20-004051RX Ernesto Gonzalez vs. Division Of Hunting And Game Management, Fish And Wildlife Conservation Commission Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Tuesday, December 1, 2020.

Summary: Florida Administrative Code Rule 68A-15.004(9)(d), relating to the operation of electric bicycles in wildlife management areas, is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

By an email to DOAH’s C lerk ’ s Office dated August 8, 2020, Petitioner

Ernesto Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) objected to a proposed amen dment to

r ule 68A - 15.004 (9 ), which Respondent Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation

Commission (“FWC”) intended to adopt . This email was not immediately

docketed as a petition under section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes, alleging the

invalidity of a proposed rule , because it did not appear to satisfy the

minimum pleading requirements of section 120.56( 1)(b) or even to seek an

administrative determination of the proposed rule’s invalidity .

About one month later, Gonzalez again emailed DOAH, this time making

clear his desire to challenge rule 68A - 15.004(9) as an existing rule, in a

proceeding under section 120.56(3) . In response, Gonzalez’s August 8, 2020,

email was docketed as a rule challenge petition, and , on September 11, 2020,

the case was assigned to the undersigned .

The rule amendment at issue took effect on September 13, 2020 . The

undersigned, accordingly, treated Gonzalez’s email as a petition under

section 120.56(3) . Although this case was originally docketed under the “R P”

suffix, indicating a proposed - rule challenge under section 120.56(2), the

undersigned has changed the designation to “RX” in the caption, the better to

classify this proceeding for future reference .

The final he aring took place on October 7 , 2020. Gonzalez testified on his

own behalf , and Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 through 5 were admitted without

objection . FWC called one witness, Paul Scharine, and offered one exhibit,

Respondent’s Exhibit 1, which was received in evidence without objection .

The final hearing transcript was filed on November 2, 2020, and the

parties timely filed their respective proposed final orders ten days later .

These have been considered.

Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the official statute law of the

State of F lorida refer to Florida Statutes 2020.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

1. FWC is a constitutionally created, seven - member agency in which are

vested the “ regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to wild

animal life and fresh water aquatic life, [as well as the] regulatory and

executive powers of the sta te with respect to marine life. ” Art. IV, § 9, Fla.

Const.

2 . Gonzalez holds an FWC - issued Gold Sportsman’s License and regularly

visits wildlife management areas ( “WMAs”) , which are state game lands

coming within FWC’s regulatory jurisdiction, for recreational purposes .

Gonzale z also owns an electric bicycle, which is classified as a “Class 2

electric bicycle” under section 316.003(22)(b), Florida Statutes . He wants to

operate his el ectric bicy cle with in WMAs in accordance with the rules

applicable to ordinary b icycles .

3 . During the 2020 legislative session, the Florida Legislature amended

chapter 316 to address electric bicycles , or “e - bikes” as they are also known .

As a result, f or purposes of chapter 316 , the term “electric bicycle” is now

defined as mean ing :

A bicycle or tricycle equipped with fully operable

pedals, a seat or saddle for the use of the rider, and an electric motor of less than 750 watts which meets the requiremen ts of one of the following

three classifications:

(a) “Class 1 electric bicycle” means an electric

bicycle equipped with a motor that provides

assistance only when the rider is pedaling and that

ceases to provide assistance when the electric bicycle reach es the speed of 20 miles per hour.

(b) “Class 2 electric bicycle” means an electric

bicycle equipped with a motor that may be used exclusively to propel the electric bicycle and that

ceases to provide assistance when the electric

bicycle reaches the speed of 20 miles per hour.

(c) “Class 3 electric bicycle” means an electric

bicycle equipped with a motor that provides

assistance only when the rider is pedaling and that

ceases to provide assistance when the electric bicycle reaches the speed of 28 miles pe r hour.

§ 316.003(22), Fla. Stat.

1

4 . The n ewly enacted electric bicycle regulations provide , in pertinent

part , as follows:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, an

electric bicycle or an operator of an electric bicycle shall be afforded all the rights and privileges, and

be subject to all of the duties, of a bicycle or the operator of a bicycle, including s. 316.2065. An

electric bicycle is a vehicle to the same extent as a

bicycle . However, this section may not be construed

to prevent a loc al government, through the exercise

of its powers under s. 316.008, from adopting an

ordinance governing the operation of electric bicycles on streets, highways, sidewalks, and

sidewalk areas under the local government’s jurisdiction or to prevent a munici pality, county, or

agency of the state having jurisdiction over a bicycle path, multiuse path, or trail network from

restricting or prohibiting the operation of an

electric bicycle on a bicycle path, multiuse path, or trail network.

* * *

1 See Ch. 2020 - 69, § 2, at 2, Laws of Fla .

(7) An operator may ride an electric bicycle where

bicycles are allowed, including, but not limited to,

streets, highways, roadways, shoulders, bicycle

lanes, and bicycle or multiuse paths.

§ 316. 2065 5 , Fla. Stat. 2

5 . I n the wake of this legislation, FWC published a Notice of Development

of Rulemaking in the June 22, 2020, edition of the Florida Administrative

Register , announcing its intent to establish regulations governing the use of

e - bikes i n WMAs . See 46 Fla. Admin. Reg. 2378 ( June 22, 2020 ).

6 . Thereafter, FWC published a Notice of Proposed Rule in the July 24 ,

2020, edition of the Florida Administrative Register , which included the

following , full text of the proposed rule on e - bikes :

68A - 15.004 General Regulations Relating to

Wildlife Managemen t Areas.

( 1) through (8) No change.

(9) Vehicles:

(a) through (c) No change.

(d) Electric bicycles may be operated only on named

or numbered roads. Unless otherwise prohibited by

specific area rule, Class 1 electric bicycles (as

defined in 316.003, F.S.) are exempt from this

restriction and may be used pursuant to

regulations relating to bicycles.

(10) through (16) No change.

See 46 Fla. Admin. Reg. 2886 ( July 24 , 2020).

7 . On August 3, 2020, Gonzalez sent an email to the d irector of FWC’s

Division of Hunting and Game Management, in which he made an “official

objection” to the proposed rule on the use of e - bikes in WMAs . Gonzalez

requested that the rule “be withdrawn and resubmitted to allow all electric

2 See Ch. 2020 - 69, § 8 , at 5 - 6 , Laws of Fla .

bicycles the same rights and privileges that bicycles have on Commission -

managed lands as clearly intended by the spirit of” section 316.20655 .

Gonzalez did not, however, specifically request a hearing on the proposed

rule.

8 . On August 8, 2020, Gonzalez emailed DOAH ’s Clerk ’ s Office to express

his displeasure with FWC’s failure to respond to his August 3, 2020, em ail

and to “exercise [his] rights as per Florida State Statute 120.56” to object to

the proposed e - bikes rule . Given a generous construction , th is email might

have been found to satisfy the minimal pleading requirements of section

120.56(1)(b) and been docketed as a petition under section 120.56(2) , alleging

the invalidity of a proposed rule . But such responses on DOAH’s part would

have required ag gressively reading between the lines, as Gonzalez did not

clearly state that he was seeking an administrative determination of the

proposed rule’s (in) validity . Instead , he concluded his correspondence with a

request that the proposed rule “be withdrawn and resubmitted to allow all

electric bicycles the same rights and privileges that bicycles have on Commission - managed lands . ” This is not exactly the remedy available under

section 120.56(2)(b).

9 . Meanwhile, on July 24, 2020, FWC filed the proposed rule with the

Joint Administrative Procedures Committee , which had no objections thereto .

Accordingly, F WC filed the proposed rule with the Department of State on

August 24, 2020, and it took effect on September 13, 2020 .

10 . On September 10, 2020, Gonzalez again emailed DOAH, this time

addressing his correspondence to the then - cle rk , Claudia Lladó , and

Robert S. C ohen, Acting Director and Chief Judge . Gon zalez asked why he

had not received a response to his previous email and stated that he wanted

to “ file a formal objection through FSS 120.56(3) Challenging rules in effect;

Special Provisions .”

11 . Chief Judge Cohen replied to Gonzalez’s second email on

September 10, 2020, stating , in relevant part:

The rule appears to have been formally adopted

since no objections were received by the FWC.

Filing an objection with DOAH does not serve as a

comment to the proposed rule. However, you did

file with DOAH an objection to the proposed rule

which, while lacking in sufficient de tail to be

considered a petition challenging a rule, will be

assigned to a judge to request either that you

amend the request to conform with the rules so it

can be deemed a petition with DOAH pursuant to

section 120.56 (1), Florida Statutes, on the ground

the rule constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated

authority. There may be an objection filed by the

FWC, but that will be dealt with by the judge

assigned.

12 . The case was assigned , the next day, to the undersigned , who treated

Gonzalez’s August 8, 2020, email as a petition pursuant to section 120.56(3) ,

alleging the invalidity of the e - bikes amendment to rule 68A - 15.004 (9) . This

se emed the most practical solution since the rule had taken effect on

September 13, 2020 . Because the undersigned concludes below , for reasons

unrelated to which party had the burden of proof, that the e - bikes rule at

issue is a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority, the failure to treat

Gonzalez’s original email as a section 120.56(2) petition was a t wors t a

harmless error, even assuming it was an oversight or mistake , which is not

the undersigned’s conclusion .

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

13 . FWC disputes DOAH’s jurisdiction to entertain this rule

challenge proceeding . The jurisdictional question hinges on whether

rule 68A - 15.004(9) (d) is the product of statutorily delegated legislative

authority or , rather, legislative authority that FWC derives directly from the

Florida Constitution. FWC maintains that the e - bikes rule was promulgated

pursuant to powers drawn, not from statutes, but from the constitution and

hence falls outside the reach of the Administrative Procedure Act .

14 . There can be no doubt that FWC rules are not subject to

administrative rule challenges under section 120.56 when, and to the extent,

such rules result from the exercise of legislative authority derived from the

constitution . See Fla. Admin. Code R. 68 - 1.008(5)(c)1.; § 120.52(1)(a), Fla.

Stat.; Airboat Ass’n of Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Game & Fresh Wate r Fish Comm’n ,

498 So. 2d 629, 631 - 32 (Fla 3d DCA 1986) (FWC “is vested with exclusive

legislative authority to adopt reasonable rules to regulate game and fresh water fishing in this state.”) . It is equally true, however, that when FWC

adopts a rule pursuant to statutorily delegated legislative authority, such

rule is “fully subject to” challenge under section 120.56 . See Fla. Admin. Code

R. 68 - 1.008(5)(c) 2 . ; § 20.331(9)(c), Fla. Stat. (FWC “ shall follow the provisions

of chapter 120 when adopting rul es in the performance of its statutory duties

or responsibilities. ”).

15 . Section 20.331(9)(c) , Florida Statutes, sets forth a nonexclusive list of

FWC’s statutory duties, which FWC has adopted, nearly verbatim, as a rule:

[FWC’s] statutory duties or respo nsibilities include,

but are not limited to , the following:

* * *

(c) Land acquisition and management;

* * *

(h) Regulation of o ff - road vehicles on state lands[.]

Fla. Admin. Code R. 68 - 1.008(2) (emphasis added) .

16 . FWC argues that rule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) does not derive from FWC’s

statutory duty to regulate off - road vehicles because e - bikes are not off - road

vehicles . The premise of this argument, however, is fairly debatable, and, in

any event, even if e - bikes are technically not off - road vehicles, they are

closely enough related to such vehicles that the power to regulate off - road

vehicles on state lands (which is clearly a statutory power) cannot be

meaningfully distinguished from the power to regulate e - bikes on state lands .

The und ersigned , therefore , is not persuaded that rule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) is an

exercise of constitutionally delegated rulemaking authority.

17 . To explain, while e - bikes are plainly not “motor vehicles” for purposes

of the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law , 3 the y could reasonably be

deemed “off - road vehicles” under the more relevant Outdoor Recreation and

Conservation Act of 1963 , which is codified in chapter 375 , Florida Statutes .

There we find the following definitions:

( 1) “Motor vehicle” means any self - propelled

vehicle, including every device in, upon, or by

which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn, except devices moved by human or animal power or used exclusively upon

stationary rails or tracks.

(2) “Public lands” means any lands in the state

which are owned by, leased by, or otherwise

assigned to the state or any of its agencies and

which are used by the general public for recreational purposes.

(3) “Commission” means the Fish and Wildlife

Conservation Commission.

(4) “Off - road vehicle” means any motor vehicle

under this act which is not licensed or registered under chapter 320, except those vehicles when used

in timber harvest, reforestation, or other industry

as may be directed by the landowner or m ineral

owner.

§ 375.312, Fla. Stat .

1 8 . E - bikes fall within the foregoing definition of “off - road vehicle” if they

are “motor vehicles” as defined in subsection (1) . FWC contends that the term

“self - propelled vehicle” as used in subsection (1) unambiguously excludes

anyth ing “moved by human power. ” This is true as far as it goes — but e - bikes

3 See § 3 1 6.003(45), Fla. Stat.

are not moved only by human power; they are, in fact, motor ized vehicles

propelled, to some extent, by electric power . Contrary to FWC’s assertion,

subsection (1) does not unambiguously exclude from the category of “motor

vehicle” a device, such as an e - bike, which is moved in part by human power,

and also partially by a motor. 4 FWC’s interpretation of section 375.312 (1) as

excluding e - bikes from the definition of “motor vehicle” is not necessarily

unreasonable, but neither is it the only reasonable interpretation of the

statutory text, which can as reasonably be understood to classify e - bikes as a

type of motor vehicle .

19 . It is not necessary, in this case, to decide with firm finality whether

e - bikes are off - road vehicles as that term is defined in chapter 375 . If they

are , then rule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) i s obviously the function of a statutory duty .

Even if they are not, however, the undersigned concludes , anyway, that the

rule is an agency action under chapter 120, because the enumeration of

statutory duties in both section 20.331(9)(c) and Florida Administrative Code

R ule 68 - 1.008(2) is not meant to be exhaustive; and be cause the power to

regulate e - bike usage on public lands is, if not coterminous with the power to

regulate off - road vehicles, at least closely analogous to that statutory duty. 5

Applying the rule of ejusdem generis , the undersigned concludes that the

regu lation of e - bikes on state lands falls within FWC’s statutory powers. 6

4 Moreover, some e - bikes, at least, are capable of being moved exclusively by electric motor

power, up to speeds of 20 miles per hour . See § 316.003(22)(b), Fla. Stat . It is difficult to see

why a Class 2 electric bicycle should not be considered a “ self - propelled vehicle.”

5 It should be noted that unlike the rule at issue in Airboat Association of Florida , 498 So. 2d

at 631 n.2, which prohibited the use of three - wheeled all - terrain vehicles “for the purposes of

hunting, fishing or frogging,” rule 68 A - 15.004(9)(d) is not anchored to the regulation or

protection of wild animal life, marine life, or freshwater aquatic life . This is not to deny that

the rule likely affords some incidental protection to wildlife, but to observe that traffic

control, not w ildlife protection, is clearly the main focus of this v ehicular regulation , w hose

evident purpose is to prevent both dama ge to state lands and injur y - causing accidents .

6 See generally Green v. State , 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) (“ Under the doctrine of ejusdem

generis , where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the

general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those

specifically enumerated. ” ); see also Ro bbie v. Robbie , 788 So. 2d 290, 293 n.7 (Fla. 4th DCA

2000) (When, in implementing a non - exhaustive statutory listing, the use of an

20 . For these reasons, it is concluded that DOAH has jurisdiction to hear

and decide the instant rule challenge.

21 . Turning to the merits, Gonzalez has proved that he is substantially

affected by rule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) and thus has standing to maintain this

action . It is his burden to prove by “ a preponderance of the evidence that the

existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as to the

objections raised. ” § 120.56(3) (a) , Fla. Stat . As mentioned, however, even if

this were a challenge under section 120.56(2) and FWC had the “ burden to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed rule is not an

invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised ,” 7

the outcome would be the same.

22 . A rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any of

the following applies:

(a) The agency has materi ally failed to follow the

applicable rulemaking procedures or requirements

set forth in this chapter;

(b) The agency has exceeded its grant of

rulemaking authority, citation to which is required

by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;

(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or con travenes the

specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;

(d) The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate

standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled

discretion in the agency;

(e) The rule is arbitra ry or capricious. A rule is

arbitrary if it is not supported by logic or the

necessary facts; a rule is capricious if it is adopted without thought or reason or is irrational; or

(f) The rule imposes regulatory costs on the

regulated person, county, or city which could be reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives

unenum erated criterion is indicated, “ that ad hoc factor will have to bear a close affinity with

those enumerated in the st atute — i.e., the factor employed must be ejusdem generis with the

enumerated ones.” ) .

7 See § 120.56(2 )(a), Fla. Stat .

that substantially accomplish the statutory

objectives.

§ 120.52 ( 8 ), Fla. Stat . Of these statutory criteria, Gonz alez’s objections

implicate (c) and, arguably, (a). 8

23 . Although Gonzalez complains that FWC failed to “properly follow due

process,” he has not identified any provisions of section 120.54 to which FWC

allegedly did not adhere . Thus, the undersigned concl udes that rule 68A -

15.004(9)(d) is not invalid for any material failure on FWC’s part to follow the

prescribed rulemaking procedures , as such was not proved .

24 . Gonzalez’s principal argument is that rule 68A - 15.004(9)(d)

contravenes section 316.20655(1) . The problem, for Gonzalez, is the statute’s

“savings clause,” which clearly and unambiguously preserves the authority of

a state agency or local government to “ restrict [] or prohibit [] the operation of

an electric bicycle on a bicycle path, multiuse path, or trail network ” over

which the local authority has jurisdiction . See § 316.20655(1), Fla. Stat .

Gonzalez contends that the savings clause is inapplicable because it “does not

allow for [the local authority] to restrict an electric bicycle to dispersed us e or

use other than on an established path or trail,” nor does it “allow the agency to restrict a class of electric bicycles, [but] rather [only] electric bicycles as a

whole . ” The undersigned rejects these arguments , which cannot be squared

with the plain language of the statute .

25 . The statute permits an agency, such as FWC, to prohibit the use of

e - bikes on paths and trails . S uch a prohibition, if promulgated, effectively

requires that e - bikes be operated elsewhere, e.g., on streets and roads . What

Gonzalez appears to be arguing is that, by restricting e - bikes to “named or

numbered roads,” rather than simply prohibiting their use on paths and

8 Gonzalez did not allege that FWC is without authority to make the rule at issue . See

§ 120.52(8)(b), Fla. Stat . R ule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) seems likely to withstand such an objection,

however, should a challenge be brought on these grounds, as it appear s not to exceed FWC’s

rulemaking authority under sections 379.2223 and 375.313, Florida Statutes .

trails, rule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) bans the operation of e - bikes in areas besides

bicycle paths, multiuse paths, or trail networks , and, in so doing, exceeds the

scope of the savings clause . The logic behind th is argument holds that WM As

comprise not two, but three subsets of property, namely (i) roads, (ii) paths

and trail networks, a nd (iii) everything else that is not a road, path, or trail

(“Non - Road Areas ” or “NRAs”). 9 Gonzalez contends that the rule is invalid

because it prohibits the use of e - bikes in NRAs.

26. Gonzalez has made a clever argument here , but i t is too clever by half .

He is undoubtedly correct that NRAs exist within WMAs . Rule 68A -

15.004(9)(d) , moreover, plainly does prohibit the use of e - bikes in NRAs, to

the extent the rule restricts the operation of e - bikes to named or numbered

roads . Where Gonzalez’s argument fails is in assuming that section

316.20655 mandates that e - bikes be permitted to operate in NRAs, and that

the savings clause works to forbid a local authority from prohibiting the use

of e - bikes on NRAs surrounding paths and trails.

2 7 . While section 316.20655 unambiguously requires that e - bike operators

be given the same rights and privileges as operators of ordinary bicycles,

nevertheless, when it speaks about where e - bikes may be ridden , the statute

mentions only places clearly designed to accommodate vehicular traffic .

§ 316.20655(7) , Fla. Stat . To be sure, the list in subsection (7) is nonexclusive,

but , notably , not include d among the mentioned items are areas such as , e.g.,

forests, fields, and undeveloped habitat . It requires a strained interpretation

of section 316.20655 , which the under signed rejects as unreasonable, to

conclude that the law entitles e - bike operators , as of right, to ride on NRAs

that are not plainly suitable and set aside for vehicular traffic.

28 . Likewise, to read the savings clause as a warrant only to prohibit the

use of e - bikes on paths and trails, which are by definition suitable for some

forms of traffic, but as not allowing any restrictions on the use of e - bikes in

9 Non - Road Area is not a term of art . The undersigned has coined it for ease of discussion .

NRAs alongside the paths and trails, even where such NRAs are un suitable

(or un safe) for any type of vehicular traffic, strikes the undersigned as

strained and unreasonable . The better reading of section 316.20655 (1) is that

it preserves the power of local authorities to prohibit the use of e - bikes in

areas where, under subsection (7), the ir operation would otherwise be

statutorily permitted . The statute does not “preserve” the right of local

authorities to restrict the use of e - bikes in NRAs , because the re is no need to

do that: the statute does not otherwise mandate that e - bikes be permitted to

operate in NRAs .

2 9 . The bottom line, then, is that r ule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) effectively

prohibits the use of e - bikes on bicycle path s , multiuse path s , or trail net work s

over which FWC has jurisdiction, while conditionally exempting Class 1

electric bicycles from this restriction . The rule , therefore, falls squarely

within the savings clause of section 316.20655(1) and does not enlarge,

modif y, or contravene this statute . To the extent Gonzalez’s objection to

rule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) is based on the premise that the rule contradicts

section 316.20655(1) , the objection is not well - taken.

30 . It is concluded that r ule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) is not an invalid exercise

of deleg ated legislative authority as that concept is defined in section

120.52(8)(c) .

O RDER

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

O RDERED that Florida Administrative Code Rule 68A - 15.004(9)(d) be, and the

same is hereby declared, a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

D ONE A ND O RDER ED this 1st day of December , 2020 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

J OHN G. V AN L ANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 1st day of December , 2020 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Ernesto Gonzale z

1202 Southwest 93rd Place

Miami, Florida 331 7 4

(eServed)

Rhonda E. Parnell, Esquire

Florida Fish and Wildlife

Conservation Commission

Farris Bryant Building

620 South Meridian Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(eServed)

Emily Norton, General Co unsel

Florida Fish and Wildlife

Conservation Commission

Farris Bryant Building

620 South Meridian Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1050

(eServed)

Eric Sutton, Exec utive Director

Florida Fish and Wildlife

Conservation Commission

Farris Bryant Building

6 20 South Meridian Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1600

(eServed)

Ernest Reddick, Program Administrator Anya Grosenbaugh

Florida Administrative Code and Register

Department of State

R. A. Gray Building

500 South Bronough Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 0250

(eServed)

Ken Plante, Coordinator

Joint Admin istrative Proced ures Committee

Room 680, Pepper Building

111 West Madison Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1400

(eServed)

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O J UDICIAL R EVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original notice of administrative appeal with the

agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy of the notice, accompanied by any filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the District Court of

Appeal in the app ellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters

or where a party resides or as otherwise provided by law.