20-001769 Department Of Agriculture And Consumer Services vs. Moving Systems Of South Florida, Inc. Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, October 5, 2020.

Summary: Petitioner should approve Respondent?s application for renewal of registration as an intrastate mover, even though Respondent is currently a defendant in a civil enforcement action brought by Petitioner.

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE

The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has grounds for refusing to

renew Respondent ’ s registration as an intrastate mover, where Respondent is

currently a defendant in a civil enforcement action brought by Petitioner,

which action Respondent ’ s presid ent allegedly failed to disclose in the subject

application for renewal registration.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

By letter dated March 11, 2020, Petitioner Department of Agriculture and

Consumer Services ( “ Department ” ) notified Respondent Moving Systems of

Sou th Florida, Inc. ( “ Moving Systems ” ) , that it intended to deny Moving

Systems ’ application for renewal of registration (licensure) as an intrastate

mover . The Department gave two reasons for its preliminary decision,

namely that (i) Moving Systems is a defe ndant in a pending enforcement

proceeding, which is based upon allegations of fraud and dishonest dealing,

and (ii) Moving Systems failed to disclose the existence of the pending

proceeding in its application .

Moving Systems timely requested a formal hea ring, and t he Department

referred the matter to DOAH on April 9 , 20 20 . The undersigned scheduled

the final hearing for J une 29, 2020 . The matter was later continued to

July 2 8, 2020 , which is when the hearing took place .

At hearing, t he Department called one witness, an employee named Ryan

Hartle . Petitioner ’ s Exhibits A through D were received in evidence . Moving

Systems ’ president, James Fischer, testified for Respondent, whose Exhibits

B and C were admitted . In addition, official re cognition was taken of the

Recommended Order in Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v.

Florida Licensed Moving Corporation , Case No. 19 - 5838 (Fla. DOAH May 5,

2020), as well as of chapters 120 and 507, Florida Statutes.

The final hearing transcript was filed on September 3, 2020 . Each party

timely filed a proposed recommended order on September 14, 2020.

U nless otherwise indicated, citations to the official statute law of the

State of Florida refer to Florida Statutes 201 9 .

F INDINGS OF F ACT

1 . The Department is the state agency responsible for , among other

things, licensing and regulating household moving services in the S tate of

Florida .

2 . Moving Systems is a Florida corporation registered with the

Department as a licensed mover authorized to engage in the intrastate transportation and shipment of household goods .

3 . Moving Systems ’ registration (IM1939) was scheduled to expire on

February 11, 2020 . Accordingly, it timely submitted an application for

renewal registration (the “ Ren ewal Application ” ), which was signed by James

Fischer ( “ Fischer ” ) , the corporation ’ s president , on February 9, 2020 .

4 . Question number 9 of the Renewal Application ask s :

Has the mover or any director, officer, owner, or

general partner of the business:

a . been convicted of a crime involving fraud,

dishonest dealing, or any act of moral turpitude? YES ____ NO ____

* * *

b . not satisfied a civil fine or penalty arising out of

any administrative or enforcement action brought by any governmental a gency or private person

based upon conduct involving fraud, dishonest

dealing, or any violation of Chapter 507, Florida

Statutes? YES ____ NO ____

c . a pending criminal, administrative, of [ sic ]

enforcement proceeding in any jurisdiction , based

up on conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or

any act of moral turpitude ? YES ____ NO ____

d . had a judgment entered in any action brought by

the department or the Department of Legal Affairs

pursuant to Chapter 507 or ss. 501.201 - 501.213,

Florida Statutes? YES ____ NO ____

Fischer checked the answer “ NO ” to each of these items.

5 . Moving Systems and Fischer are among th e defendants in State of

Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Florida

Licensed Moving Corporation, et al. , Case No. 2018 - CA - 002516, which is

pending in the Circuit Court for Seminole County, Florida (the “ Action ” ) . The

Action is a ci vil proceeding brought by the Department under section 507.10,

seeking to enforce compliance with chapter 507 . The Department alleges in

the Action that the defendants, including Moving Systems and Fischer,

engaged in actions involving fraud or dishonest d ealing .

6 . Moving Systems and Fischer have each vigorously denied the

allegations made against them in the Action, which remained pending as of

the final hearing in this case . The Department ’ s intended agency action in

this case does not depend upon proof of the allegations upon which the Action

is based . No findings of fact concerning the merits of such allegations will be

made herein.

7 . By letter dated March 11, 2020, the Department notified Moving

Systems that it intended to deny the Renewal Applicatio n for two reasons .

First , the Department asserted, then as here, that both Moving Systems and

one of its officers (Fischer) have pending against them an enforcement proceeding, i.e., the Action, “ based upon conduct involving fraud, dishonest

dealing, or an y other act of moral turpitude, ” which the Department contends

provides grounds for nonrenewal pursuant to section 507.03(8)(d) . Second ,

the Department alleged, and has here sought to prove, that Fischer

knowingly made a false statement in the Renewal Appl ication when he

denied that the mover “ has … a pending enforcement proceeding in any

jurisdiction , based upon conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any

act of moral turpitude . ”

8 . Fischer disputes that his answer to question number 9(c) was

knowingly false . He maintains that this question is confusing because it (i) is

syntactically awkward and (ii) employs legal terminology, which is unfamiliar

to ordinary laypersons . There is some merit to these criticisms of the

question.

9 . Question numb er 9(c) attempts — not entirely successfully — to

paraphrase section 507.03(8)(d), which authorizes the Department to deny,

refuse to renew, or revoke a registration if a mover or one of its principals

“ [h]as pending against him or her any criminal, administra tive, o r

enforcement proceedings in any jurisdiction, based upon conduct involving

fraud, dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude . ” (Emphasis

added . ) The prepositional phrase ( “ pending against him or her ” ) makes clear

that the verb ( “ has ” ) , as used in the statute, is operating semantically as a

standalone, transitive verb, which denotes t hat the mover stand s in a certain

relationship to the pending proceeding, i.e., he or she is a party to such proceeding .

10 . Question number 9(c) omits the prepositional phrase, without which

the verb “ has ” is not clearly a transitive verb, but instead can be misread as

an auxiliary verb . Confusion then arises because there is no verb phrase of

which “ has ” is a part . Instead, the question asks, “ [h]as the mover … a

pending ” proceeding? T h is may cause applicants to wonder, “ Ha s the mover

what with respect to a pending proceeding? ” Testified in? Heard about? Been

named as a party to? The undersigned believes that an applicant could

reasonably read this somewh at affected language and decide that the

question does not apply to him or her, based upon a simpl e misunderstanding

of , or uncertainty about, what is being asked. 1

11 . In addition, the terms “ enforcement proceeding, ” and “ fraud, dishonest

dealing, or an y act of moral turpitude, ” are legalistic in nature, as Fischer

argues . A n applicant who is a party to a legal proceeding could reasonably

conclude , even so, that the proceeding is not based upon historical conduct

involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or an act of moral turpitude as he

understands those terms .

12 . Increasing the likelihood of an applicant ’ s reaching such a conclusion

is that the question does not distinguish between alleged conduct and actual

conduct . As a result, a n applicant who is certain of his innocence might

answer “ no ” to question number 9(c) rather than appearing to admit that his

conduct was fraudulent or dishonest . Indeed, a falsely accused applicant

would probably view any pending enforcement proceeding as based upon, not

his condu ct, but upon unfounded allegations . Why should such an applicant

not answer “ no ” to question number 9(c), when answering “ yes ” might give

the impression that he did something which he knows that he did not do?

1 3 . Consequently, the undersigned credits Fisc her ’ s testimony that he did

not knowingly make a false statement on the Renewal Application .

Reinforcing this f inding is that Fischer had no reason to knowingly attempt

to conceal the Action because the Department is the plaintiff therein .

Obviously, the D epartment was aware of the Action , and thus falsely denying

its existence would have been both foolish and futile . Fischer had no motive

to lie, and while this is not dispositive, it is corroborative circumstantial

evidence.

14 . It is found as a matter of ultimate fact that the evidence fails to show

Fischer knowingly made a misrepresent ation in the Renewal Application in

violation of chapter 507 . See § 507.07(2), Fla. Stat.

1 Question 9(c) is not wrong, grammatically, nor is it necessarily ambiguous in a legal sense .

But, the question is stilted and likely confuses applicants who are not wordsmiths.

15 . The other ground, however, is the true crux of the Department ’ s case .

The pendency of the Action is an undisputed fact, and Moving Systems and

Fischer are defendants in that case . There can be no genuine dispute,

moreover, that the Action is an “ enforcement proceeding ” based up on

allegations of “ dishonest dealing ” as those t erms are used in section

507.03(8)(d) . Viewed in isolation, paragraph (d) ’ s plain and literal language

makes for a seemingly open - and - shut case against Moving Systems, which

has pending against it an enforcement proceeding based upon dishonest dealing.

16 . Yet, p aragraph (d) does not stand alone but is just one part of

subsection (8), all of whose provisions must be read as a whole and construed together . When paragraph (d) is considered in conjunction with the other

paragraphs of subsection (8), it becomes far less clear that a license may be

revoked or nonrenewed on the basis of mere allegati ons of wrongdoing by the

licensee, where such allegations have yet to be proved .

17 . Th e undersigned concludes as a matter of law , for reasons explained

below, that s ubsection (8) is clear and unambiguous with respect to the

Department ’ s authority to deny an initial application based upon the

pendency of a proceeding described in paragraph (d), but is ambiguous as to

whether paragraph (d) provides g rounds for tak ing away a valuable and

legally protected property interest via revocation or nonrenewal of an existing license simply because unproved allegations of misconduct have been made

against the licensee . Because subsection (8) is penal in nature, this ambiguity

mu st be resolved in Moving Systems ’ favor .

C ONCLUSIONS O F L AW

18 . DOAH has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding

pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1) .

19 . A proceeding, such as this one, which arises from an agency ’ s

preliminary decision not to renew a license based upon the licensee ’ s alleged

commission of a disciplinable offense, is penal in nature because nonrenewal

of licensure is tantamount to imposing a penalty upon the licensee . See Ag.

for Pers. with Disab. v . Daniel Madistin LLC #1 , Case No. 15 - 2422FL, at 13

(Fla. DOAH Nov. 25, 2015; Fla. APD Jan. 26, 2016) . Accordingly, the

Department must prove the charges against Moving Systems by clear and

convincing evidence. Dep ’ t of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. & Inves tor Prot. v.

Osborne Stern & Co. , 670 So. 2d 932, 933 - 34 (Fla. 1996) (citing Ferris v.

Turlington , 510 So. 2d 292, 294 - 95 (Fla. 1987)); Nair v. Dep ’ t of Bus. & Prof ’ l

Reg., Bd. of Med. , 654 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

20 . Regarding the standard of proof, in Slomowitz v. Walker , 429 So. 2d

797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the court developed a “ workable definition of

clear and convincing evidence ” and found that of necessity such a definition

would need to contain “ both qualita tive and quantitative standards. ” The

court held that:

[C] lear and convincing evidence requires that the

evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise and

explic it and the witnesses must be lacking in

confusion as to the facts in issue . The evidence

must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to b e established.

Id . The Florida Supreme Court later adopted the Slomowitz court ’ s

description of clear and convincing evidence . See In re Davey , 645 So. 2d 398,

404 (Fla. 1994) . The First District Court of Appeal also has followed the

Slomowitz test, addin g the interpretive comment that “ [a]lthough this

standard of proof may be met where the evidence is in conflict, … it seems to

preclude evidence that is ambiguous. ” Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Shuler

Bros., Inc. , 590 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), re v. denied , 599 So. 2d

1279 (Fla. 1992) (citation omitted).

2 1 . It is unlawful in this state to “ conduct business as a mover or

moving broker, or advertise to engage in the business of moving or offering to

move, without being registered with the departme nt. ” § 507.07(1), Fla. Stat .

Consequently, before engaging in such activities, “ [e]a ch mover and moving

broker mu st [ initially ] register with the department ” and thereafter renew

this “ registration biennially on or before its expiration date . ”

§ 507.0 3 (1), (4) , Fla. Stat .

2 2 . Section 507.09(1)(d) provides that “ if the department finds that a

mover … or a person employed or contracted by a mover has violated or is

operating in violation of this chapter , ” then it may refuse “ to register or

revok[ e ] or sus pend [ ] a registration. ”

2 3 . Section 507.07(2) states that it is a violation of chapter 507 to

“ knowingly make any false statement, representation, or certification in any

application, document, or record required to be submitted or retained under

this ch apter. ”

2 4 . Section 507.03(8) provides as follows:

The department may deny, refuse to renew, or

revoke the registration of any mover or moving

broker based upon a determination that the mover

or moving broker, or any of the mover ’ s or moving

broker ’ s direc tors, officers, owners, or general

partners:

(a) Has failed to meet the requirements for

registration as provided in this chapter;

(b) Has been convicted of a crime involving fraud,

dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral turpitude;

(c) Has not satisfied a civil fine or penalty arising

out of any administrative or enforcement action

brought by any governmental agency or private

person based upon conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or any violation of this chapter;

(d) Has pending against him or her any criminal,

administrative, or enforcement proceedings in any

jurisdiction, based upon conduct involving fraud,

dishonest dealing, or any other act of moral

turpitude ; or

(e) Has had a judgment entered against him or

her in any action brough t by the department or the Department of Legal Affairs under this chapter or ss. 501.201 - 501.213, the Florida Deceptive and

Unfair Trade Practices Act.

(Emphasis added.)

2 5 . The foregoing statutory and rule provisions “ must be construed

strictly, in favor of the one against whom the penalty would be imposed. ”

Munch v. Dep ’ t of Prof ’ l Reg., Div. of Real Estate , 592 So. 2d 1136, 1143

(Fla. 1st DCA 1992); see Camejo v. Dep ’ t of Bus. & Prof ’ l Reg. , 812 So. 2d 583,

583 - 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); McClung v. Crim. Ju st. Stds. & Training

Comm ’ n , 458 So. 2d 887, 888 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) ( “ [W]here a statute

provides for revocation of a license the grounds must be strictly construed

because the statute is penal in nature . No conduct is to be regarded as

included within a p enal statute that is not reasonably proscribed by it; if

there are any ambiguities included, they must be construed in favor of the licensee. ” ); see also, e.g., Griffis v. Fish & Wildlife Conserv. Comm ’ n , 57 So. 3d

929 , 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (statutes im posing a penalty must never be

extended by construction).

2 6 . As reflected in the findings above, the Departmen t failed to carr y its

burden of proving, by clea r and convincing evidence, that Fischer knowingly

made a false statement in the Renewal Application .

27 . As for the other ground, section 507.03(8) identifies five offenses

for which the Department may deny, revoke, or nonrenew a registration .

The Department charges Moving Systems with the offense defined in

paragraph (d), which makes it a vi olation merely to be accused in a pending

proceeding of conduct involving fraud, dishonest dealing, or an act of moral

turpitude . For ease of reference, this category of wrongdoing will hereafter

be called “ Deceitful Conduct ” for short . The intended denial of Moving

Systems ’ Renewal Application on this basis raises the question of whether

section 507.03(8)(d) authorizes the Department to revoke or nonrenew a

registration — and thereby effectively put an established mover out of

business — solely because someone has alleged that the licensee engaged in

Deceitful Conduct, which might be untrue or at least unprovable . For the

reasons that follow, the undersigned answers this question of law in the

negative .

28 . On close examination of subsection (8), it will be see n that

paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) all have, at bottom, a common cause - in - fact,

namely the applicant or licensee ’ s Deceitful Conduct, “ but for ” which none of

these offenses could arise . There is a huge difference , however, between

paragraphs (b) and (c), on the one hand, and paragraph (d) on the other,

namely t hat the former offenses require that the applicant or licensee have

been adjudicated guilty of Deceitful Conduct, whereas the latter offense

requires only that such conduct have been alleged . Notice, as well, the

substantial distinction between the offenses defined in paragraphs (b) and (c) . Being convicted of a crime involving Deceitful Conduct is an offense, per se,

but being found guilty of Deceitful Conduct in a civil or administrative proceeding is not disciplinable by itself . The offense defined in paragraph (c)

is not the finding of guilt, per se, but instead is the failure to satisfy any penalty that might have been imposed secondary to such a finding .

29 . This means that while the Department could deny an applicant ’ s

initial application for licensure based up on his prior conviction of a crime

involving Deceitful Conduct, it could not deny such an application based upon a civil or administrative adjudication of Deceitful Conduct adverse to the

applicant, so long as the applicant had paid the resulting fine . The

Department could, however, deny initial registration to an applicant based

upon the pendency of any criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement

proceeding against the applicant invo lving allegations of Deceitful Conduct.

30 . With respect to licensees, if paragraph (d) were interpreted literally

and strictly likewise to permit the revocation or nonrenewal of an existing

registration, then subsection (8) would treat pending charges of criminal

Deceitful Conduct as being equivalent to a subsequent conviction on such

charges, 2 and pending civil or administrative allegations of Deceitful Conduct

as worse than an adverse adjudication based upon finding s that such conduct

occurred in fact .

31 . At first blush, it might seem anomalous for the statute to equate

charges and allegations with final adjudication s of guilt , but the appearance

of abnormality largely disappears when taking into account the fact that

subsection (8) lumps together, without differentiation, grounds fo r (i) denying

initial registration applications and for (ii) revoking existing registrations .

The se are two very different situations, however, because denial of

registration is not a sanction for violating the law, but r ather reflects the

application of a regulatory measure designed to safeguard the public . See,

e.g. , Osborne Stern , 670 So. 2d at 934.

32 . Thus, a t the initial application stage, the focus is on protecting

consumers , not on protecting the rights and interes ts of a licensee facing the

loss of livelihood . See, e.g., Rolle v. Crist , 2001 WL 163 8505, at *6 - 7 (Fla.

DOAH Dec. 14, 2001) . Agencies are afforded wide discretion in denying

licensure to applicants deemed unfit . See, e.g., Astral Liquors, Inc. v. Dep ’ t of

Bus. Reg. , 463 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 1985) . It is , therefore , not peculiar that

the legislature would permit the Department to deny registration to an

applicant who is presently a defendant in a proceeding based up on

allegations that the applicant e ngaged in Deceitful Conduct . Indeed, it seems

2 prior Presumably an existing licensee charged under paragraph (d) would not have a

conviction for criminal Deceitful Conduct because a person having such a criminal record

should have been d enied initial registration; or, if licensed when the crime was committed,

had his registration revoked based upon the prior conviction, pursuant to paragraph (b).

prudent to postpone the registration of such an applicant until after the

pending proceeding has run its course . If he is later acquitted or otherwise

found not in violation, or if he satisfies any civil fine o r penalty thereafter

resulting from th e then - pending civil or administrative enforcement

proceeding, he may reapply . If none of th e se conditions is subsequently met,

however, the applicant should not be registered to do business as an

intrastate mover in F lorida .

33 . In contrast to an initial applicant, a registered mover has significant

property rights in the license , which the law respects and protects . Osborne

Stern , 670 So. 2d at 935 . It is unlikely that the legislature intended to

authorize the Department to revoke a license, and thus extinguish valuable

property rights, based up on mere allegations . Revocation or nonrenewal is a

sanctio n, and a harsh one at that . Such punitive action c an destroy a

company and cost employees their jobs . It is little comfort to the licensee ,

moreover, that he might reapply for licensure if later found not in violation .

By then it is usually too late ; the licensee will have long been out of business.

34 . It is concluded that paragraph (d) clearly authorizes the denial of an

initial application based up on a pending proceeding involving allegations of

Deceitful Conduct, but that the statute is ambiguous with regard to whether a license may be revoked or no n r enewed on such basis . Th is ambiguity must

be resolved in favor of the licensee . Accordingly, the undersigned interprets

paragraph (d) as a regulatory provision, not a sanction , and holds that

Moving Systems may not be nonrenewed based up on the pendency of the

Action .

35 . This holding is strengthened by paragraph (e), which makes it a

disciplinable offense to be adjudicated in violation of chapter 507 or guilty

under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in any action brought by, respectively, the Department or the Department of Legal Affairs .

Not all actions brought by the state against an applicant or mover under

chapter 507 or chapter 501 , Florida Statutes, involve Deceitful Conduct, of

course, but those that do fall under the b roader, more general category of

administrative or enforcement actions mentioned in paragraphs (c) and (d) .

The pending Action against Moving systems, for example, is described both

by the general language in paragraph ( d ) and by the specific language in

para graph (e).

36 . If paragraphs (d ) and (e) were construed as cumulative grounds for

sanctioning a licensee, then the Department could revoke a registered mover ’ s license by filing a civil enforcement proceeding based up on

allegations of Deceitful Conduct , and then initiating an administrative

disciplinary proceeding under paragraph (d) based up on the existence of the

enforcement proceeding . In this way, the Department could bootstrap

unproved allegations of wrongdoing into grounds for the immediate revoca tion of a license , effectively depri ving t he licensee of a meaningful

opportunity to timely dispute the allegations in defense of his license and

livelihood . A judgment would be needed for disciplinary purposes only in

those instances where the alleged vio lation of chapter 507 or chapter 501 did

not involve Deceitful Conduct .

37 . This case demonstrates that such concern s are not academic because,

in fact, the Department seeks to revoke (nonrenew) Moving Systems ’ license

based up on allegations that have not yet been p roved, and which Moving

Systems disputes . If the Department could revoke Moving Systems ’

registration via this proceeding, rather than doing so only after obtaining a

judgment against Moving Systems in the Action (should that occur) , then

Mo ving Systems — which is currently a going concern — would suffer the loss

of its business before any finding of violation or other wrongdoing has been

made .

38 . The undersigned rejects the notion that paragraph (d) authorizes such

a draconian scheme, which is inconsistent with the many protections afforded

licensees against the deprivation of their substantial rights in maintaining the property interests that their licenses create . In relation to registered

movers, subsection (8 ) is best understood as authorizing revocation or

nonrenewal only when the licensee has (i) been convicted of a crime involving

Deceitful Conduct; (ii) not satisfied a civil fine or penalty resulting from an

administrative or enforcement proceeding based u pon Deceitful Conduct; or

(iii) had a judgment entered against it in any action brought by the S tate

under chapter 507 or chapter 501. 3

39 . This does not leave the Department without recourse if it

determines — based upon its own investigation of the facts u nderlying a

pending criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement proceeding against a

registered mover arising from the mover ’ s alleged Deceitful Conduct — that

the mover poses an immediate and serious danger to consumers and the

public . In such an event, the Department is authorized to order the summary

suspension of the mover ’ s registration in accordance with, and subject to the

requirements of, section 120.60(6) .

R ECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

R ECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

enter a final order approving Moving Systems ’ Renewal Application and

renewing registration IM 1939.

3 A license might also be revoked under paragraph (a) if the licensee ceased to meet the

requ irement s for registration under chapter 507, but this provision i s not implicated in this

case.

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 5th day of October , 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

J OHN G. V AN L ANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 5th day of October , 2020 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Genevieve Ha l l , Esquire

Department of Agriculture and Consu mer Services

Mayo Building, Room 520

40 7 Calhoun Street

Ta llahassee, Florida 3 2 399 - 0800

(eServed)

Donald Goldrich, Esquire

Donald S. Goldrich, P.A.

Post Office Box 970735

Coconut Creek, Florida 33073 - 2734

(eServed)

Tom A. Steckler, Director

Division of Consumer Services

Department of Agriculture and Consu mer Services

Mayo Building, Room 520

407 South Calhoun Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0800

N OTICE O F R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order . Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed wi th the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.