21-001496 Ronald Jones vs. Carter-Parramore Academy Status: Closed Recommended Order on Tuesday, October 26, 2021.

Summary: Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Respondents' failure to interview him for teaching positions was due to discrimination or in retaliation for protected activity.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

R ONALD J ONES ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 21 - 1492

J AMES A. S HANKS M IDDLE S CHOOL ,

Respondent.

/

R ONALD J ONES ,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 21 - 1493

H AVANA M AGNET S CHOOL ,

Respondent.

/

R ONALD J ONES ,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 21 - 1496

C ARTER - P ARRAMORE A CADEMY ,

Respondent.

/

R ECOMMENDED O RDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was conducted in th ese case s on

August 17, 2021, via Zoom teleconference, before Lawrence P. Stevenson, a

duly - designated Administrative Law Judge (ÑALJÒ) of the Division of

Administrative Hearings (ÑDOAHÒ).

A PPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Ronald D avid Jones, pro se

1821 McKelvy Street

Quincy, Florida 32351

For Respondent s : William B reen Armistead, Esquire

Coppins Monroe, P.A.

1319 Thomaswood Drive

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE S

The issue s are whether Respondents, James A. Shanks Middle School,

Havana Magnet School, and/or Carter - Parramore Academy, subjected

Petitioner to discrimination on the basis of his age, sex, or race, in violation of

section 760.10, Florida Statutes, 1 and/or whether Respondent retaliated

against Petitioner for the exercise of protected rights under section 760.10.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On October 28, 2020, Petitioner, Ronald D. Jones (ÑMr. JonesÒ or

ÑPe titionerÒ), filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ( the

Ñ FCHR Ò ) an Employment Complaint of Discrimination against each of three

schools in the Gadsden County School District (ÑSchool DistrictÒ): James A.

Shanks Middle School ; Havana Magnet Sc hool ; and Carter - Parramore

Academy. The Employment Complaint of Discrimination against James A.

Shanks Middle School stated as follows:

I believe I have been discriminated against based

on my race (Black), Sex (male), and age (over 40). I

also believe I am being retaliated against for filing

a complaint with the Florida Commission on

Human Relations. I have been working within the

1 Citations sh all be to Florida Statutes (2020) unless otherwise specified. Section 760.10 has

been unchanged since 1992, save for a 2015 amendment adding pregnancy to the list of

classifications protected from discri minatory employment practices. Ch. 2015 - 68, § 6, Laws of

Fla.

Gadsden County School system since January 2008

as a substitute teacher and have teaching

experience. Around or in October 2020, I applied for

a Social Studies position at James A. Shanks

Middle School but was not offered an interview by

Principal Maurice [Stokes].

The Employment Complaint of Discrimination against Havana Magnet

School stated as follows:

I believe I have been disc riminated against based

on my race (Black), Sex (male), and age (over 40). I

also believe I am being retaliated against for filing

a complaint with the Florida Commission on

Human Relations. I have been working within the

Gadsden County School system since January 2008

as a substitute teacher and have teaching

experience. Around or in January 2020, I applied

for a Social Studies position at Havana Magnet

School but was not offered an interview by

Principal Parish Williams.

The Employment Complaint of Discr imination against Carter - Parramore

Academy stated as follows:

I believe I have been discriminated against based

on my race (Black), Sex (male), and age (over 40). I

also believe I am being retaliated against for filing

a complaint with the Florida Commissi on on

Human Relations. I have been working within the

Gadsden County School system since January 2008

as a substitute teacher and have teaching

experience. Around or in January 2020, I applied

for a Social Studies/History position but was not

offered an in terview by Principal Willie Jackson.

The FCHR conducted an investigation into all of Mr. JonesÔs allegations.

On April 19, 2021, the FCHR issued a written determination in each of the

three cases that there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unl awful

practice occurred.

On April 29, 2021, Mr. Jones timely filed a Petition for Relief in each of

the three cases with the FCHR. On May 6, 2021, the FCHR referred the cases

to DOAH for the assignment of an ALJ and the conduct of formal hearings.

On May 12, 2021, Respondents filed a motion to consolidate the three cases,

which was granted by Order dated May 17, 2021.

The final hearing was scheduled for July 21, 2021, and was convened on

that date. However, no court reporter was available at the date an d time of

the hearing. The hearing was rescheduled for August 17, 2021, on which date

it was convened and completed.

At the hearing, Mr. Jones testified on his own behalf. Mr. JonesÔs Exhibits

1 through 20 were admitted into evidence.

The School Distric t presented the testimony of Major Willie Jackson,

Principal of Carter - Parramore Academy; Sonya Jackson, Human Resources

Director for the School District; Parish Williams, Principal of Havana Magnet

School at the time relevant to this hearing; and Maurice Stokes, Principal of

James A. Shanks Middle School , at the time relevant to this proceeding. The

School DistrictÔs Exhibits 1 through 9 were admitted into evidence.

The one - volume Transcript of the final hearing was filed with DOAH on

October 1, 2021. Re spondent s timely filed their consolidated Proposed

Recommended Order on October 8, 2021. Mr. Jones filed his Proposed

Recommended Order on October 13, 2021, outside the ten - day period allotted

for the submission of proposed orders under Florida Administrat ive Code

R ule 28 - 106.216(2). Respondent s did not object to the late filing and

PetitionerÔs Proposed Recommended Order has therefore been considered in

the preparation of this Recommended Order.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the

following Findings of Fact are made:

1. The Gadsden County School District is an employer as that term is

defined in section 760.02(7). It is the governing body responsible for the

administration of public schools in Gadsden County and is therefore treated

as a Respondent in this proceeding , though unnamed by Petitioner.

2. James A. Shanks Middle School, a public school of Gadsden County, is

an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7).

3. Havana Magnet School, a public school in Gadsden County, is an

employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7).

4. Carter - Parramore Academy, a public school in Gadsden County, is an

employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7).

5. Mr. Jones, who was 63 years old at the time of the hearing, is a black

male.

6. Mr. JonesÔs complaint is that he applied for open teaching positions in

January 2020 at two Gadsden County public schools, applied for a third

position in October 2020, and did not receive an interview for any of the

positions. Mr. Jones alleges that the failure to interview him constituted

discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and/or age.

7. Mr. Jones has worked in the recent past as a substitute teacher for the

School District. The record established that Mr. Jones was eligible for a

temporary teaching and professional teaching certificate for social sciences

from October 12, 2017, through October 12, 2020. Mr. Jones was not eligible

for certificates in other educational areas.

8. Mr. Jones testified, and t he School District did not dispute, that he has

applied for ÑhundredsÒ of positions with the School Board over the years.

These applications were mostly for teaching positions but also included a

range of jobs from bus driver to deputy superintendent.

9. M r. Jones has filed two discrimination complaints against the School

District prior to the instant cases that resulted in DOAH Recommended

Orders. In the most recent case, Jones v. Gadsden County School Board , Case

No. 20 - 4489, 2021 WL 1256500 (Fla. DOAH Ma r . 3 0 , 2021), ALJ James H.

Peterson III found that the School DistrictÔs internal application system had

labeled Mr. Jones as ÑineligibleÒ for employment , and that Mr. Jones had

therefore been summarily excluded from the pool of candidates for several

posi tions with the School District. The School District explained that

Mr. Jones stated on his application that he had a criminal record, which

triggered an automatic ÑineligibleÒ notification on the School DistrictÔs

internal employment application system.

10 . ALJ Peterson went on to find that the evidence established that

Mr. Jones had been cleared by the Department of Education and that he had,

in fact, been eligible for employment by the School District. ALJ Peterson

found that the School DistrictÔs employm ent application system erroneously

labeled Mr. Jones as ineligible for employment, but that this error was a

simple mistake and not evidence of unlawful discrimination or retaliation. In

a Recommended Order entered on March 30, 2 021, ALJ Peterson

recommend ed that the FCHR enter a Final Order dismissing Mr. JonesÔs

petition for failure to provide evidence of discrimination.

11. The hearing in DOAH Case No. 20 - 4489 was completed on

December 16, 2020. After the hearing made it aware of its error, and well

befo re ALJ Peterson issued his Recommended Order, the School District

corrected the error and manually removed the ÑineligibleÒ designation from

Mr. JonesÔs employment application. In an email dated January 27, 2021,

counsel for the School District advised Mr. Jones his application status had

been changed from ÑineligibleÒ to ÑcompleteÒ and that his criminal history

would no longer prevent him from applying for employment with the School

District.

12. As to the applications at issue in these consolidated cases, Mr. Jones

applied for social studies teaching positions at Carter - Parramore Academy

and James A. Shanks Middle School in January 2020 , and applied for a social

studies teaching position at Havana Magnet School in October 2020. These

applications were all made before the School District had corrected

Mr. JonesÔs application status in light of the hearing before ALJ Peterson. On

each of these applications, Mr. Jones did not receive an interview because the

School DistrictÔs employment application system show ed him as Ñineligible.Ò

13. Major Willie Jackson, a 58 - year - old black male, has been the principal

at Carter - Parramore Academy for three years. Mr. Jackson testified that

Mr. Jones had worked for him at James A. Shanks Middle School about five

years ago a s a one - on - one assistant for an exceptional education student, but

that Mr. Jones had been hired by the schoolÔs Exceptional Student Education

department, not by him. Mr. Jackson recalled interviewing Mr. Jones for

another position at James A. Shanks Middl e School but could not recall

whom he ultimately hired.

14. Mr. Jackson testified that he did not interview Mr. Jones for the social

studies teaching position at Carter - Parramore Academy in January 2020

because the School DistrictÔs application system sho wed that Mr. Jones was

ineligible for employment. Mr. Jackson stated that he would have

interviewed Mr. Jones but for the erroneous statement as to his eligibility.

Mr. Jackson ultimately hired John Leprell, a white male in his early forties.

Mr. Jackson t estified that he had no knowledge of any prior FCHR

complaints that Mr. Jones had made.

15. Mr. Jackson credibly testified that none of his decisions was based on

Mr. JonesÔs age, race, or sex, or in retaliation for engaging in protected

activity.

16. Pari sh Williams, a black male over the age of 40, was the principal at

Havana Magnet School in January 2020. He testified that he did not know

Mr. Jones and did not know his age or race before the hearing in the instant

cases. Mr. Williams also testified that he was unaware of any FCHR or other

complaints that Mr. Jones had made against the School District.

17. Mr. Williams testified that he did not interview Mr. Jones for the open

social studies teaching position at Havana Magnet School because the School

Dist rictÔs application system indicated that Mr. Jones was ineligible.

Mr. Williams stated that he would probably have interviewed Mr. Jones had

he not been flagged as ineligible. Mr. Williams ultimately hired Patrice

Monroe, a black female, for the position.

18. Mr. Williams credibly testified that his decision on the job position was

not based on Mr. JonesÔs race, age, or sex, or in retaliation for engaging in

protected activity.

19. Maurice Stokes, a black male over the age of 40, was principal at

James A. Shanks Middle School when Mr. Jones applied for a social studies

teaching position in October 2020. Mr. Stokes stated that he did not know

Mr. Jones personally but had seen him before. Mr. Stokes could not recall

whether Mr. Jones had applied for the posit ion, but he knew that he did not

interview Mr. Jones. Mr. Stokes testified that he would not interview

Mr. Jones or any other candidate who was listed as ÑineligibleÒ on the School

DistrictÔs employment application system. Mr. Stokes hired Ken Hubbard, a

6 0 - year - old black male, for the social studies position.

20. Mr. Stokes testified that he hired Mr. Hubbard because he was the

best social studies candidate available. Mr. Stokes had no knowledge of any

FCHR complaints that Mr. Jones had made against the Sc hool District.

Mr. Stokes credibly testified that his decision was not based on Mr. JonesÔs

race, age, or sex, or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity.

21. Sonya Jackson, Human Resources Director for the School District,

testified about the pr ocess by which the School District corrected Mr. JonesÔs

information in its database. She testified that Mr. Jones has continued to

make applications since the ÑineligibleÒ status was removed from his record.

Ms. Jackson stated that Mr. Jones was called fo r an interview on a

maintenance supervisor position for which he had applied, but that he turned

down the interview.

22. Mr. Jones testified at length but provided no evidence that the School

District or any of its personnel had discriminated against him based on his

race, age, or sex, or that anyone retaliated against him for exercising his

right to file complaints of discrimination with the FCHR. Mr. Jones claimed

that in 2008 the School District dismissed him from a teaching job in a

manner disallowed b y statute, 2 and that it has spent the last 13 years

covering its tracks by placing false records in his employment file. He

complained that the School District only hires women for teaching positions,

though two of the three jobs he applied for in these ca ses were eventually

filled by men.

23. Mr. Jones appears to assume that when someone of a different race,

age, or sex is hired for a job that he seeks, the result is due to discrimination

against him. If the person hired is a woman, then Mr. Jones was

dis criminated against based on sex. If the person hired is younger, then it is

age discrimination. Mr. Jones had no real answer when confronted with the

hiring of Mr. Hubbard, a 60 - year - old back male, at James A. Shanks Middle

School. He also could not explai n away the fact that the hiring decision in

each of the three cases was made by a principal who was black, male, and

over 40 years of age.

24. Mr. Jones provided no evidence that any of the decisions not to

interview him were ca u sally linked to protected a ctivity. Mr. Jones

established that he is prolifically litigious but failed to establish that his

activities are as well known in the community as he believes. Each of the

principals credibly testified that they were unaware that Mr. Jones had

engaged in p rotected activity.

2 Mr. Jones never provided a citation to the law he claimed the School District violated by

dismissing him.

25. In summary, Mr. Jones offered insufficient evidence that he was

discriminated against based on his race, age, or sex. Mr. Jones also offered

insufficient evidence that he was subjected to unlawful retaliation.

26. Mr. Jones offered n o credible evidence disputing the non -

discriminatory reason given by the School District for its failures to interview

him for the three positions at issue.

27. Mr. Jones offered no credible evidence that the School DistrictÔs stated

reason for not hiring him was a pretext for discrimination based on his age,

race, or sex.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

28. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject

matter and the parties to this proceeding. §§ 120.569, 120.57(1), and

760.11(7), Fla. Sta t.

29. The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the Ñ Florida Civil Rights Act Ò or

the Ñ FCRA Ò ), chapter 760, prohibits discrimination in the workplace. The

FCRA is modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991,

42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq . ( Ñ Title VII Ò ), so that federal case law regarding Title

VII is applicable to construe the FCRA . See Castleberry v. Edward M.

Chadbourne, Inc. , 810 So. 2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

30. Section 760.10 states the following, in relevant part:

(1) It is an unlawful employment practice for an

employer:

(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national

origin, age, handicap, or marital status.

* * *

(7) It is an unlawful employment practice for an

employer, an employment agency, a joint labor -

management committee, or a labor organization to

discriminat e against any person because that

person has opposed any practice which is an

unlawful employment practice under this section,

or because that person has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

section.

31. The School District and each of the three schools to which Mr. Jones

submitted an application is an Ñ employer Ò as defined in section 760.02(7),

which provides the following:

(7) Ñ Employer Ò means any person employing 15 or

more employees for each working day in each of

20 or more calendar weeks in the current or

preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a

person.

32. Florida courts have determined that federal case law applies to claims

arising under the Florida Civil Rights Act, and as such, the United States

Supreme Court Ô s model for employment discrimination cases set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d

668 (1973), applies to claims arising under section 760.10, abse nt direct

evidence of discrimination. See Harper v. Blockbuster EntmÔt Corp. , 139 F.3d

1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998); Paraohao v. Bankers Club, Inc. , 225 F. Supp. 2d

1353, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Fla. State Univ. v. Sondel , 685 So. 2d 923, 925

n.1 (Fla. 1st D CA 1996); Fla. DepÔt of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205

(Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

33. ÑDirect evidence is Óevidence, which if believed, proves existence of fact

in issue without inference or presumption.ÔÒ Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc. , 833

F.2d 1525, 1528 n .6 (11th Cir. 1987)( quoting BlackÔs Law Dictionary 413 (5th

ed. 1979)). In Carter v. City of Miami , 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1989), the

court stated:

This Court has held that not every comment

concerning a person Ô s age presents direct evidence

of disc rimination. [ Young v. Gen. Foods Corp . , 840

Young Court

made clear that remarks merely referring to

characteristics associated with increasing age, or

facially neutral comments from which a plaintiff

has inferred discri minatory intent, are not directly

probative of discrimination. Id . Rather, courts have

found only the most blatant remarks, whose intent

could be nothing other than to discriminate on the

basis of age, to constitute direct evidence of

discrimination.

34. Petitioner offered no evidence that would satisfy the stringent

standard of direct evidence of discrimination.

35. Under the McDonnell analysis, in employment discrimination cases,

Petitioner has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of evidence, a

prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. If the prima facie case is

established, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut this preliminary

showing by producing evidence that the adverse action was taken for some

legitimate, non - discriminatory reaso n. If the employer rebuts the prima facie

case, the burden shifts back to Petitioner to show by a preponderance of

evidence that the employer Ô s offered reasons for its adverse employment

decision were pretextual. See Texas DepÔt of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine , 4 50 U.S.

248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981).

36. In order to prove a prima facie case of unlawful employment

discrimination under chapter 760, Petitioner must establish that: (1) he is a

member of the protected group; (2) he was subject to advers e employment

action; (3) the School District treated similarly situated employees outside of

his protected classifications more favorably; and (4) Petitioner was qualified

to do the job and/or was performing his job at a level that met the employerÔs

legit imate expectations. See , e.g ., Jiles v.United Parcel Serv ., Inc ., 360 Fed.

Appx. 61, 64 (11th Cir. 2010); Burke - Fowler v. Orange Cnty , 447 F.3d 1319,

1323 (11 th Cir. 2006); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc ., 330 F.3d 1313,

1316 (11th Cir. 2003); Willi ams v. Vitro Servs. Corp ., 144 F.3d 1438, 1441

(11th Cir. 1998); McKenzie v. EAP Mgmt. Corp ., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374 - 75

(S.D. Fla. 1999).

37. Petitioner has failed to prove a prima facie case of unlawful

employment discrimination.

38. Petitioner is a bl ack male over the age of 40 and is therefore a member

of a protected group.

39. Petitioner applied for three social studies teaching positions with the

School District and was not interviewed for any of them due to an error in the

information contained in the School DistrictÔs application system. Petitioner

was therefore subject to an adverse employment action.

40. Petitioner was eligible to receive a temporary teaching and

professional teaching certificate for social sciences, grades 6 through 12,

during t he period relevant to this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner was

qualified to perform the jobs for which he applied.

41. As to the question of disparate treatment, the applicable standard was

recently revised in Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga. , 918 F.3d 1 213, 1218 (11th

Cir. 2019): Ñ[A] plaintiff asserting an intentional - discrimination claim under

McDonnell - Douglas must demonstrate that she and her proffered

comparators were Ósimilarly situated in all material aspects.ÔÒ

42. State courts in Florida have f ound that a person suffers Ñ disparate

treatment Ò in his or her employment, in violation of Title VII Ð and, by

extension, the FCRA Ð when he or she is singled out and treated less

favorably, on the basis of his or her status as a member of a protected class ,

t han other employees who are otherwise similarly situated in all relevant

respects. Johnson v. Great Expressions Dental Ctrs. of Fla. , P.A., 132 So. 3d

1174, 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Valenzuela v. Globeground N . Am . , LLC , 18

So. 3d 17, 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) .

43. Petitioner offered no evidence as to disparate treatment of similarly

situated employees outside of his protected classification, aside from the mere

fact that each employee hired by the School District did not exactly match his

age, race, or sex. Di scriminatory intent may be proved by inference, but a

trier of fact Ñcannot infer discrimination from thin air.Ò Lizardo v. DennyÔs,

Inc . , 270 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2001) ( citing Norton v. Sam's Club , 145 F.3d

114, 119 (2d Cir.1998) ) . Mere speculation or se lf - serving belief on the part of

a complainant concerning motives of a respondent is insufficient, standing

alone, to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. See

Lizardo , 270 F.3d at 104. (ÑPlaintiffs have done little more than cite to their

mistreatment and ask the court to conclude that it must have been related to

their race. This is not sufficient.Ò). See also Norton , 145 F.3d at 120 (anti -

discrimination law Ñdoes not make employers liable for doing stupid or even

wicked things; it m akes them liable for discriminating È.Ò).

44. There was in fact no disparate treatment in these cases, merely an

acknowledged error in the application system. The School District was not

yet aware of the error when Petitioner applied for the jobs at issue in this

proceeding. Having failed to establish the disparate treatment element,

Petitioner has not established a prima facie case of employment

discrimination. ÑFailure to establish a prima facie case of ... discrimination

ends the inquiry.Ò Ratliff v. Sta te , 666 So. 2d, 1008, 1013 n.6 (Fla. 1st DCA

1996) (citations omitted).

45. Even if Petitioner were deemed to have submitted sufficient evidence

to show a prima face case of unlawful discrimination, credible and unrebutted

testimony by the three principals showed that the School DistrictÔs reason for

not interviewing Petitioner for a social studies teaching position was based on

the mistaken ineligibility designation. The evidence was insufficient to show

that the School DistrictÔs reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.

46. Petitioner cannot prove pretext by a mere showing that the School

District made a mistake in failing to interview him. In a proceeding under

the FCRA, the court is Ñ not in the business of adjudging whether employment

decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, [the court Ô s] sole concern is whether

unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment

decision. Ò Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. , 196 F.3d 1354, 1361

(11th Cir. 1999). A courtÔs role is not to sit as a Ñsuper - personnel departmentÒ

to re - examine a companyÔs business decisions. The court does not ask

whether the employer selected the most qualified candidate, but whether the

selection was based on an unlawful motive. Denney v. City of Albany , 247

F.3d 117 2, 1188 (11th Cir. 2001). Petitioner failed to establish that the S chool

D istrict acted with an unlawful motive.

47. As to PetitionerÔs retaliation claim, the court in Blizzard v. Appliance

Direct, Inc. , 16 So. 3d 922, 926 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), described th e elements of

such a claim as follows:

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

section 760.10(7), a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) that he or she engaged in statutorily protected

activity; (2) that he or she suffered adverse

employment actio n and (3) that the adverse

employment action was causally related to the

protected activity. See Harper v. Blockbuster

EntmÔt Corp. , 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied 525 U.S. 1000, 119 S. Ct. 509, 142 L. Ed.2d

422 (1998). Once the plaintiff ma kes a prima facie

showing, the burden shifts and the defendant must

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the adverse employment action. Wells v.

Colorado Dep Ô t of Transp. , 325 F.3d 1205, 1212

(10th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff must then respo nd

by demonstrating that defendant Ô s asserted reasons

for the adverse action are pretextual. Id .

48. Petitioner made no evidentiary showing that any employment action

by the School District was causally related to any statutorily protected

activity he too k while an employee. Petitioner has filed several discrimination

complaints against the School District and its personnel. Petitioner plainly

believes that these complaints have made him notorious among School

District personnel, but the three principals w ho testified were uniformly

unaware of the complaints and only casually acquainted with Petitioner

himself.

49. The courts recognize a Ñcommon senseÒ requirement that Ñ[a] decision

maker cannot have been motivated to retaliate by something unknown to

him. Ò Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc ., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir.

2000). 3 Ñ[T]emporal proximity alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of

fact as to causal connection where there is unrebutted evidence that the

decision maker did not have kno wledge that the employee engaged in

protected conduct.Ò Corbitt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. , 589 F.3d 1136 (11th

Cir. 2009) ( quoting Brungart , 231 F.3d at 799 ) . PetitionerÔs unsupported

assertions of retaliation were unsupported by credible evidence.

50. In conclusion, Mr. Jones failed to present a prima facie case of

discrimination based on age, race, or sex, and failed to show that his failure

to obtain an employment interview was in retaliation for his exercise of

protected activity.

R ECOMMENDATION

Base d upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

R ECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a

final order finding that neither James A. Shanks Middle School, Havana

Magnet School, nor Carter - Parramore Academy commit ted an unlawful

employment practice , and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case.

3 Brungart was decided under the Family and Medical Leave Act, but its reasoning as to the

element of retaliation has been repeatedly applied in cases involving Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq . See e.g., Mitchell v. Mercedes - Benz U.S. IntÔl,

Inc ., 637 Fed. Appx. 535, 539 (11th Cir. 2015); and Willis v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc ., 619

Fed. Appx. 960, 962 (11th C ir. 2015).

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 2 6 th day of October , 2021 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

S

L AWRENCE P. S TEVENSON

Administrative Law Judge

1230 Apalachee Park way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 2 6 th day of October , 2021 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Ronald David Jones

Florida Commission on Human Relation s 1821 McKelvy Street

Room 110 Quincy, Florida 32351

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020 Gwendolyn P. Adkins, Esquire

Coppins, Monroe, Adkins and Dincman,

William Breen Armistead, Esquire P.A.

Coppins Monroe, P.A. 1319 Thomaswood Drive

1319 Thomaswood Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Es planade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCE PTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.