19-004175TTS Broward County School Board vs. Brenda Joyce Fischer Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, January 29, 2020.

Summary: In a weak attempt at humor, Respondent carelessly made an insensitive remark in class, which was a mistake, but did not rise to the level of just cause for Petitioner to suspend Respondent from her teaching position for five days, without pay.

A STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 19 - 4175 TTS

BRENDA JOYCE FISCHER ,

Respondent .

/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case came before Administrative Law Judge John G.

Van Laningham, Division of Administrative Hearings ( " DOAH " ), for

final hearing by video teleconference on November 14, 2019, at

sites in Tallahassee and Lauderdale Lakes, Florida .

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Elizabe th W. Neiberger , Esquire

Bryant Miller Olive, P.A.

One Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 2200

Miami, Florida 33131

For Respondent: Robert F. McKee, Esquire

Robert F. McKee, P.A.

1718 East Seventh Avenue, Suite 301

Tampa, Florida 33605

STATEMENT OF THE ISSU E

T he issue is whether just cause exists for Petitioner to

suspend Respondent from her teaching position for five days,

without pay, based up o n Respondent's interactions with students

in a photography class she taught during the 2018 - 2019 school

year .

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On June 12 , 2019, Petitioner Broward County School

Board issued an Administrative Complaint against Respondent

Brenda Joyce Fischer , alleg ing that , while teaching the

preceding school year, Ms. Fischer had made an insensitive

remark about Latinos to a student named M.G. during her first -

period photography class at Western High School and, at other

times, had yelled at some students in that same class. At its

regularly scheduled meeting on July 23, 2019, Petitioner adopted

the recommendation of its s uperintendent that Ms. Fischer be

suspended from her teaching position for five days, without pay,

based up on these allegations .

Ms. Fischer timely requested a formal administrative

hearing to contest Petitioner ' s intended action. On August 6 ,

2019, Petitioner referred the matter to DOAH for further

proceedings. Upon assignment, the undersigned set the final

hearing for Septembe r 24 and 25 , 2019. A Joint Motion to

Continue Final Hearing was later granted, which postponed the

hearing for a couple of months.

By Order dated November 13, 2019, the undersigned granted

Petitioner's m otion for l eave to a mend the a dministrative

c omplaint, to add allegations that Ms. Fischer had mistreated

C.C., another photography student.

At the final hearing, which took place on November 14 ,

201 9 , Petitioner called the following witnesses: Derek Gordon,

an a ssistant p rincipal at Western High School; Christine Graf,

an a ssistant p rincipal at Western High School; Julia Munoz, a

s chool c ounselor at Western High School; a former Western High

School s tudent, M.C.; and two current Western High School

students, M.G. and C.C. Petitioner's E xhibits 4 through 6 and 9

through 19 were received in evidence. Official recognition was

taken of Petitioner's Exhibit 7 and of the file for DOAH Case

No. 19 - 1928TTS. Ms. Fischer testified but did not offer any

exhibits.

T he final hearing transcript was filed on D ecember 16 ,

2019 . Each party timely filed a p roposed r ecommended o rder

( " PRO " ) on January 9 , 20 20 , which was the deadline . The

parties ' PROs have been considered in the preparation of this

Recommended Order.

U nless otherwise indicated, citations to the official

statute law of the state of Florida refer to Florida Statutes

201 9 .

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Broward County School Board ( " School Board " or the

" district " ), Petitioner in th is case, is the constitutional

entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Broward

County Public School System.

2. A t all times relevant to this matter , Respondent Brenda

Joyce Fischer ( " Fischer " ) , was employed as a n art teacher at

Western High School , where she ha d been assigned since 2009 .

Fischer first became an employee of the district in 1992 .

3. During the 2018 - 2019 school year, Fischer taught a

photography class, which met during first period several days

per week. The events at issue occurred in this fir st - period

class in the early months of 2019.

4. The main incident took place on March 1, 2019, and

involved a tenth - grade student named M.G., who —— as she

frequently did —— arrived late that day to the 90 - minute class,

which started at 7:40 a.m. On this particular morning, M.G.

walked in no earlier than 8:00 a.m. (her recollection) or as

late as 8:20 a.m. (according to Fischer). Whether M.G. was

20 minutes or 40 minutes late, however, is immaterial. The

important (and undisputed) fact is that M.G. was q uite

noticeably tardy , again .

5. Within minutes after her untimely arrival, M.G. showed

Fischer a pass, which authorized M.G. to leave class early to

attend a school - sponsored function . The student asked the

teacher for permission to go. Fischer denied M.G. ' s request

because M.G. had not completed the day ' s assignment .

6. At some point, Fischer made the comment that gave rise

to this proceeding, namely, that M.G. was operating on " Latin

time " despite living in the United St ates (or words to this

effect). 1 / Fischer ' s exact words have been lost to time, but the

phrase " Latin time " was among them , and the gist of the remark

was to suggest that M.G. was prone to running late, as Latin

people are known to do (so the statement would have it) .

7. M.G. claims that this remark offended her . A fter

Fischer denied M.G. ' s r equest to leave class for the special

function , M.G. protested to Fischer about the perceived slight . 2 /

8. The undersigned credits Fischer ' s testimony that she

did not intend to cause offense and, indeed, did not at the time

regard the " Latin time " remark as a to - be - taken - seriously

commentary on the un punctuality (as the remark implies) of

Latinos and Latinas. Rather, she thought it was a bon mot ,

something more light hearted or humorous than cutting or

disparaging. Of course, as Fischer should have known, remarks

of this nature, once commonplace, had by 2019 fallen into

disfavor, and a culture of victimhood had arisen, which

encouraged people to seek redress even for unintentional, de

minimis offense s . Fischer should have known better than to

utter a comment that was practically guaranteed to be called out

as culturally insensitive, as indeed it is, to some degree.

There is no dispute that, despite her lack of bad in tent,

Fischer was in the wron g .

9. As it happened, though, M.G. was apparently less

offended by the implied stereotype of Latin people as being

chronically unpunctual, than by the application of the

stereotype to a non - Latina such as herself. A s M.G. inf ormed

Fischer when she complained about the remark, M.G. ' s familial

roots are in Spain, not Latin America, and thus , she identifies

as European (Spanish ), not Latin . This can be taken as an

objection by M.G. , not to the term " Latin time " per se, but to

being lumped together with other Spanish speaking peoples , who se

shared language , she maintains, should not be assumed to

indicate similarities in other respects . 3 / The irony is that

M.G. ' s comment , therefore, was itself offensive, because her

statement can reasonably be understood as an assertion that

Spaniards , in general, are more punctual than Latinos .

10. The undersigned points this out , not to criticize or

discredit M.G., but to illustrate that it is easy for a person

innocently to make a statement which can be interpreted by

another as offensive , particularly if the listener is primed to

take offense . M.G. did not intend to insult Latinos by

distinguishing herself from them, but her remark is , actually ,

somewh at insensitive in its implication , if taken at face value .

It is interesting to note , as an aside, that none of the other

students took offense at M.G. ' s comment. This might, in part,

reflect the higher status conferred by victimhood at the hands

of a te acher versus those of a student . But more likely, the

indifference to M.G. ' s seeming acceptance of the cultural

stereotype suggests that no one present actually took the " Latin

time " remark seriously as a true statement of Fischer ' s opinion

about people of Latin descent . What the students recognized was

that Fischer ' s ill - advised attempt at humor , which was doomed to

failure because that joke isn ' t funny anymore (if it ever was),

gave M.G. an opening , and that as soon as M. G. pounced, she had

won the victim's unassailable virtue .

11. Fischer responded to M.G. ' s objection appropriately,

if predictably: she apologized, twice to M.G., and again to

other students within earshot of her " Latin time " remark. M.G.

rather ungraciously refused to accept Fisch er ' s repeated

apologies, accusing Fischer of being insincere about not having

mean t the remark to be interpreted " that way, " i.e., as a mean

spirited slur. 4 / Not content to let Fischer off the hook , M.G.

appealed for help to the school administration , which did not

hesitate to oblige. When she turned Fischer in for making the

" Latin time " remark , M.G. also reported an unrelated incident

involving another student, C.C., whom M.G. felt Fischer had

mistreated ; his story is told below. T he district 's

disciplinary machine , its fuel having been ignited by the spark

of these accusations of prejudice, went to work, leading

eventually to this hearing .

12. As regards C.C., the charges against Fischer are

founded on allegation s that she " yelled " at the student

" aggressively " and " inappropriately . " By way of background, a t

the time of his enrollment in Fischer ' s photography class, C.C.

was attending school in the U.S. for the first time, having just

recent ly e migrat ed from Venezuela. C.C. could not speak English

when he arrived in this country .

13. C.C. used his cell phone in class as a translation

tool, which everyone agrees is permissible . He also , however,

frequently used his phone to communicate with other s via text

messages, which is ge nerally not allowed , for obvious reasons.

In fact, Fischer often observed C.C. surreptitiously texting

during class when he should have been paying attention to the

lesson or working on an assignment.

14. One morning, Fischer noticed that C.C. was texting

instead of editing a photograph , which he was supposed to be

doing. She walked up behind C.C. and , at close range in a loud

voice, ordered him to get off the phone . Now, c learly, a

teacher should not be subject to discipline for telling a

st udent to stop goofing off in class . So what could Fischer

have done wrong here? The district alleges that Fischer

" yelled " at C.C. and contends that " yelling " constitutes a

disciplinable offense. In other words, it is not what Fischer

said, but how she said it, which forms the basis of the alleged

offense.

15. The fatal flaw in the district ' s theory is that there

is no evidence of an objective standard by which to measure the

relative ferocity of Fischer ' s vocalization . Instead, s everal

students testified that Fischer " yelled, " in their respective

opinions, on this and other occasions. Fischer , for her part,

acknowledge d that she has a loud voice, but denie d having yelled

at C.C. Maybe each witness told the truth in this regard , as he

or she sees it . One person ' s tolerance for loud sounds may

differ from another ' s. If there is a n objective standard for

distinguishing " appropriate " from " inappropriate " volume levels

for purposes of suspending or terminating a teacher for

" yelling , " however, it is certainly not established by the

opinions of a few of the teacher ' s students . 5 / T o be clear,

t here is no evidence suggesting that when Fischer " yelle d " (as

these students saw it) , she was enraged, ranting, gesticulating

wildly, or otherwise behaving in a manner that might indicate a

potentially dangerous inability to control her emotions or

actions.

16. When Fischer ordered C.C. to get off his phone, she

startled him , causing the student to leave the classroom. C.C.

immediatel y proceeded to the guidance counselor ' s office , to

report that Fischer ' s reprimanding him for unauthorized cell

phone use had made him anxious and upset. The district makes

much of C.C. ' s emotional reaction , but it is hardly remarkable

for a student to feel upset over being reprimanded. What ' s

important here is th at C.C. had not been unjustly reprimanded .

His feelings , while understandable, are not persuasive proof of

wrongdoing by Fischer.

17. The district also believes it is somehow relevant that

C.C. was the subject of a Response to Intervention ( " RTI " )

process due to his having been diagnosed with autism and ADHD in

Venezuela. As a threshold matter, b ecause Fischer taught an

elective class and , hence , was not one of C.C. ' s " core "

teachers, it is unclear whether she knew much , if anything ,

about this RTI. In any event, there is no evidence that Fischer

was provided any written instructions concerning accommodations

that she was supposed to provide, which she thereafter failed to

o ffer. If such documentation exists , it was not produced at

hearing.

18. The few students who testified against Fischer accused

her broadly of having given C.C. a hard time in class,

insinuating (if not outright stating) that she did not care for

C.C., specifically, because he struggled to keep up

academically , nor for Spanish speaking students , in general .

The evidence in this regard is nonspecific, undetailed , lacking

in context , and, in a word, thin . The proof is insufficient to

support any fi ndings of material fact.

Determinations of Ultimate Fact

1 9 . The district h as failed to prove, by a preponderance

of the evidence, the charges brought against Fischer .

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

20 . DOAH has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in

this pro ceeding pursuant to s ections 1012.33(6)(a)2., 120.569,

and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

21 . A district school board employee against whom a

disciplinary proceeding has been initiated must be given written

notice of the specific charges prior to the hearing. Although

the notice " need not be set forth with the technical nicety or

formal exactness required of pleadings in court, " it should

" specify the [sta tute,] rule, [regulation, policy, or collective

bargaining provision] the [school board] alleges has been

violated and the conduct which occasioned [said] violation. "

Jacker v. Sch . B d . of Dade C ty. , 426 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1983)(Jorgenson, J. concurring).

2 2 . Once the school board, in its notice of specific

charges, has delineated the offenses alleged to justify

termination, those are the only grounds upon wh ich dismissal may

be predicated . See Lusskin v. Ag . for Health Care Admin . ,

731 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Cottrill v. Dep ' t of

Ins . , 685 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Klein v. Dep ' t

of Bus . & Prof ' l Reg . , 625 So. 2d 1237, 1238 - 39 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1993); Delk v. Dep ' t of Prof ' l Reg . , 595 So. 2d 966,

967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992 ); Willner v. Dep ' t of Prof ' l Reg ., B d . of

Med . , 563 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), rev. denied ,

576 So. 2d 295 ( Fla. 1991).

23 . In an administrative proceeding to suspend or dismiss

a member of the instructional staff, the school board, as the

charging party, bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance

of the evidence, each element of the charged offense(s). See

McNeill v. Pinellas Cty . Sch . Bd. , 678 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1996); Sublett v. Sumter C ty . Sch . Bd. , 664 So. 2d 1178,

1179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); MacMillan v. Nassau Cty . Sch . Bd. , 629

So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

24. As follows, section 1012.33(1)(a) define s, in relevant

part, the term "just cause" for purposes of describing the

grounds upon which a teacher's professional services contract

may be terminated:

Just cause includes, but is not limited

to, the following instances, as defined by

rule of the State Board of Education:

immorality, misconduct in office,

incompetency, . . . gross insubordination,

[or] willful neglect of duty.

25. In its Amended Administrative Complaint , the district

alleges that Fischer is guilty of misconduct in office, as

defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A - 5.056(2) ;

incompetency, as defined r ule 6A - 5.056(3)(a); gross

insubordination, as defined in r ule 6A - 5.056(4); willful neglect

of duty , as defined in r ule 6A - 5.056(5) ; violation of School

Board Policy 4008; and violat ion of School Board Policy 4.9.

2 6 . Whether Fischer committed any of the charged offenses

i s a question of ultimate fact to be decided in the context of

each alleged violation. McKinney v. Castor , 667 So. 2d 387, 389

(Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Langston v. Jame rson , 653 So. 2d 489, 491

(Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

27. The State Board of Education has defined "misconduct

in office" as meaning one of more of the following:

(a) A violation of the Code of Ethics of

the Education Profession in Florida as

adopted in Rule 6A - 10.080, F.A.C.;

(b) A violation of the Principles of

Professional Conduct for the Education

Profession in Florida as adopted in

Rule 6A - 10.081, F.A.C.;

(c) A violation of the adopted school board

rules;

(d) Behavior that disrupts the student's

learning environment; or

(e) Behavior that reduces the teacher's

ability or his or her colleagues' ability to

effectively perform duties.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A - 5.056(2).

28. As the predicate acts for establishing misconduct in

office, the district accused Fisc her of having violat ed one or

more of the following Principles of Professional Conduct:

1. [The educator s] hall make reasonable

effort to protect the student from

conditions harmful to learning and/or to the

student' s mental and/or physical health

and/or safety.

* * *

5. [The educator s] hall not intentionally

expose a student to unnecessary

embarrassment or disparagement.

* * *

7. [The educator s]hall not harass or

discriminate against any student on the

basis of race, color, religion, sex, age,

national or ethnic origin, political

beliefs, marital status, handicapping

condition, sexual orientation, or social and

family background and shall make reasonable

effort to assure that each student is

protected from harassment or discr iminatio n.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A - 10.081(2)(a).

29. The district failed to carry its burden of proving

that Fischer is guilty of misconduct in office. The only close

question here is whether the bonehead "Latin time" remark is

disciplinable. As found, Fischer's comment was clearly a faux

pas. But was it mean spirited , racially motivated, or an

expression of discriminatory animus? As a matter of fact, as

found, Fischer did not intend the "Latin time" remark to be

taken seriously as an ethnic slur. Her sincere apologies to

M.G. and the other students should have sufficed to resolve the

incident satisfactorily.

30. Further, the derogatory force of the "Latin time"

remark, at least under the circumstances at issue, is simply not

that strong. The u ndersigned cannot find that the comment in

question is so offensive, on its face, that its mere utterance

rises to the level of misconduct in office for purposes of

establishing just cause for dismissal . The undersigned

recommends, as well, that t he distr ict think long and hard about

whether to bas e the suspension or termination of a teacher on a

minor , unintentional transgression such as this. Doing so would

signal that small offenses justify high outrage and serious

consequences , thereby encouraging stu dents to report on their

teachers for ever more trivial infractions. This could cause

classrooms to becom e arid environments presided over by cautious

teachers who interact warily with their students , whose power as

pote ntial accusers, prudence would coun sel, should remain

constantly in the back of one's mind. The undersigned doubts

that such fraught teacher - student relationships , within an

atmosphere of distrust no less, would be conducive to learning.

31. The district likewise has not met its burden of

proving that Fischer was guilty of "incompetency" through

"inefficiency," which is defined, in relevant part, as meaning

one or more of the following:

1. Failure to perform duties prescribed by

law;

2. Failure to communicate appropriately

with and relat e to students; [or]

3. Failure to communicate appropriately

with and relate to colleagues,

administrators, subordinates, or parents.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A - 5.056(3)(a). This charge failed as a

matter of fact due to the insufficien cy of t he evidence.

32 . The district failed to prove that Fischer committed

"gross insubordination," defined in r ule 6A - 5.056(4) as "the

intentional refusal to obey a direct order, reasonable in

nature, and given by and with proper authority; misfeasance, or

malfeasance as to involve failure in the performance of the

required duties." The district contends that Fischer was

directed not to scream at students, to treat all stakeholders

with respect, to refrain from subjecting students to

embarrassment and disparagement, and to p romptly communicate

with parents when students are struggling in her classes. The

evidence, however, fails to establish that Fischer intentionally

disobeyed a direct order by engaging in conduct that she knew

had been specifically forbidden. Indeed, apar t from t he "Latin

time" remark , nothing Fischer did (as far as the instant record

shows) could possibly be called insubordinate, and the remark,

while unfortunate, was not spoken with the intent to refuse a

direct order.

33. The district failed to prove Fischer guilty of

"willful neglect of duty," an offense which is defined as the

"intentional or reckless failure to carry out required duties."

Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A - 5.056(5). The evidence simply does not

establish that Fischer failed to carry out her teaching duties.

34. The district failed to prove violations of either

School Board Policy 4008 or School Board Policy 4.9. At least

to the extent pertinent here, these policies do not prescribe

substantive grounds for su spension or dismissal that enlarge the

criteria set forth in r ule 6A - 5.056. Thus, the district's

failure to prove the offenses defined in the State Board of

Education's rule is equally fatal to the charges that Fischer

violated either of the cited policie s.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Broward County School Board

enter a final order exonerating Brenda Joyce Fischer of all

charges brought against her in this proceeding and awarding

Fischer back salary as required under section 1012.33(6)(a) .

DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January , 2020 , in

Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 29th day of January , 2020 .

ENDNOTES

1 / There is a dispute about whether Fischer made the "Latin

time" remark upon M.G.'s arrival or later, after M.G. had asked

to be excused from class. The sequence of these events is not

material.

2 / At least some of M.G.'s outrage likely resulted from

Fischer's ref usal to let her leave class, but this is of passing

interest. The relative offensiveness of Fischer's "Latin time"

remark is independent of M.G.'s subjective evaluation thereof,

and, in any event, everyone agrees that Fischer shouldn't have

said it, even in jest. Moreover, even if M.G. were really upset

only about the denial of her request to be excused from class,

that fact would not be dispositive disproof of just cause.

3 / One student (D.V.) gave a contemporaneous written statement

to the district in which M.G. is reported to have told Fischer

"[t]hat yes we are known, hispanics [sic] are known for being

late to everything but that doesn't apply to all of us." D.V.

did not testify at hearing, and no one else put these words in

M.G.'s mouth, so the un dersigned is not finding that M.G. said

this, exactly. D.V., however, was not a friendly witness to

Fischer, and thus , it is unlikely that D.V. fabricated this

recollection , which make s M.G. look less righteously indignant,

if not biased herself. At a minimum, D.V.'s statement lends

support to the finding above that M.G.'s verbal complaint to

Fischer is open to the interpretation that M.G. was saying, not

literally but in effect, "We Spaniards are not like those other

Hispan ics, so don't call me unpunctual" —— because that is what

D.V. apparently heard.

4 / There is no persuasive evidence behind the notion that

Fischer intended her remark to convey genuine racial or ethnic

prejudice, as M.G. asserted in rejecting Fischer's apo logy. It

should go without saying, but perhaps bears mentioning, that

the term "Latin time" —— in contrast, say, to a crude racial

epithet —— is not unambiguously reflective of discriminatory

animus. If Fischer had said "you spics are always late," for

examp le, there would have been no doubt about discriminatory

intent, and M.G.'s disbelief of Fischer's disavowal of such

animus would have been justified. What Fischer actually said,

however, has nowhere near the derogatory force of the

hypothetical, a distinc tion that the district seems completely

to have overlooked. Without more than the instant record

discloses, the likeliest explanation for Fischer's remark is

momentary thoughtlessness, which is suboptimal to be sure, but

not malum in se.

5 / There is no evidence of a consensus among Fischer's students

that she yells at them often. Rather, this is the consensus

opinion of a few students whose dislike of Fischer's photography

class, which the evidence makes clear, just might have made them

less than fully impartial in the matter. There is no evidence

that many, or any, of Fischer's peers or supervisors shared the

disgruntled students' opinion.

COPIES FURNISHED :

Elizabeth W. Neiberger , Esquire Bryant Miller Olive, P.A. One Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 220 0

Miami, Florida 33131

(eServed)

Robert F. McKee, Esquire

Robert F. McKee, P.A.

1718 East Seven th Avenue, Suite 301

Tampa, Florida 33605

(eServed)

Katherine A. Heffner, Esquire

Robert F. McKee, P.A.

1718 East Seven th Avenue, Suite 301

Tampa, Florida 33605

(eServed)

Denise Marie Heekin, Esquire

Bryant Miller Olive, P.A.

One Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 2200

Miami, Florida 33131

(eServed)

Matthew Mears , General Counsel

Department of Education

Turlington Building , Suite 1 2 44

325 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

(eServed)

Richard Corcoran , Commissioner of Education

Department of Education

Turlington Building , Suite 1514

325 West Gaines Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0400

(eServed)

Robert W. Runcie , Superintendent

Broward County School Board

600 South east Third Avenue, Tenth Floor

Fort Lauderdale , Florida 333 01 - 3125

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any e xceptions

to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that

will issue the Final Order in this case.