20-001705 Scarlett Rabalais vs. Bosshardt Property Management, Llc Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, April 5, 2021.

Summary: Petitioner failed to prove Respondent discriminated against her based on a disability or retaliated against her for filing a complaint under the Fair Housing Act. Recommend dismissal of Petition for Relief.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

S CARLETT R ABALAIS ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 20 - 1705

B OSSHARDT P ROPERTY M ANAGEMENT ,

LLC ,

Respondent .

/

R ECOMMENDE D O RDER

On October 1, November 23 and 24, 2020, and February 16 and 17, 2021 ,

Administrati ve Law Judge Yolonda Y. Green of the Divisio n of

Administrative Hearings (ÑD OAH Ò ) , conducted a hearing , pursuant to section

120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2020), by Zoo m conference .

A PPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Scarlett Rabalais, pro se

Post Office Box 5224

Salt Springs, F lorida 32134

For Respondent: J ohn McDonough, Esquire

Meier, Bonner, Muszynski, O'Dell & Harvey

260 Wekiva Springs Road , Suite 2000

Longwood, F lorida 32779

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE

Whether Respondent , Bosshardt Property Management, LLC

(ÑBosshardtÒ) , violated the Fair Housing Act as alleged in the Housing

Charge of Discrimination.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On December 20, 2019 , Petition er, Scarlett Rabalais (ÑPetitionerÒ or

ÑMs. Rabalais Ò) , filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint ("C omplaint ")

with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") alleging that

Respondent engaged in unlawful housing discrimination based on disability

a nd retaliation by depriving her of access to common services.

At the filing of this matter, Salt Springs Resort Association (ÑSSRAÒ) was

named as a Respondent in this matter. However, on February 5, 2021,

Petitioner filed a Notice of Dismissal to dismiss SSRA as a party as those

parties reached an agreement to resolve issues in dispute related to SSRA.

Thus , the only remaining party is Bosshardt.

On March 24, 2020 , FCHR issued a Determination of No Cause, by which

FCHR determined that reasonable cause di d not exist to establish that an

unlawful housing practice occurred.

On April 1, 2020 , Petitioner filed a Petition for hearing with FCHR, in

response to FCHRÔs determination of Ñno cause.Ò The Petition was

transferred to DOAH for a final hearing and was a ssigned to the

undersigned.

The final hearing was initially scheduled for June 2 6, 2020 . Petitioner

requested a c ontinuance on June 1, 2020, which was granted. The

undersigned rescheduled this matter for hearing on August 13 , 2020. After

another request f or continuance, this matter was rescheduled for October 1,

2020.

On October 1, 2020, the hearing commenced as scheduled. However, the

case was recessed as the hearing was not completed. The hearing was

ultimately completed on February 17, 2021. Petitioner offered the testimony

of 12 witnesses: Ernest Foster, Gary Gensberg, Gary Griffith, Brenda

Harvey, Peter Johansen, Jane Jorden, Robert McBride, Cynthia Nelson,

Sharon Noble , Pam Wingfield, Garry Phillip Solomon , Ph.D., and

Diane Suchy. Petitioner also off ered Exhibits 3, 5, 6, 16, and 49, 1 which were

admitted into evidence. Respondent did not offer any witnesses. RespondentÔs

Exhibit 3 and 15 w ere admitted into evidence.

After the close of the record, Respondent made an ore tenus Motion to

Exclude and St rike the T estimony of Gary Solomon, Ph.D. The undersigned

heard argument from the parties and instructed them to file memorand a of

law to support their respective arguments. After hearing argument and

reviewing the memoranda of law, the undersigned denies RespondentÔs

Motion.

The parties did not order a transcript , and thus, the proposed

recommended orders in this matter were due on February 26, 2021.

Petitioner timely filed her post - hearing submittal. Respondent filed its post -

hearing submittal on March 1, 2021. Given there was no objection or

prejudice shown, b oth parties Ô post - hearing submittals were considered in

drafting this Recommended Order. Unless otherwise indicated, citations to

the Florida Statutes refer to the 201 8 version, which was the versi on in effect

at the time of the alleged discrimination.

1 PetitionerÔs Exhibit s received into evidence included multiple pages within each numbered

exhibit. To the extent any additional documents, audio, or visual files are contained on the

thumb drive accompanying this Recommended Order, they were not received into evidence;

and, t herefore, were not considered by the undersigned in the preparation of this

Recommended Order.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

The following Findings of Fact are made b ased on the exhibits and

testimony offered at the final hearing .

1. Ms. Rabalais is the owner of Lot 198 at Salt Springs Resort, a Florida

recreational vehicle condominium established pursuant to c hapter 718,

Florida Statutes. As an owner of a lot in Salt Springs Resort, she is a member

of SSRA , the homeownerÔs association.

2. B osshardt is a Florida corporation providing community associati on

management services and was the Community Association Manager (ÑCAMÒ)

for SSRA from September 2013 until August 31, 2019. B osshardt acted as the

agent, and at the direction of SSRA , manage d the business related to the

property, including enforcement of SSRA rules and decisions of the Board of

Directors.

3. The CAM is the general point of contact for the association. The CAM

would collect on bills and collect payments for assessment and manage the

property.

4. Petitioner contends Respondent subjected her to retaliation beginning

after the filing of PetitionerÔs HUD complaint. In support of her position,

Petitioner points to alleged harassment by Ms. Noble, the failure to maintain

he r lawn and repaint her lot number, and removal of one of her post s from

the townhall webpage.

5. Throughout the hearing , Ms. Rabalais raised allegations about

incidents that occurred before December 20, 2018, which is 365 days prior to

the filing of her Complaint of Discrimination dated December 20, 2019.

However, some of the fac ts will be discussed herein to help supplement and

explain the alleged continued discrimination and to provide a more detailed

record of Ms. RabalaisÔ s complaints.

Golf Cart Incident

6 . Petitioner alleges that B osshardt was responsible for housing

dis crimination and harassment arising out of an April 17, 2018, confrontation

between Petitioner and Sharon Noble, a lot owner and former SSRA board

member. Ms. Rabalais identified Ms. Noble as one of the worst of her

neighbors who disliked her.

7 . At some point before Ms. Rabalais filed t he complaint of discrimination,

Ms. Noble and Ms. Rabalais were good friends. While there is a dispute

regarding the nature of the relationship , at some point the friendship

deteriorated.

8 . In 2016 , a dispute arose betwe en Ms. Rabalais and Ms. Noble over

Ms. Rabalais Ô s intent to file a lawsuit against SSRA and Ms. NobleÔs refusal

to assist her. The dispute was referenced in emails between Ms. Rabalais and

Ms. Noble and through Ms. NobleÔs testimony at hearing.

9 . Ms. Nob le acknowledged at the hearing that she and Ms. Rabalais were

no longer friends.

10 . On April 17 , 201 8 , Sharon Noble was driving her golf cart on the road

in front of Ms. RabalaisÔ s lot. She stopped her cart to send a text message to

someone. At around th e same time, Ms. Rabalais attempted to enter her

drive way. Ms. Rabalais was unable to enter the drive way as two carts could

not drive on the road side by side. Ms. Rabalais began to blow her horn so

Ms. Noble circled around behind Ms. RabalaisÔ s golf car t to allow her to drive

pass her. Ms. Noble then finish ed her text message and left the area .

Ms. Noble credibly testified that she did not attempt to intimidate

Ms. Rabalai s.

1 1 . Ms. Noble believed the incident was intentional and as a result, she

wrote an incident report document ing the incident. Ms. Noble reported the

incident to the SSRA .

1 2 . Jane Jorden was in Ms. RabalaisÔ s golf cart and witnessed the

incident. She recalled that Ms. Noble was recording Ms. RabalaisÔ s lot and

blocking the driveway w ith her golf cart. Ms. Rabalais became upset after

Ms. Noble drove her cart behind her. Ms. Rabalais went to the guard gate to

report the incident and call the police .

1 3 . Tom, o ne of the employees working at the guard gate, completed a

report regarding t he incident. Tom did not testify at the hearing and , thus,

his statement about the incident is not relied upon for a finding of fact. It is

simply used to supplement the testimony offered at the hearing.

1 4 . Tom did not observe the incident but rather rep orted that the police

were called and took statements from Ms. Noble and Ms. Rabalais. SSRA

sent Ms. Rabalais a letter advising her to contact the police if she is

concerned about her safety.

1 5 . While Ms. Rabalais believes that she was subjected to disc rimination

and retaliation by Respondent by way of the actions of Ms. Noble, the fact is

that Ms. Noble, and more importantly Bosshardt, was in no position to deny

Ms. Rabalais access to common services and facilities under SSRAÔs control.

To the extent Ms . Rabalais believed her fellow neighbors disliked her or were

not nice to her, that activity is not actionable as unlawful housing

discrimination.

1 6 . The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the incident with

Ms. Noble was a personal dispute t hat was not due to housing discrimination

facilitated at the direction of Bosshardt.

Lost Assessment Payment

1 7 . Between July 1, 2018 , and October 1, 2018, a quarterly assessment

accrued. Ms. Rabalais Ô s check with a send date of September 28, 2018, w as

mailed to Bosshardt using an address that was previously known to be

BosshardtÔs address. However, t he assessment check payment was returned

and the label affixed to the envelope indicated that the mail was returned to

s ender , was not deliverable as add ressed, and was unable to be forward ed . In

order to qualify as a candidate for a position on the SSRA Board of Director s ,

all assessments must be paid before a designated date. As a result of the

assessment check not being delivered before the deadline to declare

candidacy, Ms. Rabalais did not meet the criteria to run for the Board.

1 8 . Ms. Rabalais alleges in her complaint that Bosshardt engaged in a

discriminatory act by not accepting her payment so she could not run for the

Board of Directors. There is no sufficient evidence to support this allegation.

Although there was testimony from Ms. Nelson that there were suspicious

circumstances surrounding delivery of the check, the evidence offered at

hearing does not demonstrate that Bosshardt engaged in nefa rious or

discriminatory actions regarding the assessment payment. The greater

weight of the evidence, however, established that the check was returned

undelivered.

Failure to M aintain P roperty and P aint L ot N umber

19. Ms. Rabalais alleged in her Complain t that Respondent failed to

maintain her lawn and failed to repaint her lot number as it did for other lot

owners. There was no clear indication that the conduct occurred on or after

December 20, 2018.

20 . Generally, a ll lot owners received basic service s . An exception would

be if the lot owner has a Ñ no trespassing Ò sign on the property .

21 . Diane Suchy worked as the designated CAM for SSRA. She testified

that maintenance staff were employees of SSRA and worked at the direction

of Bosshardt. They maint ained common areas and the lawns of individual lot

owners. The maintenance team also repaints the lot numbers as needed.

2 2 . Gary G ens berg, the maintenance supervisor , testified that he

maintained Ms. Rabalais's lawn and conducted weed maintenance as nee ded.

He also recalled that Ms. Rabalais did not have a large area that required

maintenance. Regarding th e lot numbers , they would be repainted if it was

not visible. Ms. Rabalais's lot number was visible a t the time in question.

Mr. Gensberg credibly test ified that he was never given instructions to not

maintain Ms. Rabalais's lot .

23 . Despite the maintenance team maintaining Ms. Rabalais property as

needed, the evidence established that Ms. Rabalais posted no trespassing

signs on her property for a n unk nown period of time. Furthermore, there was

no evidence to support a finding that if Ms. Rabalais Ô s lawn was not

maintained or her lot number was not repainted, it was result of

discrimination based on disability or retaliation.

T ownhall Facebook Group P age

2 4 . Gary Griffith, the Bosshardt president at the time of the allegations

alleged in the Complaint , testified about the lot owners Ô Facebook g roup page.

Mr. Griffith testified that Bosshardt did not manage the Facebook group

page. Rather, Mr. Foster, Brenda Harvey , and other lot owners , were

administrators on the account. T hus, Bosshardt made no determination

regarding who could post or remove posts from the account.

2 5 . The page had rules for posting including, the exclusion of posts that

were argum entative, contained unfounded allegations, or attack ed the Board

of Directors. On February 4, 2019, Ms. Rabalais posted a message about her

experience with litigation with SSRA and Bosshardt. At the end of that

message she wrote, ÑSSRA/Bosshardt has caused a homeowner to kill himself

and ruined many ownersÔ lives È. Ò The administrators determined the post

was unsubstantiated a nd threatening and failed to comply with the

guidelines established for the page. As a result, the post was removed. Based

on the ev idence offered at hearing, Bosshardt was not involved with removal

of Ms. RabalaisÔ s February 4, 2019 , post. Therefore, there was no evidence to

establish that Bosshardt discriminated against Ms. Rabalais when her post

was removed from the T own H all page.

Expert Testimony

2 6 . Petitioner offered the testimony of Gary Solom o n , Ph.D. , as an expert

regarding HOA syndrome. He works as a professor at the College of Southern

Nevada. HOA syndrome is not a recognized clinical disorder, and there are no

peer - revie wed articles offered to support Dr. SolomonÔs opinion. Despite his

purported knowledge about HOA syndrome, he was unable to provide a basis

for his conclusions. Dr. Solomon had not read the SSRA rules or policies and

procedures; and he had no understanding of Florida condominium law. He

was also unable to provide an opinion regarding whether Ms. Rabalais had

suffered from HOA syndrome. Based on the evidence offered at hearing,

D r. Solom o n was not accepted as an expert i n this matter .

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

2 7 . DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter in this

case. §§ 120.569 and 120.57, Fla. Stat.

PetitionerÔs Disability Discrimination Claim

28 . Section 760.34 (2) , Florida Statutes , provides , in pertinent part, that :

Ñ[a] ny person who files a complaint under subsection (1) (for a violation of

housing discrimination) must do so within 1 year after the alleged

discriminatory housing practice occurred. Ò Petitioner timely filed her

Complaint.

29. Petitioner brought the Complaint pursuant to s ectio n 804 ( b ) or ( f ) of

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 , as amended by the Fair Housing Act

of 1988. Thus, the asserted claims fall under the Federal Fair Housing Act,

42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), and the Florida Fair Housing Act, section 760.23(2).

30 . Se ction 760.23(2) provides that: Ñ [i]t is unlawful to discriminate

against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a

dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,

because of race, color, nati onal origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or

religion. Ò

31 . Florida Ô s Fair Housing Act is patterned after the Federal Fair Housing

Act. Federal court decisions interpreting the Federal Fair Housing Act

provide guidance in determining whether a violatio n of Florida Ô s Fair

Housing Act has occurred. Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass Ô n, Inc. ,

765 F. 3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014). Section 760.23(2) is patterned after

42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) of the Federal Fair Housing Act; and, therefore, the same

legal analysis applies to each section.

32 . Petitioner ha s the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that Respondent violated section 760.23(2) by discriminating

against her because of her disability . § 760.34(5), Fla. Stat. A Ñ preponderance

of t he evidence Ò means the Ñ greater weight Ò of the evidence, or evidence that

Ñ more likely than not Ò tends to prove the fact at issue. Gross v. Lyons , 763 So.

2d 276, 280. n.1 (Fla. 2000).

33 . Petitioners alleging intentional discrimination under the Fair Hou sing

Act must establish a prima facie case. Petitioner s can do so either by direct or

circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would

prove the existence of discriminatory intent without resort to inference or

presumption. Den ney v. City of Albany , 247 F. 3d 1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001).

Ñ [O]nly the most blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other

than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor constitute

direct evidence of discrimination. Ò Wilson v. B/ E Aerospace, Inc. , 376 F. 3d

1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004); s ee e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Alton Packaging Corp. ,

901 F. 2d 920, 923 (11th Cir. 1990)(holding that the general manager's

statement that Ñ if it was his company he wouldn't hire any black people, Ò

constitu tes direct evidence). In this case, Petitioner presented no direct

evidence of disability discrimination by Respondent.

34 . When no direct evidence of disability discrimination exists, a

Petitioner may attempt to establish a prima facie case circumstantia lly by

demonstrating that they: (1) are an aggrieved party; (2) suffered an injury

because of the alleged discrimination; and (3) were denied, based on her

disability , access to services or facilities protected by the Fair Housing Act

that were available t o other homeowners who did not have a disability.

Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. ,

456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Simhoni v. Mimo on the Beach I

Condo. Ass'n, Inc. , Case No. 18 - 4442 R.O. ¶ 39 (Fla. DOA H Feb. 26, 2019;

FCHR May 16, 2019); and Austin and Tomayko v. Saddlebag Lake Owners

Ass'n, Inc. , Case No. 16 - 1799 (Fla. DOAH Sept. 15, 2016; FCHR Dec. 8,

2016) .

3 5 . Not all conduct by a condominium association or board member is

actionable under the Fai r Housing Act. The Federal Fair Housing Act was

passed to ensure fairness and equality in housing, not to become an all -

purpose civility code regulating conduct between neighbors. Lawrence v.

Courtyard at Deerwood Ass'n, Inc. , 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1142 (S .D. Fla.

2004). Where the alleged discriminating conduct, as in the instant case,

occurred after the complainants Ô purchase of their unit, which is commonly

referred to as Ñ post - acquisition, Ò a narrow construction of the types of

actionable conduct is requ ired.

3 6 . In Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. City of LaGrange,

Georgia , 940 F. 3d 627 (11th Cir. 2019), the court examined the plain

language of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) in determining what post - acquisition conduct

is actionable. The court explained t hat section 3604(b) Ñ makes clear that the

conduct at issue must relate to services provided in connection with the sale

or rental of a dwellingÈ. Ò Construing the plain meaning of the statute

narrowly, the court stated that section 3604(b) only Ñ reaches cer tain post -

acquisition conduct, including post - acquisition conduct related to the

provision of services, as long as those services are connected to the sale or

rental of a dwelling. Ò Id . at 632 - 34.

3 7 . At issue in that case was municipality provided electr icity, gas, water,

and law enforcement services. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal

concluded that law enforcement services are not provided "in connection with

the sale or rental of a dwelling. Ò However, basic utility services, such as

electricity, gas, and water, Ñ are inextricably intertwined with the dwelling

itself Ò and Ñ connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling because they are

fundamental to the ability to inhabit a dwelling. Ò Id . at 634.

3 8 . In the instant case, Petitioner failed to establish the second and third

prongs of a prima facie case. Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence

that she suffered an injury because of her disability. She also failed to

establish that she was denied access to facilities or services protected by the

Fa ir Housing Act that were available to other non - disabled lot owners.

3 9 . Petitioner ha s resided at her lot continuously, without interruption. At

no time ha s she been restricted from accessing any services of the resort . To

the contrary, she was provided services as needed. To the extent she may not

have received service, she had a Ñ no trespassing Ò sign on her lot forbidding

anyone to enter her property.

40. Petitioner failed to make a prima facie case because the evidence she

offered at hearing did not p rove that Bosshardt had deprived her of access to

services available to the other lot owners. The burden, therefore, never

shifted to Bosshardt to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its conduct.

41 . Petitioner also claim s that Responden t created a hostile housing

environment based on her disability . There is some question of the viability of

a claim for hostile housing environment. See Lawrence v. Courtyards at

Deerwood AssÔn, Inc. , 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1146; Simhoni , Case No. 18 - 4442

( Fla. DOAH Feb. 26, 2019; FCHR May 16, 2019); Austin and Tomayko , Case

No. 16 - 1799 (Fla. DOAH Sept. 15, 2016; FCHR Dec. 8, 2016).

42 . However, e ven if a claim of a hostile housing environment based on

disability is cognizable, Petitioner has failed to esta blish such a claim. Courts

that have recognized a claim of a hostile housing environment require s that a

plainti ff establish that, because of their disability , she w as subjected to

unwelcome conduct that was so severe and pervasive as to alter the

conditio ns of her housing and interfere with her right to the use and

enjoyment of her property. Mohamed v. McLaurin , 390 F. Supp. 3d 520, 548 -

51 (D. Vermont 2019)( Ñ courts that recognize a hostile housing environment

claim under the FHA require a high degree of pr oof, effectively requiring a

plaintiff to prove that the discriminatory harassment resulted in constructive

eviction Ò ); Godwin v. City Redevelopment, LLC , 2018 WL 3620482, at *3

(D. Nev. 2018)(unpleasant comments by neighbors including single off - hand

comm ent about plaintiff's national origin was not severe or pervasive);

Krieman v. Crystal Lake Apartments Ltd. Partnership , 2006 WL 1519320, at

*12 (N.D. Ill. 2006)(recognizing a demanding standard for establishing hostile

housing environment claim -- conduct m ust be extreme and not merely rude or

unpleasant offensive utterances); Simhoni , Case No. 18 - 4442, R.O. ¶ 43 (Fla.

DOAH Feb. 26, 2019; FCHR May 16, 2019). Ñ Whether a housing environment

is illegally hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at a ll the

circumstances, and factors may include the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a

mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with the

use and enjoyment o f the premises. Ò Jackson v. Park Place Condo. Ass'n, Inc. ,

619 Fed. Appx. 699, 704 (10th Cir. 2015).

43. The conduct at issue in this case was sometimes unfriendly, but it

never rose to a level of such extreme offensiveness as to be deemed severe

and perv asive. Even if Petitioner could establish there was a hostile housing

environment at SSRA, Petitioner has not established in any way that

Respondent was the cause of a hostile environment or that she was denied

access to service.

Retaliation

44 . Section 760.37, the anti - retaliation provision, provides, in pertinent

part: Ñ [i]t is unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any

person in the exercise of, or on account of her or his having exercised È any

right granted under [the Florida Fai r Housing Act]. Ò Section 760.37 is

patterned after 42 U.S.C. § 3617 of the Federal Fair Housing Act; and,

therefore, the same legal analysis applies to this section.

45. As with a claim of disparate treatment discrimination under section

760.23(2), Petiti oner ha s the burden of establishing a claim of retaliation

under section 760.37 by a preponderance of the evidence.

46 . In the present case, Petitioners failed to present direct evidence of

retaliation.

47 . To establish a claim of retaliation under sec tion 760.37 based on

circumstantial evidence, Petitioner must show that: (1) Respondent coerced,

intimidated, threatened, or interfered; (2) with Petitioner enjoyment of a

housing right after the exercise of that right; (3) because of discriminatory

animus . Lawrence , 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 - 44; Anderson v. Shaddock Estates

Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. , 2008 WL 10590598, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Cosme v.

Lakeshore Club of Polk Cty. Homeowners Ass'n , (Fla. DOAH July 7, 2011;

FCHR Aug. 30, 2011).

48. Here , Petitione r relies on a series of events with neighbors and

perceived misdeeds. The on ly incident that could be related to Respondent as

the property manager, fails because Bosshardt did not employ the

maintenance company and the company did not act at the direction of

Respondent. Furthermore, based on the evidence established at hearing, by a

preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner received services as needed. If she

did not receive services, it was during a time that she had a no trespassing

sign on her property. Nonetheless, none of the alleged conduct was based on

discrimination or in retaliation for Petitioner filing her HUD Complaint.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner failed to establish a case of retaliation as it

relates to Respondent.

R ECOMMENDATION

Bas ed on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

R ECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a

final order dismissing the Petition for Relief .

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 5th day of April , 2021 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County , Florida.

S

Y OLONDA Y. G REEN

Administrative Law Judge

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 5th day of April, 2021.

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Scarlett Rabalais

Florida Commission on Human Relations Post Office Box 5224

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110 Salt Springs, Florida 32134

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

Cheyanne Costilla, Gen eral Co unsel

John McDonough, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations

Meier, Bonner, Muszynski, 4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

O'Dell & Harvey Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

Suite 2000

260 Wekiva Springs Road

Longwood, Florida 32779

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIO NS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.