21-002270F Ariana Ortega Domingez, E.M.T. vs. Department Of Health, Bureau Of Emergency Medical Services Status: Closed DOAH Final Order on Wednesday, September 29, 2021.

Summary: Petitioner is not entitled to attorney?s fees pursuant to section 57.111, because the actions of the probable cause panel in authorizing the filing of an administrative complaint were substantially justified at the time probable cause was found.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

A RIANA O RTEGA D OMINGEZ , E.M.T. ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 21 - 2270F

D EPARTMENT OF H EALTH , B UREAU OF

E MERGENCY M EDICAL S ERVICES ,

Respondent .

/

F INAL O RDER

A final hearing in this matter was held on August 25, 2021, via Zoom

video conference before Robert S. Cohen, a duly designated Administrative

Law Judge (ÑALJÒ) of the Division of Administrative Hearings (ÑDOAHÒ).

A PP EARANCES

For Petitioner: David M. Beckerman, Esq uire

David M. Beckerman, P.A.

7000 W est Palmetto Park R oad , Suite 500

Boca Raton, Florida 33433

For Respondent: Kimberly Lauren Marshall, Esq uire

Prosecution Services Unit

Department o f Health

4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C - 65

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3265

S TATEMENT O F T HE I SSUE

The issue for determination is whether Petitioner, Ariana Ortega

Domingez (ÑPetitionerÒ) , is entitled to recover attorneyÔs fees and costs

pursuant to sectio n 57.111, Florida Statutes (2019), incurred in defending the

Administrative Complaint (ÑACÒ) filed by Respondent, Department of Health

(ÑDepartmentÒ or Ñ Respondent Ò ), seeking to impose discipline on PetitionerÔs

e mergency m edical t echnician (ÑEMTÒ) certifi cate.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On May 19, 2020, the Department filed a one - count A C against Petitioner

in D OH C ase No. 2020 - 12066. The A C alleged that Petitioner violated

section 401.411(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2017), by engaging in unprofessional

conduct, including , but not limited to, a departure from or failure to conform

to the minimal prevailing standards of acceptable practice in her care of

Patient I.K.

On June 2, 2020, Petitioner sent the Department a completed Election of

Rights form requesting an a dministrative h earing involving disputed issues

of material fact . On December 7, 2020, the Department forwarded the case to

DOAH for assignment of an ALJ. On December 8, 2020, the undersigned

issued his Initial Order in DOAH C ase No. 20 - 5321PL.

After the parties engaged in discovery, on February 18, 2021, the

Department filed an unopposed Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, which was

granted. On May 28, 2021, the Department brought the case back to the

Probable Cause Panel for the Bureau of Emergency Medic al Oversight

(ÑPCPÒ) for further review. In light of new information obtained in the

discovery process, the P CP reconsidered its previous finding of probable cause

and dismissed the case.

On June 17, 2021, Petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Award of

Attorney [Ô] s Fees and Costs Pursuant to Chapter 57.111, Fla. Stat [ . ] (ÑMotion

for AttorneyÔs FeesÒ) at DOAH, seeking an award of her attorneyÔs fees and

costs incurred in defending DOAH C ase No. 20 - 5321PL. The fees case was

assigned DOAH C ase No. 21 - 2270F , and a hearing was scheduled for

August 25, 2021. Prior to the hearing, at the partiesÔ request, the issue of

entitlement to fees was bifurcated from the issue of amount of fees.

On August 18, 2021, the parties filed a Pre - h earing Joint Stipulation,

whic h contained a statement of facts to which the parties agreed. The

parties agreed that Petitioner was a prevailing small business party under

section 57.111. The only issue remaining to be determined at the hearing was

whether the Department was substantial ly justified in filing the AC against

Petitioner.

The hearing was convened and completed on August 25, 2021. At the

hearing, neither party presented witness testimony. Joint Exhibits 1

through 4 were admitted without objection. PetitionerÔs Exhibits 1 and 2 were

admitted over RespondentÔs objections to both. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the parties agreed that their p roposed f inal o rders would be filed

within ten days of the filing of the Transcript at DOAH.

The one - volume Transcript of the hearing w as filed on September 9, 2021.

The parties each timely filed a P roposed Final Order , both of which have

been considered in preparation of this Final Order.

F INDINGS O F F ACT

Stipulated Facts

1. On May 19, 2020, the Department presented its case against Pet itioner

to the PCP . The PCP found probable cause and authorized the filing of a one -

count AC , alleging a violation of section 401.411(1)(g). Based upon the

information presented, the PCP found probable cause and authorized the

filing of the AC .

2. On May 1 9, 2020, the Department filed its AC against Petitioner ,

alleging a violation of section 401.411(1)(g).

3. On or about June 23, 202 0 , Petitioner timely filed an Election of Rights

form which indicated that she disputed the material allegations of fact in t he

AC and requested a formal hearing.

4. On December 7, 2020, the Department filed a copy of the AC and

Petitioner Ôs Election of Rights form with DOAH . On that same day, counsel

for the Department sent a letter to the DOAH Chief Judge request ing that

the m atter be assigned to an A LJ .

5. On December 8, 2020, the undersigned was assigned the case and

issued an I nitial O rder in DOAH C ase No. 20 - 5321PL.

6. On January 29, 2021, counsel for Petitioner took the deposition of Ryan

Pagliarulo, EMT (ÑPagliaruloÒ) , Pe titionerÔs EMT partner on the date of the

incident. PagliaruloÔs testimony at the deposition directly contravened his

prior statements to the Department.

7. On February 18, 2021, the Department filed a Motion to Relinquish

Jurisdiction, which the undersign ed granted the following day.

8. On May 27, 2021, the P CP reconsidered the matter in light of the newly

obtained testimony from Pagliarulo and closed the case.

9. Petitioner qualifies as a prevailing small business party under

section 57. 1 11.

Additional F indings of Fact

10. A proceeding is Ñsubstantially justifiedÒ if Ñit had a reasonable basis in

law and fact at the time it was initiated by a state agency.Ò £ 57.111(3)(e),

Fla. Stat. (2019).

11. The P CP reviewed the following materials: a draft of the pro posed AC ;

the report, supplemental opinion, and curriculum vitae of the DepartmentÔs

expert; an 18 - page Supplemental Investigative Report dated October 21,

2019; a ten - page Supplemental Investigative Report dated May 24, 2019; and

a 1,017 - page Final Invest igative Report dated November 5, 2018.

12. The AC charged Petitioner with violating section 401.411(1)(g), by

failing to conform to the minimum standards of acceptable practice in her

care of Patient I.K. ( Ñ I.K. Ò ).

13. The AC concerned an incident involvin g an ambulance crew ,

comprising Petitioner and Pagliarulo, dropp ing a patient and fatally injur ing

him.

14. At all times material to the AC , Respondent was employed as an EMT

with American Medical Rescue (ÑAMRÒ).

15. On May 23, 2018, Petitioner and her par tner, Pagliarulo, transported

I.K., an elderly man, from a long - term care facility to his home .

16. The patient was dropped while strapped to a gurney while being

removed from the emergency vehicle , and struck his head. He subsequently

died from a combinat ion of his injuries and his end - of - life conditions .

17. At the time of the incident, Petitioner was a recent EMT licensee and

was 20 years old.

18. The charges against the two EMTs involved in the incident, Petitioner

and Pagliarulo, were brought two years after the incident occurred. The

charges were brought to the DepartmentÔs attention after a complaint was

filed by I.K.Ôs son.

19. The Department initiated investigations against both EMTs in

response to the complaint.

20. The case against Pagliarulo was considered separately by the

Department, resulting in a settlement agreement between the two parties,

executed on or about June 29, 2020.

21. Pagliarulo, during an interview with the DepartmentÔs investigator,

clearly and unequivocally stated that both he and Petitioner were handling

the stretcher , w ith I.K. strapped to it, when it overturned. Pagliarulo further

described where he and Petitioner were standing in relation to the stretcher

while removing it from the ambulance and in picking it up after it fe ll.

22. The Department investigator also requested to interview Petitioner;

however, she declined an interview and instead provided a written statement

to the Department.

23. PetitionerÔs brief written statement , dated October 29, 2018, included

a general denial that she deviated from the standard of care; however,

Petitioner did not directly address any of the allegations in the complaint,

including who was handling the stretcher at the time I.K. was dropped.

Specifically, all she stated regarding the inci dent was the following:

As it pertains to the allegations I may have violated

my Practice Act as an EMT, I deny these

allegations. As part of my employment with AMR I

underwent extensive training as to loading and

unloading of patients on a stretcher which included

viewing training videos from the stretcher

manufacturer and participating in field training on

several occasions with a superior specifically

related to the loading and unloading of patients

while on a stretcher. As such, prior to the transport

o f the patient I received extensive training in

preparation of attending to patients such as I.K. In

conclusion, I believe that my care provided to

Patient I.K. on May 19, 2018, met the prevailing

standard of care for my Practice Act.

24. However, Petitio nerÔs handwritten and signed , yet unsworn, statement

given on May 17, 2018, the day of the incident, provides almost

contemporaneous details of her version of the events , in pertinent part, as

follows :

SUBJECT OF REPORT: Pt [patient] fell with

stretcher.

SUMMARY: crew arrived to pt destination. Due to

rain we waited a few minutes Pt wanted to go

inside. I Ariana proceeded to look for an elevator

Because [sic] all we seen [sic] was stairs. As I found

an elevator I walked back to the truck to tell my

partner there was an elevator[.] [H]e acknowledged

& proceeded to take out stretcher. I was about

10 feet away when pt fell with the stretcher on pts

left side. Me and my partner and another

bystander turned patient Back [sic] on the wheels

of the stretcher. È I Ariana covered pts [sic] skin

tears and lacerations and contacted C8 for further

directions. Pt was transferred to West Boca.

The ÑbystanderÒ referenced in PetitionerÔs handwritten statement was not

identified.

25. PagliaruloÔs handwritten, unsigned repor t acknowledged the

inclement weather, but did not include any information regarding

PetitionerÔs having gone in search of an elevator and, therefore, not being

present when he loaded I.K. onto the stretcher. He stated that Ñhe and his

crew immediately pick ed up the stretcher,Ò but did not confirm that

Petitioner was ten feet away when the stretcher overturned or that he had

put I.K. on the stretcher himself. He did not mention a bystander being

present at the time the stretcher overturned.

26. PetitionerÔs report indicates that Pagliarulo alone removed the

stretcher and did not state that the decision to do so was made jointly.

PagliaruloÔs report is silent on the issue of who was handling the stretcher at

the time it fell; however, in all other respects, th e information contained in

his report is consistent with the more detailed statement he later provided to

a Department investigator.

27. The Department also attempted to obtain investigative documents

from PetitionerÔs employer, AMR, but AMR twice refused to provide these

documents, citing attorney - client privilege.

28. The Department contracted with a licensed EMT expert , Bradley

Mayberry (ÑMayberryÒ) , to review the case for potential violations of the

standard of care . Mayberry holds numerous certificati ons, most notably, as

an EMT, a paramedic, and a firefighter. He is qualified by virtue of his

education, training, and experience to give an expert opinion in this matter.

29. Mayberry stated that dropping a patient is always a violation of the

standard o f care for EMTs, regardless of whether injuries occurred as a

result. He further stated that EMTs receive extensive training in the safe

operation of stretchers in order to avoid incidents such as the one occurring

here.

30 . In conducting his review of the case, Mayberry stated that he reviewed

all of the DepartmentÔs investigative materials, including Petitioner Ôs brief

response to the allegations. However, in his report dated May 6, 2019, he

makes no mention of PetitionerÔs May 17, 2018, handwritten state ment (see

paragraph 24 above) in which she states she was returning from having

found the elevator to I.K.Ôs apartment and witnessed the overturning of the

gurney when she was still ten feet away from the gurney . This constitutes a

significant omission in his report and was either due to his not having seen

PetitionerÔs May 17 , 2018, statement or not giving it any weight in his

conclusions that the standard of care was violated.

31. According to the exhibits admitted at hearing, the DepartmentÔs

ex pert rece ived from the DepartmentÔs counsel, Rose Garrison, additional

documents to review, Supplemental Report 1, dated May 24, 2019, and

Supplemental Report 2, dated October 21, 2019. Contained in these reports

was the statement from Petitioner dated May 17, 2018 (see paragraph 24

above) , in which she claimed to have been approaching Pagliarulo from the

elevator as she witnessed the gurney overturn. Mayberry stated, in a letter

dated February 28, 2020, that this additional information did not change his

opinion re garding a deviation from the standard of care. Further, he stated,

receipt of PetitionerÔs May 17 , 2018, statement did not cause him to change

his opinion because it is not Ñwithin my expertise to determine what details

are factual.Ò

3 2 . Petitioner was ent itled to receive and review a copy of the

DepartmentÔs full investigative file, including the expertÔs written opinion,

and to submit a response for the P CP to consider prior to making its

determination of probable cause, Petitioner did not avail herself o f this

opportunity. She could have, either on her own or with assistance of counsel,

restated the facts she set forth in her May 17, 2018, statement , in the form of

a sworn affidavit or deposition, or expanded on them prior to the PCP

meeting.

3 3 . The Depa rtmentÔs investigative report of Petitioner, signed by Jenna

Murphy (ÑMurphyÒ), m edical m alpractice i nvestigator, and accepted into

evidence without objection at hearing, bears discussion. In MurphyÔs

interview of Pagliarulo, she documented that , due to th e inclement weather

(in his words, Ñtropical storm forceÒ with rain, wind, and lightning), he called

dispatch to request a delay in removing I.K. from the ambulance, but was

told they Ñwere not allowed to wait any longer.Ò H e acknowledged Petitioner

had go ne to look for an elevator while he stayed in the ambulance with I.K. ,

but stated that he waited to put I.K. on a stretcher until Petitioner returned.

Pagliarulo stated that Petitioner was on the side of the stretcher, while he

was at the head of the stret cher, when it Ñvery quickly tippedÒ to the side and

Ñvery quicklyÒ was picked back up.

3 4 . Petitioner refused to give any more information to the investigator

when called on October 10, 2018, other than confirming her physical address,

her email address, a nd making a request that Murphy send any

correspondence to her via email. Murphy noted in her report that P etitioner

did not give a recorded statement on that date, and that a computer

background check conducted on October 12, 2018, showed that P etitioner had

never been charged with a felony or misdemeanor in Florida as an adult.

3 5 . Pagliarulo settled the case brought against him by the Department,

DOH Case No. 2020 - 0187, via a settlement agreement executed by the

parties on June 29, 2020, and made part of a F inal O rder from the

Department on July 23, 2020. Pursuant to the agreement, he received a letter

of concern against his EMT certification, a $1,500 fine, and agreed to

reimburse the Department $2,200 in costs.

3 6 . It was not until January 29, 2021, wh en Petitioner took PagliaruloÔs

deposition, that he made statements, under oath, that directly contradicted

what he had previously told the DepartmentÔs investigators. Shortly after

this deposition, the DepartmentÔs unopposed Motion to Relinquish

Jurisdict ion was granted. The PCP then reconsidered the matter in light of

this new information and dismissed the case against Petitioner.

3 7 . The transcript of PagliaruloÔs deposition was not filed in the

underlying case here, nor was it offered into evidence at t he brief hearing

conducted in this matter. The undersigned can only speculate whether

Pagliarulo testified under oath that he had misstated the facts concerning

PetitionerÔs involvement, or lack thereof, in the placing o f I.K. on the gurney

or whether she was in transit to the ambulance from having located the

elevator when she witnessed the gurney overturn with Pagliarulo attempting

to move I.K. by himself. Such speculation is not enough evidence to result in

specific factual findings regarding the veracit y of the only piece of

contemporaneous evidence demonstrating PetitionerÔs lack of involvement in

I.K.Ôs fall, her handwritten, unsworn statement dated May 17, 2018.

3 8 . Further, the undersigned cannot conclude, as a matter of fact, that the

PCP did not h ave that statement before it when it determined probable cause

existed to bring the AC against Petitioner. Had competent evidence been

produced to the undersigned that the PCP considered PetitionerÔs version of

what occurred in the transport of I.K. , resul ting in his fall and injuries, it is

possible a conclusion could be reached here that the PCPÔs finding of probable

cause was not substantially justified. PetitionerÔs failure or refusal to follow

up and convince the PCP that she was not directly involved in the tragic

incident has made it impossible for the undersigned to conclude that the PCP

determination of probable cause was not substantially justified at the time of

its decision.

Ultimate Facts

3 9 . Petitioner denied, in a handwritten, unsworn, and n early

contemporaneous statement, any wrongdoing in her role of assisting

Pagliarulo with placing I.K. on the stretcher and allowing it to fall, thereby

severely injuring him. Pagliarulo unequivocally implicated her in the

incident.

40 . Based upon the evide nce available to the P CP at the time probable

cause was found (and not knowing whether the PCP even saw the

handwritten statement from Petitioner) , it was reasonable for the PCP, at the

time of its initial consideration of the case against Petitioner, to b elieve that

both Petitioner and Pagliarulo were responsible for the decision to remove

I.K. from the ambulance during inclement weather and that both were

handling the stretcher when it fell.

4 1 . Based upon the foregoing, and the evidence adduced at hearin g

regarding what was known to the PCP at the time probable cause was found,

there was a reasonable basis in law and fact to believe that Petitioner

engaged in unprofessional conduct, including a failure to conform to the

minimum prevailing standard of acce ptable practice, in her care of I.K .

4 2 . Therefore, the DepartmentÔs filing of the AC was substantially

justified.

C ONCLUSIONS O F L AW

4 3 . DOAH has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding

pursuant to sections 57.111, 120.569, and 120. 57(1), Florida Statutes (20 19 ).

The undersigned has final order authority pursuant to section 57.111(4)(d).

4 4 . Section 57.111 provides , in relevant part:

(4)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, an award

of attorneyÔs fees and costs shall be made to a

pr evailing small business party in any adjudicatory

proceeding or administrative proceeding pursuant

to chapter 120 initiated by a state agency, unless

the actions of the agency were substantially

justified or special circumstances exist which would

make the award unjust.

4 5 . Once the party seeking fees under section 57.111 proves that it is a

prevailing small business party, the burden shifts to the government agency

to show that its action in initiating the proceeding was Ñsubstantially

justified.Ò Helmy v . DepÔt of Bus. & Pro fÔl Reg. , 707 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1998). The parties stipulated that Petitioner is a small business

prevailing party, thereby shifting the burden to the Department.

4 6 . Substantial justification is defined by section 57.111(3 )(e) as Ña

reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a state

agency.Ò

4 7 . The Ñsubstantially justifiedÒ standard is not so strict as to require the

agency to demonstrate that its actions are correct; rather, an agency need

only prese nt an argument for its actions that could satisfy a reasonable

person. Ag. for Health Care Admin. v. MVP Health, Inc. , 74 So. 3d 1141, 1144

(Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

4 8 . F or the Department to demonstrate that it had substantial

justification for its actions, th e P CP must have had a solid, though not

necessarily correct, basis in law and fact for finding probable cause and

directing the filing of the AC . See Fish v. Dep't of Health , Bd. of Dentistry ,

825 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). To sustain a determina tion of

probable cause, there must be some evidence considered by the P CP that

would Ñreasonably indicate that the violation occurred.Ò Id .

4 9 . A decision to prosecute that turns on a credibility assessment has a

reasonable basis in law and fact. DepÔt of Health , Bd. of Med. v. Thomas ,

890 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

50 . When determining whether substantial justification exists to support

the filing of an AC , the tribunal must only examine the information before

the P CP at the time it found that pr obable cause existed and directed that an

AC be filed. DepÔt of Health , Bd. of Physical Therapy Practice v. Cralle ,

852 So. 2d 930, 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Fish , 825 So. 2d at 423).

ÑSubsequent discoveries do not vitiate the reasonableness of the a ctions of the

board at the time they made their probable cause determinations.Ò Cralle ,

852 So. 2d at 933 ( citing Ag. f or Health Care Admin. v. Gonzalez , 657 S o . 2d

56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ) .

5 1 . The reviewing body in a fees case Ñmay not consider any new ev idence

which arose at a fee hearing, but must focus exclusively upon the information

available to the agency at the time that it acted.Ò MVP Health, Inc. , 74 So. 3d

at 1144.

5 2 . The central focus of PetitionerÔs argument that she is entitled to fees

under the Ñsubstantially justifiedÒ standard is that she made a brief

statement, set forth in paragraph 24 above, that Pagliarulo was solely

responsible for attempting to transport I.K. to his home while she was

looking for an elevator. She was certain that she was still ten feet away from

the gurney when it tipped over under the lack of due care by Pagliarulo.

What is unusual here is that, in her subsequent more detailed statement to

the DepartmentÔs investigator, she makes only conclusory remarks that she

did n ot deviate from the standard of care, not mentioning her actions set

forth in her previous statement or expounding on it.

53. On the DepartmentÔs side, after reviewing the more than 1,000 pages

of documents, including both investigative reports and patien t records for

I.K., the PCP found probable cause to bring an AC against Petitioner. There

was no transcript of the PCP provided as evidence at hearing, so the

undersigned is left to guess as to whether the PCP was aware of the

exculpatory statement given b y Petitioner within days of the incident.

Petitioner did not testify before the undersigned and subject herself to cross -

examination, so the undersigned is left to determine whether the brief

statement she wrote on May 17, 2018, is enough to overcome Pagli aruloÔs

insistence of Petitioner's involvement from the date of the incident, through

the PCP Ôs determination of probable cause to proceed made on May 19, 2020 ,

all the way until his deposition was taken on January 29, 2021. At best, the

conflicting statem ents of Petitioner and Pagliarulo represent disputed issues

of material fact. Of course, the undersigned learned at hearing , from the

representations of counsel for Petitioner and from the DepartmentÔs action

following PagliaruloÔs deposition, that Petitio ner was being truthful all along.

The only issue remaining is, therefore, whether the PCP was Ñsubstantially

justifiedÒ in authorizing the filing of the one - count AC on May 19, 2020. In

short, does the existence of the one handwritten, unsworn statement fr om

Petitioner to the DepartmentÔs investigator, in and of itself, suffice to

substantially justify the PCPÔs finding of probable cause? If the PCP knew in

May 20 20 what it learned in May 2021, the answer would be self - evident: the

finding of probable cause to bring an AC against Petitioner was not

substantially justified. However, such was not the case in May 2020.

54. From the affidavit filed by counsel for Petitioner, dated June 17, 2021,

it is apparent that Petitioner did not retain legal counsel until o n or about

July 21, 2020. This was after the PCP found probable cause to authorize the

Department to issue the AC against Petitioner. It follows that Petitioner did

not have the benefit of counsel prior to that date. Looking at the assistance

given to her by counsel, Petitioner chose wisely because , once retained, her

counsel took the necessary steps to prove both that she was truthful in her

explanation of her role concerning the incident with I.K. on the gurney on

May 16, 2018, and that Pagliarulo was unt ruthful in recounting his version of

what transpired on that date to the DepartmentÔs investigator.

55. The undersigned is reasonably certain that, had counsel for Petitioner

been retained prior to the PCP meeting on May 19, 2020, he would have

taken the necessary steps to present a strong er case to the Department and

the PCP in PetitionerÔs defense. This could very well have resulted in there

having been no probable cause found when the PCP met that day. We will

never know for sure because counsel had not been retained to assist

Petitioner prior to the May 19, 2020, meeting of the PCP. Clearly, once

counsel intervened on behalf of Petitioner, a professional review of the

existing evidence was conducted ; discovery was conducted and the true facts

of the cas e were revealed when Pagliarulo changed his earlier version of the

events; and the Department, when presented with the newly - revealed

evidence, moved to relinquish jurisdiction, which allowed the reconvened

PCP to make its determination that no probable ca use continued to exist to

proceed with this matter. It is evident that PetitionerÔs wise move in hir ing

highly competent counsel resulted in her convincing the Department to

dismiss the case. Unfortunately, her hiring of counsel came too late for her to

es tablish liability for the Department to pay the attorneyÔs fees and costs

already incurred.

56. Based upon the foregoing, the PCP was substantially justified in

finding probable cause to authorize the filing of an AC against Petitioner in

May 2020, despit e being proven otherwise a year later . Therefore, Petitioner

is not entitled to attorneyÔs fees under section 57.111.

O RDER

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

O RDERED that the Motion for AttorneyÔs Fees filed by Petitio ner is hereby

denied.

D ONE A ND O RDERED this 29th day of September , 2021 , in Tallahassee,

Leon County, Florida.

S

R OBERT S. C OHEN

Administrative Law Judge

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 29th day of September , 2021 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

David M. Beckerman, Esquire Chase E. Den Beste, Esquire

David M. Beckerman, P.A. Department of Health

7000 West Palmetto Park Road , Suite 500 Prosecution Services Unit

Boca Raton, Flori da 33433 4052 Bald Cypress Way , Bin C - 65

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3265

Kimberly Lauren Marshall, Esquire

Department of Health Joseph A. Ladapo, M.D. , Ph.D.

Prosecution Services Unit State Surgeon General

4052 Bald Cypress Way , Bin C - 65 Department of Health

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3265 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A - 00

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1701

Louise St. Laurent, Gen eral Counsel

Department of Health Wanda Young, Agency Clerk

Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health

4052 Bald Cypre ss Way, Bin C - 65 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A - 02

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3265 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 1703

N OTICE O F R IGHT T O J UDICIAL R EVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial

review pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are

governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are

commenced by filing the original notice of administrative ap peal with the

agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within 30 days of

rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy of the notice, accompanied

by any filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the d istrict c ourt of

a ppeal in the appellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters

or where a party resides or as otherwise provided by law.