19-004342 Felton J. Boyd vs. Sport Clips, Inc. Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, August 12, 2020.

Summary: Petitioner did not establish that Respondent was his employer. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to prove a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination.

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE

The issue to be determined is whether Respondent, Sport Clips, Inc., is

Petitioner’s “employer” under the Flo rida Civil Rights Act of 1992,

chapter 760, Florida Statutes (“FCRA”).

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

Felton J. Boyd (“Mr. Boyd”) filed a charge of discrimina tion with the

Florida Commission on Human Relations (“Commission”) on September 24,

2018 , against Sport Clips, Inc. (“SCI”) under the FCRA. Mr. Boyd alleged

that he “was employed by Respondent as a hair dresser” and was subjected to

racial discrimination a nd a hostile work environment by his supe rvisor,

Kristi Turner (“Ms. Turner”) . Mr. Boyd further alleged that he and his co -

workers complained about Ms. Turner on December 13, 2017 , to their area

manager, Cristin Kelley (“Ms. Kelley”) , and they were fired a fter they

complained.

In response to Mr. Boyd’s charge, the Commission issued a

“Determination: No Reasonable Cause.” In doing so, the Commission found

that the “investigation did not support his allegations” and more specifically,

the “investigation did not support that [Mr . Boyd] was [SCI’s] employee.” The

Commission found that SCI “franchises business in Florida, but does not own

any businesses in Florida or have any control over business operations in

Florida.”

Dissatisfied with the Commission’s concl usion, Mr. Boyd filed a Petition

for Relief challenging the Commission’s dete rmination. In his Petition,

Mr. Boyd asserted the following:

c. During the time that Mr. Boyd was employed by

Respondent, Mr. Boyd, an African American male, was subjected to r aci al discriminate [ sic ] by

Ms. Turner.

d. Specifically, Mr. Boyd was subjected to the

following from Manager Ms. Turner:

i. Ms. Turner required Mr. Boyd to work until close

on Sundays despite Mr. Boyd's request to attend church on Sundays.

ii. Ms. Turner r epeatedly and constantly criticized

Mr. Boyd with no valid reason.

iii. When Mr. Boyd was doing a good job,

Ms. Turner stated “ ... you have proved me wrong. ”

iv. Ms. Turner had told employees that she only wanted “ pretty little white girls ” working in t he

store.

v. Ms. Turner had requested for employees to dye

their hair blonde or wear blonde wigs

vi. Ms. Turner created a hostile work environment.

e. On December 13, 2017, Mr. Boyd's co - workers

had complained to Cristin Kelley regarding the discriminat ion by Ms. Turner to Mr. Boyd and to

his co - workers.

f. Ms. Kelley assured Mr. Boyd's co - workers that

the matter would be handled; however, Mr. Boyd and his co - workers were terminated in December of

2017 after voici ng their concerns regarding

Ms. Turner.

The Commission transmitted the case to DOAH to conduct all necessary

proceedings and submit recommended findings to the Commission.

1 The

parties agreed to bifurcate the potential issues in the case and the undersigned agreed that the hearing would be li mited to the issue of whether

1 Two separate Petitions for Relief involving identical parties and the same issues of fact and

law were filed with DOAH and assigned Case Numbers 19 - 4342 and 19 - 5255, respectively.

These cases were ordered consolidated on January 22, 2020.

SCI is Mr. Boyd’s employer. All evidence at the hearing related to the

employment relationship was accepted and considered.

On June 8, 2020 , the parties filed a Corrected Joint Pre - h earing

Stipulation, which in cluded eight st ipulated facts. To the extent relevant,

those stipulated facts have been incorporated in the Findings of Fact below.

At the hearing, the parties presented testimony of JV - SC Investments,

LLC (“JV - SC”) , Managing Member Drew C. Hopper ; Petitioner Felton J.

Boyd ; and SCI Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Gordon B. Logan (now

retired). Joint Exhibits 1 through 5, SCI’s Exhibits 1 through 6, and

Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 were admitted into evidence.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties indicated their inte ntion to

order a transcript of the proceedings. The parties requested that they be

afforded 20 days from the date of filing of the official transcript at DOAH to submit thei r proposed recommended orders. The undersigned agreed to that

request.

The four - vo lume hearing T ranscript was filed with DOAH on June 22,

2020. On July 13, 2020, Respondent timely filed its P roposed R ecommended

O rder. Petitioner did not file a proposed recommended order.

Except where otherwise indicated, all references to the Florida S tatutes in

this Recommended Order are to the 2019 edition.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

Based upon the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented at the

final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made:

1. S CI is a Texas corporation, whose sole office is located at 110 Sport

Clips Way, Georgetown, Texas, 78628. SCI’s Chief Executive Officer at the

time of the alleged discriminatory events was Gordon B. Logan.

2. SCI is the owner of the “Sport Clips” trademark s and business system.

It licenses the Sport Clips trademarks and business system to independent

business people. Each Sport Clips franchisee signs a franchise agreement

under which SCI licenses its trademarks and the franchisee agrees to abide

by certain operating rules that protect the Sport Clips trademarks and brand.

In addition, each franchisee pays to SCI a royalty and advertising fee, as well

as other fees.

3. Sport Clips is a sports - themed hair - cutting salon which provides

customers with haircuts, s hampoo, and beard trims. There are approximately

1,800 Spor t Clips franchise stores and an additional 75 Sport Clips stores

owned and ope rated by SCI.

4 . SCI provides operating rules to its franchisees in a confidential

operating manual. 2 The operating ma nual does not cover employment

policies, employee compensation , or employee benefits. These employment

matters are determined by the individual franchisee. Instead, the operating

manual focuses on business operations. According to Gordon Logan, CEO of

SCI, the company trademark “[is] the essence of the business. You have to

have a trademark and protect that trademark in order to have a viable

system, one that franchisees can present in a consistent manner and the

public knows what to expect when they come i nto a franchise b usiness using

that trademark.” The purpose of the procedures and specifications in the

operating manual is to protect the Sport Clips trademark and brand. If SCI

failed to enforce its trademark and brand standards, it could lose the right to use the trademark. Further, it ensures that the public’s expectations are met

2 Neither party introduced a copy of the confidential operating manual into evidence at the

hearing and therefore it is not part of the record of this case.

no matter which store they visit in the country, and protects the franchisees’

investments in the franchise.

5 . The procedures and specifications set forth in SCI’s franchise

agreement and operating manual, including requiring franchisees to

participate in specific training, use Sport Clips uniforms , and use a particular

point of sales system, are typical of the franchise industry.

6. JV - SC is a Florida Limited Liability Comp a ny managed by Drew C.

Hopper. JV - SC’s sole corporate office is located at 708 Main Street, Houston,

Texas.

7. No SCI officer, employee , or representative holds any position with

JV - SC , nor does any JV - SC officer, employee, or representative hold any

posit ion with SCI . Likewise, SCI has no ownership interest in any of Mr.

Hopper’s Sport Clips stores or business entities, and Mr. Hopper and his

business entities have no ownership interest in SCI.

8. Over the last 21 years, Mr. Hopper has been involved in app roximately

30 Sport Clips stores as a franchisee. Through JV - SC, Mr. Hopper operates

eight Sport Clips franchise stores for profit in North Central Florida, including two locations in Gainesville. Mr. Ho pper hired Ms. Kelley to

manage the day - to - day operat ions of the Gainesville stores, and Ms. Kelley

hired Ms. Turner, with Mr. Hopper’s approval, to manage and cut hair at one of JV - SC’s Gainesville stores.

9. JV - SC has a franchise agreement with SCI with regard to the

Gainesville location managed by Ms. Tur ner (“Franchise Agreement”). Under

the Franchise Agreement, SCI granted JV - SC “a non - exclusive and personal

license to operate one unit of the Franchised Business in strict conformity with the Franchisor’s standards and specifications” at 2231 N orthwest

13 th Street, Suite 20, Gainesville, Florida 32608 (“13th Street Location”).

10. Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were responsible for recruiting and hiring

hair stylists at the 13th Street Location. Ms. Turner was responsible for

supervising the stylists at the 13t h Street Location. Employees in JV - SC’s

corporate office in Houston also handled human resources functions for

JV - SC. Mr. Hopper ultimately decided what to pay stylists on behalf of

JV - SC. JV - SC set employee expectations and Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner

wer e responsible for handling employee misconduct and firing decisions at

the 13th Street Location. Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were also responsible for

ensuring that the 13th Street Location was properly equipped with necessary

tools and inventory.

11. Mr. Bo yd was a hair stylist at the 13th Street Location. He was hired

by Ms. Turner on August 30, 2017 , and his rate of pay was set by JV - SC at

$10 per hour. When he was hired, he completed a new hire form which states

in bold print at the top: “JV - SC Investment s LLC DBA Sport Clips FL901.”

12. Mr. Boyd’s employment was terminated less than three months after

he was hired by Ms. Turner for a violation of JV - SC policy related to a

customer complaint. SCI had no involvement in Mr. Boyd’s hiring or

termination of e mployment.

13. During his employment, Mr. Boyd’s work schedule was established by

Ms. Turner and his benefits, including holidays, vacation pay , and health

insurance, were determined by JV - SC. If Mr. Boyd was going to be late or

absent from work, he neede d to contact Ms. Turner. Ms. Turner supervised

Mr. Boyd’s appearance and conduct while on duty at the 13th Street Location

and she conducted his performance reviews. SCI has never exercised control

over Mr. Boyd, including his working hours, pay, and vacat ion benefits.

14. Mr. Boyd’s personnel records were created and maintained by JV - SC

and the records repeatedly identify JV - SC as Mr. Boyd’s employer. Mr. Boyd’s

paychecks and W - 2 were issued by JV - SC and make no reference to SCI.

Likewise, Ms. Turner and M s. Kelley were hired and paid by JV - SC and

JV - SC created and maintained their personnel records. SCI has no

employment records indicating that Mr. Boyd, Ms. Turner , or Ms. Kelley

were ever employed by SCI.

15. JV - SC had an employee handbook based on a tem plate it received

from SCI. The handbook was modified by JV - SC and could be modified by

JV - SC at any time. Indeed, SCI expressly advised JV - SC to modify the form

handbook to ensure it complied with local laws and to reflect the business

practices of JV - SC .

16. The employee handbook identifies JV - SC in bold red print on the front

cover and provides “Sport Clips stores are independently owned and operated

franchises. Team Members working in franchised stores are employed by the

franchisee (Team Leader) and a re not employed by Sport Clips, Inc.” JV - SC’s

employee handbook was provided to its employees, including Mr. Boyd.

JV - SC’s employee handbook required Mr. Boyd to report complaints of

discrimination to his manager, Ms. Turner, or if he had a complaint

conc erning her, to Mr. Hopper at JV - SC.

17. Under s ection XVI of the Franchise Agreement, JV - SC “acknowledges

and agrees that [JV - SC] is an independent business person and independent

contractor.” Further, this s ection provides in relevant part:

Nothing in th e Agreement is intended to make

either party an agent, legal representative,

subsidiary, joint venturer, partner, employee or

servant of the other for any purpose whatsoever.

During the term of this Agreement, [JV - SC] shall

hold itself out to the public a s an independent

contractor operating the Franchised Business

pursuant to a license from [SCI] and as an authorized user of the System and the Proprietary

marks which are owned by [SCI]. [JV - SC] agrees to

take such affirmative action as may be necessary to

do so, including exhibiting to customers a sign provided by [SCI] in a conspicuous place on the

premises of the Franchised Business.

18. In compliance with this s ection of the Franchise Agreement, JV - SC

posted at its 13th Street Location a sign in the fr ont of the store which states:

“This Sport Clips store is owned and operated by JV - SC Investments, LLC an

independent Sport Clips franchisee.”

19. With regard to JV - SC’s employees, the Franchise Agreement provides

that “[SCI] shall not have the power to hi re, manage, compensate or fire

[JV - SC’s] employees and it is expressly agreed that [SCI] has no employment

relations hip with [JV - SC’s] employees.” The Franchise Agreement further

provides:

Franchisees are responsible for hiring, managing

and compensating their employees within the laws

of any jurisdiction in which they operate and are

encouraged to consult their own legal counsel to ensure their compliance with all applicable laws. Franchisee and Franchisor recognize that

Franchisor neither dictates nor co ntrols labor and

employment matters for the Franchisee or the

Franchisee’s employees.

20. Over the last 21 years, SCI has never told Mr. Hopper “who to hire,

how to hire, how much [he] should hire them for, how much [he] should pay

[employees]. It’s alway s been up to [him].”

21. With regard to JV - SC’s funds and store premises, the Franchise

Agreement provides “[e]xcept as herein expressly provided, [SCI] may not

control or have access to [JV - SC’s] funds or the premises of the Franchised

Business, or in any other way exercise dominion or control over the

Franchised Business.” SCI has no control or ownership interest over JV - SC’s

bank accounts, set up by Mr. Hopper; SCI is only authorized to withdraw from the accounts the specific royalties and fees set forth in the Franchise

Agreement. Proceeds from the sales at the 13th Street Location are deposited into JV - SC’s bank account.

22. SCI does not lease or own the property at the 13th Street Location or

any of the 23 locations Mr. Hopper franchises from SCI. JV - SC leases the

property from a third party. SCI does not own any real estate in common

with or lease any property to Mr. Hopper or his related business entities.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

23. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

ca se pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

24. The FCRA prohibits an “employer” from “discriminat[ing] against any

individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s r ace” and retaliating against “any

person because that person has opposed any practice which is an unlawful

employment practice under this section.” § 760.10(1)(a) and (7), Fla. Stat.

25. The Commission’s enforcement authority as to employment

discriminatio n and retaliation is limited to acts committed by an “employer”

as defined by s ection 760.02(7):

“Employer” means any person employing 15 or

more employees for each working day in each of 20

or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding

calendar year, and any agent of such a person.

26. FCRA’s definition of “employer” corresponds to the definition of

employer found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) at 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(b), which provides in relevant part:

The term “employer” m eans a person engaged in an

industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or

more employees for each working day in each of

twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or

preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a

person . . .

27. Because the FCRA wa s modeled on Title VII, Florida courts have

determined that federal case law interpreting Title VII applies when a court is called upon to construe the FCRA. See Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N . Am . ,

LLC , 18 So. 3d 17, 21 (Fla. 3d 2009); Fla. State Univ. v. So ndel , 685 So. 2d

923, 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Fla. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d

1205, 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

28. Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence

that Respondent is his “employer” under the FCRA. See S ondel , 685 So. 2d at

926 - 929; Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co. Inc. , 396 So. 2d 778, 788 - 89 (Fla.

1st DCA 1981).

29. In this case, Petitioner named SCI as the sole Respondent in this

proceeding, allegin g that SCI was his “employer . ” SCI, a franchisor wi th its

only office in Texas, denied that it was Petitioner’s employer and submitted

evidence that its franchisee, JV - SC, a Florida company, was Petitioner’s

employer.

30. In determining whether two entities, SCI and JV - SC in this instance,

should both be v iewed as an “employer , ” they must by extension of Title VII

case law meet the “s ingle or joint employer” test. Joint employment is

primarily a factual issue. Supervision of day - to - day activities, authority to

hire or fire, promulgation of work rules, and a uthority to make work

assignments can all be indicia of a joint employment relationship. Holyoke Visiting Nurses Ass'n v. NLRB , 11 F.3d 302, 306 (1st Cir. 1993). The record in

this cause does not prove the existence of any of these factors.

31. DOAH admini strative law judges have routinely applied the “single or

joint employer test” in cases involving the question of whether the Respondent is Petitioner’s “employer” under the FCRA. See Harrison v. The

MG Herring Group, Inc. , Case No. 17 - 5067 (Fla. DOAH May 11, 2018; Fla.

FCHR July 19, 2018); Moss v. HCA, Inc. , Case No. 11 - 3983 (Fla. DOAH

Oct. 2, 2012; Fla. FCHR Dec. 19, 2012); Winsor v. Pathway Technologies,

LLC , Case No. 10 - 1830 (Fla. DOAH May 5, 2011; Fla. FCHR July 14, 2011).

32. “The predominant trend i n determining whether two businesses

should be treated as a single or joint employer under § 2000e(b) is to apply the standards promulgated by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

The NLRB factors include: (1) interrelation of operations, (2) central ized

control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common

ownership or financial control. The showing required to warrant a finding of

single employer status has been described as ‘highly integrated with respect

to ownership and operations.’” McKenzie v. Davenport - Harris Funeral Home ,

834 F. 2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1987)(internal citations omitted).

33. Application of the McKenzie criteria to the facts in the instant case

does not lead to the conclusion that SCI and JV - SC were “highly integrated”

in their ownership and operations.

34. In terms of the first factor, interrelation of operations, courts consider

“whether the two entities have common offices, common record keeping,

shared bank accounts and equipment.” Gray v. McDonald's USA, LLC , 874 F .

Supp. 2d 743, 750 (W.D. Tenn. 2012)(internal quotations omitted). In the

instant case, there is no evidence indicating interrelation of operations.

Rather, the undisputed evidence established that SCI and JV - SC operated

wholly independent corporate offic es and SCI did not own or lease any

property with JV - SC, including the 13th Street Location. At all relevant

times, JV - SC maintained its own records, including personnel records for

Petitioner and his managers. JV - SC owned and operated its bank accounts at

Wells Fargo, with SCI only being authorized to debit specific royalties and

fees due to it under the Franchise Agreement. JV - SC supplied its own

equipment for its stores, including the 13th Street Location, albeit with

equipment that met the standards and specifications set forth by SCI.

35. In terms of the second factor, JV - SC controlled its own labor relations.

JV - SC hired and fired its own em ployees, including Petitioner. JV - SC also

managed its own payroll, including issuing paychecks to Mr. Boyd ; set h ours

of work and rates of pay for its employees, including Mr. Boyd ; and had its

own employees, including Manager Ms. Turner and Area Manager Ms. Kelley, who supervised employees, including Mr. Boyd, and performed

other human resource functions. Although t here is evidence that SCI

provided training to JV - SC managers and employees from time to time, no

evidence indicates SCI maintained or exercised the ability to hire, manage,

compensate , or fire JV - SC employees. The Franchise Agreement expressly

prohibits i t, and there is no evidence SCI had any involvement in the hiring,

managing, compensating , or firing of Petitioner or his managers.

36. While the Franchise Agreement imposes a number of obligations on

JV - SC, these obligations relate to ensuring franchisees honor the Sport Clips

business system to protect the Sport Clips trademark and business, not

personnel management. One federal court found in a discrimination case

against a franchisor, McDonald’s, “[a]ny directives relating to personnel management — includ ing obligating franchisees to employ adequate personnel

so as to operate the Restaurant at its maximum capacity and efficiency and

to ensure all employees wear uniforms, present a neat and clean appearance,

and render competent and courteous service – are far too general to

constitute control rising to the level of employment.” Id. Likewise, SCI’s

typical franchise requirements related to employing a full - time, trained

manager ; proper staffing levels ; Sport Clips uniforms ; and method for serving

customers a re far too general to constitute control rising to the level of

employment.

37. With regard to the third factor, no evidence indicates SCI and JV - SC

shared common management. Both entities have different officers and

executives involved with operating thei r businesses. It is undisputed that

JV - SC had its own managers, Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner, both of whom were

hired by Mr. Hopper. Although SCI employs inspectors to inspect Sport Clips

stores to ensure compliance with the Sport Clips system (an inspection

Petitioner experienced only once during his employment and which had

nothing to do with his termination of employment), this minimal supervision is insufficient as a matter of law to rise to the level of common management.

See I d.

38. Finally, the fourth factor as to whether the two entities share

“common ownership and financial control” is not met “[i]f neither of the

entities is a sham.” Id. It is undisputed that neither SCI nor JV - SC is a sham

entity. SCI is therefore not Mr. Boyd’s employer under the single or joint

employer test.

39 . It is undi sputed that SCI did not set Mr. Boyd’s wage rate, select the

benefit plans he could participate in, determine his work hours , or terminate

his employment. Instead, only JV - SC had substantial and direct control o ver

Mr. Boyd’s terms and conditions of employment. Furthermore, requiring certain store hours, training, a full - time manager, and conducting sporadic

inspections to ensure franchised businesses were meeting standards are

insufficient under the rule to prov e SCI was a joint employer.

4 0 . Petitioner relies on Del Pilar v. DHL Global Customer Solutions

(USA), Inc. , 993 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), Parker v. Domino’s Pizza,

Inc. , 629 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), Kane Furniture Corp. v. Miranda ,

506 So. 2 d 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), and Nazworth v. Swire Florida, Inc. , 486

So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), to argue SCI is liable as Boyd’s employer because as a franchisor, SCI had the right to control the means to be used by

its franchisee, JV - SC.

3 However, thi s case law is inapplicable to the instant

case in which Petitioner must prove SCI was his employer to impose liability

under the FCRA, as these cases all involve plaintiffs injured in car accidents

seeking to hold defendants liable in tort under a theory o f vicarious liability. Further, all of the cases cited by Petitioner involve third - party plaintiffs who

have no previous relationship with the defendants. “Those cases therefore focus on appearances as an indicator of agency because they involve plaintiffs

who relied on the appearance of agency arguably because they had no other

knowledge of the actual relationship between the franchisee and the

franchisor.” Gray , 874 F. Supp. 2d at 752. In this case, Petitioner had an

employment relationship with JV - SC, a franchisee, which he had knowledge

of given his personnel and payroll records, as well as the conspicuous signage

3 Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Final Order, filed December 9, 2019.

posted at the 13th Street Location and employee handbook informing him of

this fact.

4 1 . In any event, the Parker, Kane Furniture, and Nazwort h cases were

effectively superseded by the Florida Supreme Court in Mobile Oil

Corporation v. Bransford , 648 So. 2d 119 (1995), which held that the simple

existence of a franchise agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee is

insufficient as a matter of law to establish vicarious liability of the franchisor.

4 2 . A demonstration that Respondent was an “employer” as defined in

s ection 760.02(7) is an essential, threshold element of Petitioner’s prima facie

case of employment discrimination. See Arbaugh v . Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500,

516 (2006). Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to

establish that SCI was his employer. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to prove

a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination.

R ECOMMENDATION

Bas ed upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the

undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner failed to prove that Sport

Clips, Inc. is an “employer” pursuant to s ection 760.02(7) , Florida Statute ,

and dismissing the Petitions for Relief filed in these consolidated cases.

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 12 th day of August , 2020 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

W. D AVID W ATKINS

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 12 th day of August , 202 0 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

Robert W. Bauer, Esquire

Bauer Law Group, P.A.

Suite B

3721 Northwest 40th Terrace

Gainesvil le, Florida 32606

(eServed)

Deborah L. Taylor, Esquire

SportsClips, Inc.

Suite 1200

3730 Kirby Drive

Houston, Texas 77098

Stephanie M. Marchman, Esquire

GrayRobinson, P.A.

Suite 106

720 Southwest 2nd Avenue

Gainesville, Florida 32601 - 6250

(eServed)

Maria Perez Youngblood, Esquire

Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A.

Suite B

3721 Northwest 40th Terrace

Gainesville, Florida 32606

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.