation of the fair

market value of his home but that she has performed thousands of CMAs in

her career and agreed to undertake this one for Respondent.

45. Ms. Castillo began by looking for active, expire d, sold , and pending

properties in the Multiple Listing Service, a proprietary tool available to

realtors and brokers. Ms. Castillo explained that an ÑexpiredÒ property is one

that has been on the market but failed to sell.

46. Ms. Castillo examined county records and went out to visit four or five

properties. She went inside at least one of the comparable houses and found

it to be in worse condition than RespondentÔs house. Ms. Castillo stated that

none of the comparable houses was as large as RespondentÔs five bedroom,

three bath house. Ms. Castillo opined that RespondentÔs property was in good

condition. The kitchen had been renovated and there were no issues with the

roof or the bathrooms.

47. After performing her CMA, Ms. Castillo told Respondent that s he

could easily sell his property for $635,000. She had no knowledge as to why

he stated a value of $603,357 on Form 6. Ms. Castillo suggested that

Respondent may have just decided to err on the side of conservatism.

48. At the time, Ms. Castillo did not p repare a written report of her CMA.

She merely made an oral report of the result to Respondent. Ms. Castillo

testified that after the instant case was begun, she was approached by

counsel for Respondent who asked her to create a document memorializing

the CMA and price evaluation she performed in May 2017.

49. Ms. Castillo testified that the document she produced at the request of

RespondentÔs counsel was a fair recreation of her contemporaneous work, but

she could not state with certainty whether the house s she selected as

comparable properties for the document were the same houses she used as

comparables in 2017. Though she was unable to verify that she had perfectly

recreated her 2017 CMA, Ms. Castillo nonetheless expressed confidence that

her evaluation was accurate and that any other professional would be

comfortable using the same comparable properties and would have calculated

a value in the same range as she did.

50. Ms. CastilloÔs written recreation of her CMA stated that as of May

2017, RespondentÔs property would appraise at $603,000. Ms. Castillo did not

explain why her recreation arrived at a value of $603,000 when she originally

told Respondent that she could sell the property for $635,000. The most likely

explanation is that Ms. Castillo was som ewhat clumsily attempting to assist

Respondent by making her CMA match the number on RespondentÔs Form 6.

51. D ae na Richardson is the Assistant Director for the Residential

Division of the Miami - Dade Property Appraiser. Ms. Richardson testified

that the P roperty Appraiser uses a Ñmass appraisalÒ process to determine the

value of properties. She described the process as follows:

Basically, the difference between mass appraisal

and what you would have for someone that's either

selling their home or possibly doing a refinance is a

fee appraisal, meaning they are going in, they are

looking at the subject property, they are finding

comparable sales within that immediate area in

order to determine a value for whether [sic] loan

purposes or refinance purposes or p urchasing

purposes.

Within the property appraiser's office, because we

have so many parcels, it is not possible for us to do

individual appraisals for every single property, so,

therefore, we have to do it in mass based on market

area.

Basically, we will take, for example, an area like

the subject property, we will take all of those

properties within the subject area, we will see what

sales sold within that subject area, we will see if

there is any additional external influences that we

need to be aware o f, that we need to make

adjustments for, and then we will determine values

for those properties based on the sales within that

area, and then we will apply those values to the

entire population.

52. As the name suggests, the mass appraisal process does no t consider

each property individually. Ms. Richardson testified that in the last year

about 60,000 property owners filed petitions contesting the Property

AppraiserÔs mass appraisal valuation of their properties. Those petitions go

before special magistrat es with the count yÔs Value Adjustment Board.

Ms. Richardson conceded that the Value Adjustment Board considers market

value information provided by real estate brokers on behalf of petitioners.

53. Ms. Richardson discussed the Property Appraiser's summary of

RespondentÔs property, including the lot size, building size, adjusted square

footage of the building, year built, Ñeffective age,Ò 4 and zoning. The summary

included a statement of the Property AppraiserÔs determination of the land

value, building value , Ñextra featuresÒ value, market value , and assessed

value of RespondentÔs property for the t ax years 2014 through 2018.

4 A buildingÔs effective age is determined by reference to renovations done subsequent to its

initial construction.

Ms. Richardson also discussed the list of comparable properties for each of

those years, as determined by the Property Appraiser.

54. Ms. Richardson noted that the Property AppraiserÔs Office never

valued RespondentÔs property at more than $430,054 for any tax year

between 2014 and 2018.

55. The Property AppraiserÔs market value for RespondentÔs property was

$201,652 for tax year 2014 a nd $430,054 for tax year 2018. The value did not

increase steadily over the five year period. Rather, the market value jumped

from $201,652 for tax year 2014 to $346,759 for tax year 2015, mostly due to

the Property AppraiserÔs determination that the value of RespondentÔs land

nearly quadrupled in a single year, from $52,173 in tax year 2014 to $192,324

in tax year 2015. The market value then remained steady for the next two

years: $338,246 for tax year 2016 and $338,929 for tax year 2017. The value

then ju mped by nearly another $100,000 in tax year 2018, again because of

an increase of nearly $100,000 in the assessed value of RespondentÔs land.

56. Even during the apparently consistent years from 2015 to 2017, there

were significant changes within the value s that make up the Property

AppraiserÔs market value, which is the sum of land value plus building value

plus the relatively negligi ble value of Ñextra features.Ò From 2015 to 2016,

RespondentÔs land increased in value from $192,324 to $236,313, but the

va lue of his house decreased from $151,492 to $98,308. The overall market

value was virtually the same for tax years 2016 and 2017, but only because

another decrease of $22,806 in the value of the building was offset by an

increase of $23,592 in the value of the land.

57. Ms. Richardson testified about a map showing the locations of the

comparable properties for the tax years 2014 - 2018 that the Property

Appraiser used during its valuation process. Ms. Richardson testified that

her office used values from wit hin the market area of RespondentÔs property

to determine its value.

58. The properties used by the Property Appraiser were generally closer to

RespondentÔs property than were the comparable properties selecte d by

Ms. Castillo. Ms. Richardson explained th at the properties used by the

Property Appraiser Ñwere all within close proximity, maybe one or two blocks

away from the subject property, all having the same external factors, all

having the same influence as far as traffic, whether itÔs the elementary sc hool

or just people going through the neighborhood. It all shows the same

influences that the subject property would have as well.Ò

59. The properties selected by Ms. Castillo were outside of the boundaries

of the Ñmarket areaÒ as determi ned by the Proper ty Appraiser. In

Ms. RichardsonÔs opinion, these properties would not be considered true

comparables to RespondentÔs property.

60. Ms. RichardsonÔs opinion is credited to t he extent of her expertise:

Ms. CastilloÔs selections would not be comparable proper ties for the purposes

of the Property AppraiserÔs Office in establishing the value of a residential

property for taxation.

61. Ms. CastilloÔs opinion is likewise credited to the extent of her

expertise. The Advocate presented no evidence to suggest that a nother

realtor or broker would have reasonably disagreed with Ms. CastilloÔs

methodology and conclusions as to the fair market value of RespondentÔs

property.

62. Anthony Brunson, a CPA who has worked for political campaigns for

over 20 years, testified th at a property appraiserÔs valuation would be the last

thing he would use for determining fair market value for Form 6 purposes

because property appraisers throughout Florida tend to undervalue

residential property. Mr. Brunson credibly testified that the m ost common

method of determining the value of real property for reporting purposes is to

obtain :

a fair market study done by a realtor wherein you

look at like property sales in the geographic area,

which could provide, in my view, the best estimate

of th e current market value of your particular

property. Beyond that, a formal appraisal is

actually the very best, but that becomes costly, and

I believe, you know, not warranted in a

circumstance like this.

63. All witnesses agreed that placing a fair market value on a piece of

property is an art, not a science. There are different methodologies employed

to establish value and different reasons for seeking to establish value. The

Property Appraiser looks at actual sales in the market area. It is backward

look ing and could result in undervaluing properties in a rising market. A

broker performing a CMA looks not only at completed sales but at active and

pending listings; it is a more current snapshot but also carries the risk of

overvaluing the property based on asking prices rather than completed sales.

As the Advocate pointed out, there may be a difference between Ñmarket

priceÒ as established by completed sales and Ñmarket valueÒ in the opinion of

a real estate broker.

64. There is also the question of whethe r a CMA , such as that performed

by Ms. Castillo , may be considered a Ñmore accurate appraisalÒ of fair market

value than the market value set by the Property Appraiser. Respondent

conceded that Ms. Castillo did not , and could not , lawfully perform a for mal

appraisal of his property. Only a licensed appraiser may perform a formal

appraisal, which is usually commissioned by a lender seeking an opinion on

the collateral value of a property about to be sold. A full formal appraisal may

cost several hundred doll ars, as opposed to a CMA that is generally offered

free of charge by a real estate agent or broker. For purposes of Form 6

reporting, Mr. BrunsonÔs opinion was that a CMA is preferable to a property

appraiserÔs valuation and that he would not advise a clie nt to go to the

further expense of obtaining a formal appraisal.

65. Chapter 475, p art II, Florida Statutes, sets forth the definitions and

standards governing property appraisers in the State of Florida. The

AdvocateÔs Proposed Recommended Order attempts to import the statutes

and rules regarding appraisers into Form 6 because of its reference to an

Ñappraisal.Ò The undersigned is unpersuaded because he is confident that if

the Commission intended to provide that the only alternative to a property

appraise rÔs valuation is to retain a licensed appraiser to perform a full formal

appraisal at a cost of hundreds of dollars, and further intended to adopt the

definitions and standards of chapter 475, part II , in their entirety and by

reference into Form 6, it wou ld have done so clearly and expressly rather

than to hang so much meaning , without undergoing rulemaking, on the

single word Ñappraisal.Ò

66. The evidence presented at the hearing established that Respondent in

good faith sought a better estimate of the f air market value of his residence

than the Ñmarket value for tax purposes,Ò in light of the common perception

that property appraisers undervalue residential properties and RespondentÔs

knowledge that his political rivals would minutely examine his Form 6 for

any possible flaws. Mr. Brunson credibly testified that he routinely advises

clients that a CMA is preferable to a property appraiserÔs valuation for

purposes of Form 6 filing.

67. Respondent had a personal and pro fessional relationship with

Ms. Castil lo prior to engaging her to perform the CMA for his property in

2017. It appears that when asked to recreate her CMA in 2019, Ms. Castillo

shaded her conclusion in a misguided effort to assist Respondent in this

hearing, making her CMA conclusion match mor e closely the number

Respondent included on his Form 6. Respondent offered no satisfactory

explanation as to why he changed Ms. CastilloÔs $635,000 valuation to

$603,357 on Form 6.

68. These discrepancies in RespondentÔs case were disquieting but

ultimate ly not dispositive. It is understood that a statement of fair market

value is an estimate made by a real estate professional. While the Miami -

Dade Property AppraiserÔs statement of the market value for tax purposes is

presumptively acceptable for Form 6 pu rposes, the evidence presented at the

hearing demonstrated that the mass appraisal process does not necessarily

yield a satisfactory value for each individual parcel, as evidenced by 60,000

petitions in one year contesting the Property AppraiserÔs valuatio ns.

69. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for Respondent to believe that an

individuated CMA for his property would be more accurate than the value

sta ted by the Property Appraiser. The Advocate made insinuations regarding

RespondentÔs possible motives f or reporting an inflated value for his property

but failed to offer actual evidence that Respondent was interested in

anything other than reporting an accurate fair market value.

70. Because of the subjectivity involved in producing a CMA or any other

valu ation of real property, and absent a definitive showing of bad faith or

illicit intent, there should be a fairly wide range of acceptable Ñfair market

valueÒ numbers for financial disclosure purposes. If the Commission truly

intends that a candidateÔs esti mate of the value of his real property must be

accurate enough to withstand forensic financial examination by a CPA,

Form 6 should be revised through rulemaking to include that cautionary

note.

71. Clear and convincing evidence was not presented that Respo ndent

filed an inaccurate Form 6 for the year 2016.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

72. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject

matter of and the parties to this proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla.

Stat.

73. The Commission is aut horized to conduct investigations and make

public reports on complaints concerning violations of chapter 112, part III,

Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for P ublic Officers and Employees.

§ 112.322, Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 34 - 5.0015.

74. The Co mmission, through its Advocate, is asserting the affirmative

regarding Respondent's purported violations of Article II, Section 8, Florida

Constitution, and section 112.3144. The party having the affirmative of the

issues in a proceeding bears the burden o f proof. DepÔt of Transp. v. J.W.C.

Co. Inc. , 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); and Balino v. DepÔt of HRS , 348

So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

75. In this case, the elements of the alleged violation must be established

by clear and convincing evidence. Siplin v. CommÔn on Ethics , 59 So. 3d 150

(Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Latham v. CommÔn on Ethics , 694 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1997).

76. In Evans Packing Co mpany v. Dep artment of Agric ulture and

Consumer Ser vices , 550 So. 2d 112, 116, n. 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), t he Court

defined clear and convincing evidence as follows:

[C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the

evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to

which the witnesses testify must be distinctly

remembered; the evidence must be precise and

exp licit and the witnesses must be lacking in

confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence

must be of such weight that it produces in the mind

of the trier of fact the firm belief of conviction,

without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations

sought to be established. Slomowitz v. Walker , 429

So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).

77. Judge Sharp, in her dissenting opinion in Walker v. Dep artment of

Bus iness & Prof essiona l Reg ulation , 705 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 5th DCA

1998) (Sharp, J., dissenting), re viewed recent pronouncements on clear and

convincing evidence:

Clear and convincing evidence requires more proof

than preponderance of evidence, but less than

beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Inquiry

Concerning a Judge re Graziano , 696 So. 2d 744

(Fla. 19 97). It is an intermediate level of proof that

entails both qualitative and quantative [sic]

elements. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. , 658 So. 2d

961, 967 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1051,

116 S. Ct. 719, 133 L.Ed.2d 672 (1996). The sum

total of evi dence must be sufficient to convince the

trier of fact without any hesitancy. Id. It must

produce in the mind of the fact finder a firm belief

or conviction as to the truth of the allegations

sought to be established. Inquiry Concerning

Davey , 645 So. 2d 3 98, 404 (Fla. 1994).

78. Article II, Section 8 of the Florida Constitution provides as follows, in

relevant part:

Ethics in government. Ð A public office is a public

trust. The people shall have the right to secure and

sustain that trust against abuse. To assure this

right:

(a) All elected constitutional officers and

candidates for such offices and, as may be

determined by law, other public officers,

candidates, and employees shall file full and public

disclosure of their financial interests.

(b) All ele cted public officers and candidates for

such offices shall file full and public disclosure of

their campaign finances.

* * *

(f) There shall be an independent commission to

conduct investigations and make public reports on

all complaints concerning breac h of public trust by

public officers or employees not within the

jurisdiction of the judicial qualifications

commission.

* * *

(i) Schedule Ð On the effective date of this

amendment and until changed by law:

(1) Full and public disclosure of financial i nterests

shall mean filing with the custodian of state

records by July 1 of each year a sworn statement

showing net worth and identifying each asset and

liability in excess of $1,000 and its value together

with one of the following:

a. A copy of the perso nÔs most recent federal

income tax return; or

b. A sworn statement which identifies each

separate source and amount of income which

exceeds $1,000. The forms for such source

disclosure and the rules under which they are to be

filed shall be prescribed by the independent

commission established in subsection (f), and such

rules shall include disclosure of secondary sources

of income.

* * *

(3) The independent commission provided for in

subsection (f) shall mean the Florida Commission

on Ethics.

79. Sectio n 112.3144 provides as follows, in relevant part:

(1)(a) An officer who is required by s. 8, Art. II of

the State Constitution to file a full and public

disclosure of his or her financial interests for any

calendar or fiscal year, or any other person

requi red by law to file a disclosure under this

section, shall file that disclosure with the Florida

Commission on EthicsÈ.

* * *

(8) Forms or fields of information for compliance

with the full and public disclosure requirements of

s. 8, Art. II of the State Constitution shall be

prescribed by the commission.

80. In furtherance of its statutory mandate, the Commission has

promulgated Form 6 for the full and public disclosure of financial interests.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 34 - 8.002.

81. Respondent stood as a candi date in the 2017 special election for State

Senate District 40. As a candidate for legislative office, Respondent was

required to file full and public disclosure of his campaign finances to the

Division by way of a Campaign TreasurerÔs Report , and to file a full and

public disclosure of his financial interests with the Commission via Form 6.

In this case, Respondent is alleged to have filed an erroneous Form 6 in

violation of Article II, Section 8 , Florida Constitution and section 112.3144.

82. During the re levant reporting period, Respondent made two $25,000

contributions to his campaign that he reported as ÑloansÒ on his Campaign

TreasurerÔs Report. Respondent did not report these amounts as ÑassetsÒ on

his Form 6. The instructions for Form 6 state Ñmoney o wed youÒ is considered

an asset and instructs the filer that Ñaccounts, notes, and loans receivableÒ

should be valued Ñat fair market value, which generally is the amount you

reasonably expect to collect.Ò

83. The Findings of Fact established that Responde nt reported his

contributions to his own campaign as ÑloansÒ out of a mistaken

understanding of the DivisionÔs reporting requirements. Respondent never

considered these sums to be loans as that term is used in Form 6. He did not

believe the money was owed to him. He had no reasonable expectation of

collecting any of it. At the conclusion of his campaign, Respondent recovered

less than one - tenth of the total amount he contributed as Ñloans.Ò

84. The Advocate cites In Re: Steven Mueller , Case No. 12 - 3138EC ( Fla.

DOAH Jan . 24, 2013 ; Fla. CommÔn on Ethics Mar. 15, 2013 ) as authority in

thi s case. Among other things, Mr. Mueller was found to have violated the

cited constitutional and statutory provisions by making a $20,000 loan to his

own political campaign and not reporting the loan as an asset on his Form 6.

The R ecommended O rder in Mueller is a conclusory 11 - page document, five

pages of which are statutory quotation, and offers little illumination for the

decision in this case. Mr. Mueller represented himself in the case and did not

file a proposed recommended order. No detail of the nature of Mr. MuellerÔs

loan is provided. No information is provided as to whether the loan was

repaid. The findings of fact and conclusions of law are so cursorily stated that

it is unclear whether Mr. Mueller even contested the allegation regarding the

loan at the final hearing.

85. The ALJ in Mueller noted a lengthy catalogue of reporting failures

that Ñall point to a casual indifference to the financial disclosure

requirements of Florida law.Ò Mueller , ¶ 20. In the instant case, Respondent

is accused of one omission and one inaccuracy , and has vigorously contested

both charges. The evidence established that Respondent was far from

indifferent to the stateÔs financial disclosure requirements. If anything, he

was hypersensitive about filing accurate disclosure forms because of the

political atmosphere in which he operated.

86. In the instant case, the question of whether RespondentÔs campaign

contributions were rea lly loans was fully litigated. Based on the totality of

the evidence, the undersigned found that there was no loan to be disclosed on

RespondentÔs Form 6. In the alternative, if the Commission were to conclude

that RespondentÔs campaign contributions were reportable as loans, the

undersigned found that the amount Respondent reasonably expected to

recover was zero. Any civil penalty imposed by the Commission should reflect

the asset value of the ÑloansÒ at the time they were made.

87. In summary, the Advocate failed to de monstrate by clear and

convincing evidence that RespondentÔs failure to report his campaign

contributions as assets on his Form 6 constituted a violation of Article II,

Section 8, Florida Constitution, or section 112.3144.

88. On his Form 6, Respondent rep orted th e value of his property at

1519 S outhwest 19th Street in Miami as $603,357. Respondent derived this

number, in a way never quite explained, from a CMA that estimated the

value of his property at $635,000. The CMA was performed by an experienced

rea ltor and broker named Anabel Castillo, who was a former employee and

still a friend of Respondent. Ms. Castillo described how she performed the

CMA, which was in keeping with the standard methodology used in her

industry.

89. The Advocate disputed whether the comparable properties chosen by

Ms. Castillo were within the market area of RespondentÔs home, but the only

supporting evidence was the opinion testimony of Property Appraiser

employee Deana Richardson. The undersigned found Ms. Richardson to be

makin g an apples - to - oranges comparison between the selection of comparable

properties for the Property AppraiserÔs purpose of establishing taxable value

and the selection of comparables for the purpose of a real estate brokerÔs

CMA.

90. Anthony Brunson, a CPA w ith a great deal of experience in filing

reports for political campaigns, credibly testified that he regularly advises

clients to use CMAs to report property values on Form 6 because they provide

the best estimate of current fair market value. Mr. Brunson agre ed with

Ms. Castillo that property appraisers tend to undervalue residential

property.

91. In light of the evidence and the plain language of Form 6, the

undersigned declines the AdvocateÔs suggestion that a reporting individualÔs

only alternative to r eporting the market value for tax purposes is to

commission a formal appraisal. The undersigned concludes that if the

Commission intended for Form 6 to import all the definitions and

requirements of chapter 475, part II, it would make that intent explicit. It is

reasonable to read the term ÑappraisalÒ in Form 6 in a less restrictive way

that encourages individuals to make honest attempts at reporting more

accurate values for their properties than the mass appraisal value stated by

the P roperty A ppraiser for tax purposes.

92. The Advocate argues that a candidate may be motivated to falsely

embellish his net worth to give Ñthe appearance or image of success in oneÔs

personal and professional life.Ò The Advocate posits that people are more

likely to vote for a financially stable candidate than one who is struggling

financially.

93. The Advocate presented no solid evidence that RespondentÔs motives

were to mislead the public or to do anything other than report the most

accurate fair market value available. Resp ondent filed his disclosures in the

sure knowledge that his political opponents would perform a granular

examination of his Form 6. It is difficult to fathom why Respondent would

abandon the safe harbor of valuing his property Ñat its market value for tax

purposesÒ unless he believed he was using a more accurate appraisal of its

fair market value. Given the acknowledged subjectivity of real estate

valuation, there is no factual or legal reason why the Commission should not

be satisfied with the value report ed on RespondentÔs Form 6. 5

94. In summary, the Advocate failed to demonstrate by clear and

convincing evidence that RespondentÔs statement of the fair market value of

the property at 1519 Southwest 19th Street in Miami on his Form 6

constituted a violati on of Article II, Section 8, Florida Con stitution, or section

112.3144 .

95. At the hearing, the Advocate attempted to introduce evidence that

Respondent was not the sole owner of the property at 1519 S outhwest

19th Street. During discovery, the Advocate ob tained information indicating

that RespondentÔs former wife may have still had an interest in the property.

The Advocate suggested that this shared ownership might affect the

valuation Respondent reported on his Form 6. See § 112.3144(6), Fla. Stat.

Neithe r the Report of Investigation nor the AdvocateÔs Recommendation

made any allegation regarding the status of RespondentÔs ownership of the

property at 1519 S outhwest 19th Street. The Advocate took the position that

5 As sug gested above, if the Commission intends to strictly interpret Ña more accurate

appraisalÒ to mean a full formal appraisal by a licensed appraiser, it should amend the

language of the Form 6 instruction s to make its intent clear.

because it was alleged that Respondent h ad filed an inaccurate Form 6, any

facts supporting that general allegation could be asserted to support a finding

of a violation, regardless of whether those facts were pled at the outset of the

hearing.

96. The mere reference to the charging statute, wi thout supporting factual

allegations, was not sufficient to place Respondent on notice of the charges

against him. Trevisani v. DepÔt of Health , 908 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA

2005). See also Cottrill v. DepÔt of Ins ., 685 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA

1996) ( Ñ Predicating disciplinary action against a licensee on conduct never

alleged in an administrative complaint or some comparable pleading violates

the Administrative Procedure Act. To countenance such a procedure would

render nugatory the right t o a formal administrative proceeding to contest

the allegations of an administrative complaint. Ò ).

97. Based on these principles, the undersigned ruled at the hearing that

the Advocate would not be permitted to raise issues not alleged in the Order

Findin g Probable Cause or the supporting documents referenced therein. See

In re: Lonnie Evans , ¶¶ 40 - 44, Case No. 10 - 6459EC (Fla. DOAH Feb. 16,

2011 ; Fla. CommÔn on Ethics Mar. 3, 2011 )(concluding that Ñit would have

been improper to consider evidence against L onnie Evans to support factual

allegations never identified in the Order Finding Probable Cause.Ò) .

R ECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a public report finding that the

evidence presented at the public hearing in this case was insufficient to

establish clearly and convincingly that Respondent violated Article II, Section

8 , Florida Constitution , or section 112.3144, Florida Statutes, by filing an

inaccurate CE Form 6, ÑFu ll and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests , Ò f or

the year 2016.

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 26th day of May , 2020 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

S

L AWRENCE P. S TEVENSON

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Adminis trative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 26th day of May , 2020 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Melody A. Hadley, Esquire

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

(eServed)

Benedict P. Kuehne, Esquire

Kuehne Davis Law, P.A.

Suite 3550

100 Southeast 2 n d Street

Miami, Florida 33131

(eServed)

Elizabeth A. Miller, Esquire

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol, Plaza Level 01

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Millie Fulford, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Ethics

Post Office Drawer 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32317 - 570 9

(eServed)

C. Christopher Anderson, III, Executive Director

Florida Commission on Ethics

Post Office Drawer 15709

Tallahassee, Florida 32317 - 5709

(eServed)

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions wi thin 15 days from

the d ate of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.