20-002123F City Of Destin vs. Thomas Wilson, David H. Sherry, Rebecca R. Sherry, And John S. Donovan Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Thursday, August 6, 2020.

Summary: Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent filed any pleading, motion, or other paper in Case No. 19-3356 for an improper purpose. Thus, the motion for fees under section 120.595(2)(e) is denied.

A PPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire

Timothy Joseph Perry, Esquire

Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A.

Post Office Box 1110

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondents: D. Kent Safriet, Esquire

Joseph Alexander Brown, Esquire

Hopping Green & Sams, P.A.

119 South Monroe Street, Suite 300

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

S TATEMENT O F T HE I SSUE

The issue to be determined is whether Destin is entitled to attorney’s fees

pursuant to section 12 0.569(2)(e), from Respondents related to litigation

between the parties in DOAH Case No. 19 - 3356.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On February 20, 2020, a Recommended Order was entered in DOAH Case

No. 19 - 3356 that approved the issuance of a permit for the U.S. Ar my Corps

of Engineers (Corps) , to maintenance dredge a section of East Pass in Destin,

Florida, and to place the spoil material onto critically eroded beache s to the

east of East Pass. Destin had previously moved for sanctions, including costs

and attorney ’s fees, pursuant to section 120.569(2)(e). The Recommended

Order reserved j urisdiction with DOAH to resolve the issue of sanctions by

separate final order, provided Destin renew ed its m otion within 30 days of

the Department of Environmental Protection’s ( DEP) entry of its final order .

The Final Order in DOAH Case No. 19 - 3356 was entered on April 6, 2020.

On May 1, 2020, Destin timely filed its Renewed Motion for Attorney's Fees, Expenses and Costs (Renewed Motion). The Renewed Motion was assigned

for disp osition as Case No. 20 - 2123F. On May 12, 2020, Respondents filed

their Response. Upon notice, oral argument was scheduled and held on

July 27, 2020.

F INDINGS O F F ACT

1. On November 14, 2016, DEP issued a Permit Modification to the Corps

which modified t he location upon which spoil from the dredging of East Pass

in Destin, Florida could be placed, from being on “a portion of the beach on

Eglin Air Force Base (to the west of East Pass),” to “the Gulf - front beaches on

the eastern and western sides of East P ass.” The modification deleted

language from an original permit that prohibited, with minor exception,

placement of dredged material “on any beach east of the Main Channel.”

2. On November 16, 2018, John S. Donovan, David H. Sherry, and

Rebecca R. Sherry filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging the Permit Modification, which was referred to DOAH and assigned as DOAH

Case No. 19 - 1915. The Petition in Case No. 19 - 1915 was dismissed as not

being timely filed. A full account of the procedural hi story of that case is

contained in the docket of C ase No. 19 - 1915.

3. On June 5, 2019, Thomas Wilson filed his Petition for Formal

Administrative Hearing (Wilson Petition). The Wilson Petition was

substantively identical to that filed in Case No. 19 - 1915. The Wilson Petition

was referred to DOAH on June 19, 2019, and assigned as DOAH Case No. 19 - 3356. On June 28, 2019, David H. Sherry, Rebecca R. Sherry, and

John S. Donovan filed a Motion for Leave to I ntervene in Case No. 19 - 3356,

which was granted on July 8, 2019.

4. On August 20, 2019, Destin moved to intervene in DOAH Case

No. 19 - 3356 , which was granted on August 26, 2019 .

5. On August 21, 2019, DEP filed a proposed amendment to the Permit

Modification, which changed the condition direc ting placement of dredged

material to “the eastern and western sides of East Pass” to one requiring that

“[b]each compatible material dredged from the initial maintenance dredge

event following issuance of [the Permit Modification], shall be placed to the

east of East Pass” (the Proposed Change). The Proposed Change also

extended the term of the Permit.

6. On September 4, 2019, John S. Donovan, David H. Sherry, and

Rebecca R. Sherry filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to

challenge the Propos ed Change, which was referred to DOAH and assigned

as DOAH Case No. 19 - 4979. On September 20, 2019, Case No. 19 - 4979 was

consolidated with Case No. 20 - 3356. 1

7. On October 21, 2019, Petitioners filed a First Amended Petition for

Formal Administrative Hear ing (Amended Petition) to address the

August 21, 2019, Proposed Change . On November 5, 20 19 , t he Amended

Petition was accepted as filed.

8. On November 15, 2019, Destin filed its Motion for attorney’s fees

pursuant to the authority in section 120.569(2)(e) .

9. Also o n November 15, 2019, Petitioners filed a Second Amended

Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. 2

10. The final hearing was convened on November 20, 2019, as scheduled.

11 . Issues related to the disposition of DOAH Case No. 19 - 1844 were

ta ken up at the final hearing as a preliminary matter. Case No. 19 - 1844

involved the issuance of a permit to Destin to perform maintenance dredging

of East Pass north of the U.S. Highway 98 bridge, with placement of dredged

material to the beaches to the eas t of East Pass. A Recommended Order had

1 At the commencement of the final hearing, DOAH Case No. 19 - 4979 was severed, and a

written Order Granting Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Relinquish ing Jurisdiction, and Closing

File was entered on January 29, 2020. Since the May 1, 2020 , Renewed Motion was filed only

with regard to Case No. 19 - 3356, further discussion of Case No. 19 - 4979 is unnecessary.

2 The purpose of the Second Amended Petition w as primarily to drop Petitioners’ objection to

the extended term of the Permit authorized by the Proposed Change, and is of no

consequence to the disposition of this proceeding.

been entered on October 14, 2019, which determined that dredged material

from the maintenance dredging of East Pass should, to be compliant with

section 161.142, Florida Statutes, be placed on adjacent eroding beache s

east of the inlet. It also determined that the East Pass IMP is not an

unadopted rule as described in section 120.5 7(1)(e). At the commencement

of the final hearing, a Final Order in Case No. 19 - 1844 had not yet been

entered. The substantial similarities in the issue s of law and fact between

Case No. 19 - 1844 and this case were discussed, and it was determined that if

the Final Order in Case No. 19 - 1844 substantially adopted the Recommended

Order, an Order to Show Cause would be entered, asking the parties to

address whether collateral estoppel applied to some or all of the issues in this case.

12 . During the pendency of Case No. 19 - 1844, Destin filed a Motion for

Attorney’s Fees, Expenses and Costs pursuant to sec tions 120.569(2)(e) and

120.595. The Recom mended Order in Case No. 19 - 1844 reserved ruling on

Destin’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Expenses and Costs under section

120.569(2)(e), “provided [Destin] renews its Motion within 30 days of DEP’s entry of the final order” in Case No. 19 - 1844. No renewed motion was filed.

With regard to section 120.595 fees, the Recommended Order included a “determination” that John S. Donovan, David H. Sherry, and Rebecca R.

Sherry did not participate in Case No. 19 - 1844 “for an improper purpose, i.e.,

primarily to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous purpose or

to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, licensing, or securing the approval of an activity…,” and r ecommended that the motion for attorney’s

fees be denied.

13. On November 20, 2019, after t he final hearing in Case No. 19 - 3356

had convened , DEP entered its Final Order in Case No. 19 - 1844. The Final

Order adopted the Recommended Order with minor modifications that are

not pertinent here.

14. An Order to Show Cause was issued on November 22, 2 019, as to

whether disposition of issues in Case No. 19 - 1844 would collaterally estop the

challengers to the Permit in Case No. 19 - 3356 as to some or all of the issues

in that case. It was thereafter determined, for reasons set forth in the

Recommended Ord er in Case No. 19 - 3356, that Respondents were not

estopped from challenging the Corps’ Permit Modification and Proposed

Change.

15. The Recommended Order in Case No. 19 - 3356 was entered on

February 20, 2020. The Recommended Order considered the evidence of fered

by Destin, DEP, and Respondents, primarily expert in nature except for

testimony as to standing, and found and concluded that the Corps was

entitled to the Permit Modification as modified by the Proposed Change.

16. Destin filed its Renewed Motion as authorized in the Recommended

Order, and Respondents filed a Response.

17. On July 27, 2020, oral argument was held on the Motion and Amended

Motion as renewed. It was noted by the undersigned during a series of

questions that the Motions did not identify a specific “ pleading, motion, or

other paper ” alleged to have been filed for an improper purpose. Counsel for

Destin thereupon stated that the pleadings alleged to have been signed for an

improper purpose were the June 5, 2019 , Wilson Petition, and the Oc tober 21,

2019, Amended Petition. No other pleadings, motions , or papers were

identified as having been signed for an improper purpose. Thus, the analysis

in this O rder is limited to those pleadings.

C ONCLUSIONS O F L AW

18. Attorney’s fees in Florida are a warded by applying the “American

Rule,” meaning that they may only be awarded by statute or by agreement of

the parties . Dade Cty. v. Peña , 664 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1995); Fla Pt.'s Comp.

Fund v. Rowe , 472 So. 2d 1145, 1148 (Fla.1985) . As a ge neral rule ,

adjud icative bodies should apply the plain and unambiguous language of a

statute. I t is also well - established that “statutes awarding attorney's fees

must be strictly construed.” Peña at 960.

19 . Section 120.569(2)(e) provides that:

(e) All pleadings, motions , or other papers filed in

the proceeding must be signed by the party, the

party’s attorney, or the party’s qualified

representative. The signature constitutes a certificate that the person has read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that, based upon

reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any

improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause

unnecessary delay, or for frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of t hese requirements, the presiding

officer shall impose upon the person who signed it,

the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the

pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.

20 . Section 120.569(2)(e) authorizes the imposition of a sanction, which

may include reasonable attorney's fees and expenses, if a determination is

made that a par ty signed a paper in a proceeding for an improper purpose.

DOAH has jurisdiction to resolve that issue by separate final order. See, e.g. ,

Friends of Nassau Cty., Inc. v. Nassau Cty. , 752 So. 2d 42, 44 - 45 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2000) .

21 . A frivolous claim is not merely one that is likely to be unsuccessful.

Rather, it must be so clearly devoid of merit that there is little, if any, prospect of success. French v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. , 920 So. 2d 671, 679

(Fla. 5th DCA 2006). “[A] finding of improper purpose co uld not stand ‘if a

reasonably clear legal justification can be shown for the filing of the paper.’” Procacci Commer. Realty v. Dep’t of HRS , 690 So. 2d 603, 608, n. 9 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1997)(quoting Mercedes Lighting & Electrical Supply v. State, Dep’t of

Gen . Servs. , 560 So. 2d 272, 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)).

22 . An objective standard is used to determine improper purpose for the

purpose of imposing sanctions on a party or attorney under section

120.569(2), and its predecessor statutes. See, e.g., Friends of N assau Cty., Inc.

v. Nassau Cty. , 752 So. 2d at 50 - 51.

23 . The fundamental question for determination under section

120.569(2)(e) is not whether the evidence is ultimately sufficient to support

the allegations in a pleading, but whether, at the time the p leading is signed ,

counsel conducted reasonable inquiry prior to signing the pleading at issue.

Furthermore, counsel is entitled to “rely on the opinions of experts, when it is

reasonable to do so.” Friends of Nassau Cty., Inc. , 752 So. 2d at 52.

24. Desti n argues that Respondents could have responded to its Motion

and Amended Motion by withdrawing th e Wilson Petition (and presumably

the Amended Petition) “ prior to: (1) the Final Hearing; (2) the Post - Hearing

Arguments on December 19, 2019; (3) the Proposed Recommended Orders;

(4) the Recommended Order; or (5) the filing of exceptions to that Order. A

withdrawal at any of those points would have expedited the resolution of the case and mitigated the amount of time and resources expended by the City. ”

(Renewe d Motion at ¶ 11). However, sanctions under section 120.569(2)(e)

are not imposed when a party continues to maintain a proceeding after

evidence of its “frivolous purpose” emerges, as is the case with fees under

section 120.595, and do not take into consid eration whether a party

withdraws an offending pleading after notice, as is the case with fees under

section 57.105, Florida Statutes. Rather, as set forth above, the analysis of “improper purpose” is fixed on the date the pleading is signed, regardless of

what comes after.

25 . Despite Destin’s intervention on August 26, 2019 , the original Motion

was not filed until November 15, 2019, more than five months after the filing

of the Wilson Petition, almost three months after Destin intervened, and less

than th ree full business days prior to the commencement of the final hearing.

The seven - day time period for filing a response under Florida Administrative

Code Rule 28 - 106.204 did not run until after the final hearing was complete.

26. The Amended Motion filed on December 18, 2019 , served only to note

that the findings made in the Recommended Order “ were not disturbed in the

Final Order . ”

27 . As was the case in French , Destin “filed a general notice of intent to

seek attorney's fees pursuant to [section 120.569(2) (e) ] prior to the hearing in

this case, [but] the notice did not identify any ‘pleadings, motions, or other

papers’ it believed had been filed for an improper purpose.” Rather, the

Motion and the Amended Motion were designed “[t]o determine whether a

proce eding was initiated for an improper purpose” (Motion and Amended

Motion at ¶ 4) ; requested consideration of issues related to “participation in a

proceeding” ( Motion and Amended Motion at ¶ 5 ); and concluded that “the

maintenance of this case is done for a n improper and frivolous purpose and

an appropriate sanction should be applied.” (Motion and Amended Motion at

¶ 14)

28 . S ection 120.595(1), which is not the basis for fees or sanctions in this

case, allows for an award of costs and attorney’s fees when “t he nonprevailing

adverse party has been determined by the administrative law judge to have participated in the proceeding for an improper purpose . ” S ection 120.569(2)(e)

establishes no comparable standard. Rather, section 120.569(2)(e) is directed to wheth er “a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed ” for an improper

purpose. As stated by Judge Daniel Manry:

14. Section 120.569(2)(e) is aimed at deterring

parties from filing “ pleadings, motions, and other

papers ” for improper purposes. The statute is not

intended to shift fees and costs to compensate the

prevailing party. Section 120.569(2)(e) is aimed at

the conduct of counsel and not the outcome of the proceeding. See Mercedes Lighting and Electrical

Supply, Inc. v. State, Department of General

Services , 560 So. 2d 272, 276 (Fla. 1st DCA

1990)(involving former Section 120.57(1)(b)5 that is now codified in Section 120.569(2)(e)).

15. A party seeking sanctions under Section 120.569(2)(e) is required to take action to mitigate the amount of resources expen ded by the party in

defense of a pleading that the party claims is filed for an improper purpose. Mercedes , 560 So. 2d at 277. The party must give prompt notice to the opposing party and allow the ALJ an opportunity to promptly punish an offending party. T he purpose of

Section 120.569(2)(e) is not well served if an offending party is not sanctioned until the end of the administrative hearing. Id.

Beverly Health and Rehab. Servs - Palm Bay v. Ag. for Health Care Admin. ,

Case No. 02 - 1297F (Fla. DOAH Apr. 25, 2 003).

29 . Judge Donald Alexander provided an even more detailed analysis of

the requirements and limitations of section 120.595(2)(e) in the following

lengthy, but pertinent and comprehensive, discussion:

Several broad tenets govern a sanctions request.

Fi rst, an essential element of a claim for sanctions

is for the moving parties to identify a specific pleading, motion, or other paper interposed for an improper purpose, “such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or for frivolous purpose or

needless increase in the cost of litigation.”

§ 120.569(2)(e), Fla. Stat.; French v. Dep't of Child.

& Fams. , 920 So. 2d 671, 676 - 77 (Fla. 5th DCA

2006). To determine whether a paper is filed for an improper purpose, it is necessary to determine

wheth er the filing is reasonable under the

circumstances. Mercedes Lighting & Elec. Supply

Co. v. Dep't of Gen. Servs. , 560 So. 2d 272, 276

(Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The determination must be

based on an objective evaluation of the circumstances existing at the time the papers were

filed. See Friends of Nassau Cnty. , 752 So. 2d at 57.

(Unlike claims under sections 57.111 and 57.105(5),

liability under section 120.569(2)(e) is determined

only based on the circumstances as of the time of

the filing of the offending doc ument, not

subsequently.) The issue is not whether the non -

moving party would ultimately prevail on the

merits. Rather, the question is whether a party or

attorney made a reasonable inquiry of the facts and law prior to signing and filing a pleading, motio n,

or other paper. Id. at 52. Finally, and especially

relevant here, if an obvious offending paper is filed, a party is obligated to promptly take action to mitigate the amount of resources expended in defending against the offending paper. See

Mercedes , 5 60 So. 2d at 276 - 77. A delay in seeking

sanctions undermines the mitigation principle that applies to the imposition of sanctions. Id. The

purpose of the statute is to deter subsequent abuses, a purpose not well - served if an offending

pleading is fully lit igated and the offender is not

punished until the end of the trial. Id.

* * *

Accepting the City's invitation to rule otherwise would encourage a party to sit back and fully litigate a case, and depending on the final outcome,

to then seek sanctions un der section 120.569(2)(e);

clearly, this process is not contemplated by the statute. See, e.g., Spanish Oaks of Cent. Fla., LLC

v. Lake Region Audubon Soc'y, Inc. , Case No. 05 -

4644F, 2006 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 294 at

*48 (Fla. DOAH July 7, 2006)(where moving party

did not file request for sanctions until “just prior to

the final hearing,” delay warranted denial of request); Rustic Hills Phase III Prop. Owners Ass'n

v. Olson , Case No. 00 - 4792, Order Denying

Sanctions Under Section 120.569(2)(e), (Fla. D OAH

July 31, 2001)(where moving parties waited until final hearing to seek sanctions, and the basis for sanctions was the weakness of the evidentiary

presentation, sanctions not awarded); Hasselback v.

Dep't of Envtl. Prot. , Case No. 07 - 5216, 2011 Fla.

ENV . LEXIS 63 (Fla. DOAH June 14, 2011)(failure to timely take action to mitigate the amount of

resources expended in litigating the permit criteria

warranted denial of request for sanctions); Still v.

New River Solid Waste Ass'n , Case No. 01 - 1033,

2001 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 2720 (Fla. DOAH

Aug. 7, 2001)(request denied where moving party

waited until final hearing to seek sanctions

directed to non - moving party's amended petition for

hearing); Alfonso v. Constr. Indus. Licensing Bd. ,

Case No. 05 - 4711, Orde r Denying Motion for

Attorney's Fees, (Fla. DOAH July 26, 2006)(sanctions denied as being untimely where request was filed two weeks after proposed recommended orders were submitted by parties). The moving parties have cited no contrary

authority on this i ssue. Accordingly, as to all

papers filed prior to the filing of the Motion, the

request for sanctions is denied.

David and Cynthia Cope v. Dep’t of Envtl Prot. and City of Gulf Breeze , Case No. 10 - 8893 (Fla. DOAH Oct. 26, 2011).

The Wilson Petition

30 . The Wilson Petition was signed on June 5, 2019. At that time, Case

No. 19 - 1844, which involved substantially similar conditions regarding

Destin’s maintenance dredging permit as were being applied in the Corps’

Permit Modification, was being actively lit igated. Case No. 19 - 1844 was still

almost two months from final hearing. At the time the Wilson Petition was

signed, the issue of the propriety of depositing dredged spoil to the east of

East Pass was very much in the air, and was the subject of opposing b ut

firmly held expert opinions. It was not unreasonable for Respondents’ counsel

to sign the Wilson Petition challenging the Corps Permit Modification in Case No. 19 - 3356 on the same grounds that Respondents challenged Destin’s

permit in Case No. 19 - 1844.

The Amended Petition

31. The Amended Petition was signed on October 21, 2019, one week after

the entry of the Recommended Order in Case No. 19 - 1844 . Destin’s

suggestion that Respondents should have known that their arguments were

doomed to failure at that time disregards the process by which the agency,

DEP, has authority to consider the Recommended Order, review exceptions,

and enter its own Final Order. That process did not run its course until

November 20, 2019, well after the Amended Petition was signe d, after the

Amended Motion was filed, and after the final hearing in Case No. 19 - 3356

had been convened and was ongoing.

32. Furthermore, when the Amended Petition was signed, Respondents

knew that the undersigned had determined, though w ith regard to s ection

120.595 , that Respondents had not participate d in Case No. 19 - 1844 “for an

improper purpose, i.e., primarily to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or

for frivolous purpose or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, licensing,

or securing th e approval of an activity… . ”

33. Since Case No. 19 - 1844 was ongoing, and since it had been determined

that Case No. 19 - 1844 had not been maintained for the comparable section

120.595 “improper purpose,” it was not unreasonable or unwarranted on

October 21 , 2019, for counsel for Respondents to maintain their challenge to

the placement of dredged material to the east of East Pass.

34 . In Case No. 19 - 3356, as with Case No. 19 - 1844, Respondents

ultimately did not prevail . Nonetheless , they presented testimony and

evidence in support of the issues raised in the Wilson Petition and the

Amended Petition, including expert testimony that was not offered in Case

No. 19 - 1844. The undersigned did not find the testimony to have been

without substance, but instead found the testimony to have been outweighed

by other competent, substantial evidence offered by DEP and Destin. (DOAH

Case No. 19 - 3566, R.O. at ¶¶ 36 - 39). Thus, there was nothing to suggest that,

on October 21, 2019, it would have been unreasonable for Responden ts’

counsel to rely on Respondents’ experts when concluding that the Amended Petition was not being interposed to harass the Corps or to cause

unnecessary delay in the issuance of the Corps ’ Permit Modification , for

frivolous purpose , or for needless incre ase in the cost of litigation .

Failure to Identify a “Pleading, Motion, or Other Paper ”

35. As indicated herein, neither the Motion nor the Amended Motion

specified any particular pleading, motion, or other paper that was signed for

an improper purpose. I t was not until oral argument that the specific

pleadings that warranted imposition of a sanction, i.e. , the Wilson Petition

and Amended Petition, were identified. To the extent section 120.569(2)(e)

requires such identification, which the undersigned beli eves to be the

standard, then the failure to identify a particular pleading in the Motion or

Amended Motion constitutes a separate and independent ground for denial.

Timing of the Motion

36. As set forth herein, the M otion was filed on November 15, 2019 ,

almost three months after Destin intervened in Case No. 19 - 3356 , and less

than three full business days prior to the commencement of the final hearing.

The Amended Motion was filed on December 18, 2019, almost a month after

the completion of the final he aring. “ The delay in seeking sanctions also

militates, in and of itself, against granting the request for sanctions .”

Spanish Oaks of Cent . Fl a. , LLC v. Lake Region Audubon Soc ’y , Inc. , Case

No. 05 - 4644F, F.O. at ¶ 51 (Fla. DOAH July 7, 2006)(underlying DO AH Case

No. 05 - 2606 referred to DOAH on July 20, 2005; Motion for Attorney’s Fees

filed on September 7, 2005; final hearing held on September 22, 2005) . T he

delay on the part of Destin in filing its Motion and Amended Motion

constitutes a separate and inde pendent ground for denial.

C ONCLUSION

37 . Ba sed upon a full review and consideration of the record in this

proceeding, the undersigned finds that the Wilson Petition and the Amended

Petition were not, on the dates upon which they were signed, interposed f or

any improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or

for frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of litigation .

38. Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein,

the City of Destin’s Motion for A ttorney's Fees, Expenses and Costs, and

Amended Motion for Attorney's Fees, Expenses and Costs , as renewed by the

Renewed Motion for Attorney's Fees, Expenses and Costs , are collectively

D ENIED .

D ONE A ND O RDERED this 6th day of August, 2020 , in Tallahassee , Leon

County, Florida.

E. G ARY E ARLY

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

ww w.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 6th day of August , 2020 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire

Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A.

Post Office Box 1110

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

(e Served)

Timothy Joseph Perry, Esquire

Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A.

Post Office Box 1110

Tallahassee, Florida 32302

(eServed)

D. Kent Safriet, Esquire

Hopping Green & Sams, P.A.

Suite 300

119 South Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32 301

(eServed)

Joseph Alexander Brown, Esquire

Hopping Green & Sams, P.A.

Suite 300

119 South Monroe Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Paul Joseph Polito, Esquire

Department of Environmental Protection

Douglas Building, Mail Station 35

3900 Com monwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Jay Patrick Reynolds, Esquire

Department of Environmental Protection

Douglas Building, Mail Station 35

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3900

(eServed)

Marianna Sarkisyan, Es quire

Department of Environmental Protection

Douglas Building, Mail Station 35

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk

Department of Environmental Protection

Douglas Building, Mail St ation 35

3900 Co mmonwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3000

(eServed)

Justin G. Wolfe, General Counsel

Department of Environmental Protection

Legal Department, Suite 1051 - J

Douglas Building, Mail St ation 35

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 3239 9 - 3000

(eServed)

Noah Valenstein, Secretary

Department of Environmental Protection

Douglas Building

3900 Commonwealth Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3000

(eServed)

N OTICE O F R IGHT T O J UDICIAL R EVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial

review pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are

governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are

commenced by filing the original notice of administrative appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy of the notice, accompanied

by any filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the d istrict c ourt of

a ppeal in the appellate dis trict where the agency maintains its headquarters

or where a party resides or as otherwise provided by law.