20-004958 Matalyn Johnson vs. Uceda School Of Orlando, Inc. Status: Closed Recommended Order on Thursday, September 2, 2021.

Summary: Petitioner failed to show Respondent was proper ?employer? for her ?failure to hire? FCRA claim. Respondent was not and could not be integrated with hiring entity under ?single employer? test.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

M ATALYN J OHNSON ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 20 - 4958

U CEDA S CHOOL OF O RLANDO , I NC . ,

Respondent .

/

R ECOMMENDED O RDER

On August 18, 2021, Administrative Law Judge Hetal Desai of the

Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) held a final hearing via Zoom

teleconferencing.

A PPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Ka 'Juel Washington, Esquire

The Washington Trial Group, PLLC

37 North Orange Avenue, Suite 500

Orlando, Florida 32801

For Respondent: Chris Kleppin, Esquire

The Kleppin Law Firm

8751 West B roward Boulevard, Suite 105

Plantation, Florida 33324

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE

Whether Respond ent, Uceda School of Orlando, Inc. (Uceda Orlando),

discriminated against Petitioner, Matalyn Johnson (Ms. Johnson) , based on

her race and disability when it failed to hire her. The specific issue to be

determined is whether Uceda Orlando wa s an ÑemployerÒ under the Florida

Civil Rights Act of 1992, chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2020) (FCRA). 1

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On April 20, 2020 , Ms. Johnson filed an Employment Complaint of

Discrimination (Charge) with the Florida Commission of Human Relations

(FCHR) against Uceda Orlando alleging discrimination based on r ace, c olor,

s ex, d isability, and a ge (FCHR No. 2020 - 24645). Specifically, in the "Business

Information" section of the Charge , she listed as the employer: "UCEDA

School of Orlando, Inc." In the sectio n titled "Street Address (Branch/Office in

Florida) , " she listed: "4586 S. Kirkman Rd." In the "Statement" section of the

Charge, Ms. Johnson alleged "Mr. Ricardo [Sanchez] was the corporate

representative who conducted the process" and he failed to hire h er because

she i s African - American and has a disability regarding her speech.

On October 9, 2020, FCHR issued a "Determination: Reasonable Cause,"

finding reasonable cause existed to believe Uceda Orlando discriminated

against Ms. Johnson based on her d isability, but not based on any other

protected basis. The Determination was sent to Uceda Orlando at the

following address:

Uceda School of Orlando, Inc.

c/o Mr. Juan J. Uceda

5425 S Semoran Blvd, Suite 8

Orlando, FL 32822

On November 10, 2020, Ms. Johns on filed a Petition for Relief alleging

Uceda Orlando had failed to hire her because of her disability and race.

FCHR transferred the Petition to DOAH on November 10, 2020, where it was

assigned to the undersigned and set for hearing.

1 All references to the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code are to the versions

in effect in 2020.

After the parties ha d begun discovery in these proceedings, o n

December 23 and 29 , 2020, Ms. Johnson moved to amend the Petition to add

as a respondent Uceda School o f Orlando O BT , Inc . (Uceda OBT). Petitioner's

motion to amend was hear d at a pre - hearing conference on January 8, 202 1 ,

and the final hearing was continued until Ms. Johnson's counsel could

provide information regarding a separate Charge of Discrimination that

Ms. Johnson intended to file with FCHR against Uceda OBT. The m otion to

a mend was ultimately denied on Ja nuary 27, 2021, and the matter was reset

for a final hearing.

On February 9, 2021, the parties participated in a case status conference

in which Ms. Johnson indicated she had filed a second related Charge of

Discrimination against Uceda OBT (FCHR No. 202 1 - 28223) (OBT Charge) .

Per the parties ' request , the case was placed in abeyance. On April 23, 2021,

a status report on the OBT Charge was filed and the parties provided dates

for a final hearing in this case. The case was taken out of abeyance and a

final hearing was noticed for August 18, 2021. 2

At the beginning of the final hearing, Uceda Orlando made a n unopposed

motion to bifurcate the potential issues in the case . T he undersigned agreed

that the hearing would be limited to the issue of whether Uceda Orlando was

the proper respondent ; and if so, a subsequent hearing would be held on the

issue of whether it had discriminated against Ms. Johnson for "failure to

hire" based on disabi lity and race . All evidence at the hearing related to

which entity advert ised and failed to hire Ms. Johnson and regarding the

r elationship between Uceda Orlando and Uceda OBT was accepted and

considered.

2 FCHR issued a Determination of "No Reasonable Cause" on t he OBT Charge on July 20,

2021. After the final hearing in this case, Petitioner filed a "Petition for Relief" in FCHR No.

2021 - 28223 . FCHR transferred that Petition to DOAH on August 23, 2021, where it was

assigned to the undersigned (DOAH Case. 21 - 2546) and is currently pending.

At the final hearing, Ms. Johnson presented her own testimony and that

of two others: Angel Rodriquez and Charo Uceda. Petit ioner 's Exhibits P - 5, P -

7, and P - 8 were admitted into evidence. Uceda Orlando presented the

testimony of Charo Uceda and Respondent's Exhibits R - 1 through R - 3 were

admitted into evidence.

A fter the evidentiary portion of the hearing, the undersigned heard

argument as to why Uceda Orlando should be dismissed as an improper

respondent. Based on the evidence and argument presented, the undersigned

found that Ms. Johnson had not presented sufficient evidence to establish

that Uceda Orlando was the proper respo ndent. Rather, Uceda OBT was the

entity responsible for not hiring Ms. Johnson . The undersigned further found

Uceda Orlando and Uceda OBT could not be considered a "single employer"

for liability purposes. The reasons for these determinations were stated o n

the record. Having concluded that Ms. Johnson did not e stablish that Uceda

Orlando was the proper respondent, it wa s unnecessary to determine

whether the alleged discriminatory action took place in this proceeding .

Although a court reporter was present, the parties declined to order a

transcript. The parties were given ten days to file proposed recommended

orders (PROs). Petitioner did not file a PRO. Respondent filed its PRO on

August 19, 2021 , which has been reviewed and considered.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

P ARTIES AND E NTITIES

1. Ms. Johnson is an African - American female who has a speech

impediment caused by a stroke and/or cancer. She applied for an ESL

teaching position at a school located on Kirkman Road in Orlando , Florida. 3

2. U ceda Orlando operates a s chool located at 5425 South Semoran

Boulevard in Orlando, Florida. Uceda Orlando was incorporated in 2003.

Juan Uceda (Mr. Uceda) is the registered agent and at all relevant times was

the president and director o f Uceda Orlando.

3. Uceda OBT operates at le ast two schools located in Orlando, Florida:

(1) at 12934 Deertrace Avenue, Suite B; and (2) at 4586 South Kirkman Road

(Uceda Kirkman). Uceda OBT was incorporated in 2010. Charo Uceda

(Ms. Uceda) is the registered agent and president of Uceda OBT.

ESL T EA CHER P OSITION

4 . Angel Rodriguez was a teacher who worked at Uceda Kirkman from

April 2019 to February 2020. For the time relevant to these proceedings,

Mr. Rodriguez was supervised by Ricardo Sanchez.

5 . According to Mr. Sanchez ' s W - 2 forms , he was paid by "Uceda School of

Orlando Ï OBT, Inc."

6 . Mr. Sanchez , who interviewed Ms. Johnson and made the decision not

to hire her, was employed by Uceda OBT.

7 . In November 2019, Mr. Rodriguez submitted his resignation letter to

Uceda Kirkman. 4 Mr. Sanchez ask ed Mr. Rodriguez if he knew of anyone who

could teach ESL in his place. Mr. Rodriguez suggested Ms. Johnson for the

position.

3 "ESL" stands for "English as a second language."

4 Mr. Rodriguez continued to work as a substitute teacher at Uceda Kirkman after he

resigned.

8 . Mr. Rodriguez worked with Ms. Johnson at an Orange County public

middle school. He told Ms. Johnson about the ESL position he w as vacating

at Uceda Kirkman and encouraged her to apply.

9 . Ms. Johnson applied for the ESL position. Based on the overwhelming

evidence at the hearing, it is clear that Ms. Johnson applied for

Mr. Rodriguez's vacant position with Uceda Kirkman (operated by Uceda

OBT) and not for a position with a school operated by Uceda Orlando.

10. Ms. Johnson is a public middle school teacher in Orange County. She

has a bachelor's degree in English with a minor in Spanish. She is certified to

teach ESL classes to stude nts in sixth through twelfth grades.

11 . Although Ms. Johnson's application was not entered into evidence, her

unrebutted testimony and the testimony from Mr. Rodriguez established that

she was qualified for the ESL position.

12 . Ms. Johnson interviewed f or the position with Mr. Sanchez. She later

heard from Mr. Sanchez that she did not get the position.

13 . On January 13, 2020, Ms. Johnson received an official notification that

she had not been selected for the ESL position. The email was from "Uceda

Sch ool of Orlando - Kirkman," and stated in relevant part:

Subject: Application for ESL Teacher at Uceda

School of Orlando - Kirkman

Thank you for applying to the ESL Teacher

position at Uceda School of Orlando - Kirkman.

Unfortunately, Uceda School of Orlando - Kir kman

has moved to the next step in their hiring process,

and your application was not selected at this time.

I NTERRELATION OF INDI VIDUAL U CEDA S CHOOLS

14 . Mr. Uceda is the father of Ms. Uceda and Doris Uceda. Together the

three co - founded the Uceda Englis h Institute (UEI) in the 1980s, which is a

chain of federally - accredited ESL schools. There are numerous locations or

branches of U EI in Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, and New York.

15 . Each UEI school is separately owned and incorporated , and each is

overse en by different administrators. The schools that were discussed at the

hearing were owned by Mr. Uceda's family members , including his daughters

and grandchildren.

16 . Ms. Uceda testified that she currently own s and operate s Uceda OBT,

which ha s two camp uses: the Deertrace campus and Uceda Kirkman.

Ms. Uceda also either ha s a financial interest or i s on the board of U EI

schools located in Boca Raton, Florida; Westin, Florida; and Elizabeth,

New Jersey.

17 . Ms. Uceda ha s 100% ownership interest in Uceda OBT and i s the only

officer of Uceda OBT. She d oes not have any ownership interest nor d oes she

serve in any capacity with Uceda Orlando.

18 . Mr. Uceda ha s no ownership interest in and d oes not serve in any

capacity with Uceda OBT.

19 . Although Mr. Rodr iguez believed that all " Uceda schools " were owned

"by the same people," there was no evidence of this at the hearing. When

asked what entity paid his salary, Mr. Rodriguez did not know. He testified

that he thought all " Uceda schools " shared employees and students. However,

he could not provide any examples and admitted that he only worked at

Uceda Kirkman.

20 . Ms. Uceda convincingly testified that employees who work at one

Uceda school c an apply to work at another Uceda school, but they are paid

separatel y and not allowed to just move back and forth. She also explained

that Uceda OBT and Uceda Orlando ha ve separate accounting records, bank

accounts, lines of credit, payroll preparation, telephones, and offic es. They d o

not share employees or administrators .

21 . According to the corporate documents introduced at the hearing,

Uceda OBT and Uceda Orlando have different operating addresses, different

registered agents, and different officers and directors . Although Ms. Uceda

was listed as an officer of Uceda O rlando in the past , she has not served in

any capacity at Uceda Orlando since 2013.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

22 . The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the

parties and the subject matter of this cause pursuant to sections 120.569,

120.57( 1), and 760.11(7), Florida Statutes , and F lorida Admin istrative Code

R ule 60Y - 4.016 .

23 . Under the FCRA , it is an unlawful employment practice for an

employer to " fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate

against any individual È because of such individual ' s race, color, religion,

sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. "

§ 760.10(1)(a) , Fla. Stat.

24. The FCRA is patterned after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended (Title VII) , and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 Ï 12213 (ADA). Therefore, claims of race and disability

discrimination under the FCRA are analyzed using the same framework and

federal caselaw as Title VII and ADA claims. See D ' Angelo v. ConAgra F oods,

Inc. , 422 F.3d 1220, 1224 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005); Holly v. Clairson Indus.,

L.L.C. , 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007).

25 . Ms. Johnson has a classic failure to hire claim. She must prove the

following elements by a ponderance of the evidence:

(1) sh e belongs to a protected class ;

(2) she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was

seeking applicants;

(3) despite meeting qualifications, the employer rejected her for th e job ;

and

(4) after the rejection, the employer hired someone outside her class, or

the position remained open and the employer continued seeking applicants

with similar qualifications. See generally, Miami - Dade Cty. v. Davis , 307 So.

3d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (failure to hire based on race and gender).

W AS U CEDA O R LANDO THE PROPER PAR TY ?

26 . T he parties agreed that the threshold issue at the hearing was

whether Uceda Orlando was the "employer" that was seeking applicants and

rejected Ms. Johnson for the ESL positio n .

27. A discrimination claim can only be brought b y an employee against an

"employer." Peppers v. Cobb Cty., Ga . , 835 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2016) .

F ederal courts have interpreted the term " employer " liberally , and asked this

basic question: " which entity is in control of the fundamental aspects of th e

employment relationship that gave rise to the claim. " Lyes v. City of Riviera

Beach , 166 F.3d 1332, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). This question can be

answered by examin ing the totality of the employment relationship using

these factors : " (1) how much control the alleged employer exerted on the

employee, and (2) whether the alleged employer had the power to hire, fire, or

modify the terms and conditions of the employee ' s employment. " Peppers , 835

F.3d at 1297 (quotations and citations omitted).

2 8 . Un derstandably, Ms. Johnson believed that the position she sought

was with Uceda Orlando because the rejection notice includes a reference to

" Uceda School of Orlando - Kirkman" (emphasis added) and does not mention

Uceda OBT.

29. However, the evidence clearl y established th e following: (1) Uceda

OBT operates Uceda Kirkman, (2) Mr. Rodriguez worked at Uceda Kirkman,

(3) the position he left vacant was at Uceda Kirkman, (4) Ms. Johnson

applied for the position at Uceda Kirkman, (5) Mr. Sanchez interviewed

Ms. J ohnson at Uceda Kirkman, (6) Mr. Sanchez rejected Ms. Johnson for the

position , and (7) Mr. Sanchez was employed by Uceda OBT. All of these facts

point to Uceda OBT (doing business as Uceda Kirkman) as the proper

respondent.

30 . Because there is no evidenc e that Uceda Orlando had any control over

Mr. Sanchez or Uceda Kirkman, Uceda Orlando cannot be said to be the

"employer" for purposes of Petitioner's discrimination claim. Rather, Uceda

OBT is the "employer" and should have been named as the respondent in this

case.

C AN U CEDA O RLANDO AND U CEDA OBT BE CONSIDERED AS O NE ?

3 1 . Ms. Johnson argued at the hearing that Uceda OBT (wh ich owns and

operates Uceda Kirkman) and Uceda Orlando were so integrated that they

are the same for liability purposes.

3 2 . Courts ca n consider facially discrete entities together for purposes of

determining whether an entity is a proper respondent under the

" single employer " test. 5 See Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla. , 166 F.3d 1332,

1341 (11th Cir. 1999) ; Boyd v. Sports Clips, Inc. , Case No. 19 - 4342, 2020 WL

4754138, at *7 ( Fla. DOAH Aug . 12, 2021) (" DOAH administrative law judges

have routinely applied the ' single or joint employer test ' in cases involving

the question of whether the Respondent is Petitioner's ' employer ' under the

FCRA. ") . 6

3 3 . The " single employer " or "integrated enterprise" theory involves

examining four factors to determine if n ominally independent entities are so

interrelated that they actually constitute a single integrated enterprise. Long

v. Aronov Realty Mgm t., Inc. , 645 F. Supp.2d 1008, 1029 (M.D. Ala. 2009) .

5 In the Eleventh Circuit, t here are two circumstances where the single employer te st is

used: " (1) to determine if a parent corporation should be integrated with a subsidiary

corporation; and (2) to determine if a group of related companies should be integrated. "

McKenzie v. Davenport - Harris Funeral Home , 834 F.2d 930 , 931 - 34 (11th Cir. 1987) . "C ourts

should be highly deferential to the corporate form and should only disregard it in

extraordinary circumstances. È This deference encompasses the notion that common

ownership, absent some element of economic or other integration ... will not be sufficient to

warrant disregarding the corporate form. " Labovitz v. Springville Pediatrics, LLC, No. 2:18 -

CV - 01918 - RDP, 2020 WL 1953826, at *12 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 23, 2020) .

6 E.g. Moss v. HCA, Inc. , Case No. 11 - 3983 (Fla. DOAH Oct. 2, 2012; Fla. FCHR D ec. 19,

2012) (dismissing case were evidence did not establish corporate respondent was an

integrated enterprise with local hospital); Winsor v. Pathway Tech . , LLC , Case No. 10 - 1830

(Fla. DOAH May 5, 2011; Fla. FCHR July 14, 2011)(finding two companies wer e separate for

liability purposes even though they shared ownership where they did not share employees,

operated in separate states , and maintained HR and payroll separately); Myers v. Central

Fl a. Inv . , Inc ., Case No. 02 - 3580 (Fla. DOAH Apr . 17, 2003; Fla . FCHR Dec. 30, 2003)

(finding sufficient integration to treat two separate corporations as one employer).

The burden is on the p etitioner to establish the se factors to show the

existence of an integrated enterprise. Cardinale v. S. Homes of Polk Cty., Inc. ,

310 F. App'x. 311, 312 (11th Cir. 2009) . The four factors to determin e

whether separate corporate entities can be treated as one are:

" (1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations,

(3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial

control. " McKenzie , 834 F.2d at 9 33. See also Kaufman v. AutoNation, Inc. ,

No. 99 Ï 8377, 2000 WL 35722358, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Jun e 7, 2000) ( using the

four - prong test to determine whether companies could be considered

integrated enterprises in ADA and ADEA employment discrimination case);

K eene v. TECO Energy Corp., Case No. 98 Ï 2406 Ï CIV Ï T Ï 17B, 2000 WL

230243, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2000) (applying the four - prong test to ADA

case). In analyzing these factors, t he totality of the circumstances controls

and no single factor is conclusive, nor is the p resence of all four factors

necessary to a finding of sufficient integration or " single employer. " E.E.O.C.

v. Dolphin Cruise Line, Inc. , 945 F. Supp. 1550, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (ADA

case). Each of the factors is considered below.

3 4 . Regarding t he first factor, t here are s everal indicia considered by

courts when analyzing whether entities are interrelated in operations for

liability purposes. These include the existence of combined or shared

(1) accounting records , (2) bank accounts , (3) l ines of credits , (4) payroll

preparation , (5) communication or IT systems , (6) telephone numbers , and

(7) offices. Morrison v. Magic Carpet Aviation , 383 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.

2004) (quot ations and citations omitted).

3 5 . Here, Ms. Johnson presented no evid ence to suggest that Uceda

Orlando and Uceda O BT have combined accounting records, lines of credit,

bank accounts, payroll preparation, telephone numbers, or offices. There was

testimony regarding a UEI website or online presence, but no specific web

addre ss or web page was offered into evidence.

To the contrary, the only evidence regarding these factors was from

Ms. Uceda that Uceda OBT did not share any of these things with Uceda

Orlando.

3 6 . Regarding the second element, Ms. Johnson offered no evidenc e

regarding labor relations in this case. Ms. Uceda testified that Uceda OBT

has its own human resources department and maintain s separate

employment policies from Uceda Orlando.

3 7 . Regarding the third element, "common management" is established by

showin g the existence of common directors and officers. Fike v. Gold Kist,

Inc. , 664 F.2d 295 (11th Cir. 1981) . Ms. Johnson did not present any evidence

that Uceda Orlando and Uceda OBT shared the same ownership or

management during the relevant period . Instead , the only evidence offered

regarding officers identified Mr. Uceda as the director and president of Uceda

Orlando and Ms. Uceda as the president of Uceda OBT. There was no sharing

of officers or directors between the two entities.

3 8 . Regarding the final e lement of ownership, t here was no evidence

regarding who owned Uceda Orlando or how it was financed. T he testimony ,

however, did establish that Ms. Uceda had no ownership interest in Uceda

Orlando and wa s the sole owner of Uceda OBT.

39 . Ms. Johnson argued that both Uceda Orlando and Uceda OBT were

part of UEI , and therefore both could be considered an "employer."

Presumably, she was arguing that UEI wa s a franchis or, with Uceda Orlando

and Uceda OBT as franchise e s. A franchisor is not liable for the action s of an

individual franchis e e or its employees (such as Mr. Rodriguez or

Mr. Sanchez) , absent a sufficient factual showing of an agency or employment

relationship between them. See West v. LQ Mgmt., LLC , 156 F. Supp. 3d

1361, 1370 - 71 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (exam ining agency relationship in the public

accommodation and franchise context); Monacelli v. The UPS Store , No.

2:08CV174 - FTM - 99SPC, 2009 WL 22773, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2009)

(dismissing employment discrimination claim against franchisor; " it appears

tha t the UPS Store is a franchisee of UPS and not wholly owned by UPS or

Mail Boxes Etc. ") ; and Mobile Oil Corp . v. Bransford , 648 So. 2d 119 , 120

(1995) ( "i t is well understood that the mere use of franchise logos and related

advertisements does not necessar ily indicate that the franchisor has actual or

apparent control over any substantial aspect of the franchisee's business or

employment decisions. Nor does the provision of routine contractual support

services refute this conclusion. ").

4 0 . Here, there was no evidence that Mr. Sanchez, the decision - maker for

the ESL position, had any agency relationship with UEI or Uceda Orlando or

that he was employed by any entity other than Uceda OBT. Therefore, if

there was discrimination it can only be attributable to U ceda OBT. T here was

no evidence supporting a finding that UEI or another Uceda "franchise"

school ( such as Uceda Orlando ) could be liable .

4 1 . In conclusion, based on the totality of the evidence, Uceda Orlando is

not the " employer" for Ms. Johnson 's dis crimination claims and was

improperly named as a respondent.

42. Nothing in this Recommended Order prevents Ms. Jo h nson from

bringing a claim against UEI , Uceda Kirkman, or Uceda OBT, or prevents

these entit i es from asserting defenses to such claims.

R EC OMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

R ECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a

final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Matalyn Johnson

against Uceda School of Orlando, In c.

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 2nd day of September, 2021 , in Tallahassee,

Leon County, Florida.

S

H ETAL D ESAI

Administrative Law Judge

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

D ivision of Administrative Hearings

this 2nd day of September , 2021 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Chris Kleppin, Esquire

Florida Commission on Human Relations The Kleppin Law Firm

4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110 8751 West Broward Boulevard , Suite 105

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020 Plantation, Florida 33324

Ka'Juel Washington, Esquire Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel

The Washi ngton Trial Group, PLLC Florida Commission on Human Re lations

37 North Orange Avenue , Suite 500 4075 Esplanade Way , Room 110

Orlando, Florida 32801 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.