20-003036 Michael Grasso vs. St. Marks Stone Crab Festival, Inc. Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, November 10, 2020.

Summary: The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Respondent violated section 760.08, Florida Statutes, by denying Petitioner access to a public accommodation.

Statutes (2019), 1 by precluding Petitioner (“Michael Grasso” or “Mr. Grasso”)

from bringing his dog onto its premises.

Mr. Grasso filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission

on Human Relations (“the Commission”) on December 20, 2019, alleging that

the St. Marks Stone Crab Festival discriminated against him based on his

disability:

I am an individual with a disabilit y. I was

discriminated agains t because of my disability. On

October 26, 2019 , I attempted to enter the St.

Marks Stone Crab Festival. As I approached the table where admissions were being taken, a female

who identified herself as Anna Bell told me that

the re was a no pet policy. I told her that I

understood but my dog is a service animal for my disability and is exe mpt from rules for pets. This

individual then asked me to produce an ID card

proving he was ac tually a service animal. I told her

that I did not have one and I tried to explain to her

that the law did not require me to have one. I also

told her that I would not enter if she did not want us to and I then asked her who was in charge so

that I could follow up later. When I told her about

the law, she proceeded to get the sheriff’s officers

who were on site. The officer (Deputy Yarbrough) spoke with me and admitted that they did not know

the law as it pertained to service animals and I

p rinted it out for him. Mr. Yarbrough

acknowledged that the law sai d that an ID was not

required, but he said that since it was the rules of the Festival, he was there to enforce their rules.

Mr. Yarbrough maintained that I was not allowed

entrance unless I left my service animal elsewhere. I wrote a letter to Ray Stokes who sits on the city council and I called him, and he was belligerent and questioned whether I had a need for a service

1 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references shall be to the 2019 version of the Florida

Statutes.

animal. Mr. Stokes refused further contact with

me.

On June 5, 2020, the Commission issued a Notice setting forth its

determination th at reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful

practice had occurred:

[Mr. Grasso] attempted to enter [the Festival] on October 26, 2019. [Mr. Grasso] alleged that [the Festival] denied him service by refusing to let him enter due to his disabili ty and need for a service

animal. The investigation supports his allegations. [Mr. Grasso] provided proof that he is disabled and requires the use of a service animal. [The Festival] acknowledged that it has a policy of requiring

disabled guests with servi ce animals to provide

identification proving that the animal is a service

animal. [The Festival] also acknowledged that since

[Mr. Grasso] did not have documentation that his dog is a service animal, he was denied entry into

the festival. This is direct ev idence of disability

discrimination.

Mr. Grasso filed a Petition for Relief on July 6, 2020, and the Commission

referred this matter to DOAH on July 7, 2020, for a formal administrative

hearing.

The final hearing was commenced as scheduled on August 2 7, 2020.

Due to unforeseen circumstances, the final hearing was continued to

September 17, 2020, and completed that day.

Mr. Grasso called himself, Deputy Robert Standeford, and Sergeant

Jeffrey Yarbrough as witnesses. Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 through 8 w ere

accepted into evidence.

The St. Marks Stone Crab Festival called Paula Bell and William M.

Bishop, Jr. , as witnesses and did not attempt to move any exhibits into

evidence.

The T ranscript from the proceeding conducted on August 27, 2020, was

filed o n September 16, 2020, and the T ranscript from the proceeding

conducted on September 17, 2020, was filed on October 21, 2020. Both parties

filed their proposed recommended orders prior to October 21, 2020, and those

pleadings were considered in the prepara tion of this Recommended Order.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, the record as a whole,

and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are

made:

The Parties

1. Mr. Grasso previously worked as the CEO of a multi - million dollar

company and served on the board of directors of another entity. The record

evidence and testimony persuasively established that Mr. Grasso suffered a

severely traumatic episode in 2007 causing him to suffer from post - t raumatic

stress disorder (“PTSD”) and anxiety. Mr. Grasso also has difficulty with crowds and dealing with strangers.

2. At some point, Mr. Grasso relocated from Las Vegas to the Florida

Keys, and a psychiatrist treating him at the time suggested that

Mr. Grasso obtain an emotional support animal. Mr. Grasso heeded that

advice and rescued Zuco, a large labrador - mastiff mix, from a shelter in May

of 2016 , when Zuco was one and a half years old.

3. Mr. Grasso trained hundreds of dogs when he owned a pet store in the

1990s, and he utilized a training program he found on the internet to teach

Zuco how to be a service animal.

4. Mr. Grasso has spent many hours training Zuco, and the first step in

Zuco’s training involved vigilance commands such as block and watch. The

block command calls for Zuco to act as a barrier between Mr. Grasso and

others. The watch command requires Zuco to monitor what is occurring

behind Mr. Grasso, and Zuco’s movements will alert Mr. Grasso to the

presence of potential dangers. Mr. Grasso has also trained Zuco to enter a

room prior to Mr. Grasso in order to assess the situation inside. Finally, Zuco

is very sensitive to changes in Mr. Grasso’s moods and will attempt to remove

Mr. Grasso from a stressful situation if he becomes upset . 2

5. Mr. Grasso moved to St. Marks, Florida in 2018. He lives on a boat

docked at a local marina. Mr. Grasso works part - time doing handyman - type

work for the marina owner who allows Zuco to be with Mr. Grasso while he

works.

6. Mr. Grasso has been trea ting with Dr. Joseph Dorn since November of

2018, and Dr. Dorn has diagnosed Mr. Grasso as suffer ing from PTSD. In

addition, the Social Security Administration has diagnosed Mr. Grasso as a

disabled individual entitled to monthly payments. According to Mr. Grasso,

he can no longer engage in the type of work he performed prior to the 2007

incident because his PTSD and anxiety make it impossible for him to

maintain a full - time job.

7. The St. Marks Stone Crab Festival is a not - for - profit Florida

corporation . The Festival began as a means to raise funds for the St Marks

2 – Mr. Grasso described Zuco’s training as follows: “And one of the things that I taught him

you asked what I teach him. And what I teach him is vigilance command s such as ‘block’ and

‘wa tch.’ Like if I walk up to – if there’s people back here and I walk up to a counter to pay for

something, I’ll tell him to ‘watch.’ He’ll turn around, he’ll pay attention behind me, and if

anybody approaches me, his body language will let me know. He’ll ei ther start wagging his

tail first, it it’s just – if somebody’s approaching aggressively, he will immediately make –

like, either bark or, you know, kind of (nonverbal utterance) like, let me know that something’s going on behind you that you need to turn around and watch. And ‘block’ is a command that you use to keep – to just put him between me and the public. If I’m walking

somewhere with him, you’ll always notice that he is between me and the public all the time. Whenever somebody’s coming to approach me that I don’t know, he’s between us.”

Volunteer Fire Department. Since its inception, the Festival’s mission has

expanded to encompass other activities such as beautifying the City of

St. Marks and funding a substantial portion o f the St. Marks Fourth of July

celebration. The Festival draws 10 to 12 thousand attendees a year.

8. The Festival admits people who pay an admission fee. During the

events described herein, the Festival admitted animals with documentation

or vests ident ifying them as service animals. If the animal did not have

documentation or a vest, then the Festival would not admit the animal.

The Events of October 26, 2019

9. The Festival was scheduled to open at 10:00 a . m . on October 26, 2019,

and Mr. Grasso arrived at 9:30 a . m . with Zuco in order to assess the crowd

size. He had never attended the Festival before and planned to leave if he

determined that the crowd would be too large.

10. Zuco was on a leash but not wearing a vest or anything else

identifying him as a service animal.

1 1 . When Mr. Grasso attempted to enter the Festival, he encountered

Paula Bell, a Festival volunteer who was collecting admission fees from patrons. Ms. Bell relayed to Mr. Grasso that the Festival had a no dog policy

and that he could enter the Festival without Zuco. After Mr. Grasso

explained that Zuco was a service animal, Ms. Bell requested documentation

substantiating that Zuco was a service animal rather than a pet. At that

point, the conversation became heated with Mr. Grasso sta ting that he did

not have any documentation substantiating Zuco’s service animal status and

that requiring him to furnish such documentation was against the law.

1 2 . The Festival had retained multiple off - duty officers from the Wakulla

County Sheriff’s Of fice to provide security. After Mr. Grasso asserted that the Festival was violating the law, he and Ms. Bell wanted to get law

enforcement involved.

1 3 . Mr. Grasso had walked about a block - and - a - half from the location of

his confrontation with Ms. Bell b y the time Sergeant Jeffrey Yarbrough

arrived at the scene. Upon Sergeant Yarbrough’s arrival, Ms. Bell called to

Mr. Grasso, and he returned to engage in further discussions.

1 4 . Mr. Grasso soon left again in order to retrieve a copy of section 413.08,

F lorida Statutes, 3 from his boat and returned within a few minutes.

Mr. Grasso and Sergeant Yarbrough began a heated discussion that caught

the attention of Deputy Sheriff Robert Standeford who was patrolling the

Festival Grounds. Deputy Standeford interve ned because the discussion

between Sergeant Yarbrough and Mr. Grasso had become loud and needed to

be deescalated. Deputy Standeford tried to calm Mr. Grasso so that Deputy

Yarbrough could read section 413.08.

1 5 . After Sergeant Yarbrough read the statute, either he or someone

associated with the Festival’s management decided that Mr. Grasso could

stay but Zuco could not. After forcefully expressing his displeasure with that

decision, Mr. Grasso headed back toward his boat.

1 6 . Given that people were yelli ng at various times during the

aforementioned verbal exchanges, Deputy Standeford noticed that Zuco was

understandably “a little nervous.” Nevertheless, Zuco never became

aggressive, and Deputy Standeford had no concerns that Zuco was dangerous.

Ultimat e Findings

17 . The St. Marks Stone Crab Festival is a “public accommodation” within

the meaning of section 760.02(11). The greater weight of the evidence

indicates that it is a place of exhibition or entertainment. 4

3 ) provides that “[a]n individual with a disability has the right to be Section 413.08(3

accompanied by a service animal in all areas of public accommodation that the public or

customers are normally permitted to occupy.” Section 413.08(3)(b), specifies that “[d]ocumentatio n that the service animal is trained is not a precondition for providing service

to an individual accompanied by a service animal. A public accommodation may not ask about the nature or extent of an individual’s disability. To determine the difference betw een

a service animal and a pet, a public accommodation may ask if an animal is a service animal

required because of a disability and what work or tasks the animal has been trained to perform.”

4 The Festival made no argument that it was not a “public ac commodation” within the

meaning of section 760.02(11).

18 . The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that PTSD

substantially limits Mr. Grasso’s ability to work. As a result, he has a

“handicap” within the meaning of section 760.08.

1 9 . The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Zuco is a

“service animal” within the meaning of secti on 413.08(1)(d). Mr. Grasso has

trained Zuco to perform very specific t asks designed to help

Mr. Grasso feel secure in unfamiliar surroundings and around people .

20. The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that the Festival

violated section 413.0 8(2)(b) by conditioning Mr. Grasso’s entry on him

producing documentation substantiating Zuco’s status as a service animal.

21 . The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that the Festival

violated section 760.08 by denying Mr. Grasso access to a pu blic

accommodation.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

22 . DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties to this proceeding and the

subject matter pursuant to sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and 760.11(1), Florida

Statutes.

23 . The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“the Florida Ci vil Rights Act” or

“the Act”), chapter 760 , prohibits discrimination in places of public

accommodation.

2 4 . Section 760.08 provides that :

[a] ll persons are entitled to the full and equal

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,

privileges, advanta ges, and accommodations of any

place of public accommodation without

discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,

color, national origin, sex, pregnancy, handicap,

familial status, or religion.

2 5 . Section 760.02(11), defines a “public accommod ation” as :

places of public accommodation, lodgings, facilities

principally engaged in selling food for consumption

on the premises, gasoline stations, places of

exhibition or entertainment, and other covered

establishments. Each of the following

establis hments which serves the public is a place of

public accommodation within the meaning of this

section:

(a) Any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment

which provides lodging to transient guests, other

than an establishment located within a building

which contains not more than four rooms for rent or

hire and which is actually occupied by the

proprietor of su ch establishment as his or her

residence.

(b) Any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch

counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally

engaged in selling food for consumption on the

premises, including, but not limited to, any such

facility locat ed on the premises of any retail

establishment, or any gasoline station.

(c) Any motion picture theater, theater, concert

hall, sports arena, stadium, or other place of

exhibition or entertainment.

(d) Any establishment which is physically located

within the premises of any establishment otherwise

covered by this subsection, or within the premises

of which is physically located any such covered

establishment, and which holds itself out as serving

patrons of such covered establishment.

2 6 . Florida provide s additional protections for disabled persons who

utilize service animals. Section 413.08(2) mandates that :

[a]n individual with a disability is entitled to full

and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,

and privileges in all public accommodation s. A

public accommodation must modify its policies,

practices, and procedures to permit use of a service

animal by an individual with a disability. This

section does not require any person, firm, business,

or corporation, or any agent thereof, to modify or

provide any vehicle, premises, facility, or service to

a higher degree of accommodation than is required

for a person not so disabled.

27 . With regard to service animals, section 413.08(3 ) provides that :

An individual with a disability has the right to be

accompanied by a service animal in all areas of a

public accommodation that the public or customers

are normally permitted to occupy.

(a) The service animal must be under the control

of its handler and must have a harness, leash, or

other tether, unle ss either the handler is unable

because of a disability to use a harness, leash, or

other tether, or the use of a harness, leash, or other

tether would interfere with the service animal’s

safe, effective performance of work or tasks, in

which case the serv ice animal must be otherwise

under the handler’s control by means of voice

control, signals, or other effective means.

(b) Documentation that the service animal is

trained is not a precondition for providing service to

an individual accompanied by a service animal. A

public accommodation may not ask about the

nature or extent of an individual’s disability. To

determine the di fference between a service animal

and a pet, a public accommodation may ask if an

animal is a service animal required because of a

disability and what work or tasks the animal has

been trained to perform.

2 8 . In establishing that one was the victim of dis crimination, a petitioner

can produce: (a) direct evidence that discrimination motivated disparate

treatment in the provision of services; or (b) circumstantial evidence

sufficient to allow the trier of fact to infer that discrimination caused

disparate tr eatment.

29. Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would prove the existence

of discriminatory intent without resort to inference or presumption. Denney v.

City of Albany , 247 F.3d 1172, 1182 (11th Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno , 115

F.3d 1 555, 156 1 (11th Cir. 1997). As to the nature of the evidence, “only the

most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to

discriminate . . . will constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Damon v.

Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. , 196 F.3d 1 354, 1358 - 59 (11th Cir. 1999)

(citations omitted).

30. During the time period relevant to the instant case, the Festival only

admitted animals with documentation or vests identifying them as service

animals. That policy was directly contrary to the provisi on in section

413.08(3)(b) stating that “ [d] ocumentation that the service animal is trained

is not a precondition for providing service to an individual accompanied by a service animal. ” Denying Mr. Grasso entry into the festival based on the

aforementione d policy is direct evidence of discrimination based on his

disability.

31. Moreover, even if it were assumed that there is no direct evidence of

discrimination in the instant case, Mr. Grasso presented circumstantial

evidence sufficient to allow a trier of fact to infer that discrimination led to

the disparate treatment.

32. With regard to evaluating discrimination claims based on

circumstantial evidence, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000a, prohibits discrimination in places of pu blic accommodation, in

language identical to that found in section 760.08. Because of the relatively small number of Title II cases, federal courts routinely find guidance in the

law of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, includin g

the law of the shifting burdens of evidence production. See Fahim v. Marriott

Hotel Serv. , 551 F.3d 344, 349 (5 th Cir. 2008), and cases cited therein. The

United States Supreme Court’s model for employment discrimination cases

set forth in McDonnell Doug las Corporation v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct.

1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), also provides the model for Title II cases. Fahim , 551 F.3d at 349 - 50.

33 . Under the McDonnell analysis, as modified for cases of discrimination

in places of public accommod ation, a petitioner has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by a preponderance of the

evidence. If the prima facie case is established, then the burden shifts to the

respondent to rebut that preliminary showing by produ cing evidence that the

allegedly discriminatory action was taken for some legitimate, non -

discriminatory reason. If the respondent rebuts the prima facie case, then the

burden shifts back to the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that th e respondent’s offered reason was pretextual or that the

respondent’s reason, if true, was only one reason for its action and that

another motivating factor was the petitioner’s protected characteristic.

3 4 . In order to prove a prima facie case of unlawf ul public accommodation

discrimination under section 760.08, a petitioner must establish that he or

she: (a) is a member of a protected class; (b) attempted to contract for the

services of a public accommodation ; (c) was denied those services; and (d) the

services were made available to similarly situated persons outside his or her

protected class. Fahim , 551 F.3d at 350.

3 5 . The question of whether Mr. Grasso belongs to a protected class turns

on whether PTSD is a disability. With regard to disability d iscrimination, the

Act is construed in conformity with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“the

ADA”) found in 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc. , 419 F.3d

1169, 1175 (11 th Cir. 2005)(citing Wimberly v. Secs Tech Grp., Inc. , 866 So.

2d 14 6, 147 (Fla. 4 th DCA 2004)(noting that “[b]ecause Florida Courts

construe the FCRA in conformity with the ADA, a disability discrimination cause of action is analyzed under the ADA.”). See also Holly v. Clairson

Indus., LLC , 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11 th Cir. 2007)(noting that FCRA claims

are analyzed under the same standards as the ADA).

3 6 . The 11 th Circuit has stated that a diagnosis of PTSD by itself does not

establish that one is disabled under the ADA. Haines v. Cherokee Cty , 2010

WL 2821853, at *12 (N.D . GA 2010). The impairment must substantially

limit a major life activity such as caring for oneself, performing manual

tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. Id. When the major life activity at issue is that of workin g, an alleged victim

of discrimination must demonstrate that he or she is unable to work in a

broad class of jobs. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not

constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. See

D’A ngelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. , 422 F.3d 1220, 1227 (11 th Cir. 2005).

3 7 . The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Grasso is

disabled within the meaning of the ADA and thus satisfies the first prong of a prima facie case of unlawful public accommodation discrimination under

section 760.08. As a result of the traumatic incident he experienced in 2007,

Mr. Grasso’s ability to work has been substantially limited because he has

difficulty being around groups of people, especially strangers. As discussed

above, Zuco acts as a shield between Mr. Grasso and others. With Mr. Grasso

being so uncomfortable around people, he is unable to perform the work he

performed prior to the 2007 incident or any sort of work requiring a

significant amount of inter action with people. His current work of performing

odd jobs around a marina does not require substantial interaction with

others.

3 8 . The Festival argues that Mr. Grasso has not proven that he suffers

from PTSD. Mr. Grasso moved into evidence a letter f rom the Social Security

Administration indicating he was entitled to monthly payments as a disabled

individual and a document signed by Dr. Joseph Dorn stating Mr. Grasso

suffers from PTSD. While those documents are hearsay statements being

offered to prov e that Mr. Grasso suffers from PTSD, the undersigned can

consider them because their contents supplement and/or corroborate

Mr. Grasso’s testimony about his symptoms and that he has been diagnosed

as having PTSD. See § 120.57(1)(c) , Fla. Stat. (providing that “[h]earsay

evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other

evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it

would be admissible over objection in civil actions.”).

3 9 . There is no dispute t hat Mr. Grasso attempted to enter the Festival

and was denied access because he wanted to bring Zuco onto the Festival

grounds. There is also no dispute that the Festival allowed other, non -

disabled people to enter. Therefore, Mr. Grasso has established th e second,

third, and fourth prongs of a prima facie case of unlawful public

accommodation discrimination under section 760.08.

40 . In order to counter Mr. Grasso’s prima facie case, the Festival argues

that Zuco is not a service animal and that it acted appropriately by denying

access to Mr. Grasso unless he could produce documentation substantiating Zuco’s status as a service animal.

41 . Section 413.08(1)(d) defines as service animal as:

an animal that is trained to do work or perform

tasks for an indiv idual with a disability, including

a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or

other mental disability. The work done or tasks

performed must be directly related to the

individual’s disability and may include , but are not

limited to, guiding an indi vidual who is visually

impaired or blind, alerting an individual who is

deaf or hard of hearing, pulling a wheelchair,

assisting with mobility or balance, alerting and

protecting an individual who is having a seizure,

retrieving objects, alerting an indivi dual to the

presence of allergens, providing physical support

and assistance with balance and stability to an

individual with a mobility disability, helping an

individual with a psychiatric or neurological

disability by preventing or interrupting impulsive

or destructive behaviors, reminding an individual

with mental illness to take prescribed medications,

calming an individual with posttraumatic stress

disorder during an anxiety attack , or doing other

specific work or performing other special tasks. A

serv ice animal is not a pet. For purposes of

subsections (2), (3), and (4), the term “service

animal” is limited to a dog or miniature horse. The

crime - deterrent effect of an animal’s presence and

the provision of emotional support, well - being,

comfort, or com panionship do not constitute work

or tasks for purposes of this definition.

(emphasis added).

42 . The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Zuco helps

Mr. Grasso control his anxiety when he is in the presence of others.

Mr. Grasso has trai ned Zuco to perform very specific tasks that are intended

to help Mr. Grasso feel secure in unfamiliar surroundings and around people .

While the Festival argues that Zuco lacks formal training, section 413.08(1)(d) does not require that animals have any so rt of certification in

order to be considered “service animals.”

43 . In sum, Mr. Grasso has established a prima facie case of

discrimination, and the burden now shifts to the Festival to rebut that preliminary showing by producing evidence that its decis ion to deny access to

Mr. Grasso and Zuco was based on a legitimate, non - discriminatory reason.

4 4 . The Festival’s decision to condition Mr. Grasso’s entry on him

producing documentation substantiating Zuco’s status as a service animal

was a violation of s ection 413.08(2)(b). Florida law only allowed the Festival

to inquire if Zuco was a service animal and what tasks he had been trained to

perform. As a result, the Festival’s decision to deny access to Mr. Grasso was not based on a legitimate, non - discrimin atory reason. S ee § 413.08(2)(b) , Fla.

Stat. (mandating that “[d]ocumentation that the service animal is trained is

not a precondition for providing service to an individual accompanied by a

service animal. A public accommodation may not ask about the natu re or

extent of an individual’s disability. To determine the difference between a

service animal and a pet, a public accommodation may ask if an animal is a

service animal required because of a disability and what work or tasks the

animal has been trained to perform.”).

4 5 . The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that the Fe stival

violated section 760.08 by denying Mr. Grasso access to a public

accommodation.

4 6 . Mr. Grasso has requested that the undersigned recommend that he be

awarded damag es. How ever, section 760.11(5) indicates that only a court of

law, rather than an administrative tribunal, is authorized to award punitive

damages and compensatory damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity , and

other intangible injuries in cases such as this. S ee generally Broward Cty. v.

La Rosa , 505 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1987)(holding that an administrative agency cannot award damages for personal injuries).

5

R ECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

R ECOMMENDED tha t the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a

final order : (a) finding that the St. Marks Stone Crab Festival violated the

Florida Civil Rights Act by conditioning Mr. Grasso’s entry on the production

of documentation substantiating that his dog was a “service animal” ; and

(b) prohibiting the aforementioned practice.

5 Section 760.11(7) provides that “[i]n the event the final order issued by [the Commission]

determines that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the

aggrieved person ma y bring, within 1 year of the date of the final order, a civil action under

subsection (5) as if there has been a reasonable cause determination or accept the affirmative

relief offered by [the Commission], but not both.”

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 10 th day of November, 2020 , in Tallahassee,

Leon County, Florida.

G. W. C HISENHALL

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Bu ilding

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 10 th day of November, 2020 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Tammy S. Bar ton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

Michael Grasso

2017 Gardenbrook Lane

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Ronald A. Mowrey, Esquire

Mowrey Law Firm, P.A.

515 North Adams Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties hav e the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.