19-003727MTR David Brown, An Individual, And Tonja Jenkins, His Wife vs. Agency For Health Care Administration Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Tuesday, December 3, 2019.

Summary: Petitioners proved, by a preponderance of evidence, that $69,623.38 represents a fair and reasonable determination of past medical expenses actually recovered by Petitioners and payable to AHCA.

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DAVID BROWN, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND

TONJA JENKINS, HIS WIFE ,

Petitioners , Case No. 19 - 3727MTR

vs.

AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE

ADMINISTRATION ,

Respondent .

/

FINAL OR DER

Pursuant to notice, on September 11, 2019, Administrative

Law Judge Yolonda Y. Green of the Florida Division of

Administrative Hearings (“Division”), held a hearing in

Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner s : Floyd B. Faglie, Esquire

Staunton and Faglie, P.L.

189 East Walnut Street

Monticello, Florida 32344

For Respondent: Alexander R. Boler, Esquire

2073 Summit Lake Drive, Suite 300

Tallahasse e, Florida 32317

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue to be determined is the amount payable to

Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”), as

reimbursement for medical expenses paid on behalf of David

Brown (“Mr. Brown”) pursuant to section 409.910, Florida

Statutes (2018), 1/ from settlement proceeds he received from a

third party.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On November 16, 2017, Petitioners, David Brown, an

Individual, and Tonja Jenkins, His Wife (“Ms. Jenkins”) , filed

a Petition to Determine Amo unt Payable to Agency for Health

Care Administration in Satisfaction of Medicaid Lien (“the

Petition”) to challenge AHCA’s placement of a Medicaid lien in

the amount of $181,975.75 on Petitioners $2,500,000 settlement

proceeds from a third party.

The p arties filed a Joint Pre - H earing Stipulation that

contained a statement of admitted and stipulated facts for which

no further proof would be necessary. Those stipulated facts

have been incorporated into the Findings of Fact below, to the

extent necessary.

The final hearing commenced as scheduled on September 11,

2019. At hearing, Petitioners’ Exhibits 1 through 9 were

admitted. Petitioner s presented the testimony of two expert

witnesses: Brett Rosen, Esquire, and R. Vinson Barrett,

Esquire. AHCA did not call any witnesses and did not offer any

exhibits at the hearing.

The Transcript of the hearing was filed with the Division

on October 17, 2019. AHCA timely filed its Proposed Final Order

(”PFO”) by the initial designated date. On October 29, 2019,

P etitioners filed an Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to

File Proposed Final Order, which the undersigned granted.

Petitioners timely filed their PFO on November 4, 2019. The

PFOs filed by the parties have been considered in preparation of

this Fina l Order.

FINDING S OF FACT

The following Findings of Fact are based on exhibits

accepted into evidence, testimony offered at the hearing, and

admitted facts set forth in the pre - hearing stipulation.

Facts Pertaining to the Underlying Personal Injury Litigat ion

and the Medicaid Lien

1. Mr. Brown is the recipient of Medicaid for injuries he

sustained in an automobile accident.

2. AHCA is the state agency charged with administering the

Florida Medicaid program, pursuant to chapter 409.

3. On February 25, 2015, Mr. Brown, then 46 years old, was

involved in a T - bone automobile accident. In the accident,

Mr. Brown suffered a fractured wrist, torn shoulder, skin

abrasions, a grade 4 bilateral pulmonary contusion, and a right

middle cerebral artery infarct (c ommonly referred to as a

stroke) with hemorrhagic contusion. Due to complications

related to placement of a trachea, he underwent reconstructive

surgery of his throat. Mr. Brown suffered permanent severe

brain damage causing him to suffer left hemiparesi s and

difficulty swallowing or speaking. As a result of the accident,

Mr. Brown is now disabled and has difficulty ambulating, eating,

and caring for himself without assistance.

4. Mr. Brown’s medical care related to the injury was paid

by Medicaid . A HCA provided $181,975.75 in benefits . A Medicaid

Manage Care Plan, known as WellCare, provided an additional

$110,559.15 in benefits. The sum of these benefits,

$292,534.90 , constituted Mr. Brown’s entire claim for past

medical expenses.

5. Petitioner s pursued a personal injury action against

the owner and operator of the car that caused the accident

(“Defendant”) to recover all their damages.

6. AHCA did not commence a civil action to enforce its

rights under section 409.910 or intervene in Petitio ner s’ action

against the Defendant .

7. During the pendency of Mr. Brown’s personal injury

action, AHCA was notified of the action and AHCA asserted a

Medicaid lien of $181,975.75 against Petitioners’ cause of

action and settlement of that action.

8. There were liability issues with the case including the

degree of comparative negligence that could be attributed to

each driver. Specifically, there was a question of which driver

had the green light. The personal injury claim ultimately

settled for a l ump - sum unallocated amount of $2,500,000.

9. By letter, AHCA was notified of settlement of

Petitioners’ claim.

10. AHCA has not filed a motion to set - aside, void , or

otherwise dispute Petitioners’ settlement.

11. The Medicaid program through AHCA s pent $181,975.75

for Mr. Brown’s past medical expenses.

12. Application of the formula set forth in

section 409.910(11)(f) to Petitioners’ $2,500,000 settlement

authorizes payment to AHCA of the full $181,975.75 Medicaid

lien.

13. Petitioners have dep osited AHCA’s full Medi caid lien

amount in an interest - bearing account for the benefit of AHCA

pending an administrative determination of AHCA’s rights.

14. As a condition of eligibility for Medicaid, Mr. Brown

assigned AHCA his right to recover medical expenses paid by

Medicaid from liable third parties

Expert Witness Testimony

Testimony of Brett Rosen

15. Petitioners presented the testimony of Brett Rosen,

the lead trial attorney who litigated the underlying personal

injury claim. Mr. Rosen is a shareholder with the law firm of

Goldberg and Rosen in Miami, Florida. Mr. Rosen has been a

trial attorney for approximately 12 years and he specializes in

representing parties in catastrophic injury, personal injury,

and wrongful death cases.

16. Mr. Ro sen’s firm takes approximately eight to ten

cases to trial each year. Since the firm routinely conducts

civil jury trials, Mr. Rosen continuously educates himself on

jury verdicts by reviewing the Florida Jury Verdict Reporter

(a publication of jury v erdict reports) and conducting

roundtable discussions with other attorne ys. Using information

found in j ury v erdict reports , the Daily Business Review , and

his experience, Mr. Rosen makes assessments concerning the value

of damages sustained by individual s.

17. Without objection, Mr. Rosen was accepted as an expert

in the valuation of damages suffered by Petitioners.

18. In addition to presenting testimony as an expert,

Mr. Rosen also presented factual testimony regarding the

underlying personal injury claim. As the lead attorney,

Mr. Rosen met with Mr. Brown monthly on average during the two

years that he represented him. Mr. Rosen also consulted with a

neurologist and ENT physician who both treated Mr. Brown.

19. Mr. Rosen testified that Mr. Brown ’ s vehicle was

struck on the right side (commonly referred to as T - bone

accident) by a vehicle , causing the vehicle he was driving to

flip over onto its side. While Mr. Brown was able to get out of

his vehicle , he suffered multiple injuries as further desc ribed

in paragraph three herein . In addition to the brain injury, he

had a tracheostomy that ultimately resulted in a bad outcome.

As a result, he could not eat, speak , or drink for approximately

two years.

20. Mr. Rosen testified that Mr. Brown’s inj uries had

significant negative impact on Mr. Brown and his wife,

Ms. Jenkins. Mr. Rosen testified that Ms. Jenkins resigned from

her job to take care of her husband and assist with his

recovery. Ms. Jenkins also suffered loss of consortium damages

result ing from Mr. Brown’s injuries. The couple was forced to

live with relatives w hen they could not afford rent. Overall,

Mr. Rosen testified that the injuries negatively impacted

Mr. Brown’s ab ility to lead a normal life.

21. Mr. Rosen testified that the l itigation of the case

involved factual, causation , and legal disputes. There were no

eyewitnesses , and the question remained regarding which driver

had the green light. In addition, the insurance policy was

limited to $50,000. Mr. Rosen later brought a bad faith claim

against the insurance company due to their failure to timely

tender the policy limits . After fully evaluating the risks, the

parties settled the case for $2,500,000.

22. Mr. Rosen testified that the full value of the claim

is $10,500,000. However, Petitioners settled the claim for

$2,500,000 , which represents 23.8 percent of the value of their

damages. Mr. Rosen testified that since Mr. Brown only

recovered 23.8 percent of his total damages, he recovered in the

settlement only 23.8 perce nt of his $292,534.90 claim for past

medical expenses, which amounts to $69,623.38. Mr. Rosen

testified that it would be reasonable to allocate $69,623.38 of

the settlement to past medical expenses .

Testimony of Vinson Barrett

23 . Vinson Barrett was also identified as Petitioners’

expert witness. Mr. Barrett, a trial attorney with 40 years of

experience, is a partner with the law firm of Barrett , Nonni and

Homola. His firm represents clients in medical mal practice,

automobile, premise liability, and pha rmaceutical products

liability cases. Mr. Barrett has conducted numerous jury trials

and has handled cases involving catastrophic injuries.

24 . Mr. Barrett routinely reviews jury verdict reports,

disc usses cases with other lawyers, and makes assessment s

concerning the value of damages suffered by injured persons.

Mr. Barrett has also served as an expert in a number of cases

regarding evaluation of damages.

25 . Mr. Barrett was recognized as an expert in the area of

evaluation of damages.

26 . To eval uate the medical damages suffered by Mr. Brown,

Mr. Barrett reviewed the police report, medical records, and the

amended life care plan for Mr. Brown. Mr. Barrett also

considered the overall level of pain and suffering Mr. Brown

would suffer throughout th e remainder of his life. Mr. Barrett

testified that when compared to other traumatic brain cases,

Mr. Brown is a little better off than other traumatic cases he

has reviewed because he is able to ambulate using assistive

devices and his mental abilities h ave not been compromised

significantly.

27 . Mr. Barrett opined that the overall value of the

damages would be more than $10,500,000 . Mr. Barrett testified

that his estimate was a conservative valuation of damages.

Mr. Barrett concluded that , accepting M r. Rosen’s even more

conservative valuation, the $2,500,000 settlement constituted

23.8 percent of the full valu e of Petitioners’ damages.

Mr. Barrett testified that allocation of $69,623.38 of the

settlement would be a reasonable allocation of damages to the

past medical expenses.

Ultimate Findings of Fact

28 . The undersigned finds that the testimony of Mr. R osen

and Mr. Barrett was credible and persuasive as to the total

damages incurred by Petitioners. While assigning a value to the

damages that pla intiffs could reasonably expect to receive from

a jury is not an exact science, Mr. Rosen’s extensive experience

with litigating personal injury lawsuits makes him a very

compelling witness regarding the valuation of damages suffered

by Petitioners. As a trial lawyer who has testified in nearly

20 cases regarding valuation an d allocation of damages, and

40 years of experience handling personal injury matters

i nvolving catastrophic injuries, Mr. Barrett is also a credible

witness regarding the valuation and allocation of damages in a

case such as Mr. Brown’s.

29 . The undersigned also finds that Mr. Barrett was

qualified to present expert testimony as to how a damages award

should be allocated among its components, such as past medical

expenses, economic d amages, and noneconomic damages.

30 . AHCA offered no evidence to counter the expert

opinions regarding Petitioners’ total damages or the past

medical expenses t he y recovered.

31 . Accordingly, it is found that the preponderance of the

evidence demonstrat es that the total value of Petitioners’

personal injury claim is $10 ,500,000 and that the $2,500,000

settlement resulted in Petitioners reco vering 23.8 percent of

Mr. Brown’s past medical expenses. In addition, the

preponderance of th e evidence demonstrat es that $69 ,623.38

amounts to a fair and reasonable determination of the past

medical expenses actually recovered by Petitioners and payable

to AHCA.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

32 . The Division has jurisdiction over the subject matter

and the parties in this c ase pursuant to sections 120.569,

120.57(1) and 409.910(17), Florida Statutes (2019).

3 3 . AHCA is the agency authorized to administer Florida’s

Medicaid program. § 409.902, Fla. Stat.

34 . The Medicaid program “provide[s] federal financial

assistance t o States that choose to reimburse certain costs of

medical treatment for needy persons.” Harris v. McRae , 448 U.S.

297, 301 (1980).

3 5 . “The Medicaid program is a cooperative one. The

Federal Government pays between 50 percent and 83 percent of the

cos ts a state incurs for patient care. In return, the State

pays its portion of the costs and complies with certain

statutory requirements for making eligibility determinations,

collecting and maintaining information, and administering the

program.” Estate of Hernandez v. Ag. for Health Care Admin. ,

190 So. 3d 139, 14 1, 42 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2016)(internal citations

omitted).

36 . Though participation is optional, once a state elects

to participate in the Medicaid program, it must comply with

federal requirement s. Harris , 448 U.S. at 301.

37 . One condition for receipt of federal Medicaid funds is

that states must seek reimbursement for medical expenses

incurred on behalf of Medicaid recipients who later recover from

legally liable third parties. See Ark. Dep' t of Health & Human

Servs. v. Ahlborn , 547 U.S. 268, 276 (2006); see also Estate of

Hernandez , 190 So. 3d at 142 (noting that one such requirement

is that “each participating state implement a third party liability provision which requires the state to see k

reimbursement for Medicaid expenditures from third parties who

are liable for medical treatment provided to a Medicaid

recipient”).

38 . Consistent with this federal requirement, the Florida

Legislature enacted section 409.910, designated as the “Medicai d

Third - Party Liability Act,” which authorizes and requires the

state to be reimbursed for Medicaid funds paid for a recipient's

medical care when that recipient later receives a personal

injury judgment, award, or settlement from a third party.

Smith v. Ag. for Health Care Admin. , 24 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 5th DCA

2009); see also Davis v. Roberts , 130 So. 3d 264, 266 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2013)(stating that in order “[t]o comply with federal directives the Florida legislature enacted section 409.910,

Florida Statutes, which authorizes the State to recover from a

personal injury settlement money that the State paid for the

plaintiff’s medical care prior to recovery.”).

39 . Section 409.910(1) sets forth the Florida

Legislature’s clear intent that Medicaid be repaid in full for

medical care furnished to Medicaid recipients by providing that:

It is the intent of the Legislature that

Medicaid be the payor of last resort for

medically necessary goods and services

furnished to Medicaid recipients. All other

sources of payme nt for medical care are

primary to medical assistance provided by

Medicaid. If benefits of a liable third

party are discovered or become available

after medical assistance has been provided

by Medicaid, it is the intent of the

Legislature that Medicaid be repaid in full

and prior to any other person, program, or

entity. Medicaid is to be repaid in full

from, and to the extent of, any third - party

benefits, regardless of whether a recipient

is made whole or other creditors paid.

Principles of common law an d equity as to

assignment, lien, and subrogation are

abrogated to the extent necessary to ensure

full recovery by Medicaid from third - party

resources. It is intended that if the

resources of a liable third party become

available at any time, the public tr easury

should not bear the burden of medical

assistance to the extent of such resources.

40 . In addition, the Florida Legislature has authorized

AHCA to recover pay ments paid from any third party; the

recipient; the provider of the recipient’s medical se rvices ; or

any person who received the third - party benefits. § 409.910(7),

Fla. Stat.

41 . Section 409.910(6)(a) outlines AHCA’s procedure to

recover the full amount paid for medical assistance as follows:

[I]s automatically subrogated to any rights

that an applicant, recipient, or legal

representative has to any third - party

benefit for the full amount of medical

assistance provided by Medicaid. Recovery

pursuant to the subrogation rights created

hereby shall not be reduced, prorated, or

applied to only a portion of a judgment,

award, or settlement, but is to provide full

recovery by the agency from any and all

third - party benefits. Equities of a

recipient, his or her legal representative,

a recipient’s creditors, or health care

providers shall not defeat , reduce, or

prorate recovery by the agency as to its

subrogation rights granted under this

paragraph.

42 . The amount to be recovered by AHCA from a settlement,

which is of relevance here, from a third party is determined by

a formula in section 409.910 (11)(f). Ag. for Health Care

Admin. v. Riley , 119 So. 3d 514, 515 n.3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

43 . Section 409.910(11)(f) provides:

Notwithstanding any provision in this

section to the contrary, in the event of an

action in tort against a third party in

wh ich the recipient or his or her legal

representative is a party which results in a

judgment, award, or settlement from a third

party, the amount recovered shall be

distributed as follows:

1. After attorney’s fees and taxable costs

as defined by the Flor ida Rules of Civil

Procedure, one - half of the remaining

recovery shall be paid to the agency up to

the total amount of medical assistance

provided by Medicaid.

2. The remaining amount of the recovery

shall be paid to the recipient.

3. For purposes of calculating the agency’s

recovery of medical assistance benefits

paid, the fee for services of an attorney

retained by the recipient or his or her

legal representative shall be calculated at

25 percent of the judgment, award, or

settlement.

4. Notwithst anding any provision of this

section to the contrary, the agency shall be

entitled to all medical coverage benefits up

to the total amount of medical assistance

provided by Medicaid. For purposes of this

paragraph, “medical coverage” means any

benefits un der health insurance, a health

maintenance organization, a preferred

provider arrangement, or a prepaid health

clinic, and the portion of benefits

designated for medical payments under

coverage for workers’ compensation, personal

injury protection, and cas ualty.

44 . In the instant case, applying the formula in section

409.910(11)(f) to the $2,500,000 settlement results in AHCA

being owed $181,975.75 to satisfy the Medicaid lien.

Petitioner, however, asserts that a lesser amount is owed to

Respondent.

4 5 . When AHCA has not participated in or approved a

settlement, the administrative procedure created by section

409.910(17)(b) serves as a means for determining whether a

lesser portion of a total recovery should be allocated as

reimbursement for medical e xpenses in lieu of the amount

calculated by application of the formula in section

409.910(11)(f).

46 . Section 409.910(17)(b) provides, in pertinent part,

that: 2/

A recipient may contest the amount

designated as recovered medical expense

damages payable t o the agency pursuant to

the formula specified in paragraph (11)(f)

by filing a petition under chapter 120

within 21 days after the date of payment of

funds to the agency or after the date of

placing the full amount of the third - party

benefits in the trust account for the

benefit of the agency pursuant to paragraph

(a) . . . . In order to successfully

challenge the amount payable to the agency,

the recipient must prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, that a lesser portion

of the total recovery should be allocated as

reimbursement for past and future medical

expenses than the amount calculated by the

agency pursuant to the formula set forth in

paragraph (11)(f) or that Medicaid provided

a lesser amount of medical assistance than

that asserted by the agenc y.

47 . Therefore, the formula in section 409.910(11)(f),

provides an initial determination of AHCA’s recovery for

medical expenses paid on a Medicaid recipient’s behalf, and

section 409.910(17)(b) sets forth an administrative procedure

for adversarial t esting of that recovery. See Harrell v.

State , 143 So. 3d 478, 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)(stating that

petitioner “should be afforded an opportunity to seek the

reduction of a Medicaid lien amount established by the

statutory default allocation by demonstrat ing, with evidence,

that the lien amount exceeds the amount recovered for medical

expenses”).

48 . Here, Petitioners proved by a preponderance of the

evidence that $2,500,000 repres ents 23.8 percent of

Petitioner s ’ personal injury claim valued at $10 ,500 ,000 . As a

result, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that AHCA’s

full Medicaid lien amount should be reduced by the percentage

that Petitioners’ recovery represents the total value of

Petitioner’s claim. When applying the percentage allocation of

23.8 percent to the lien amount of $181,975.75 , this results in

the amount of $69,623.38, which constitutes the share of the

settlement proceeds fairly and proportionally attributable to

Mr. Brown’s recovery of past medical expenses.

49 . While AHCA off ered no evidence to counter

Mr. Barrett’s and Mr. Rosen’s testimony, AHCA argued durin g the

final hearing and in its PFO that Mr. Barrett and Mr. Rosen

were not qualified to render an expert opinion as to what

portion of total damages amounts to a recovery of an individual

component of damages, such as past medical expenses. Both

Mr. Rosen and Mr. Barrett’s testimony demonstrated that each

witness had a considerable amount of experience making such

determinations. More importantly, Petitioners presented

s ufficient and uncontradicted evidence establishing $ 69,623.38

as the settlement portion properly allocated to past medical

expenses.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is ,

ORDERED that the Agen cy for Health Care Ad ministration is

entitled to $69,623.38 as satisfaction of its Medicaid lien.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of December , 2019 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

YOLONDA Y. GREEN

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 3rd day of December , 20 19 .

ENDNOTE S

1/ Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references will be to

the 2018 version of the Florida Statutes. That version of the

Florida Statutes was in effect when Petitioners settled their

personal injury claim. See Cabrera v. Ag. for Hea lth Care

Admin. , Case No. 17 - 4557MTR (Fla. DOAH Jan. 23, 2018)(citing

Suarez v. Port Charlotte HMA , 171 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 2d DCA

2015)).

2/ The Northern District of Florida ruled that the Medicaid Act

prohibits AHCA from requiring a Medicaid recipient to

affirmatively disprove section 409.910(11)(f)’s formula - based

allocation with clear and convincing evidence. Gallardo v.

Dudek , 263 F. Supp. 3d 1247 (N.D. Fla. April 18, 2017).

How ever, section 120.57(1)(j) contains a default provision

regarding the bur den of proof and provides that “findings of

fact shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence, except

in penal or licensure disciplinary proceedings or except as

otherwise provided by statute.” A preponderance of the evidence

is defined as “the great er weight of the evidence,” or evidence

that “more likely than not tends to prove a certain

proposition.” S. Fla. Water Mgmt. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC , 139 So.

3d 869, 871 (Fla. 2014).

In addition, the Florida Supreme Court recently ruled that

“federal law allows AHCA to lien only the past medical expenses

portion of a Medicaid beneficiary’s third - party tort recovery to

satisfy its Medicaid lien.” Giraldo v. Ag. for Health Care

Admin. , 248 So. 3d 53, 56 (Fla. 2018).

COPIES FURNISHED:

Floyd B. Faglie, Es quire

Staunton and Faglie, P.L.

189 East Walnut Street

Monticello, Florida 32344

(eServed)

Alexander R. Boler, Esquire

2073 Summit Lake Drive , Suite 300

Tallahassee, Florida 32317

(eServed)

Kim Annette Kellum, Esquire

Agency for Health Care Administrat ion

2727 Mahan Drive , Mail Stop 3

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

(eServed)

Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk

Agency for Health Care Administration

2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

(eServed)

Mary C. Mayhew, Secretary

Agency for Health C are Administration

2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

(eServed)

Stefan Grow, General Counsel

Agency for Health Care Administration

2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

(eServed)

Shena L. Grantham, Esquire

Agency for Health Care Administration

Building 3, Room 3407B

2727 Mahan Drive

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

(eServed)

Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire

Agency for Health Care Administration

2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

(eServed)

NOTICE OF R IGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to section 120.68, Florida

Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules

of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by

filing the original notice of administrative appeal with the

agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within

30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy of

the notice, accompanied by any filing fees prescribed b y law,

with the clerk of the District Court of Appeal in the appellate

district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a

party resides or as otherwise provided by law.