20-004801 Kimberly And Richard Interrante vs. Trevesta Homeowners Association, Inc., Et Al Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, March 8, 2021.

Summary: Petitioners failed to prove that they were subject to unlawful discrimination (failure to make a reasonable modification) on the basis of a disability in violation of Florida?s Fair Housing Act.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

K IMBERLY A ND R ICHARD I NTERRANTE ,

Petitioners ,

vs. Case No. 20 - 48 01

T REVESTA H OMEOWNERS A SSOCIATION ,

I NC . ,

Respondent .

/

R ECOMMENDED O RDER

The final hearing in this matter was conducted before J. Bruce Culpepper,

Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings,

pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2020), 1 on

December 22, 20 20, by Zoom video conference, from Tallahassee, Florida.

A PPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Kimberly Interrante , Pro Se

Richard Interrante , Pro Se

6530 Devesta Loop

Palmetto, Florida 34221

For Respondent: Scott H. Jackman, Esquire

Cole, Scott and Kissane, P.A.

4301 West Boy Scout Boulevard , Suite 400

Tampa, Florid a 33607

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE

Whether Petitioners, Kimberly and Richard Interrante, were subject to a

discriminatory housing practice by Respondent, Trevesta Homeowners

1 All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (20 20 ), unless otherwise noted.

Association, Inc., based on a disability, in violation of Florida ' s Fair Housing

Act .

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On or about June 22, 2020, Petitioners filed a Housing Discrimination

Complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (the

" Commission " ) alleging that Respondent, Trevesta Homeowners Association,

Inc. (the " Association " ), violated the Florida Fair Housing Act ( " FHA " ).

Petitioners claimed that the Association discriminated against them based on

a disability.

On September 18, 2020, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination

of No Cause , notifying Petitioners that reas onable cause did not exist to

believe that the Association committed a discriminatory housing practice.

On October 28, 2020, Petitioners filed a Petition for Relief with the

Commission alleging a discriminatory housing practice. That same day, the

Commis sion transmitted the Petition to the Division of Administrative

Hearings to conduct a chapter 120 evidentiary hearing.

The final hearing was held on December 22, 2020. At the final hearing,

Kimberly Interrante and Jonathan Austin testified on behalf of Pe titioners.

After the hearing (and without objection), Petitioners submitted several

documents, which have been accepted into evidence as Petitioners '

(composite) Exhibit 1. The Association offered the testimony of Allan Heinze.

Association composite Exhibi ts 1 and 2 were admitted into evidence.

A court reporter recorded the final hearing. Neither party requested a

transcript. At the close of the hearing, the parties were advised of a ten - day

timeframe following the hearing to file post - hearing submittals. At the final

hearing, both parties requested a ten - day extension of the filing deadline,

which was granted. 2 Both parties timely filed post - hearing submittals, which

were duly considered in preparing this Recommended Order.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

1. Trevesta i s a community of homes located in Palmetto, F lorida .

Trevesta is subject to rules and regulations of the Association.

2. Petitioners own a home in Trevesta. Petitioners purchased their house

in 2018.

3. Living with Petitioners is Jonathan Austin. Jonatha n is not related to

Petitioners, but is currently in a relationship with Petitioners ' daughter.

4 . Jonathan suffers from several mental health conditions including

anxiety, bipolar disorder, and similar mood - related disabilities. 3

Ms. Interrante, who testi fied on behalf of Petitioners, disclosed that

Jonathan ' s mental issues are related to a benign brain tumor.

5 . Ms. Interrante further explained that, based on his mental health

conditions, Jonathan suffers from severe anxiety and has difficulty coping

wit h stress. During tense situations, Jonathan struggles to communicat e,

think clearly, or focus on tasks. Because of the high anxiety he experiences,

Jonathan is not employed. Consequently, although Jonathan is now a young

adult, he spends most of his time i nside Petitioners ' home.

6 . Respondent does not dispute that Jonathan suffers from a mental

disability.

2 By requesting a deadline for filing post - hearing submissions beyond ten days after the final

hearing, the 30 - day time period for filing the recommended order was waived. See Fla.

Admin. Code R. 28 - 106.216(2).

3 A person has a disability (or " handicap " ) under both the Florida and F0 ederal Fair Housing

Act if he or she has " a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more

major life activities. " § 760.22(3)(a), see also 42 USC § 3602(h) .

7 . To help c ope with anxiety and stress , Jonathan relies on the comfort he

receives from his cat named " Ace. " Ace is Jonathan ' s registered Emotional

Sup port Animal.

8. Ace is a Tuxedo cat with a black and white coat . Jonathan adopted Ace

as a kitten. Ace is now five years old.

9 . Ms. Interrante expressed that Ace " absolutely " helps Jonathan manage

his mental anxiety. Jonathan offered that Ace keeps him g rounded . Ace ' s

presence h as also helped reduce the amount of medication Johnathan takes.

1 0 . Ace lives with Petitioners (and Jonathan) in their home . Ace is an

indoor cat and freely roams around the house.

11. The entryway to Petitioners ' house currently consists of a single front

door. The front door opens onto a small 6 ' by 6 ' alcove that leads to a walkway

that runs along the front yard.

1 2 . The impetus for Petitioners ' action is Jonathan ' s fear that Ace will

escape through their front door. At the fina l hearing, Jonathan testified that

he experiences overwhelming anxiety the moment he hears the front door

open. Jonathan voiced that he worries daily about Ace ' s safety. He remains

on constant guard against the possibility that Ace will unexpectedly slip

a way from the house.

1 3 . Ms. Interrante expressed that Jonathan ' s concern with Ace breaking

free from their home is real. Ace ' s natural curiosity causes him to watch the

front door . Once i n the past , Ace actually crept through the front door and

outside in to the alcove. Ace was caught before he ventured further. Ace has

never fully escaped from Petitioners ' house.

1 4 . Ms. Interrante expressed that if Ace escaped, Jonathan would suffer

a n extremely traumatic emotional reaction. Therefore, t o help alleviate

Johnathan ' s distress, Petitioners seek to modify their front entranceway to

ensure that Ace remains in the house. Petitioners specifically desire to

construct a " two - door " entry system. Basically, Petitioners hope to either

install a screen door onto the f ront door, or to screen in the front alcove and

affix a separate screen door. Petitioners believe that the addition of a

secondary barrier will prevent Ace from slipping through the (single) front

door when it is ajar .

1 5 . Ms. Interrante urged that the mo dification will ease Jonathan ' s

mental distress . Jonathan will be comforted knowing that wh en one door is

opened, the other will always be closed. That way, Ace w ould not

unexpect ed ly dart i nto the wild.

1 6 . Ms. Interrante testified that Petitioners are w illing to bear all the

costs to install a screened door and/or enclosure.

1 7 . On April 6, 2020, Petitioners submitted an Architectural Modification

Request Form to the Association seeking approval for an " addition or

modification " to their " entry way enclo sure. " With their request, Petitioners

attached plans for a screened - in enclosure, with a separate door, to be

installed within the overhanging roof structure outside the ir front door.

Petitioners also included information documenting Jonathan ' s disability .

Petitioners wrote that, " we need this modification because without it

[Jonathan] is unable to fully use and enjoy his home to the same degree as

people without disabilities. "

1 8 . On April 9, 2020 , t he Association ' s Property Manager, Allan Heinze,

notifi ed Petitioners that the Association would not approve their request to

modify their front door because " your listed alteration is not permitted in

Tevesta HOA. Front screen enclosure[s] are not permitted per the

guidelines . " On May 6, 2020, the Association ' s Design Review Committee

formally denied Petitioners ' request stating that " [s]creened enclosures are

not permitted. " In follow up correspondence with Petitioners, the

Association ' s attorney explained that Petitioners ' request lacked

documentation establ ishing " a relationship between the disability and the

need for the accommodation. " The attorney further stated that this

information could come in the form of a " statement or opinion of a physician,

therapist, counselor, etc. "

1 9 . At the final hearing, Ms . Interrante conveyed that she has tried to

obtain support for the modification from a psychiatrist or mental health

counselor. She relayed, however, that Jonathan ' s current psychiatrist,

Dr. Brock Hollett, who evaluated Jonathan in the spring of 2020, res isted her

request to personally appear at the hearing over concerns that his testimony

would interfere with his doctor - patient relationship with Jonathan. Instead,

Ms. Interrante offered several letters which she represented Dr. Hollett

prepare d on Jonatha n ' s behalf . In a letter dated June 21, 2020, Dr. Hollett

wrote that, in his opinion :

Jonathan could benefit from having a screen door

placed on his front door.

20 . Following the final hearing, Petitioners filed an additional letter they

received in April 2020 from Wendy Fisher, L icensed C linical S ocial W orker , a

behavioral health consultant who had examined Jonathan . Ms. Fisher

expressed that Ace " is necessary for the emotional health of Jonathan

because his cat ' s company will provide support and will mit igate the

symptoms that his [sic] is experiencing. " Ms. Fisher further advised that:

I strongly recommend that Jonathan ' s cat be

allowed to reside with him in his home in his

community and that accommodations can be made

to allow him to do so.

Ms. Fisher did not address the specific modifications Petitioners seek for

their front entrance. 4

21. Jonathan confirmed that he has discussed his anxiety over losing Ace

with a mental health counselor. Jonathan represented that h is counselor

4 The written letters from Dr. Hollett and Ms. Fisher are out - of - court statements and clearly

hearsay. See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, " [h]earsay

evid ence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it

shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over

objection in civil actions. " § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Consequently, the under signed makes no

findings that modifying Petitioners ' front door is necessary for Jonathan to fully enjoy the

premises based solely on Dr. Hollett ' s and/or Ms. Fisher ' s written comments.

agreed that his anxiety and stress would benefit from additional security on

the front door .

22 . Finally, in response to question s at the final hearing, both

Ms. Interrante and Jonathan were extremely skeptical that they could train

Ace not to approach the front door when it is opened. They declared that their

prior attempts to train Ace did not prove successful.

23 . Further, while Ms. Interrante agreed that her back door opens onto a

screened - in porch with a " two - door " entry system, she asserted that it was

impractical for famil y or friends to only enter or exit her home through the

rear door. Moreover, Ms. Interrante doubted that redirecting foot traffic to

the back door would alleviate Jonathan ' s fixation on the possibility that Ace

might e scap e through their front door.

24 . To explain its decision, t he Association presented the testimony of

Allan Heinze, Property Manager for Trevesta. Mr. Heinze acknowledged that

the Association received Petitioners ' modification request on April 6, 2020.

Mr. Heinze recounted that he made the i nitial decision on April 9, 2020, to

deny the request due to the fact that the Association ' s governing rules and

regulations do not permit front screen enclosures on any houses within the

community. Mr. Heinze explained that, upon buying a house in Trevest a,

homeowners become subject to the Association ' s Architectural Guidelines,

Standards & Criteria (the " Guidelines " ). The Guidelines specifically state:

Q. Front Entryway/Storm Doors:

Screen enclosures, storm doors or screen doors are

not allowed for front entrances. Wicker, wood or

wrought iron tables and chairs may be used in the

front porch/entryway. Plastic stackable furniture is

not permitted.

25 . Mr. Heinze further testified that, following his initial denial, the

Association attempted to resolve P etitioners ' modification request.

Mr. Heinze relayed that t he Association ' s attorney contacted Petitioners , via

email, to discuss the details of their request. Mr. Heinze remarked that,

based on his understanding of the concerns of the Association ' s legal counsel,

Petitioners failed to articulate a sufficient " nexus " between the specific

modification they sought and Jonathan ' s disability. Mr. Heinze explained

that the Association was interested in any information that would

substantiate ( 1) Jonathan ' s disab ility ; ( 2) the modification Jonathan needs to

address his disability ; and ( 3) how that specific modification would improve

Jonathan ' s life. M r. Heinze asserted that the Association is ready and willing

to consider any information and/or documentation Petit ioners provide from a

qualified medical provider . However, without details that establish the

necessary nexus between Jonathan ' s disability and Petitioners ' need for a

screened enclosure outside their front door , Mr. Heinze maintained that the

Association did not possess enough evidence to justify deviating from the

Association ' s Guidelines.

26 . R egarding the letters from Jonathan ' s mental health professionals,

Mr. Heinze commented that , while they show that Jonathan might " benefit "

from having a screened - in front door, the written statements did not

adequately demonstrate why a " two - door " system is medically necessary for

Jonathan to fully enjoy Petitioners ' home.

27 . Finally, d espite the Association ' s denial of Petitioners ' request to

modify their front d oor, Mr. Heinze admitted that there are a few similar

front entranceway enclosures in the Trevesta community. However,

Mr. Heinze asserted that the Association never approved these additions. On

the contrary, the homeowners who altered their front doors or alcoves did so

in direct violation of the Association ' s Guidelines. Mr. Heinze exclaimed that,

to his knowledge, the Association has never approved a formal request from a

homeowner to enclose a front entryway.

2 8 . Based on the competent substantial evid ence in the record, the

preponderance of the evidence does not establish that the Association

discriminated against Petitioners by failing to permit them to modify their

home based on a disability . Accordingly, Petitioners failed to meet their

burden of pr oving that the Association committed unlawful discrimination in

violation of the FHA.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

2 9 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the

parties and the subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to sections

120.569, 120.57(1), 760.34(4), and 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes.

30 . Petitioners assert that the Association discriminated against them in

violation of the FHA. Specifically, Petitioners allege that the Association

discriminated against them based on a disability , by refusing to permit

" reasonable modifications " to their home.

31 . The FHA is codified in sections 760.20 through 760.37 and makes it

unlawful to discriminate against any person in connection with the sale of a

dwelling. Section 760.23 states, in pertin ent part:

(2) It is unlawful to discriminate against any

person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale

or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of

services or facilities in connection therewith,

because of race, color, national origin, sex,

ha ndicap, familial status, or religion.

* * *

(7) It is unlawful to discriminate in the sale or

rental of, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny,

a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a

disability of:

(a) That buyer or renter;

(b) A person re siding in or intending to reside in

that dwelling after it is sold, rented, or made

available; or

(c) Any person associated with the buyer or renter.

(8) It is unlawful to discriminate against any

person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale

or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of

services or facilities in connection with such

dwelling, because of a disability of:

(a) That buyer or renter;

(b) A person residing in or intending to reside in

that dwelling after it is sold, rented, or mad e

available; or

(c) Any person associated with the buyer or renter.

(9) For purposes of subsections (7) and (8),

discrimination includes:

(a) A refusal to permit, at the expense of the person

with a disability, reasonable modifications of

existing premi ses occupied or to be occupied by

such person if such modifications may be necessary

to afford such person full enjoyment of the

premises.

3 2 . The FHA is patterned after the Federal Fair Housing Act found in 42

U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. Discrimination covere d under the FHA is the same

discrimination prohibited under the Federal Fair Housing Act. Savanna Club

Worship Serv. v. Savanna Club Homeowners ' Ass ' n , 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223,

1224 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2005); see also Loren v. Sasser , 309 F.3d 1296, 1300 n.9

(11th Cir. 2002); and Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass ' n , 765 F.3d

1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014)( " The [Federal Fair Housing Act] and the Florida

Fair Housing Act are substantively identical, and therefore the same legal

analysis applies to each. " ). Accord ingly, federal case law involving housing

discrimination is instructive in applying and interpreting the FHA. Dornbach

v. Holley , 854 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

3 3. Specifically regarding the subject matter of Petitioners ' claim, the

statutory la nguage in section 760.23 is similar to that found in its federal

counterpart in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). 5 When " a Florida statute is modeled after

a federal law on the same subject, the Florida statute will take on the same

constructions as placed on its feder al prototype. " Brand v. Fla. Power Corp. ,

633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Dornbach, 854 So. 2d at 213;

Milsap v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt. , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8031 (S.D.

Fla. 2010); and Fla. Dep ' t of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant , 586 So. 2 d 1205 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1991).

3 4 . To establish a claim under the FHA, the burden of proof is on the

complainant. § 760.34(5), Fla. Stat.; see also Sec ' y, U.S. Dep ' t of Hous. &

Urban Dev. ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell , 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990);

and De p ' t of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. & Investor Prot. v. Osborne Stern &

Co. , 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla. 1996)( " The general rule is that a party

asserting the affirmative of an issue has the burden of presenting evidence as

to that issue. " ).

3 5 . The prepond erance of the evidence standard is applicable to this

matter. § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.

3 6 . Discrimination may be proven through direct, statistical, or

circumstantial evidence. Valenzuela v. GlobeGround N. Am., LLC , 18 So. 3d

17, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). D irect evidence is evidence that, if believed, would

prove the existence of discriminatory intent behind the decision without any

inference or presumption. Denney v. City of Albany , 247 F.3d 1172, 1182

(11th Cir. 2001); see also Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir.

1997). Courts have held that "' only the most blatant remarks, whose intent

could be nothing other than to discriminate ... ' will constitute direct evidence

5 The pertinent language in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) states:

(3) For pu rposes of this subsection, discrimination includes --

(A) a refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped

person, reasonable modifications of existing premises

occupied or to be occupied by such person if such

modifications may be necessary to affor d such person full

enjoyment of the premises.

of discrimination. " Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. , 196 F.3d

1354 , 1358 - 59 (11th Cir. 1999). In contrast, " [e]vidence that only suggests

discrimination or that is subject to more than one interpretation does not

constitute direct evidence. " Saweress v. Ivey , 354 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1301

(M.D. Fla. 2019) .

3 7 . Petitioners p resented no direct evidence of housing discrimination by

the Association. No evidence and testimony establishes, without any

inference, that the Association intentionally refused to allow Petitioners to

add a " two - door " system onto their front entryway bec ause of Jonathan ' s

disability.

3 8 . Where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, fair housing cases

are analyzed under the three - part, burden - shifting framework set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas

Depa rtment of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See

Blackwell , 908 F.2d at 870; and Savanna Club , 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 - 32.

Under this three - part test, Petitioners have the initial burden of establishing,

by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of unlawful

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802; Burke - Fowler v. Orange

Cty. , 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006); and Valenzuela , 18 So. 3d at 22.

Next, if Petitioners sufficiently establish a prima facie case, the burde n shifts

to the Association to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action. Finally, if the Association satisfies this burden, Petitioners have the

opportunity to prove that the Association ' s reason is mere " pretext. "

Blackwell , 908 F. 2d at 870; Palm Partners, LLC v. City of Oakland Park , 102

F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2015) .

39 . Petitioners ' cause of action under the FHA is based on a claim that the

Association refused to permit a " reasonable modification " of their home. See

§ 7 60.23(9)(a), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, adapted to the facts in this case, for

Petitioners to establish a prima facie case of housing discrimination, they

must prove that: (1) a person residing in their dwelling (Jonathan) is

" disabled " within the meaning of the FHA; (2) they requested a modification

of their premises; (3) the requested modification is both reasonable and

necessary to afford Jonathan the full enjoyment of the premises; and (4) the

Association refused to make the requested modification. See Joh nson v.

Jennings , 772 Fed. Appx. 822, 825 (11th Cir. 2019); Sackman v. Balfour

Beatty Communities, LLC , CV 113 - 066, 2014 WL 4415938, at *5 (S.D. Ga.

Sept. 8, 2014); and Bhogaita , 765 F.3d at 1285. 6

40 . " Reasonable " is interpreted to mean that the modifica tion will not

require " a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program " or impose

" undue financial and administrative burdens. " Schaw v. Habitat for

Humanity of Citrus Cty, Inc. , 938 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2019), and Sabal

Palm Condominiums of Pine Island Ridge Ass ' n, Inc. v. Fischer , 6 F. Supp. 3d

1272, 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 7

41 . If Petitioners ' request is facially reasonable, the burden shifts to the

Association, who must prove that the modification would nonetheless impose

an " undue burden " or result in a " fundamental alteration " of its program. An

accommodation requires a " fundamental alteration " if it would " eliminate an

' essential ' aspect of the relevant activity. " Schaw , 938 F.3d at 1266.

42 . A modification is " necessary " if it alleviates th e effects of the disability.

Schaw , 938 F.3d at 1270. If the proposed modification " provides no direct

amelioration of a disability ' s effect, it cannot be said to be necessary. "

Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island , 544 F.3d at 1226 (11th Cir. 2008) , citing

Lapid Ï Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Scotch Plains ,

284 F.3d 442, 460 (3d Cir.2002). In other words, " there must be an

6 Bhogaita reviewed an alleged failure to accommodate claim under section 760.23(9)(b).

7 As with Bhogaita , the Schaw and Sabal Palm cases interpreted the term " reasonable

accommodation " under the FHA. See F itzpatrick v. City of Atlanta , 2 F.3d 1112, 1123 (11th

Cir. 1993)( " The elements of a prima facie case are flexible and should be tailored, on a case -

by - case basis, to differing factual circumstances. " ). See also Schwarz , 544 F.3d at 1220( " We

look to case l

Disabilities Act, 29 U.S.C. §12132] for guidance on what is reasonable under the FHA " ).

identifiable relationship, or nexus, between the requested accommodation

and the individual ' s disability. " Sabal P alm , 6 F. Supp. 3d at 1281 Ï 82.

43 . Further, the FHA requires only those modifications that " may be

necessary ... to afford ' equal opportunity ' to use and enjoy a dwelling. È In

this context, " equal opportunity " can only mean that handicapped people

must b e afforded the same (or ' equal ' ) opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling

as non - handicapped people, which occurs when accommodations address the

needs created by the handicaps . " Schwarz , 544 F.3d at 1226. Accordingly, the

Association is only required to ma ke a reasonable modification " if it ' may be

necessary to afford [Petitioners an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a

dwelling. '" Schwarz , 544 F.3d at 1225; and Sabal Palm , 6 F. Supp. 3d at

1281.

44 . Turning to the merits of the complaint, based on the ev idence in the

record, Petitioners failed to prove a case of a discriminatory housing practice

under the FHA. Initially, the Association did not dispute that Jonathan

should be considered " handicapped " within the meaning of the FHA. The

evidence also establ ishes that Petitioners requested a modification to their

house, and that the Association refused to allow them to make it.

45 . Further, based on the facts found, the modification Petitioners seek is

" reasonable. " The only ground the Association cited at t he final hearing to

deny Petitioners ' request was a provision in the Association ' s Guidelines ,

which broadly aspires to maintain a uniform aesthetic within the community.

However, no evidence shows that Petitioners ' proposed modification will pose

an undue administrative or financial burden on the Association. Petitioners,

not the Association, w ould bear the cost of the installation. In addition, the

plans Petitioners submitted with their Architectural Modification Request

Form reveal that the screened encl osure will be confined to the 6 ' by 6 ' space

located just outside their front door.

46 . Further, no evidence or testimony indicates that a screened - in

doorway on the front of Petitioners ' home will result in a " fundamental

alteration " of the Association ' s activities. No evidence in the record

demonstrates that Petitioners ' desired modification will " eliminate an

essential aspect " of the Trevesta community, or undermine the basic purpose

of the Guideline policy that prevents homeowners from installing addit ional

security measures on the front of their houses.

47 . Regarding the requirement that the modification must be " necessary, "

however, Petitioners failed to present the evidence needed to prove that a

" two - door " system on the front entryway of their home is necessary to

alleviate the effects of Jonathan ' s disability. In other words, Petitioners did

not meet their burden of substantiating the causal relationship or " nexus "

between constructing a screened - in doorway and mitigating Jonathan ' s

mental issues.

48 . To be sure, Jonathan compellingly described the distress he

experiences at the thought of Ace escaping his house. However, the two

letters Petitioners produced from Dr. Hollett and Ms. Fisher do not

sufficiently establish that a screen door will direct ly alleviate Jonathan ' s

mood - related disabilities. Aside from the hearsay evidentiary issue that

prevents a finding of fact based solely on the out - of - court statements, the

Association ' s argument that the written comments are too broad to support

Petitione rs ' request is well made. For Petitioners to meet their burden, the

medical professionals ' opinions should more squarely link the modification

and Jonathan ' s disability, other than by simply stating that Jonathan " could

benefit from having a screen door pl aced on his front door. " Further, the fact

that Ace has not actually escaped from Petitioners ' home means that, up

until now, Jonathan has been able to fully enjoy the house with his emotional

support animal.

49 . Consequently, the evidence adduced at the f inal hearing does not

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a screened - in enclosure

will directly ameliorate the effect of Jonathan ' s disability and afford him an

equal opportunity to use and enjoy Petitioners ' house that he does not now

have . Therefore, the modification Petitioners request cannot be said to be

" necessary. "

50 . At the final hearing, Petitioners (through Ms. Interrante) expressed

their extreme frustration at what they perceive to be the Association ' s lack of

compassion towards Jonathan ' s mental health condition. Petitioners clearly

believe that their proposed modification offers a simple and straightforward

solution that will cause minimal disruption within the Trevesta community.

Petitioners are further disappointed at the Asso ciation ' s refusal to take the

letters from Dr. Hollett and Ms. Fisher at face value. However, the

Association correctly points out that Petitioners bear the burden in this

administrative proceeding. And, a key component of Petitioners ' case is to

prove tha t the modification they request ed will actually alleviate Jonathan ' s

mood - related issues. The evidence produced at the final hearing, however,

does not adequately make this showing. C onsequently, Petitioners have

failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Association

discriminated against them by refusing to permit Petitioners to modify their

home.

R ECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

R ECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relati ons issue a

final order concluding that Respondent, Trevesta Homeowners Association,

Inc., did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioners

and dismiss ing their Petition for Relief.

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 8th day of March , 2021 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

S

J. B RUCE C ULPEPPER

Administrative Law Judge

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 8th day of March , 2021 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Kimberly Interrante Scott H. J ackman, Esquire

Richard Interrante Cole, Scott and Kissane, P.A.

6530 Devesta Loop 4301 West Boy Scout Boulevard , Suite 400

Palmetto, Florida 34221 Tampa, Florida 33607

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Cheyanne Costilla, Gen eral Co unsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations Florida Commission on Human Relations

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020 Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(850) 488 - 7082, Extension 1006

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.