20-004114 Tequilla Y. Lockwood vs. State Of Florida Department Of Juvenile Justice Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, January 13, 2021.

Summary: Petitioner did not prove Respondent unlawfully discriminated against her in terms of compensation based on either her age or race.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

T EQUILLA Y. L OCKWOOD ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 20 - 411 4

S TATE OF F LORIDA D EPARTMENT OF

J UVENILE J USTICE ,

Respondent .

/

R ECOMMENDED O RDER

A duly - noticed final hearing was conducted in this matter on

November 17, 2020, via Zoom conference, before Suzanne Van Wyk, an

Administrative Law Judge with the Division of Administrative Hearings

(ÑDivisionÒ).

A PPEARANCES

For Pet itioner: Tequilla Y. Lockwood, pro se

351 Carter Road

Quincy, Florida 32351

For Respondent: Debora E. Fridie, Esquire

Department of Juvenile Justice

2737 Centerview Drive , Suite 3200

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3100

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE

Whether Respondent, Department of Juvenile Justice (ÑRespondentÒ or

ÑDepartmentÒ) , is liable to Petitioner, Tequilla Lockwood (ÑPetit ionerÒ), for

employment discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of

1992, sections 760.01 - 760.11, Florida Statutes (2019). 1

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On November 18, 2019, Petitioner filed a Complaint of Discrimination

(ÑComplaintÒ) with th e Florida Commission on Human Relations

(ÑCommissionÒ) alleging that Respondent violated chapter 760 , Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; and

the Americans with Disabilities Act. Petitioner alleged that, as a Black

person over the age of 40, she was discriminated against in terms of her

compensation. Petitioner alleged that she accepted a pay cut when she began

employment with the Department in February 2007; that she never received

additional compensation, w hich she was promised; and that younger, White

employees with the same qualifications have been hired by the Department

at higher starting salaries than she received.

On August 11, 2020, the Commission issued a Determination: No

Reasonable Cause, and a N otice of Determination: No Reasonable Cause,

determining there was no reasonable cause to believe that unlawful

discrimination occurred in this matter. On September 10, 2020, Petitioner

filed a Petition for Relief (ÑPetitionÒ) with the Commission, which wa s

transmitted to the Division on September 16, 2020, for assignment of an

Administrative Law Judge to conduct a final hearing.

The final hearing was scheduled for November 17, 2020, and commenced

as scheduled. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf and

offered PetitionerÔs Exhibits 1 through 6, which were admitted into evidence.

1 Except as otherwise noted, all references to the Florida Statutes herein, are to the 2019

version, which was in effect when PetitionerÔs Complaint was fi led.

Respondent presented the testimony of Aldrin Sanders, the DepartmentÔs

former Equal Employment Opportunity (ÑEEOÒ) Officer; and Gwen

Steverson, Northwest Re gional Director for the DepartmentÔs Office of

Probation and Community Intervention. RespondentÔs Exhibits 1 through 6

were admitted into evidence.

Upon RespondentÔs Motion for Official Recognition, the undersigned

officially recognized the DepartmentÔs Ñ Classification Policy,Ò ÑClassification

Procedures,Ò and the State Personnel System ÑClassification and

Compensation Program Manual.Ò

The proceedings were recorded and a one - volume Transcript of the Final

Hearing was filed with the Division on November 3 0, 2020. Petitioner filed a

Proposed Recommended Order (ÑPROÒ) on December 7, 2020, and

Respondent timely filed a PRO on December 8, 2020. On December 14, 2020,

Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Allegations in PetitionerÔs PRO, which

was granted. The und ersigned has considered both post - hearing filings in

preparation of this Recommended Order, except those portions of PetitionerÔs

PRO which were stricken.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

1. The Department is a criminal justice agency of the State of Florida,

whose missi on is to increase public safety by reducing juvenile delinquency

through effective prevention, intervention, and treatment services,

designated to strengthen families and turn around the lives of troubled

youth. See § 20.316, Fla. Stat.

2 . Petitioner is a Black female, age 61, 2 who has been employed by the

Department as a secretary specialist, in career service, in the Office of

2 RespondentÔs age is as stated in her Petition filed on September 10, 2020.

Probation and Community Intervention (ÑProbationÒ), Northwest Region,

Circuit 2, since February 9, 2007. P etitioner was hired as a secretary

specialist, in Position No. 80019949, at an initial salary of $20,734.74, or

$797.49 biweekly.

State Personnel System

3. The Department is a state agency in the State Personnel System

(ÑSPSÒ), which is the employment system for the Executive Br anch of state

government and its applicable pay plans. Section 110.2035, Florida Statutes,

authorizes the SPS classification and compensation program for positions in

the career service, selected exempt service, and senior management service.

In addition, Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L - 31, Classification Plan,

addresses management of the classification system, and rule 60L - 32,

Compensation and Benefits, addresses management of salary and other

benefits.

4 . ÑCompensationÒ within the SPS is governed by section 110.2035, as is

the classification system. In addition, rule 60L - 32 establishes the policies and

procedures applicable to all occupations in the SPS.

5 . In the broadband system of the SPS, pay is determined through a

salary range or pay band. Pay bands establish the lowest base pay and the

highest base pay for a particular class code.

6 . The pay band for a Department secretary specialist is $797.49 to

$1,379.66 biweekly, or an annual salary from $20,734.74 to $35,871.09.

7 . Upon appointment, a sta te agency sets an employeeÔs base rate of pay

within the pay band for the broadband level to which appointed. See Fla.

Admin. Code R. 60L - 32.001.

8 . An agency may increase an employeeÔs base rate of pay within the

established pay band at any time, based up on documented justification,

provided funds are available for the increase, and the increase is not

specifically prohibited by law. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 60L - 32.0011.

9 . Pursuant to the ÑDJJ Delegation of Pay Authority,Ò effective July 1,

2016, and the ÑDJJ Spending Guidelines for FY 2019 - 2020,Ò effective July 1,

2019, Respondent authorizes increases to an employeeÔs rate of pay for a

variety of reasons, including added duties and responsibility, receipt of a

competitive job offer, and merit.

10 . A posit ion with a Competitive Area Differential (ÑCADÒ) designation is

one that has been approved by the Department of Management Services

( DMS ) and the Legislature to receive a pay additive which is designed to

attract and retain workers in geographical areas wh ere other employers pay

comparatively more for similar jobs. See Fla. Admin. Code R .

60L - 32.0012(1)(h).

Allegation of Paycut

11 . Prior to her employment with the Department, Petitioner was

employed by the Department of Children and Families (ÑDCFÒ) as a da ta

entry operator, at a salary of $20,478.38, or $787.63 biweekly.

12 . When Petitioner was hired by the Department, although she was hired

at the lowest base pay for a secretary specialist, she received a slight increase

in salary ($256.36) from her prior position with DCF.

Allegation of Failure to Increase Compensation

13 . During her employment, the Department has increased PetitionerÔs

annual salary.

14 . On October 1, 2013, her salary was increased to $22,134.84.

15 . On October 1, 2017, her salary was increased to $23,534.94.

16 . As of January 10, 2020, PetitionerÔs base rate of pay was $905.19

biweekly.

17 . As of October 1, 2020, PetitionerÔs base rate of pay is $943.66 biweekly.

18 . Based upon a biweekly base pay of $943.66, paid 26 times in a ye ar,

PetitionerÔs current annual salary is $24,535.16.

Allegation of Discrimination in Starting Salary

19 . At the time Petitioner filed her Complaint alleging that younger,

White secretary specialists were being hired at a greater rate of

compensation, Pe titioner offered no comparators. As a result, the EEO

Officer, Aldrin Sanders, conducted a statewide data comparison for

Department secretary specialists.

20 . As of January 9, 2020, the Department had 84 employees in secretary

specialist positions. Of tho se employees, one was Asian, 41 were Black, nine

were Hispanic, and 33 were White.

21 . Mr. Sanders determined that PetitionerÔs salary was higher than all

secretary specialists hired after her, with the exception of four Ð one Black

and three White Ð whose s alar ies w ere equal to that of Petitioner.

22 . Mr. Sanders further determined that all 34 secretary specialists whose

salar ies w ere higher than PetitionerÔs Ð 18 of whom were Black, five

Hispanic, and 11 White Ð were hired before Petitioner. Furthermore, fiv e of

those with higher salaries were part of the 2010 - 2011 Statewide Workforce

Reduction efforts and were demoted from other positions to the secretary

specialist position, and one was a voluntary demotion with a five percent

decrease in salary pursuant to spending guidelines.

23 . Additionally, the data obtained by Mr. Sanders indicated that, on

average, secretary specialists who are 40 years of age or older made $63.45

more than their counterparts who are 39 and under; and Black secretary

specialists, on a verage, made $8.09 more than their non - Black counterparts.

24 . At the final hearing, Petitioner identified particular Department

secretary specialists as comparators for her claims of unlawful discrimination.

She highlighted specific positions from the spr eadsheet listing the

DepartmentÔs secretary specialists statewide, which was included as a part of

Mr. SandersÔ report. Petitioner also submitted into evidence screenshots about

employee salaries from the website, ÑFlorida has a Right to Know,Ò

https://www .floridahasarighttoknow.myflorida.com/search_state_payroll .

25 . The secretary specialist in Position No. 80004540 is a Black female, 26

years old, who was hired by the Department on November 9, 2018, at a

starting base pay rate of $877.24 biweekly. That rate is higher than

PetitionerÔs starting base pay rate of $797.49 biweekly in 2007. That position

is in Probation Circuit 11, Dade County, as of November 7, 2020. According to

the screenshot from ÑFlorida Has a Right to Know,Ò the secretary specialist in

that position has an annual salary of $25,077.26, higher than PetitionerÔs

current salary of $24,535.16.

26 . The secretary specialist in Position No. 80048017 is a Black female,

37 years old, who was hired by the Department on August 16, 2019 , at a base

p ay rate of $877.24 biweekly. The secretary specialist in that position was

initially hired by the State of Florida on December 7, 2007, but the evidence

is insufficient to determine which agency previously employed her, her

position title, or her salary. T hat position is in Probation Circuit 17, Broward

County, as of September 5, 2018. According to t he screenshot from ÑFlorida

Has a Right to Know,Ò the secretary specialist is reported as having a current

annual salary of $24,077.04, which is lower than Peti tionerÔs current annual

salary.

27 . The secretary specialist in Position No. 80002854 is a Black female,

37 years old, who was hired by the Department on November 9, 2018, at a

base pay rate of $877.24 biweekly. That position is in Probation Circuit 15,

Pa lm Beach County, as of November 6, 2018. According to the screenshot

from ÑFlorida Has a Right to Know,Ò the secretary specialist is reported as

having an annual salary of $24,077.04, which is lower than PetitionerÔs

current annual salary.

28 . According t o a screenshot from ÑFlorida Has a Right to Know,Ò a

secretary specialist in Position No. ***002456, by the name of Kenneth David

Devilling, assigned to Department Community Interventions & Service,

purportedly earns $29,050.84. That position is not in Pro bation. Petitioner

introduced no competent evidence on which to base a finding of either the

race or age of that particular secretary specialist.

29 . When an employee is hired, they negotiate their salary with the hiring

manager. Determining an employeeÔs salary is a subjective process.

Managers can adjust starting salaries within the pay bands based on

consideration of many factors, including the type of appointment; the

knowledge, skills, and abilities (ÑKSAsÒ) required of the position; the KSAs

possessed by the employee; difficulty in recruitment for the position;

geographic location of the position; years of service and experience of

employees; licensure; certification and registration requirements; collective

bargaining agreements; layoff, etc. These fa ctors are not to be considered all -

inclusive, and each appointment or employment decision may vary because of

the different factors from one situation to another.

Regional Structure of Probation

30 . Probation is divided into North, Central , and South regi ons. Probation

North region is further divided into Northeast and Northwest regions. The

Northwest region encompasses judicial circuits 1, 2, 3, and 14.

31 . Gwen Steverson has served as Northwest Regional Director for

Probation since March 2019. Ms. Stever son reports directly to Assistant

Secretary Paul Hatcher, who supervises and manages Probation statewide.

32 . Ms. SteversonÔs duties and responsibilities include assisting the

assistant secretary in directing and operating all activities within the

Proba tion Northwest region; ensuring that ProbationÔs programs are

administered in accordance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations;

managing her assigned circuits; and managing all human resource decisions.

33 . Ms. Steverson has three counterparts: Ji ll Wells, regional director for

Probation Northeast; Cathy Lake, regional director for Probation Central;

and WydeeÔa Wilson, regional director for Probation South. Each regional

director has ultimate responsibility for the Probation regions, and the judic ial

circuits therein, to which they are assigned.

34 . Secretary specialist positions in the South Region are subject to a CAD

to account for cost - of - living differences in that region, compared with Central

and North. The record does not contain competent e vidence to determine the

amount of the differential.

35 . Ms. Steverson has ultimate management authority only in Probation

Northwest for recruitment, selection, hiring, and salary offers to job

candidates and pay raises to employees. She has no management authority in

the other Probation regions or in any other Department program areas with

respect to job candidates and employees. Likewise, other Department

managers have no authority concerning job candidates and employees in

Probation Northwest.

36 . Peti tioner is employed as the sole secretary specialist in Probation

Northwest, Circuit 2, Gadsden County Office, in Quincy, Florida. There are

other secretary specialist positions in Circuit 2, and the Northwest Region

more broadly, but the evidence was insuf ficient to determine how many

positions and to which circuits they are assigned.

37 . PetitionerÔs duties and responsibilities as secretary specialist include

the following: managing the office; serving as a receptionist for Probation

Circuit 2 by receiving and routing all incoming calls; receiving and directing

visitors; ensuring that office supplies are maintained and stocked; performing

background juvenile records checks for law enforcement and/or other

agencies; running monthly caseloads and distributing daily court dockets to

supervisors; performing data entry tasks, including maintaining required

tracking logs , such as Pre - Disposition Reports (PDS) and Rep - Release

Notification (PRN) logs, and entering Ñat largesÒ in the Juvenile Justice

Information Syst em (JJIS); and performing other duties as assigned.

38 . Ms. Steverson has management authority over Juvenile Probation

Officers (ÑJPOsÒ) in the Probation Northwest Region.

39 . The duties and responsibilities of a JPO differ greatly from those of a

secret ary specialist. Key JPO duties are case management of a youth and

their family, including understanding the court process; attending court for a

youth that has been arrested; arranging for all assessments, whether mental

health or substance abuse, to deter mine the needs of the youth and the

family; making referrals to Department contract providers, based upon the

results of the assessments; ensuring that all court - ordered sanctions are

completed by the youth; filing violations of probation; conducting face - to - face

visits; working with the schools; and carrying the youth through the process.

40 . The qualification s for JPOs differ from those for a secretary specialist.

A JPO must have a bachelorÔs degree; successfully complete the JPO

Academy Certification p rocess within the first 180 days of employment;

obtain certifications in Protective Action Response (PAR), Cardiopulmonary

Resuscitation (CPR), and First Aid; and be trained in the Detention Risk

Assessment Instrument (DRAI).

41 . A secretary specialist in Probation is required to have a high school

diploma and is not required to successfully complete the trainings or obtain

the certifications required for a JPO.

42 . Petitioner complained that she was performing the functions of a JPO,

for which additi onal compensation was due her, such as interpreting arrest

affidavits, Ñat larges,Ò entering charges in the Department system for four

counties, documenting status of prior cases in the case notebook, etc.

However, Petitioner did not prove that these tasks were outside of her

assigned job duties.

43 . Ms. Steverson testified, credibly, that Petitioner has not been working

Ñout of class,Ò that is, Petitioner has not been performing job duties above and

beyond those in her position description.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

44. The Division has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject

matter of this case pursuant to s ections 120.569(2) and 120.57(1), Florida

Statutes (2020).

45 . Petitioner has the burden of proving , by a preponderance of the

evidence , that Resp ondent committed an unlawful employment practice. See

St. Louis v. Fla. IntÔl Univ. , 60 So. 3d 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Fla. DepÔt of

Transp. v. J.W.C. Co ., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

46 . Petitioner can meet her burden of proof with either direct o r

circumstantial evidence. See Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC , 18 So.

3d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

47 . Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, would prove the existence

of discrimination without the need for inference or presumption. See

Maynar d v. Bd. of Regents , 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). ÑOnly the

most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to

discriminate will constitute direct evidence of discrimination.Ò Damon v.

Fleming Supermarkets of Fla. , 196 F.3d 1354, 13 58 - 59 (11th Cir. 1996).

48 . Ñ[D]irect evidence of intent is often unavailable.Ò Shealy v. City of

Albany, Ga ., 89 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir. 1996). For this reason, those who

claim to be victims of intentional discrimination Ñare permitted to establish

thei r cases through inferential and circumstantial proof.Ò Kline v. Tenn.

Valley Auth. , 128 F. 3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997).

49 . Because Petitioner introduced no direct evidence of unlawful

discrimination, Petitioner must prove her allegations by circumstantial

evidence. Circumstantial evidence of discrimination is subject to the burden -

shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green ,

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under this well - established model of proof, the

complainant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination.

50 . If the charging party is able to make out a prima facie case, the

burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, non - discriminatory reason

for the adverse employment action. See DepÔt o f Corr. v. Chandler , 582 So. 2d

1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). If the employer meets that burden, the

presumption disappears and the employee must prove that the legitimate

reasons were a pretext. See Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 17. Facts that are

sufficient to es tablish a prima facie case must be adequate to permit an

inference of discrimination. Id .

Age Discrimination

51 . Section 760.10 provides, Ñ [i] t is an unlawful employment practice for

an employer È to discriminate against an individual with respect to

comp ensation È because of such individualÔs È age.Ò £ 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

52 . Chapter 760, Part I, is patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, as well as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ÑADEAÒ), 29 U.S.C. £ 623. Whe n Ña Florida statute is modeled after a federal

law on the same subject, the Florida statute will take on the same

constructions as placed on its federal prototype.Ò Brand v. Fla. Power Corp .,

633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Valenzuela , 1 8 So. 3d at 17.

Federal case law interpreting Title VII and the ADEA applies to cases arising

under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (ÑFCRAÒ). Brown Distrib. Co. of

W. Palm Beach v. Marcell , 890 So. 2d 1227, 1230 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

53 . In cases alleging age discrimination under section 760.10(1)(a), the

Commission has concluded that, unlike cases brought under the ADEA, the

age of 40 has no significance in the interpretation of the FCRA. See Lopez v.

Wal - Mart Stores E . , L.P. , Case No. 18 - 0297 (Fl a. DOAH Oct. 25, 2018),

rejected in part, Case No. 2017 - 410 (Fla. FCHR Jan. 17, 2019). The

Commission has determined that to demonstrate the last element of a prima

facie case of age discrimination under Florida law, it is sufficient for

Petitioner to show that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated

individuals of a ÑdifferentÒ age as opposed to a ÑyoungerÒ age. See Torrence v.

Hendrick Honda Daytona , Case No. 14 - 5506 (Fla. DOAH Feb. 26, 2015),

rejected in part, Case No. 2014 - 303 (Fla. FCHR May 21, 2015), and cases

cited therein. The Commission cites its own final orders as the only basis for

this interpretation.

54 . The Commission has repeatedly rejected and modified the conclusions

of law in the DivisionÔs recommended orders construing sec tion 760.10 to

apply Ñprotected classÒ status to individuals over age 40 for the purposes of

demonstrating a prima facie case of age discrimination. See , e.g., Downs v.

Shear Express, Inc ., FCHR Order No. 06 - 036 (May 24, 2006); Boles v. Santa

Rosa Cty. She riffÔs Off ., FCHR Order No. 08 - 013 (Feb. 8, 2008); Grasso v. Ag.

for Health Care Admin ., FCHR Order No. 15 - 001 (Jan. 14, 2015); Cox v. Gulf

Breeze Resorts Realty, Inc ., FCHR Order No. 09 - 037 (Apr. 13, 2009); Toms v.

Marion Cty. Sch. Bd ., FCHR Order No. 07 - 060 (Nov. 7, 2007); and Stewart v.

Pasco Cty. Bd. of Cty. CommÔrs , FCHR Order No. 07 - 050 (Sept. 25, 2007).

55 . In its orders, the Commission reasoned that the conclusions of law

being modified Ñare conclusions of law over which the [Commission] has

subst antive jurisdiction, namely conclusions of law stating what must be

demonstrated to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination

under the [FCRA].Ò Freeman v. LD Mullins Lumber Co ., Case No. 2013 - 01700

(Fla. FCHR Nov. 7, 2014).

56 . In 2018, the Florida Constitution was amended to create article V,

section 21, which reads as follows:

Judicial interpretation of statutes and rules. Ð In

interpreting a state statute or rule, a state court or

an officer hearing an administrative action

pursuant to g eneral law may not defer to an

administrative agencyÔs interpretation of such

statute or rule, and must instead interpret such

statute or rule de novo.

57 . The undersigned is not required to defer to the CommissionÔs

interpretation of section 760.10, and declines to do so. The undersigned

adopts the more persuasive legal analysis of the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals and Florida courts.

58 . To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the federal

ADEA, the complainant must show that she is a member of a protected age

group (i.e., over 40); she was qualified for the job; she suffered adverse

employment action; and she was treated less favorably than substantially

younger persons. See McQueen v. Wells Fargo , 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14387,

at * 7 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 792) (adopting a

variation of the McDonnell test in ADEA violation claims) ; see also, City of

Hollywood v. Hogan , 986 So. 2d, 634, 641 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)(establishing

that a member of the protected class is a person Ñat least forty years of age.Ò).

59 . Alternatively, Petitioner may establish a prima facie case Ñby showing

by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the Óbut - forÔ cause of the

employerÔs adverse action.Ò McQueen v. Wells Fargo , 2 014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

14387, at *7 (citing Gross v. FBC Fin. Servs ., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)).

60 . The Findings of Fact here are not sufficient to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination based on age. Petitioner did establish the first two

elements: she is a member of a protected class Ð she is over the age of 40 Ð

and she is qualified for the position of secretary specialist. However,

Petitioner did not establish the third element Ð that she suffered an adverse

employment action.

61 . Petitioner did not receive a salary reduction, demotion, or other action

negatively affecting her salary or benefits. PetitionerÔs salary is above the

broadband minimum for a secretary specialist and her current salary is

higher than that of every secretary specialist hired after h er. The evidence

showed that, of the 34 secretary specialists whose salaries were higher than

Petitioners, all were hired before her.

62 . Nor did Petitioner establish that she was performing job duties Ñout of

class,Ò for which additional compensation is d ue. The job duties and

responsibilities about which Petitioner testified are within the scope of her

job as a secretary specialist.

63 . Assuming, arguendo, Petitioner did establish that she suffered an

adverse employment action, she still failed to prove a prima facie case

because she cannot prove the fourth element Ð that she was treated less

favorably than substantially younger persons.

64 . For purposes of proving disparate treatment, a comparator must be

similar to Petitioner in Ñall material respects.Ò S ee Lewis v. City of Union

City, Georgia , 918 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2019) . Similarity among

comparators is required for the comparisons to be meaningful. See Mac

Papers, Inc. v. Boyd , 304 So. 3d 406, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), citing Lewis .

The comparato rs offered by Petitioner are not similarly - situated to Petitioner

in order to be meaningful. The comparators are significantly different in both

geography and temporality.

65 . All the female 3 secretary specialists that Petitioner proffered as

comparators were under the age of 40, but none was employed in the

Probation North region. The specific positions singled out by Petitioner were

located in the South region, specifically Miami - Dade, Broward, and Palm

Beach counties, where a CAD applies to those salari es. The fact that those

three secretary specialists were hired at a higher base pay rate is insufficient

evidence from which the undersigned can infer age discrimination.

66 . Further, those positions are not comparable because a supervisor

other than Ms. Steverson made the decisions regarding hiring and starting

salary for those positions.

67 . Finally, the comparators were hired by the Department 11 and

12 years after Petitioner. As these hires are not contemporaneous, they are

insufficiently comparable t o draw an inference of discrimination based on

age. If younger secretary specialists hired contemporaneously with Petitioner

were hired at significantly higher rates, that might support an inference of

discrimination. The undersigned cannot rely upon compa rators whose

3 The final secretary specialist Petitioner identified as a comparator was likely male, based

solely on his name, but no credible evidence was presented as to that secretary specialist Ô s

age or race.

beginning salaries were determined years after PetitionerÔs when inflation

alone may account for higher starting salaries.

68 . Moreover, even if the particular secretary specialists were adequate

comparators, the evidence demonstrated that P etitionerÔs annual salary

exceeds two out of three of the proffered comparators. Despite them having

been hired at higher pay rates than Petitioner, she currently has a higher

salary than two of those secretary specialists. The fact that one secretary

spec ialist in Probation statewide, who is younger than, and hired later than,

Petitioner, is insufficient evidence for the undersigned to infer age

discrimination.

69 . Petitioner introduced no competent evidence to refute Mr. SandersÔ

testimony that, based on his research, Department secretary specialists who

are 40 years of age or older made, on average, $63.45 more than their

counterparts who are 39 and under.

70 . Petitioner failed to prove discrimination in compensation based on her

age.

Racial Discriminatio n

71 . Section 760.10 provides, Ñ [i] t is an unlawful employment practice for

an employer È to discriminate against an individual with respect to

compensation È because of such individualÔs race[.]Ò £ 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

72 . To establish a prima facie c ase of unlawful discrimination based on

her race, Petitioner must show that : (1) she is a member of a protected class;

(2) she was qualified for the position held : (3) she was subjected to an adverse

employment action; and (4) other similarly - situated empl oyees, who are not

members of the protected group, were treated more favorably than Petitioner.

See McDonnell - Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802.

73 . Petitioner met the first two elements: she is a member of a protected

class, Black; and is qualified for the positio n of secretary specialist.

74 . As with her claim of age discrimination, however, Petitioner is unable

to prove the third element, that she suffered an adverse employment action.

75 . Assuming, arguendo, Petitioner was subjected to an adverse

employment acti on, she failed to prove the fourth element, that similarly -

situated employees , who are not members of the protected class , were treated

more favorably.

76 . The three secretary specialists Petitioner offered as comparators are

all Black. That evidence is in sufficient to prove PetitionerÔs allegation that

White secretary specialists were hired at higher salary rates than her own.

77 . Furthermore, Petitioner did not introduce competent evidence to

refute the testimony of Mr. Sanders, who, based on his research , determined

that PetitionerÔs salary was higher than all secretary specialists hired after

her, with the exception of four Ð one Black and three White Ð whose salar ies

w ere equal to that of Petitioner; and that, on average, Black secretary

specialists made $8 .09 more than their non - Black counterparts.

78 . Petitioner failed to prove discrimination in compensation based on her

age.

R ECOMMENDATION

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, the

undersigned R ECOMMENDS that the Commission issue a f inal o rder finding

that the Department of Juvenile Justice did not discriminate against

Petitioner, Tequilla Lockwood, based upon either age or race, and dismiss

Petition for Relief No. 2020 - 21773.

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 13th day of January , 2021 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

S

S UZANNE V AN W YK

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

Fax Filing (850) 921 - 6847

www.doah.state.fl.us

F iled with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 13th day of January , 2021 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

Tequilla Y. Lockwood

351 Carter Road

Quincy, Florida 32351

Debora E. Fridie, Esquire

Department of Juvenile Justice

Suite 3200

2737 Centerview Drive

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3100

(eServed)

Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

(eServed)

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.