20-004633 Ross J. Couples vs. Xuan Ren And Timothy Cloud Status: Closed Recommended Order on Friday, May 7, 2021.

Summary: Petitioner?s complaint for alleged violation of Florida Fair Housing Act was untimely; continuing violation theory and equitable tolling did not apply.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

R OSS J. C OUPLES ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 20 - 4633

X UAN R EN A ND T IMOTHY C LOUD ,

Respondents .

/

R ECOMMENDED O RDER

On March 3, 2021, Admin istrative Law Judge Hetal Desai of the Florida

Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) conducted the final hearing in

this case via Zoom .

A PPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire

Mahshie & DeCosta

15 60 Matthew Drive, Suite E

Fort Myers, Florida 33907

For Respondent s : Steven Klaus Teuber, Esquire

Teuber Law, PLLC

Post Office Box 49885

Sarasota, Florida 3 4230

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE

W hether Petitioner's housing discrimination complaint alleging violations

of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2020)

(FFHA) , was timely filed. 1

1 Unless otherwise i ndicated, all federal and state statutory and administrative rule

references are to the 20 20 versions.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

Petitioner , Ross Couples, submitted a Housing Discrimination Complaint

(Complaint) to the Florid a Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) which

indicates that he verified it on July 21, 2020. The date the Complaint was

filed with FCHR is in dispute. The Complaint alleged Respondents

discriminated against him b ecause of his disability in violation of the FFHA :

Complainant alleged that he has requested that the

Respondent Timothy Cloud repair s [sic] his water

heater so that he could have enough water to help

assist him with therapy for his disability.

Complainant stated that the Respondent failed to

make the repairs after multiple requests.

Complainant states that in June 2019 the

Respondent would not make the accommodations in

which his lease was terminated prior and an

eviction was filed because of his consistency with

requesting that the repairs be made . As such,

Complainant believes that Respondents subjected

him to discriminatory terms and conditions based

on his physical disability.

On September 18, 2020, FCHR issued a "Notice of Determination" and

"Determination (Non - Jurisdictional)" (Determination) deeming Petitioner's

Complaint untimely pursuant to section 760.34(2) , and find ing it did not have

jurisdiction over Petitioner's claims.

On October 15, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with FCHR

contesting the dismissal. On October 20, 2020 , FCHR transmitted the

Petition to DOAH , where it was assigned to Administrative Law Judge

John D.C. Newton to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

On November 10, 2020, Judge Newton set this matter for a hearing to

address the threshold issue of whether t he FCHR C omplaint was filed within

the time period established by section 760.34(2) .

Because Judge Newton had a conflict, the undersigned conducted the

hearing on March 3, 2021. At that hearing, Petitioner presented his own

testimony. Petitioner's Exhibits P1 and P2 were admitted into evidence.

Respondents presented no witnesses and no evidence.

At the hearing, the parties stipulated to a number of dates, which are

incorporated in the Findings of Fact below. Additionally, at the hearing

Petitioner raised for the first time the defense of equitable tolling. The

undersigned allowed the parties to submit post - hearing submissions or

memoranda that were summary in nature to s pecifically address the issue of

equitable tolling.

Petitioner filed a memorandum in Support of the Application of the

Tolling Doctrine on March 15, 2021. 2 On March 16, 2021, Respondents filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion), which addressed the issue of

equitable tolling, but also included 17 exhibits that were not admitted into

e vidence at the March 3 , 2021 , final hearing. 3 On April 26, 2021, Petitioner

filed " Petitioner, Ross Couples' Response To Respondent's [sic] Motion For

Summary Judgment And Cross - Motion For Summary Final Order "

(Response) and an Affidavit in Support of the Response . The undersigned

treats the Motion and Response as proposed recommended orders.

Regarding the additional exhibits attached to the Motion, the undersigned

takes official recognition of Respondents' Exhibits 8, 9, and 14 through 17.

See §§ 120.56 9(2)(i) and 90.202(5) and (6) , Fla. Stat . ; Fla. Admin. Code R. 28 -

106.213(6 ). The remaining e xhibits have not been considered because

2 On March 18, 2021, Petitioner filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel and Request for

Continuance to Obtain New Counsel and his counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel

of Record. As a result, Petitioner was given additional time to submit post - hearing filings.

3 Although Respondents cite to an "Exhibit XX" in its Motion, no Exhibit 20 was attached.

Respondents had the opportunity to present evidence at the final hearing, but

did not. Moreover, the remaining exhibits ar e unreadable, irrelevant,

hearsay, and/or unauthenticated. Petitioner's Affidavit attached to the

Response is not admitted into the record because Petitioner was allowed to

testify at the hearing and was subject to cross - examination.

On April 26, 202 1 , Pe titioner filed a Motion for Official Recognition along

with Exhibits A through C. This motion seeks official recognition of the court

filings in Ren v. Couples , in the County Court of the 20th Judicial Circuit for

Lee County, Florida (Case No. 19 - CC - 2732 ) (eviction action); and the

licensing records of the State of Florida for Respondent Tim othy Cloud. No

objection to this motion was filed, and therefore, t he undersigned takes

official recognition of these documents and has considered attachments A

through C in preparation of this Recommended Order.

The T ranscript of the hearing was filed on March 31, 2021. As indicated

above , the Motion and Response were timely filed and are considered by the

undersigned to be proposed recommended orders.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

The following Findings of Fact are made based on the exhibits and

testimony offered at the final hearing, the stipulated facts, and the additional

documents accepted for official recognition as indicated above.

The Lease

1 . Petitioner , Ross Couples, leas ed a house located at 11635 Meadowrun

Circle in Fort Meyers, Florida (Property) , from Respondent Xuan Ren .

2 . At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Ren owned the Property.

3 . At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Timothy Cloud managed

th e Property and served as an agent for Respondent Ren .

4. The Property was part of Marina Bay Homeowners' Association (HOA)

and subject to the HOA's rules and regulations regarding lease

arrangements.

5 . On December 12, 2018, Respondent Ren and Petitioner e xecuted a year

lease for the Property from January 15, 2018 , to January 15, 2019.

6 . The lease included the following provision for it s renewal :

18. RENEWAL/EXTENSION. The Lease can be

renewed or extended only by a written agreement

signed by both Landl ord and Tenant, but the term

of a renewal or extension together with the original

Lease Term may not exceed 12 months. È A new

lease is required for each period of lease.

7 . At some point prior to January 15, 2019, Respondent offered Petitioner

another le ase agreement. Petitioner refused to pay a $100 leasing fee

required by the HOA. The parties did not renew or enter into another

12 - m onth lease, nor did Petitioner move out.

8 . As a result, after January 15, 2019, the parties switched to a month - to -

month arrangement. 4 This arrangement, however, was not approved by the

HOA.

9 . On February 23, 2019, Petitioner sent an email to the HOA manager

and Respondent Cloud. In that email , Petitioner made numerous complaints

and mentioned the need for a larger hot wat er heater for his hydrotherapy

tub, which he claimed he needed for health issues. He also discussed at

length his opposition to the $100 fee imposed by the HOA for entering into a

new lease.

10 . On February 27, 2019, Respondent Cloud issued a "Notice of

T ermination of Month - to - Month Tenancy Notice to Vacate" (Notice) to

Petitioner . The Notice indicated that the current leas ing arrangement had

4 No written lease agreement for the month - to - month arrangement was offered into evidence.

been terminated and Petitioner was to vacate the Property on or before

May 15, 2019.

11 . Petitioner did not move o ut of the Property on or before May 15, 2019.

12 . On May 20, 2019, Respondent Ren filed the eviction action a gain st

Petitioner in the appropriate court . A final judgment in the eviction action

was rendered on June 6, 2019 , and a writ of possession was issu ed for the

Property on June 7, 2019.

13. Petitioner vacated the Property and turned over possession to the

Lee County Sheriff on June 12, 2019.

Housing Complaints

14 . Petitioner testified that on April 5, 2019, he filed a complaint of

discrimination wit h the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD)

regarding his claim of disability discrimination against Respondents.

15 . On January 17, 2020, HUD issued a letter to Respondent Cloud (HUD

Letter) indicating it was dismissing the case brought by Petitioner , and

specifically finding " that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a

discriminatory housing practice has occurred . È No evidence was found to

support Petitioner's contention that his disability was used as a basis to evict

him."

16 . The HUD L etter d oes not indicate Petitioner could re - open the HUD

case or file anything else with HUD based on the same facts. I t does not

mention the FFHA or FCHR , and it does not provide any instruction or

information on how to pursue claims pursuant to state housing

d iscrimination laws. 5

17 . Petitioner claims a HUD employee, Mr. Jord a n, told him he had a year

from his last date of possession of the Property to "file the proper paperwork."

5 The HUD L etter does mention that Petitioner could file a civil lawsuit "in an appropriate

federal district court or state court within two (2) years of the date on which the alleged

discriminatory housing pr actice occurred or ended." The letter also has instructions as to

what Petitioner may be able to file if he was retaliated against for filing the HUD complaint.

This proceeding does not involve either of those situations.

Petitioner also states Mr. Jordon told him he could file a claim with either

HUD or the Florida Fair Housing Commission. 6 It is unclear when this

conversation occurred, what Mr. Jordan 's role was at HUD, and whether the

discussion was in person or over the phone. Regardless, this testimony is

hearsay and not corroborated by any no n - hearsay evidence or documentation.

18 . There is no credible evidence to establish that anyone at either HUD

or FCHR informed Petitioner that he had one year from the last date of

possession of the Property to file a n FFHA discrimination complaint with

FC HR.

19 . The date Petitioner filed his FFHA Complaint with FCHR is

contested. Petitioner testified he contacted the "Florida Fair Housing

Commission" on June 10, 2020 , regarding his FFHA claim . He admits he did

not file his FFHA complaint immediately. Rathe r, at that time , he spoke with

an "intake clerk," who sent him a complaint form, which he then filled out

and returned.

20 . There is no competent evidence corroborating Petitioner's assertion in

his Response that he filed the C omplaint with FCHR on June 1 0, 2021.

Rather, the top of the front page of the Complaint i s dated July 22, 2020, and

indicates Petitioner verified the facts in the C omplaint on July 21, 2020.

Moreover, the Determination dated September 18, 2020, also references that

the Complaint was submitted on July 21, 2020.

21 . Based on Petitioner's testimony and the date that Petitioner verified

the C omplaint with his signature, the undersigned finds Petitioner's

C omplaint was filed with FCHR on July 21, 2020.

6 The undersigne d is unaware of an agency operating under the name of "Florida Fair

Housing Commission." The undersigned assumes that Petitioner is referring to FCHR. See

§ 760.22(1), Fla. Stat. (defining ÑCommissionÒ to mean the Florida Commission on Human

Relations ).

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

22 . The unders igned and DOAH have jurisdiction over the subject matter

and the parties to this proceeding in accordance with sections 120.569,

120.57(1), and 760.35(5)(b), Florida Statutes.

23 . The FFHA makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person "in

the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the

provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,

color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion." § 760.23(2),

Fla. Stat.

2 4 . The FFHA i s patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,

as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988. As such, discriminatory acts

prohibited under the federal Fair Housing Act are also prohibited under the

FFHA. Accordingly, federal case law interpreti ng the federal Fair Housing

Act is applicable to proceedings brought under the FFHA. See generally,

Glass v. Captain Katanna ' s, Inc ., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2013)

(" a Florida law mirrored after a federal law generally will be construed in

co nformity with the federal law. ").

25 . The enforcement provision of the FFHA requires that a complaint

alleging a violation of the FFHA must be : (1) in writing, (2) verified by the

complainant, and (3) filed within one year after the alleged discriminatory

housing practice occurred :

A ny person who files a complaint under subsection

(1) must do so within 1 year after the alleged

discriminatory housing practice occurred. The

complaint must be in writing and shall state the

facts upon which the allegations of a discriminatory

housing practice are based. A complaint may be

reasonably and fairly amended at any time. A

respondent may file an answer to the complaint

against him or her and, with the leave of the

commission, which shall be granted whenever it

would be reasonable and fair to do so, may amend

his or her answer at any time. Both the complaint

and the answer must be verified.

§ 760.34(2), Fla. Stat.

26 . Petitioner has the burden to show he has complied with the time

requirements in section 760.34(2), or t hat an exception or tolling provision

applies and his claim is not barred by the statute of limitation s . See Dekalb

Cty. v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc. , 2013 WL 7874104, at *11 (N.D. Ga.

Sept. 25, 2013) (finding plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating t hat the

continuing violations doctrine applies to their federal housing discrimination

claims). He must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. § 760.34(5), Fla.

Stat.; Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

27. A "prep onderance of the evidence" means the "greater weight" of the

evidence, or evidence that "more likely than not" tends to prove the fact at

issue. Gross v. Lyons, 763 So. 2d 276, 289 n.1 (Fla. 2000).

Date of Alleged Discriminatory Housing Practice

28. As an initial matter, Petitioner did not submit a written complaint

that was verified until July 21, 2020. Therefore, even if he had contacted

FCHR previously, this is the date that he filed his FFHA C omplaint with

FCHR. As such, any claims for discriminatory c onduct that occurred prior to

July 21, 2019, are barred.

29 . Petitioner claims Respondents' l a st a lleged discriminatory action

occurred on the date he lost possession of the Property on June 12, 2019.

Even if this were true, the latest he could have filed his C omplaint with

FCHR would have been June 12, 2020. Because, as the undersigned has

determined in the Findings of Fact above, the C omplaint was filed with

FCHR on July 21, 2020, it was untimely.

30 . Petitioner claims Respondents' discrimination was con tinuing in

nature and therefore any untimeliness was excusable pursuant to Florida

Administrative Code Rule 60Y - 7.001 :

(2) Time for Filing. A complaint may be filed at any

time within one year of the occurrence of the

alleged discriminatory housing practic e. If the

alleged discriminatory housing practice is of a

continuing nature, the date of the occurrence may be

any date subsequent to the commencement of the

discriminatory housing practice up to and including

the date on which it shall have ceased. (empha sis

added).

31 . Generally, t h e statute of limitations for the FFHA begins to run as

soon as " facts supportive of the cause of action are or should be apparent to a

reasonably prudent person similarly situated. " Telesca v. Village of Kings

Creek Condo. As s'n Inc. , 390 F. App'x 877, 882 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations

omitted). In the failure to accommodate context, t he statute of limitations

begins to run when a reasonably prudent person would have become aware

that a requested accommodation has been denied. See Oliver v. Fox Wood at

Trinity Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. , 2018 WL 4608325, at *7 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2018)

(noting it was irrelevant that plaintiffs did not realize they had denied their

request for accommodation until four years later, where plaintiffs should

have known six months after nothing was done) .

32. The continuing violation doctrine relied upon by Petitioner is an

equitable doctrine applicable whe n the alleged discrimination is ongoing, and

filing is delayed because a c omplainan t need s to experience a pattern of

repeated acts before he or she can be expected to realize that the individual

acts were discriminatory in nature. See Hawkins v. Hamlet, Ltd. , 296 F.

App'x 918, 920 (11th Cir. 2008) ( " The continuing violation doctrine is based

on the equitable notion that the statute of limitations ought not to begin to

run until facts supportive of the cause of action are or should be apparent to a

reasonably prudent person similarly situated. " ) .

33 . In other words, if Petitioner should have know n that Respon dents had

denied his request for a larger hot water heater on a certain date, the

continuing violation doctrine does not apply. See Dekalb Cty. v. HSBC N. Am.

Holdings, Inc. , 2013 WL 7874104, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2013)

("Accordingly, if an event or s eries of events should have alerted a reasonable

person to act to assert his or her rights at the time of the violation, the victim

cannot later rely on the continuing violation doctrine." ) (internal citations

omitted).

34 . In Telesca , the plaintiffs reque sted an assigned handicapped parking

space in 2004 as an accommodation . The condominium association declined

their request , noting that the handicapped spaces were first come, first

serve d . Later in 2005 , the plaintiffs ' car was towed when all of the

handi capped spaces were taken and plaintiffs parked in a reserved spot .

Telesca , 390 F. App'x at 8 79 . The court held that the statute of limitations

began running in 2004 when they knew the accommodation had been denied ,

and not later wh en plaintiffs' car was t owed . Id. at 8 82 .

35 . Similarly, here, Petitioner at the earliest should have known on

February 29, 2019 (when he received the Notice) , that Respondents were not

going to renew his lease nor were they going to address his request for an

accommodation . B y M ay 20, 2019, he should have known that Respondents

were also going to evict him. The fact Petitioner did not move out on May 15,

20 19 and continued to contest the eviction until after he relinquished

possession of the Property does not make Respondents' ac tions "continuing

violations." See Hebden v. Anderson , 2018 WL 3974126, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug.

20, 2018) (finding statute of limitation began running when landlord initiated

an eviction proceeding against plaintiff); Leonard v. McDonald, 2020 WL

4721833, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 9, 2020), report and recommendation adopted ,

2020 WL 4698805 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2020) ( where plaintiff had asked for

accommodation to move to first floor as an accommodation for his disability

and landlord denied the accommodation and issued a notice that his lease

was not renewed the statute of limitations began to run on last date of

occupancy listed on the notice to vacate p remises) .

36 . Moreover, even though Petitioner claims his date of harm wa s June

12, 20 19 , it is clear that he w as aware of the discriminatory conduct as early

as April 5, 2019, when he filed his HUD complaint. A ccordingly, the very

latest Petitioner could file a n FFHA complaint for the failure to accommodate

with FCHR was April 5, 2020. Petitioner's f ailure to do s o bars his FFHA

claim s . See generally Greene v. Seminole Elec. Co - op Inc. , 701 So. 2d 646, 648

(Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (finding under state discrimination claim is barred

where based on acts occurring more than one year before the charge was

filed).

Tolling

37 . A lternatively , Petitioner argues that the limitations period for h is

FFHA complaint with FCHR was equitably tolled because a HUD employee

led h im to believe he had a year to file his FFHA claim . As indicated in the

Findings of Fact, there is no credible , competent (non - hearsay) evidence

establishing this occurred.

38 . Even if there had been such evidence, t he 1 1th Circuit rejected a

similar equitable tolling argument in Hunt v. Georgia Dep artmen t of

Community Aff airs , 490 F. App'x 196 (11th Cir. 2012) . There, the plaintiff

had filed a federal housing discrimination complaint with HUD. She later

tried to assert similar claims under the America ns with Disabilities Act

(ADA) and Rehabilitation Act, which were dismissed because they were

untimely . Hunt claim ed HUD misled her into allowing the statute of

limitations for her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims to expire. Finding

equitable tolling was inapplicable, the court stated:

Hunt alternatively argues that the limitations

period for her ADA and Rehabilitati on Act claims

was equitably tolled during the administrative

proceedings because HUD led her to believe that it

had jurisdiction of those claims and that the

FFHA's statutory tolling provision applied to them.

The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a cou rt to

toll the statute of limitations until such a time that

the court determines would have been fair for the

statute of limitations to begin running on the

plaintiff's claims. Because equitable tolling is an

extraordinary remedy to be applied sparingly , it is

appropriate only when a plaintiff untimely files due

to extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond

her control and unavoidable even with diligence.

Equitable tolling typically requires some affirmative

misconduct, such as fraud, misinformation, or

deliberate concealment. Ignorance of the law does

not, on its own, satisfy the constricted extraordinary

circumstances test. Accordingly, we have previously

rejected the contention that pro se status, ignorance

of the judicial process or slow administr ative

proceedings warrant application of equitable

tolling.

* * *

HUD merely indicated that claims under the FFHA

for discriminatory housing practices were governed

by a two - year statute of limitations and that the

two - year period governing such claims did not

include the time during which administrative

proceedings were pending. HUD's letter was silent

as to the limitations period governing claims under

the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act and in no way

suggested that the statute of limitations for those

claims was also tolled during the administrative

proceedings.

Id. 198 Ï 99 (emphasis added; citations and quotations omitted).

39 . As in Hunt , the HUD L etter in no way suggests that the statute of

limitations for Petitioner's state housing discriminat ion claim under the

FFHA would be tolled. Nor is there any evidence that there was misconduct

by anyone at FCHR or that anyone affirmatively or deliberately provided

Petitioner with misinformation regarding his FFHA claim. As such, equitable

tolling does n ot apply.

40. Finally, Petitioner argues the s tatute of l imitations is tolled because

Respondent Ren was not in the state. Petitioner relies on section 95.051,

Florida Statutes, which states:

95.051 When limitations tolled. Ð

(1) The running of the time under any statute of

limitations except ss. 95.281, 95.35, and 95.36 is

tolled by:

(a) Absence from the state of the person to be

sued.

41 . This argument was waived as it was never raised prio r to the post -

hearing submission . Moreover, this section does not apply to administrative

proceedings. See § 95.011, Fla. Stat. (applying chapter 95 to civil actions).

Respondent Ren's presence in the state was not necessary for Petitioner to

file his Comp laint with FCHR. As such, this statutory provision is

inapplicable to these proceedings. Irrespective of whether the argument is

timely raised, there was no evidence regarding whether Respondent Ren was

in Florida or elsewhere, and for what period of time.

42 . In summary, Petitioner knew he had been harmed on or before April 5,

2019 , or alternatively , should have known by May 20, 2019. Thus, at the very

latest, Petitioner was required to file a housing discrimination complaint

with FCHR on or before May 20 , 2020. Petitioner's Complaint, filed July 21,

2020, is untimely and his claims pursuant to the FFHA are barred.

R ECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

R ECOMMENDED that that the Florida Commission on Human Re lations issue

a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Ross J. Couples .

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 7th day of May , 2021 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

S

H ETAL D ESAI

Administrative Law Judge

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 7 th day of May , 2021 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Ross Joseph Couples

Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 202 - 200

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 11 0 13650 Fiddlesticks Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020 Fort Myers, Florida 33912

Steven Klaus Teuber, Esquire Xuan Ren

Teuber Law, PLLC D - 15 # 514

Post Office Box 49885 106 Hancock Bridge Parkway

Sarasota, Florida 34230 Cape Coral, Florida 33991

Timothy Cloud Paul Edward Olah, Esquire

D - 15 # 514 Law O ffices of Wells Olah, P.A.

106 Hancock Bridge Parkway 1800 Second Street , Suite 808

Cape Coral, Florida 33991 Sarasota, Florida 34236

Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel

Mahshie & DeCo sta Florida Commission on Human Relations

1560 Matthew Drive , Sui t e E 4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPT IONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.