20-001080 Rita Lynar vs. Westminster Communities, Inc.; Asbury Arms North, Inc.; And Joseph Downs, Administrator Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, January 4, 2021.

Summary: Petitioner failed to establish that Respondents retaliated against her, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On June 11, 2019 , Ms. Lynar filed a charge of housing discrimination

(retaliation) with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR),

alleging that Respo ndents retaliated against her based upon a disability , in

violation of the FHA . Ms. Lynar ’s charge stated:

Complainant Rita Lynar previously filed a

complaint of Housing Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) based on discrim ination; previous FCHR Case

No. 2017H0199. Therefore, Complainant belongs to a class of persons whom the Fair Housing Act (“the Act”) protects from unlawful discrimination by virtue of previous participation in an act protected

by the Fair Housing Act. Co mplainant rents an

apartment at the “Westminster Asbury located at

1200 Clearlake Rd. #2114, Cocoa, FL 32922; which is under the rules and regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development

(HUD) subsidized multifamily housing for the

elderly a nd disabled elderly. Which is owned by

Respondent Asbury Arms, Inc.

Complainant alleges on September 1, 2018,

Respondent Joseph Downs ordered the COS for

Westminster Communities of Florida not to cooperate with the Complainant for her annual recertificati on for HUD subsidized rent.

Complainant also alleges Respondent ordered the Service Coordinator not to give the Complainant the reasonable accommodation form. Complainant alleges the Respondent wanted to evict her and not renew her lease. Allegedly on Janu ary 9, 2019

Respondent left another eviction summons on the Complainant’s door while he and the Complainant were at the DOAH final hearing in the previous retaliation claim. Complainant alleges in January, February and March of 2019, Respondent solicited

m ultiple complaints from vulnerable elderly and

disabled individuals telling them to sign misleading

and false allegations attempting to silence the Complainant. Complainant alleged on April 22,

2019 Westminster Asbury Administrator Joseph A.

Downs testifie d on record in a court hearing that he

does not like the Complainant because she filed

previous complaints with HUD and DOAH. As

such, Complainant believes Respondents actions are based on the fact that she previously filed a Complaint with HUD (04 - 17 - 9673 - 8, 04 - 15 - 0305 - 8)

against them, and that Respondents actions are made in a retaliatory effort.

On January 28 , 2020, FCHR issued a “Notice of Determination of No

Cause,” finding that there was no reasonable cause to believe that

Respondents had committed a discriminatory housing practice against

Ms. Lynar .

On February 26 , 2020, Ms. Lynar filed a Petition for Relief from

Discriminatory Housing Practice with FCHR, again alleging that

Respondents had committed a discriminatory housing practice (retaliation)

a gainst her. FCHR transmitted the Petition to the Division and assigned the

undersigned ALJ to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

Respondents, represented by counsel, filed on March 9, 2020, a Motion to

Dismiss Based on Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel an d Motion for

Sanctions and Attorney Fees, to which Ms. Lynar filed a response. The undersigned conducted a telephonic hearing on March 16, 2020, and on

March 18, 2020, entered an Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

based on Res Judicata and Motion for Sanctions and Attorney Fees, and

Extending Time to Respond to Initial Order. On March 19, 2020, Ms. Lynar

filed a First Amended Petition for Relief from Retaliation and Discriminatory

Housing Practice and Case Caption Correction.

The undersigned orig inally noticed this matter for final hearing on

June 19, 2020. On June 8, 2020, Ms. Lynar filed a Motion for Continuance

and Objection to Respondent’s Discovery Violations, to which Respondents

filed a response. On June 12, 2020, the undersigned entered an Order

Granting Continuance, and, thereafter, noticed the final hearing for August 28, 2020. On August 21, 2020, Ms. Lynar filed an “ Emergency Motion

to Compel Respondents to Produce [sic] Motion for Continuance [sic] and

Objection to Respondent’s Discover y Violations. ” On August 25, 20 20 , the

undersigned entered an Order Granting Motion for Continuance, Ordering Response to Motion to Compel, and Scheduling Case Management

Conference. The undersigned thereafter noticed the final hearing for

September 17, 20 20.

The undersigned con ven ed the final hearing on September 17 , 2020, by

Z oom web - conference ; as the parties required additional time to view an

exhibit and call additional witnesses, the undersigned continued the final hearing until September 28, 2020, b y Z oom web - conference . Petitioner

presented the testimony of Nicholas Vidoni, and testified on her own behalf.

The undersigned admitted Petitioner’s Exhibits P 2 , P 3 , and P 6 through P12 ,

into evidence. Pastor Darwin “Don” Adkins, Josephine Brooks, and Josep h

Downs testified on behalf of Respondents. The undersigned admitted

Respondents ’ Exhibits R1 through R 4 into evidence.

The three - volume T ranscript of the final hearing was filed with the

Division on November 23, 2020 . On December 2, 2020, Petitioner file d a

Motion for Extension of Time on Proposed Recommended Order, and that

same date, the undersigned entered an Order Granting Petitioner’s Motion to

Extend Deadline for Filing Proposed Recommended Order. Petitioner and Respondent s timely submitted proposed recommended orde r s on December 7,

2020 , which the undersigned has considered in the preparation of this

Recommended Order.

All statutory references are to the 2018 codification of the Florida

Statutes , unless otherwise indicated.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

1. Re spondent Westminster Communities, Inc., owns and operates several

retirement communities across Florida. The Westminster property in this

matter is Respondent Asbury Arms North, Inc., which is located in Cocoa,

Florida. Respondent Jo seph Downs is the admin istrator for Westminster’s

Cocoa site, and manages its facilities.

2. Ms. Lynar is a resident of Asbury Arms North , Inc .

3. Ms. Lynar previously filed a housing discrimination complaint on

August 17, 2017, against Respondents that claimed that Respondents

violated the FHA, and contending that Respondents retaliated against her.

After FCHR notified Ms. Lynar that no reasonable cause existed to believe

that Respondents committed a discriminatory housing practice on

February 9, 2018 , she filed a Petition for Relief with FCHR . FCHR

transmitted the Petition for Relief to the Division on March 6, 2018 . The

Division’s case number for this matter is 18 - 1314.

4. ALJ J. Bruce Culpepper conducted a two - day final evidentiary hearing

in DOAH C ase No. 18 - 1314 on Septembe r 11, 2018, and January 9, 2019. On

July 10, 2019, ALJ Culpepper issued a Recommended Order, which concluded that Ms. Lynar failed to meet her burden of proving that Respondents

committed a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the FHA, and recom mended that FCHR dismiss Ms. Lynar’s Petition for Relief. On

October 1, 2019, FCHR entered a Final Order that adopted ALJ Culpepper’s

F indings of F act and C onclusions of L aw, and dismissed Ms. Lynar’s Petition

for Relief. See Lynar v. Westminster Retiremen t Communities Foundation,

Inc., et al., Case No. 18 - 1314 ( Fla. DOAH July 10, 2019; F CHR Oct. 1,

2019)( Lynar I I ).

5. As previously noted in the undersigned’s March 18, 2020, Order

Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Based on Res Judicata and

Collateral E stoppel and Motion for Sanctions and Attorney Fees, and

Extending Ti m e to Respond to Initial Order, the undersigned specifically

precluded any attempt by Ms. Lynar to relitigate any matter resolved (or that

could have been resolved) in Lynar I I in the inst ant matter. Thus, in the

instant matter, the undersigned only considered any alleged acts that

occurred after the final hearing in Lynar I I commenced, i.e., after

September 11, 2018, as possible evidence of FHA retaliation. 1

November 7, 2018 , Incident and Lease Termination

6. On November 8, 2018 — af ter the commencement of the final hearing in

Lynar II , and while that matter remained pending — Ms. Lynar was involved

in an incident at Asbury Arms North.

7. Pastor Adkins, who was conducting a regular morning Bib le study

meeting on November 8, 2018, in the fellowship room, which is a common area in the Asbury Arms North building that has multiple entranceways, noticed Ms. Lynar walk through the fellowship room “at a very fast pace” on

multiple o ccasions that morni ng. Upon her first pass through the fellowship

room, he heard Ms. Lynar screaming in front of Mr. Downs’s office and

pounding on his office door. Pastor Adkins did not see Ms. Lynar scream or

pound, but heard it.

8. Pastor Adkins next observed Ms. Lynar pa ss through the fellowship

room again, and she went towards her apartment. Then, approximately a

minute or two later, she rushed back through the fellowship room, went to

the same area in front of Mr. Downs’s office, and began screaming and

1 Additionally, Ms. Lynar, in 2014, filed a charge of discrimination against Respondents,

alleging a n FHA violation. After receiving a N o C ause D etermination from FCHR, she filed a

Petition with FCHR, alleging gender dis crimination. FCHR transmitted that Petition to the

Division, which assigned it DOAH C ase No. 15 - 2796 ( Lynar I ) . ALJ Culpepper also

conducted a partial hearing in that matter but , on December 15, 2015, the parties filed a

Stipulation for Dismissal. Consiste nt with the undersigned’s March 18, 2020 , ruling, the

undersigned did not consider any alleged acts that occurred prior to September 11, 2018, in

the instant matter.

pounding on the same office door. He also heard Ms. Lynar screaming at

Ms. Brooks, who was located in close proximity to Mr. Downs’s office. He

described Ms. Lynar’s behavior that morning as “unhinged.”

9. Pastor Adkins testified that these incidents disrupted his Bible s tudy

meeting for approximately 10 minutes.

10. Ms. Brooks, who is an administrative assistant at Asbury Arms North,

works at a desk in that building’s front lobby. Her desk was around the

corner from Mr. Downs’s office. She worked at the front desk on the morning

of November 7, 2018, and recalled that she heard Ms. Lynar “pounding” on

Mr. Downs’s office door; she described it as “[v]ery intentional and very loud.”

Ms. Brooks walked around the corner to observe Ms. Lynar, and testified that

Ms. Lynar began s creaming at her. Ms. Brooks testified that she said nothing

to Ms. Lynar, and that Ms. Lynar eventually left.

11. Ms. Brooks then entered Mr. Downs’s office, where there were two

other residents and a certified occupational specialist, and explained to

Mr. Downs what had transpired outside of his office.

12. Ms. Brooks was inside of Mr. Downs’s office when Ms. Lynar began

screaming and pounding on his office door a second time. Ms. Brooks testified

that Ms. Lynar’s conduct that morning frightened her.

13. M r. Downs, the administrator of Westminster’s property in Cocoa,

including Asbury Arms North, testified that on the morning of November 7, 2018, he was on a telephone call, but heard a loud pounding on his door , and

ended his call . He testified that Ms. Bro oks came to his office to explain what

had happened, and during this explanation, Ms. Lynar began pounding on the door and screaming again. After answering the door, he stated that

Ms. Lynar stormed off.

14. The undersigned observed a video recording of th e first of the two

“screaming and pounding” incidents that occurred the morning of

November 7 , 2018. Although the video recording did not also have an audio

recording of this incident, it appeared to the undersigned that Ms. Lynar

clearly approached an off ice door and, with her hand and fist, intentionally

pounded on the office door. Additionally, Respondents introduced into

evidence only one of the two “pounding and screaming” incidents, explaining

that the video of the other/second incident was unavailabl e.

1 5 . On November 20, 2018, Asbury Arms North, Inc., hand - delivered to

Ms. Lynar a “Notice of Termination of Tenancy, ” which stated , in part :

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that your tenancy … is terminated, effective at the end of the day on

December 20, 2018 . You must vacate the

premises at or before that time.

THIS TERMINATION is based on your material noncompliance with the Lease Agreement,

including one or more substantial violations of the

Lease Agreement. The specific reason for this

termination is as fo llows:

On the morning of November 7, 2018 you

committed a substantial violation of the lease by causing a loud commotion by acting aggressive and erratic, banging repeatedly on the office door, and yelling at staff and other residents, including

Reception ist Josephine Brooks and Administrator

Joe Downs. Your actions were threatening,

intimidating, harassing, and violent. Your actions interfered with the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the other residents living in the apartment

property by causing a commot ion and disrupting a

bible study being conducted by Chaplain Don

Adkins and approximately 15 residents. Your actions also disrupted the management of

Westminster Asbury by staff. Your actions scared

staff and other residents, and have caused continuing fea r among staff and other residents.

The Lease Agreement contains the following requirement regarding resident conduct:

Conduct

Residents … will not engage in, or participate in, such conduct which interferes with the

quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the oth er

residents living in the apartment property.

No act of a resident and/or guest which

threatens, intimidates, is deemed as

harassing others, is physically violent with or without injury to another person and/or property, or has unacceptable social conduct ,

will be tolerated. Any such act will be considered a violation of the Community Policies and the Lease.

No act of intimidation, harassment, verbal

abuse, physical threat or violence, or social

misconduct of, or to, and [sic] employee of this apartment p roperty by any person will be

tolerated. Any such act is considered a noncompliance of the Lease Agreement and

will result in termination of the Lease.

Your above - described actions on November 7, 2018

violate the foregoing conduct requirements, in that

yo u engaged in conduct that interfered with the

quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the other

residents, you intimidated other residents, and you intimidated, harassed, and verbally abused employees of the property. Your actions, pursuant

to the Lease, are a non compliance and have

resulted in termination of the Lease.

BE ADVISED that if you remain in the leased unit after the date specified for termination, the

Landlord may seek to enforce the termination only

by bringing a judicial action at which time you may present any defenses.

16. Thereafter, on December 22, 2018, Asbury Arms North, Inc. , filed a

Complaint for possession of real property, and damages, in county court in

Brevard County, Florida.

17. Ms. Lynar testified that she has been the subject of previ ous eviction

actions with Asbury Arms North , Inc. , and had never previously received a

Notice of Termination. She stated that Asbury Arms North , Inc., delivered

this while she was with friends in the fellowship room, and believed this was

inappropriate and retaliation for participation in Lynar II .

18. Ms. Lynar testified that she did knock on Mr. Downs’s door, to (again)

complain about a group of residents she contends engage in bullying and

harassment. She contends that instead of doing something about th e bullying

and harassment, Asbury Arms North, Inc., instituted the eviction action in

Brevard County C ourt , again, in retaliation for her participation in Lynar II . 2

Other Alleged Bases for FHA Retaliation

19. Ms. Lynar testified that she believed Responde nts’ decision to issue

the Notice of Termination and commence eviction proceedings against her was also in retaliation for her assisting another Asbury Arms North , Inc. ,

resident, Sudhir Kotecha, in bringing a n FHA discrimination claim against

Respondents.

20. Respondents had also commenced an eviction action against

Mr. Kotecha during this time period. Mr. Kotecha’s attorney, Nicholas

Vidoni, testified at the final hearing concerning the deposition of Mr. Downs in that eviction proceeding, in which Ms. Lyn ar (who was not a party to that

eviction matter, but was a party to the December 22, 2018 , pending eviction

matter involving Asbury Arms North, Inc.) attempted to attend. Mr. Downs’s attorney objected, and filed a Motion to Terminate or Limit Examination ,

requesting that Ms. Lynar not be present for the deposition because of the pending eviction matter and the pending Lynar II matter (in both of which, Mr. Vidoni represented Ms. Lynar), and other reasons. Mr. Vidoni testified

that the county judge granted t he Motion to Terminate or Limit

Examination, in part, and barred Ms. Lynar from attending Mr. Downs’s

deposition.

21. Additionally, during this time period, Ms. Lynar testified that

Respondents sought to have the county judge assigned to the eviction case

2 The issue of bullying and harassment at the hands of certain residents of Asbury Arms

No rth, Inc., was fully considered and rejected as grounds for a violation of the FHA in Lynar

II .

removed, because Ms. Lynar allegedly had contact with the county judge at a

restaurant. Mr. Vidoni confirmed that Respondents indeed filed such a

motion, but did not testify as to its resolution, and Ms. Lynar presented no

further evidence about it.

22. M s. Lynar testified that the actions of Respondents in paragraphs

20 and 21 above are further evidence of Respondents retaliating against her

for participation in Lynar II .

23. Ms. Lynar also contends that Mr. Downs reached out to the

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which subsidizes

her apartment at Asbury Arms North , Inc. , to discuss the non - renewal of

Ms. Lynar’s lease in 2014, as an additional form of retaliation. Mr. Downs

testified that Respondents had initiated an eviction proceedin g in 2014, and

that he recalled discussing with a HUD official whether Asbury Arms North,

Inc., should renew Ms. Lynar’s lease; Mr. Downs testified that the HUD

official questioned why Ms. Lynar’s lease would be renewed if Asbury Arms

North, Inc. , was in t he process of evicting her. This conversation occurred

well before the actions that resulted in Lynar II occurred, and are irrelevant.

24. Ms. Lynar failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents’

decision to issue the Notice of Termination, and subsequently commence

eviction proceedings in county court, was retaliation for her participation in

Lynar II , in violation of the FHA. The undersigned further finds that the

actions that occurred during the Kotecha eviction proceeding, and

Mr. Downs’s con versation with a HUD official, are not credible evidence of

FHA retaliation.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

25 . The Division has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties

to this proceeding in accordance with sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and 760.35(3)(b), F lorida Statutes.

26 . The FHA makes it unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or

interfere with any person in the exercise of, or on account of her or his having

exercised, or on account of her or his having aided or encouraged any other

person in the e xercise of any right granted under ss. 760.20 - 760.37 .” § 760. 37 ,

Fla. Stat.

27 . The FHA is patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as

amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988. As such, discriminatory acts

prohibited under the federal Fair Housing Act are also prohibited under the

FHA, and federal case law interpreting the federal Fair Housing Act is

applicable to proceedings brought under the FHA. See Brand v. Fla. Power

Corp., 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)(noting that “the Flori da

statute will take on the same constructions as placed on its federal

proto t ype.”).

28 . In proceedings brought under the FHA , the complainant has the

burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of

the evidence. § 760.34(5), Fl a. Stat.; Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v . J.W.C. Co.,

396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A “preponderance of the evidence” means

the “greater weight” of the evidence, or evidence that “more likely than not”

tends to prove the fact at issue. Gross v. Lyons, 763 S o. 2d 276, 289 n.1

(Fla. 2000).

29 . Regarding her retaliation claim , Ms. Lynar may establish a violation

of the FHA through either direct evidence, or through the burden - shifting

framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp oration v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

See Noel v. Aqua Vista Townhomes Condo. Ass’n, Inc. , 2019 WL 4345903 at

*3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2019). Direct evidence is that which, if believed, would

prove the existence of discriminatory intent without resort to inference or presumption. Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001).

“Direct evidence encompasses conduct or statements that both (1) reflect

directly the alleged discriminatory attitude, and (2) bear directly on the

contested [housing] decision.” Noel, 2019 WL 4345903 at *3. A s to the nature

of the evidence, “only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be

nothing other than to discriminate … will constitute direct evidence of

discrimination.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354,

1358 (11th Cir. 1999 )(citations omitted).

30 . Ms. Lynar presented no direct evidence of retaliatio n by Respondents .

No evidence or testimony established that Respondents intentionally coerced,

intimidated, threatened, or interfered with Ms. Lynar’s right to file and

proceed w ith Lynar II .

31 . Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Ms. Lynar must show that

she: (a) engaged in a protected activity ; (b) Respondents subjected her to an

adverse action ; and (c) a causal link exists between the protected activity and

the adverse acti on . Se e Philippeaux v. Apartment Inv. & Mgmt. Co., 598 Fed.

Appx. 640, 644 (11th Cir. 2015).

32 . Ms. Lynar established the first and second element s of a prima facie

case : she participated in a protected activity by pursuing a petition for relief

in Lynar II ; and Respondents subjected her to an adverse action when it

issued the Notice of Termination and commenced eviction proceedings in

county court . See Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp. , 351 F.3d 361, 363 - 64 (8th Cir.

2003)(holding that threats of eviction are sufficient to allege an adverse

action under the f ederal Fair Housing Act) . However, the undersigned

concludes that Ms. Lynar failed to establish any adverse action concerning her exclusion from a deposition of Mr. Downs in Mr. Kotecha’s eviction

proceedi ng, or Mr. Downs’s years - ago conversation with a HUD official

concerning the non - renew al of her lease.

33. With respect to whether Ms. Lynar established a causal link between

the protected activity and the adverse action, it is indisputable that

Responden t issued the Notice of Termination within a couple of months of the

start date of the hearing in Lynar II . Ms. Lynar has provided “sufficient

evidence that the decision - maker became aware of the protected conduct, and

that there was close temporal proximit y between this awareness and the

adverse … action.” Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. , 197 F.3d 1322, 1337

(11th Cir. 1999). However, given the approximately four - year period between

Mr. Downs’s 2014 conversation with a HUD official and the Notice of

Term ination, the undersigned concludes that Ms. Lynar has failed to

establish a causal connection on this allegation. See Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 - 21 (11th Cir. 2004)(holding that a three - month period

between the protected conduct and the adverse action was not sufficient to

allow a reasonable inference of causality in an Americans with Disabilities

Act retaliation suit).

34. The mere fact of close temporal proximity between the protected

activity and adverse action does not, in and of itself, es tablish the requisite

causal link under McDonnell Douglas . Here, Ms. Lynar did not present any

actual evidence that established causation. Respondents provided credible

evidence that its decision to issue the Notice of Termination, and then

commence evicti on proceedings, was based on the incident of November 7,

2018, which was a violation of the “Conduct” requirement in her lease

agreement. The credible and persuasive testimony of Pastor Adkins,

Ms. Brooks, and Mr. Downs substantiated the factual basis of Respondents’ decision. The competent, substantial record evidence establishes that

Respondents’ decision to issue the Notice of Termination, and commence

eviction proceedings, was based on reasons independent of Ms. Lynar’s participation in Lynar II , and t hus, Ms. Lynar failed to establish a causal link

between her protected activity and the adverse action. Additionally,

Respondents provided credible evidence that its reason for seeking to exclude

Ms. Lynar from the deposition of Mr. Downs in Mr. Kotecha’s eviction

proceeding was because Respondents’ eviction proceeding against Ms. Lynar

was open and pending, and it was within its legal rights to exclude Ms. Lynar from this deposition, to which the Brevard County Court agreed.

35. Ms. Lynar’s FHA retaliation claim also fails, even if the undersigned

were to assume she establish ed a prima facie case of FHA retaliation, thus

creat ing a presumption of housing discrimination. The burden would then

shift to Respondents to articulate a legitimate, non - discriminator y, and non -

retaliatory reason for its actions. See Bone v. Vill. Club, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d

1203, 1218 (M.D. Fla. 2016). The reason for Respondents’ decision should be

clear, reasonably specific, and worthy of credence. See Dep’t of Corr. v.

Chandler , 582 So. 2d 1183, 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The burden on

Respondents is one of production, not persuasion, to demonstrate to the

undersigned that its action was non - retaliatory. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace,

Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). This bur den of production is

“exceedingly light.” Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir. 1997) ,

abrogated on other grounds, Lewis v. City of Union , 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir.

2019)( en banc ) .

36. If Respondents meet this burden, the presumption of retaliat ion

disappears. The burden then shifts back to Ms. Lynar to prove that

Respondents’ proffered reason was not the true reason, but merely a “pretext”

for discrimination. See Bone, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 1218.

37. To satisfy this final step, Ms. Lynar must show “either directly by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated

[Respondents] or indirectly by showing that [Respondents’] proffered

explanation is not worthy of credence.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty . Aff . v. Burdine ,

450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). Ms. Lynar must prove that the reasons articulated

were false and that discrimination was the real reason for the action. See City

of Miami v. Hervis, 65 So. 3d 1110, 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

38. For the same reasons as concluded in paragraph 34 ab ove,

Respondents articulated legitimate, non - discriminatory, and non - retaliatory

reasons for its decision to issue the Notice of Termination and commence eviction proceedings.

39. The undersigned further concludes that Ms. Lynar failed to meet her

burden o f proving pretext. The competent substantial evidence presented at

the final hearing does not support a conclusion that Respondents’ explanation

for issuing the Notice of Termination, or commencing eviction proceedings, or

seeking to exclude her from a dep osition in an unrelated eviction proceeding,

or discussing the non - renewal of her lease in a distant telephone conversation

with a HUD official, was false or not worthy of credence.

R ECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the

undersigned hereby R ECOMMEND S that the Florida Commission on Human

Relations issue a final order dismissing Rita Lynar’s Petition for Relief.

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 4 th day of January , 202 1 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

R OBERT J. T ELFER III

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Admini strative Hearings

this 4 th day of January , 202 1 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

Stephen G. Henderson, Esquire

Henderson L egal Group

5419 Village Drive

Viera, Florida 32955

(eServed)

Rita Lynar

1200 Clearlake Road #2114

Cocoa, Florida 32922

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.