19-003416F Cynthia L. Denbow, A.R.N.P., C.N.M. vs. Department Of Health, Board Of Nursing Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Friday, January 24, 2020.

Summary: Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 18-2269PL was not supported by material facts or the application of the law to those facts.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CYNTHIA L. DENBOW, A.R.N.P.,

C.N.M.,

Petitioner,

Case No. 1 9 - 3416 F

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF

NURSING,

Respondent.

/

FINAL ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY’S FEES

On December 13, 2019, a final hearing was held via video

teleconference with locations in Tallahassee and Tampa, Florida,

before E. Gary Early, an Administrative Law Judge assigned by

the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) .

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Suzanne Suarez Hurley, Esquire

Suzanne Suarez Hurley, P.A.

Post Office Box 172474

Tampa, Florida 33672

For Respondent: Kristen M. Summers, Esquire

Linda B. Kipling, Qualified Representative

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way , Bin C - 65

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner ,

Cynthia L. Denbow, A.R.N.P, C.N.M. (Ms. Denbow or Petitioner) is

entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida

Statutes (2018) , 1/ from Respondent , Department of Health

(Department or Respondent), related to litigation between the

parties in DOAH Case No. 1 8 - 2269PL .

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On March 8, 2018 , the D epartment issued a three - count

Administrative Complaint aga inst Petitioner in DOH Case

No. 2017 - 22543 , which charged Petitioner with failing to meet

the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing

practice, engaging in unprofessional conduct, and making

deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in or related

to the practice of her profession as a nurse - midwife , in

violation of chapter 464, Florida Statutes . The Administrative

Complaint was based on a n incident in which an infant , the

mother of whom was under Petitioner’s care, did not survive

childbirth .

On or about March 20, 2018, Respondent t imely filed an

Election of Rights in which she disputed the allegations

contained in the Administrative Complaint , and requested a

formal administrative hearing. On May 7, 2018, the Election of

Rights was referred to DOAH , and was assigned to the undersigned

for disposition as DOAH Case No. 1 8 - 2269PL .

On May 22, 2018, Petitioner served the Department with a

Motion for Sanctions, which was the 21 - day “safe harbor” notice

required by s ection 57.105(4) , advising the Departmen t of her

belief that the agency action against her was unsupported by

material facts necessary to establish the violations and that

the agency action was not supported by the application of then -

existing law to the material facts.

On June 26, 2018, Petit ioner filed her Motion for Sanctions

with DOAH , stating that the Department had not withdrawn or

appropriately corrected its Administrative Complaint.

T he final hearing in DOAH Case No. 1 8 - 22 69PL was scheduled

to be held on August 2 7 and 28 , 201 8, by video teleconference in

Tallahassee and Pensacola , Florida , and was convened and

concluded as scheduled . On December 26, 2018, the Recommended

Order was entered , which recommended that the Department enter a

final order dismissing the Admin istrative Co mplaint against

Ms. Denbow. An award pursuant to s ection 120.57(5) , Florida

Statutes, being authorized only to “the prevailing party,” and

there being no determination of the prevailing party until t he

entry of a final order, the Recommended O rder did not dispose of

the Motion for Sanctions.

On February 25, 2019, the undersigned entered a Procedural

Order on Expert Witness Fees, which provided that:

A t such time as either party requests an

award of attorney’s fees and costs as a

result of the Department of Health’s final

order entered in this case, and jurisdiction

is returned to determine the award, the

allowance of expert witness fees shall be

determined and taxed as costs at that time.

On March 28, 2019, the Department entered its Final Order

by which it accepted the Recommended Order and dismissed the

Administrative Complaint against Petitioner.

On June 25, 2019, Petitioner renewed her earlier Motion for

Sanctions by filing her Updated Motion for Attorney's Fees and

Costs and Motion fo r Payment of Reasonable Fee to Expert Witness

Dr. Penny Lane, D.N.P., C.N.M. (Updated Motion). The Updated

Motion asserted that Ms. Denbow was the prevailing party in the

underlying proceeding and that Respondent knew or should have

known that, at the tim e the Administrative Complaint was served,

it was not supported by the material facts necessary to

establish its claims and was not supported by the application of

then - existing law to those material facts. Th e Updated Motion

was opened as DOAH Case No. 1 9 - 3416F.

On July 2, 2019, the Department filed a Response to

Petitioner's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs , and a

separate Response to Petitioner's Motion for Payment of

Reasonable Fee to Expert Witness Penny Lane. On July 9, 2019,

Petitioner filed a responsive Addendum to Her Updated 57.105

Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Memorandum of Law.

The final hearing in th is proceeding was scheduled to be

conducted by video teleconference in Tallahassee and Tampa ,

Florida, on December 13, 2019. On December 9, 2019, a Joint

Pre - hearing Stipulation was filed. The Joint Pre - hearing

Stipulation made no mention of the expert witness fee to Penny

Lane, and that matter has, by agreement of the parties, been

resolved.

The final hearing was convened and concluded on

December 13, 2019, as scheduled. Petitioner testified on her

own behalf, and presented the testimony of Evelyn Moya, Esquire ,

who was accepted as an expert witness; Kristen Summers, Esquire;

and her counsel, Suzanne Hurley, Esquire. Petitioner’s

Exhibits 1, 2, 4 through 6, and 12 through 18 were received in

evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Ms. Summers and

Daniel Russell, Esquire , who was accepted as an expert witness .

Respondent’s Exhibits 1 through 4 were received in evidence. In

addition, official recognition was taken of the record of DOAH

Case No. 18 - 2269PL.

The parties did not file a transcript of the final hearing.

Both parties filed Proposed Final Orders on December 10, 2020 ,

which have been considered in the preparation of this Final

Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Recommended Order in DOAH Case No. 1 8 - 2269PL ,

including the Preliminary Statement , t he Findings of Fact , and

the Conclusions of Law contained therein , and the Department ’s

Final Order in DOAH Case No. 18 - 2269PL are incorporated herein

by reference as the facts underlying this Final Order .

Stipulated Facts

2. Respondent is the state agency responsible for

regulating the practice of nursing pursuant to chapters 456 and

464, Florida Statutes.

3 . Petitioner is an Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner

(ARNP) and Certified Nurse Midwife (CNM) , who mu st comply with

section 464.012 regarding the pra ctice of ARNPs and with

Florida Administrative Code Rule 64 B9 - 4 , which requires CNMs

to comply with standards set by the American College of Nurse

Midwives (ACNM).

4 . The Administrative Complaint in the underlying case was

presented to the Florida Board of Nursing Probable Cause Panel

(Probable Cause Panel) on M arch 8, 2018.

5 . The Probable Cause Panel found probable cause and

authorized the filing of the Administrative Complaint in the

underlying case.

6. Joanna Mitrega, A.P.R.N., Respondent's expert, reviewed

the facts of the underlying case.

7. Ms. Mitre ga issued an opinion finding that the

Petitioner fell below the standard of care in the treatment of

Patient A.R. on February 8, 2018.

8 . Ms. Mitrega is a certified nurse midwife with

significant experience in the practice of nursing as it relates

to hos pital labor and delivery.

9 . On May 22, 2018, Petitioner served her proposed Motion

for Sanctions on Respondent, along with a letter and documents.

10 . O n June 26, 2018 , 35 days later, Petitioner filed her

Motion for Sanctions with DOAH .

11 . On March 28, 2019, the Final Order of the Board of

Nursing was filed in DOAH Case No. 18 - 2269PL , which accepted the

recommendation that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed .

12. P etitioner is the prevailing party for the purposes of

section 57.105.

13 . On June 25, 2019, Petitioner filed the Updated Motion .

14 . On July 9, 2019, Petitioner filed an Addendum to her

Updated Motion for Sanctions (Attorney ’ s Fees and Costs) and

Memorandum of Law.

15 . An attorney ’ s fee of $250/Hour is a reasonable rate.

Other Relevant Facts

16 . The undersigned was the presiding officer in the case

below. A review of the Recommended Order and the record in DOAH

Case No. 18 - 2269PL indicates that there were a number of

elements of the care and treatment of A.R. that were

problematic, including the failure to perform a physical exam,

digital or otherwise, for more than an hour after A.R. arrived

at the birthing cent er, and having A.R. push (for a disputed

number of times) after the child was discovered to be in the

vertex position.

17 . Non - expert testimony was inconsistent, e.g., whether

and how A.R. was manifesting her pain; whether vital signs were

checked on a rrival at the birthing center; whether A.R. was

advised of the options for safe delivery , based on the nature of

the delivery and its imminence , and issues of birth in an

ambulance; the number of contractions and discrepancies in the ir

charting; the nature and content of conversations between

Petitioner and hospital staff; and more. Evidentiary issues

with charting and recording the events were complicated by the

fact that records were not completed until after A.R. was

received at the hospital, and t hat r ecords bore dates up to

11 days after the incident, facts that would not have been

facially apparent. Each of these disputed facts, none of which

were implausible or shown to be driven by an effort to conceal

the truth, required a determination of the str essors and

circumstances to evaluate whose testimony to accept. The facts

of DOAH Case No. 18 - 2269PL were far from clear - cut, and the

undersigned struggled with the decision of how to weigh and

evaluate the testimony and evidence, acknowledging that

“diff erences in time, tone, and substance were, more likely than

not, an artifact of the stress and tumult of the moment.”

18 . The testimony of experts was conflicting. The

opinions offered by the Department’s witness, Ms. Mitrega, did

not waver, but ultimately the basis for those opinions was

determined to be less than substantiated. As evidence was

introduced at the hearing, and later carefully evaluated, the

weight of her testimony was reduced to “near zero.” However,

t he perception of the undersi gned during the hearing in DOAH

Case No. 18 - 2269PL, was that Ms. Mitrega’s testimony was not

entirely expected by the Department. Ms. Summers’s credible

testimony at the hearing in this matter substantiate d that

perception. It is not unheard of for lawye rs to be surprised by

their witness ’s testimony, even when professionally discussed

and evaluated beforehand. That Ms. Mitrega may have veered off

track at the hearing is not determinative of whether the

Administrative Complaint, as pled, was not supporte d by the

material facts necessary to establish a potential violation, or

would not be supported by the application of chapter 464 to

those facts.

19 . The D epartment was not acting without cause in DOAH

Case No. 18 - 2269PL. The Department offered admissible evidence

in support of its allegations. Had the case been evaluated

under a lesser standard of proof than “clear and convincing

evidence,” or the testimony of witnesses been weighed

differently, the outcome may have turne d. That is, however, not

an issue for, or a finding of, this proceeding. Rather, the

issue is whether the Administrative Complaint lacked factual

support or a legal basis, and was , therefore , sanctionable under

section 57.105. Under the fac t s elicited a nd the law pled in

DOAH Case No. 18 - 2269PL, it did not.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jurisdiction and Burden of Proof

20 . DOAH has jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to

sections 57.105(5), 120.569, and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes

(2019) . The Administrative Law Judge has final order authority

in this matter. § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat. (2019).

21 . As the party asserting the affirmative of the issue,

Petitioner has the burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of

the evidence, both entitlemen t to and reasonableness of the

attorneys' fees sought. Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C., Inc .,

396 So. 2d 778, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.

22 . Section 57.105 provides, in pertinent part, that:

(1) Upon the court’s initiative or motion

of any party, the court shall award a

reasonable attorney’s fee, . . . on any

claim or defense at any time during a civil

proceeding or action in which the court

finds that the losing party or the losing

party’s attorney knew or should have known

th at a claim or defense when initially

presented to the court or at any time before

trial:

(a) Was not supported by the material facts

necessary to establish the claim or defense;

or

(b) Would not be supported by the

application of then - existing law to t hose

material facts.

* * *

(4) A motion by a party seeking sanctions

under this section must be served but may

not be filed with or presented to the court

unless, within 21 days after service of the

motion, the challenged paper, claim,

defense, conten tion, allegation, or denial

is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.

(5) In administrative proceedings under

chapter 120, an administrative law judge

shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee and

damages to be paid to the prevailing party

in equal amou nts by the losing party and a

losing party’s attorney or qualified

representative in the same manner and upon

the same basis as provided in subsections

(1) - (4). Such award shall be a final order

subject to judicial review pursuant to

s. 120.68 . . . .

Timeliness of Motion

23 . Unlike some other attorneys' fees provisions, 2 /

section 57.105 contains no specific instruction as to when or

how a request for attorneys' fees shall be made. The language

quoted above, that the award of fees in an administrative

proceeding shall be awarded “in the same manner and upon the

same basis ” as the procedures established for civil proceedings ,

requires consideration. The Florida Supreme Court in Stockman

v. Downs , 573 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. 1991), held:

[A] claim for attorney's fees, whether based

on statute or contract, must be pled. The

fundamental concern is one of notice.

Modern pleading requirements serve to notify

the opposing party of the claims alleged and

prevent unfair surprise. 40 Fla. Jur . 2d

Pleadings Section 2 (1982). Raising

entitlement to attorney's fees only after

judgement fails to serve either of these

objectives. The existence or nonexistence

of a motion for attorney's fees may play an

important role in decisions affecting a

case. Fo r example, the potential that one

may be required to pay an opposing party's

attorney's fees may often be determinative

in a decision on whether to pursue a claim,

dismiss it, or settle. A party should not

have to speculate throughout the entire

course of an action about what claims

ultimately may be alleged against him.

Accordingly, we hold that a claim for

attorney's fees, whether based on statute or

contract, must be pled. Failure to do so

constitutes a waiver of the claim.

The court went on to hold t hat once pled, proof of attorneys'

fees could be presented after judgment, upon motion within a

reasonable time.

24 . T he “ safe harbor ” provision quoted above requires a

party seeking fees to serve the motion but not file it until at

least 21 days later, allowing the challenged claim or contention

to be withdrawn or corrected. In compliance with this

provision, it is undisputed that Petitioner served Respondent

with h er motion for fees on Ma y 22, 2018 .

25. The purpose of the “safe harbor” period established in

section 57.105(4), which requires that a party first serve a

motion seeking fees, followed by its filing 21 days later, is to

afford a party a last clear chance to withdraw a meritless

claim. Global Xtreme, Inc. v. Advanced Aircraft Ctr. , Inc. ,

122 So. 3d 487, 490 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2013). The “safe harbor” is strictly enforced. See Dunkin' Donuts Franchised Rests., LLC v.

330545 Donuts, Inc. , 27 So. 3d 711, 713 - 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010);

Montgomery v. Lar moyeux , 14 So. 3d 1067, 1072 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2009); Anchor Towing, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp. , 10 So.

3d 670, 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Petitioner cannot, after the litigation that is the focus of the request for attorney’s fees has concluded, change the b asis of her section 57.105 Motion for Sanctions. Thus, any grounds pled in the Updated Motion that exceed the grounds identified in the Motion for Sanctions may not form a basis for an award of fees in this action.

26 . Th e notice requirement brings secti on 57.105 within an

exception recognized by Stockman itself, at page 838:

Where a party has notice that an opponent

claims entitlement to attorney's fees, and

by its conduct recognizes or acquiesces to

that claim or otherwise fails to object to

the failure to plead entitlement, that party

waives any objection to the failure to plead

a claim for attorney's fees.

27 . Respondent, aware of Petitioner's motion for fees, did

not object during hearing to Petitioner's failure to plead

entitlement.

Standard

28. DOAH Case No. 18 - 2269PL was decided on the application

of the “clear and convincing” burden of proof. As set forth in

the Recommended Order, that burden:

[E]ntails both a qualitative and

quantitative standard. The evidence must be

credible; the me mories of the witnesses must

be clear and without confusion; and the sum

total of the evidence must be of sufficient

weight to convince the trier of fact without

hesitancy.

Clear and convincing evidence

requires that the evidence must be

found to be credible; the facts to

which the witnesses testify must

be distinctly remembered; the

testimony must be precise and

explicit and the witnesses must be

lacking in confusion as to the

facts in issue. The evidence must

be of such weight that it produces

in t he mind of the trier of fact a

firm belief or conviction, without

hesitancy, as to the truth of the

allegations sought to be

established.

In re Davey , 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994) (quoting, with

approval, Slomowitz v. Walker , 42 9 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1983)).

29 . I t is well established that “section 57.105 does not

require a finding of frivolousness to justify sanctions, but

only a finding that the claim lacked a basis in material facts

or then - existing law.” Martin Cty. Conser. Alliance v. Martin

Cty. , 73 So. 3d 856, 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see also Gopman v.

Dep’t of Educ. , 974 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

30. The standard under section 57.105 is to be applied on

a case - by - case basis. In that regard:

While the rev ised statute incorporates the

“ not supported by the material facts or

would not be supported by application of

then - existing law to those material facts ”

standard instead of the “ frivolous ”

standard . . . , an all encompassing

definition of the new standar d defies us.

It is clear that the bar for imposition of

sanctions has been lowered, but just how

far it has been lowered is an open question

requiring a case by case analysis.

Wendy's v. Vandergriff , 865 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)

( citing Mullins v. Kennelly , 847 So. 2d 1151, 1155 n.4.

(Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ) .

31 . The term “supported by the material facts” in

section 57.105(1)(a) means that the “party possesses admissible

evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the

finder of fact.” Albritton v. Ferrera , 913 So. 2d 5, 7 n.1

(Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

32 . In conducting this evaluation, it must be determined

if the party or its counsel knew or should have known that the

claim or defense asserted was not supported by the material

facts necessary to establish the claim or defense or by the

application of then - existing law to the material facts. Read v.

Taylor , 832 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). “ [ A ] n award of fees

is not always appropriate under section 57.105, even when the

party seeking fees was successful in obtaining the dismissal of

the action or summary judgment in an action.” Id. at 222; see

also Mason v. Highlands Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm ’ rs , 817 So. 2d

922, 9 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)( “ Failing to state a cause of action

is not in and of itself a sufficient basis to support a finding

that a claim was so lacking in merit as to justify an award of

fees pursuant to section 57.105. ” ).

33 . As set forth by the Fifth Dis trict Court of Appeal:

The central purpose of section 57.105 is,

and always has been, to deter meritless

filings and thus streamline the

administration and procedure of the courts.

. . . “ The purpose of section 57.105 is

to discourage baseless claims, stonewall

defenses and sham appeals in civil

litigation by placing a price tag through

attorney's fees awards on losing parties who

engage in these activities. ” . . . .

Although the statute . . . “ must be read in

light of concerns that it will spawn

satel lite litigation and chill vigorous

advocacy, ” any interpretation of the statute

must give effect to its central goal of

deterrence.

* * *

[The] dispute . . . is a classic “ he said,

she said, ” wherein the credibility of the

witnesses would have been we ighed by the

trier of fact had the matter proceeded to

trial. The fact that the witnesses provided

contradictory evidence does not necessarily

compel the court to the conclusion that the

action lacked factual support and was

therefore sanctionable under s ection 57.105.

Mullins v. Kennelly , 847 So. 2d at 1154 - 1155 (citations

omitted) .

34 . Section 57.105 is not a penalty for failing to

prevail, rather it is a deterrent against meritless, frivolous,

baseless, or non - judiciable claims. Where the non - prevailing

party presents competent, substantial evidence in support of

claims presented , and the tri er - of - fact determines the issues

adversely to the non - prevailing party based on conflicting

evidence, section 57.105 does not authorize an award of

att orney’s fees . See Siegel v. Rowe , 71 So. 3d 205 , 213

(Fla. 2d DCA 2011) . As a general proposition, section 57.105 should be applied with restraint. Minto PBLH, LLC v. 1000

Friends of Fla., Inc. , 228 So. 3d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

CONCLUSION

35 . As applied to this case, there were allegations that

were not supported by the applicable “clear and convincing”

quantum of proof. See DOAH Case No. 18 - 2269PL , Recommended

Order ¶¶ 41, 54 , 58, 59, 78, 93, and 98. Nonetheless, the

Department presented admissible evidence sufficient to establish

the fact s alleged if it had been accepted by the undersigned.

The finding that the Department did not prove its case by clear and convincing evidence is not the same as a finding that the

allegations in support of the Administrative Complaint were

lacking in merit.

36 . Based upon a full review and consideration of the

record in DOAH Case No. 1 8 - 2269PL , the undersigned concludes

that , although the Recommended Order in that case did not uph o ld

the Department’s proposed agency action , the material facts

relied upon by the Department and the application of

chapter 464, i.e. , the then - existing law , to those material

facts by the Department were not so lacking in merit as to

warrant an award of attorney’s fees or costs under section

57.105 . Furthermore, t he u ndersigned concludes that no action

taken by the Department was so clearly and obviously lacking as

to be untenable .

37 . Based on the F indings of F act and legal authority set

forth herein, the Motion for Sanctions, filed on June 26, 2018;

Petitioner Cynthia Denbow's Updated Motion for Attorney's Fees

and Costs and Motion for Payment of Reasonable Fee to Expert

Witness Dr. P enny Lane, D.N.P., C.N.M., filed on June 25, 2019;

and Petitioner Cynthia Denbow's Addendum to Her Updated 57.105

Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, filed on July 9, 2019, are

DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of January , 20 20 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

E. GARY EARLY

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 24th day of January , 20 20 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Florida

Statutes are to the 2018 codifications. It should be noted that

the applicable provisions of section 57.105 have not changed

since 2010.

2 / Compare section 57.111(4)(b)2., providing that an application

for attorneys' fees must be made within 60 days after the small

business party becomes a prevai ling party.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Suzanne Suarez Hurley, Esquire

Suzanne Suarez Hurley, P.A.

Post Office Box 172474

Tampa, Florida 33672

(eServed)

Kristen M. Summers, Esquire

Department of Health

Prosecution Services Unit

4052 Bald Cypress Way , Bin C - 65

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Linda B. Kipling

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way , Bin C - 65

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director

Board of Nursing

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way , Bin C - 02

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Kathryn Whitson, MSN, RN

Board of Nursing

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way , Bin D - 02

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Louise Wilhite - St. Laurent, General Counsel

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C - 65

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Scott Rivkees, M.D.

State Surgeon General

Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A - 00

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1701

(eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is

entitled to judicial review pursuant to s ection 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing one c opy of a Notice of Administrative Appeal with the

agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a

second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with

the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the

District Court of Appe al in the appellate district where the

party resides. The Notice of Administrative Appeal must be

filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.