21-002476 Lester Bohnenblust vs. Miami Police Relief And Pension Fund Status: Closed Recommended Order on Wednesday, January 26, 2022.

Summary: Respondent proved that Petitioner was convicted of specified criminal offenses requiring forfeiture of his rights and benefits under the pension plan.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

L ESTER B OHNENBLUST ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 21 - 2476

M IAMI P OLICE R ELIEF A ND P ENSION

F UND ,

Respondent .

/

R ECOMMEN DED O RDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing in this case was conducted by video

conference via Zoom on November 1, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge

June C. McKinney of the Division of Administrative Hearings (ÑDOAHÒ).

A PPEARANCES

For Petitioner: R awsi Williams, Esquire

Rawsi Williams Law Group

Wells Fargo Center, Suite 200

333 Southeast Second Avenue

Miami, Florida 33131

For Respondent: Gregg Rossman, Esquire

Rossman Legal

6840 Griffin Road

Davie, Florida 33314

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE

Whether Petitioner Lester Bohnenblust (ÑBo hnenblustÒ or ÑPetitionerÒ)

was convicted of a specified offense requiring forfeiture of his pension rights

and benefits pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes.

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On July 17, 2019, the Board of Trustees of Respondent Miami Pol ice

Relief and Pension Fund (ÑFundÒ or ÑRespondentÒ) notified Petitioner by a

Notice of Proposed Agency Action (ÑNoticeÒ) of its intention to terminate and

forfeit his rights, privileges, and retirement benefits from the pension fund to

which he Ñmay be en titled to or as previously received from the Fund

pursuant to section 112.3173.Ò

Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing in

Response to RespondentÔs Notice of Proposed Forfeiture of Retirement

Benefits (ÑPetitionÒ). Subsequent ly, the Petition was referred to DOAH . The

case was assigned to the undersigned administrative law judge.

The case was noticed for hearing on October 13, 2021. The parties

stipulated to continue the final hearing. Pursuant to notice, the final hearing

pr oceeded as rescheduled on November 1, 2021.

The parties filed a Joint Pre - hearing Stipulation in which they identified

stipulated facts for which no further proof would be necessary, and the

relevant facts stipulated therein are accepted and made part of the Findings

of Fact below. The parties stipulated that no minor 13 years of age or under

was involved in the instant case as alleged in the Notice.

At the final hearing, the undersigned took official notice of

section 397.575, Florida Statutes, the March man Act. Petitioner presented

three witnesses: Lizbeth Martin; Dennis Sanchez; and Bohnenblust.

PetitionerÔs Exhibits A through G were received into evidence. Respondent

presented the testimony of three witnesses: Lorena Rodriguez; James

Nicholson; and Boh nenblust. RespondentÔs Exhibits A through C were

received into evidence.

At the close of the hearing, the parties stipulated that their proposed

recommended orders would be filed within 20 days of the filing of the

transcript at DOAH. The proceeding was re corded and transcribed . On

December 1, 2021, the Transcript was filed at DOAH . Petitioner requested an

unopposed extension to file the proposed recommended order, which the

undersigned granted. Both parties filed proposed recommended orders, which

have bee n considered in preparation of this Recommended Order.

Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the versions in

effect at the time of the alleged violations.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

1. Bohnenblust was employed with the City of Miami police de partment

for approximately 21 years and last held the job of a police officer.

2. While employed with the City of Miami, Bohnenblust qualified for

pension benefits under the Fund . The Fund is a defined benefit plan.

3. On Wednesday, May 23, 2018, Bohnenblu st was scheduled to work in

uniform, and he was assigned to road patrol in the Brick el l area, south

district, on the day shift from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

4. That same morning, Bohnenblust was deposed at the State AttorneyÔs

Office. Petitioner entered a si gnal 8 on his daily activity report, 1 indicating he

was attending court.

5. That same day, Dennis Sanchez (ÑMr. SanchezÒ), PetitionerÔs brother -

in - law, took his 17 - year - old daughter, Emily Sanchez (ÑMs. SanchezÒ or

ÑnieceÒ) 2 to Jackson Memorial Healthcare (ÑJacksonÒ) because he believed she

was in crisis and wanted to commit suicide.

1 Petitioner had to input each work location in his daily activity report during his patrol

shift.

2 Ms. Sanchez is PetitionerÔs niece.

6. Ms. Sanchez has a drug history and had been in the Jackson facility the

previous weekend and discharged.

7. On May 23, 2018, when Mr. Sanchez brought Ms. Sanchez back to

Jackson, Ms. Sanchez was admitted for evaluation at noon. After her

evaluation, it was determined that she did not meet the criteria to be

recommitted to the inpatient facility and she was discharged.

8. When Bohnenblust finished the deposition, he recei ved a personal call

from Lizbeth Martin (ÑMartinÒ), his sister - in - law, the mother of his niece ,

Ms. Sanchez. Martin requested Petitioner go to Jackson to assist Mr. Sanchez

in understanding his nieceÔs discharge paperwork that Jackson had provided .

The dis charge paperwork was written in English . Mr. SanchezÔs primary

language is Spanish.

9. After the conversation, Bohnenblust went to Jackson at MartinÔs

request to help Mr. Sanchez understand the discharge paperwork instead of

returning to his district to h is work duties on his shift.

10. Petitioner asked the sergeant attending the deposition, not his

immediate supervisor, to go to Jackson.

11. Upon arrival at Jackson around 1:59 p.m. , Petitioner , in his official

City of Miami police uniform with his badge, went to the reception area and

told them that he needed to go to the mental health unit. The reception area

buzzed him in because he was in a police uniform.

12. Petitioner went to the back of the facility, contacted Mr. Sanchez, and

read his nieceÔs disc harge paperwork . The discharge paperwork Petitioner

reviewed stated that his niece had been admitted that same day at noon; that

there was a minor evaluation; instructed Ms. Sanchez to see a primary care

physician within one or two days; and scheduled Ms. Sanchez for an

outpatient appointment on May 28, 2018, at 9:00 a.m.

13. Around the same time, James Nicholson (ÑNicholsonÒ), the nurse

manager, was in a staff meeting . The staff reported to him that Marie Joseph

(ÑJosephÒ), charge nurse, might need help. Nicholson looked up and saw

Petitioner, a uniformed police officer, and Joseph.

14. Bohnenblust was able to speak to the charge nurse about his niece and

was informed his niece had been discharged from Jackson that day.

15. Bohnenblust did not have any int eraction with his niece that day. He

only observed her through the glass and saw her pacing and screaming.

16. Bohnenblust decided he wanted to recommit his niece to Jackson

involuntarily and would do so as a police officer under the Marchman Act. 3

17. B ohnenblust left the facility to return to his police car in the Jackson

parking lot. He took approximately 20 minutes to fill out a Marchman Act

form to have his niece committed to Jackson.

18. Bohnenblust completed the biographical information on the

Mar chman Act form. In the justification section on the form , requesting

Ñcircumstances under which the person was taken into custody, and which

support this opinion , Ò Petitioner provided the following:

Consumer has lost all control in regards to

substance abu se (Marijuana) and because of such

co - occurring mental health disorder has caused the

Consumer to attempt to kill herself latest episode

on Saturday (by walking in and out of traffic

endangering herself and others. Consumer is in

dire need of professional assistance. Consumer

when gi[v]en prescriptions has refused to take her

medications.

Petitioner called in and requested a case number for the form, printed the

form, and returned to Jackson's mental health unit to commit his niece.

19. Around 2:32 p.m., Bohnenblust also changed his daily activity report

from a signal 8 , court, to signal 56, Baker Act.

20. When NicholsonÔs meeting ended, he went to see what was going on.

21. Petitioner was no longer present.

3 The Marchman Act provides police officers a way to initiate an individual with a substance

ab use disorder to be involuntarily committed to a treatment facility for evaluation,

stabilization, and treatment.

22. Soon thereafter, Nicholson observed Bohnen blust back in the facility

waving paper in his hand and pointing to staff to buzz him in. After

Petitioner was let in, he went to address Joseph , accompanied by

Mr. Sanchez and Ms. Sanchez , in the unauthorized in - patient side of the

facility. This was a se cured area where only authorized personnel were

allowed.

23. Upon seeing the policeman, father, and daughter in the unauthorized

in - patient side of the unit, Nicholson approached Petitioner, Mr. Sanchez,

and Ms. Sanchez and told them they needed to go outs ide, while dressed in a

suit and tie with his identification badge clipped to his jacket. 4

24. Nicholson was enforcing the rules that prohibited unauthorized

individuals from being on the in - patient side of the facility.

25. Mr. Sanchez and Ms. Sanchez hea ded outside after being instructed to

do so by Nicholson.

26. Bohnenblust did not leave and tried to give Nicholson the paperwork.

Nicholson repeated to him to leave.

27. Bohnenblust demanded NicholsonÔs identification. At some point,

Bohnenblust walked up behind Nicholson and grabbed him by the collar of

his suit jacket, moving Nicholson forward and demanding his identification.

28. Bohnenblust continued to use force to hold Nicholson by the back of

his suit jacket, and Petitioner and Nicholson got into a verbal dispute.

Nicholson began yelling for help hysterically. Bohnenblust demanded

Nicholson provide him his identification several times . The identification

badge was clipped to NicholsonÔs suit jacket and turned around backward.

29. While holding Ni cholson by his collar, Petitioner knocked Nicholson on

the ground, and his knee was bruised . Ultimately, Petitioner told Nicholson

he was placing him under arrest, and he called for officer backup.

4 Mr. Sanchez testified he assumed that Nicholson was the manager the way he was dressed.

The undersigned fails to find PetitionerÔs testimony credible that he did n o t know Nicholson

was a Jackson employee when he was in a suit and tie and in the secured area of the facility.

30. NicholsonÔs screams caused employees to come see what was

occurring.

31. Around 2:50 p.m. , approximately four officers arrived at Jackson to

assist Bohnenblust and placed Nicholson in handcuffs . The officers detained

Nicholson , and he was taken to a room for questioning.

32. Nicholson was separated from Peti tioner, and he remained in

handcuffs for about 45 minutes before being released.

33. After the incident between Bohnenblust and Nicholson, internal

affairs of the City of Miami conducted an on - location investigation at Jackson

while Nicholson was still de tained .

34. Lorena Rodriguez (ÑRodriguezÒ) oversaw the internal affairs

investigation . She collected the statements from the various witnesses and

viewed JacksonÔs video recordings from the time when Bohnenblust arrived

at Jackson, including the incident with Nicholson.

35. Rodriquez interviewed Nicholson as part of the internal affairs

investigation. Nicholson was allowed to leave the facility around 9:00 p.m .

His work shift had officially ended around 6:30 p.m.

36. After Nicholson was released, he was no t charged with any criminal

offenses .

37. Petitioner was not allowed to charge Nicholson with any crime.

38. Ms. Sanchez was not committed to Jackson under the Marchman Act.

39. On or about December 13, 2018, Bohnenblust was criminally charged

by Informa tion with felony battery on a person 65 year[s] of age or older and

felony false imprisonment in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami -

Dade County, Florida , in Case No. F18 - 24682.

40. The Information for Case No. F18 - 24682 detailed the charges and

alleged , in relevant part, the following:

COUNT 1

LESTER A BOHNENBLUST, on or about May 23,

2018, in the County and State aforesaid, did

unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly commit

battery upon James Nicholson, a person sixty - five

(65) years of age or older, by actually and

intentionally touching or striking said person

against said personÔs will and/or causing bodily

harm, to wit: bruise to left knee, in violation of

s. 784.03 and s. 784.08(2)(c), Fla. Stat., contrary to

the form of the Statute in such cases made and

provided, and against the peace and dignity of the

State of Florida.

COUNT 2

And the aforesaid Assistant State Attorney, under

oath, further information makes LESTER A

BOHNENBLUST, on or about May 23, 2018, in the

County and State aforesa id, without lawful

authority did then and there forcibly by threat, or

secretly confine, abduct, imprison or restrain

another person, to wit: James Nicholson, against

that personÔs will. In violation of s. 787.02(2), Fla.

Stat., contrary to the form of the Statutes in such

cases made and provided, and against the peace

and dignity of the State of Florida.

41. On or about April 2, 2019, the City of Miami terminated BohnenblustÔs

employment as the disciplinary action imposed solely for his actions

regarding the incident with Nicholson at Jackson on May 23, 2018.

42. On or about June 7, 2019, Bohnenblust went to a jury trial on the two

felony charges and was found guilty and convicted of both counts, felony

battery on a person 65 years of age or older and fals e imprisonment .

43. On July 26, 2019, the judge adjudicated Petitioner guilty on the two

counts, and sentenced him to 45 days in Dade County jail and three yearsÔ

probation for his convictions.

44. On July 17, 2019, the Board of Trustees of the Fund notif ied Petitioner

of its intention to terminate and forfeit his rights, privileges, and retirement

benefits to which he had been entitled.

U LTIMATE F INDINGS OF F ACT

45. At hearing, Martin testified she called Bohnenblust requesting that he

go to Jackson to h elp Mr. Sanchez understand Ms. SanchezÔs discharge

paperwork . The evidence shows that Bohnenblust reported to Jackson in a

personal capacity to help his brother - in - law read his nieceÔs discharge

paperwork.

46. However, Bohnenblust changed his role while at Jackson . He began

acting in his official capacity as a police officer on duty when he decided to

take it upon himself to attempt to take the steps to have his niece

involuntarily recommitted by the Marchman Act process . Bohnenblust

changed his signal to 5 6, requested a case number for his nieceÔs Marchman

Act paperwork, and filled out the Marchman Act form.

47. Bohnenblust testified that he was Ñon dutyÒ and admitted , at hearing ,

that he was only admitted to the mental health unit at Jackson because he

was a police officer in uniform with a badge.

48. Petitioner also explained , at hearing , that he was aware that the

Marchman Act required a serious drug problem and that the substance abuse

had to be so severe that it created a danger. He testified that he w as

concerned about his nieceÔs possible suicide.

49. PetitionerÔs testimony that his experience ; Marchman Act certification

and training; personal knowledge of his nieceÔs drug history; observations of

his niece through the glass door pacing and yelling; t he conversation with her

father about her wanting to kill herself; and her marijuana drug use made

him determine that he should involuntarily commit her under the Marchman

Act is not found to be persuasive or credible.

50. Instead, the following competent substantial evidence in the record

demonstrates that Petitioner attempted to use his power as a police officer to

accomplish what he wanted for his niece, involuntary commitment, contrary

to JacksonÔs medical decision to discharge her : Bohnenblust Ôs testi mony at

hearing that he wanted to commit his niece even though he could not

remember the last time he had seen her; Petitioner did not even interact with

his niece on the day of the incident; PetitionerÔs full knowledge that his niece

had been evaluated th at day because he reviewed her Jackson discharge

paperwork that specifically stated she had been ÑadmittedÒ at noon, had a

minor Ñevaluation,Ò and was to schedule a follow up with her primary care

physician in one or two days, and had a follow - up appointme nt five days later

on May 28, 2018; and BohnenblustÔs admission at hearing that he spoke to

the charge nurse who informed him that his niece had been discharged.

51. Additionally, the evidence confirms that there was no dire need of

professional services a s stated in the Marchman Act form Bohnenblust

created on the date of the incident . PetitionerÔs timeline for Ms. SanchezÔs

circumstances for the involuntary commitment in the Marchman Act

paperwork stated that his nieceÔs latest attempt Ñto kill herself È [was] on

Saturday,Ò four days prior. Moreover, she had already had an evaluation that

same day , and Jackson discharged her.

52. Petitioner attempted to use his powers as a police officer to circumvent

JacksonÔs discharge decision, of which he was fully aw are. Also, Petitioner

tried to get an involuntary commitment for his niece with the knowledge of

the medical discharge.

53. To that end, Bohnenblust committed felony crimes while trying to get

his niece involuntarily committed by the Marchman Act . Petitio nerÔs actions

as alleged in the Information formed the basis for the felony convictions of

sections 784.03 and 784.08(2)(c) , Florida Statutes , battery upon a person over

65 years of age or older, and section 787.02(2), Florida Statutes, false

imprisonment, in Case No. F18 - 24682.

54. Each felony conviction occurred during , and was related to ,

PetitionerÔs employment with the City of Miami.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

55 . DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this

action pursuant to secti ons 120.57(1) and 112.3173(5), Florida Statutes.

56. Respondent has the burden of providing by a preponderance of the

evidence that Petitioner has forfeited his retirement benefits. Wilson v. DepÔt

of Admin., Div. of Ret ., 538 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989 ).

57. Article II, section 8(d) of the Florida Constitution, sets forth the ethical

standards for public officers and employees in government and provides, in

pertinent part:

Section 8. Ethics in government Ð A public office is

a public trust. The people sh all have the right to

secure and sustain that trust against abuse. To

assure this right:

* * *

(d) Any public officer or employee who is convicted

of a felony involving a breach of public trust shall

be subject to forfeiture of rights and privile ges

under a public retirement system or pension plan

in such manner as may be provided by law.

58. The Florida Legislature enacted section 112.3173 and entitled it

ÑFelonies involving breach of public trust and other specified offenses by

public officers and employees; forfeiture of retirement benefitsÒ to set forth

the parameters for forfeiture.

59. Because forfeitures are not favored in Florida, the pension forfeiture

statute should be strictly construed. Williams v. Christian , 335 So. 2d 358,

361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).

60. Section 112.3173(3) defines forfeiture and provides, in relevant part:

(3) FORFEITURE. Ð Any public officer or employee

who is convicted of a specified offense committed

prior to retirement, or whose office or employment

is terminated by reason of his or her admitted

commission, aid, or abetment of a specified offense,

shall forfeit all rights and benefits under any public

retirement system of which he or she is a member,

except for the return of his or her accumulated

contributions as of the date of termination.

61. Section 112.3173(2)(a) provides that ÑconvictionÒ and ÑconvictedÒ mean

an adjudication of guilt by a court of competent jurisdiction; a plea of guilty

or of nolo contendere; a jury verdict of guilty when adjudication of guilt is

withheld and the accused is placed on probation; or a conviction by the

Senate of an impeachable offense.

62. Section 112.3173(2)(e) sets forth the specified offenses mandated for a

forfeiture of retirement and provides, in relevant part:

(2) (e) ÑSpec ified offenseÒ means:

1. The committing, aiding, or abetting of an

embezzlement of public funds;

2. The committing, aiding, or abetting of any theft

by a public officer or employee from his or her

employer;

3. Bribery in connection with the employment o f a

public officer or employee;

4. Any felony specified in chapter 838, except

ss. 838.15 and 838.16;

5. The committing of an impeachable offense;

6. The committing of any felony by a public officer

or employee who, willfully and with intent to

defraud the public or the public agency for which

the public officer or employee acts or in which he or

she is employed of the right to receive the faithful

performance of his or her duty as a public officer or

employee, realizes or obtains, or attempts to realize

or obtain, a profit, gain, or advantage for himself or

herself or for some other person through the use or

attempted use of the power, rights, privileges,

duties, or position of his or her public office or

employment position; or

7. The committing on or after October 1, 2008, of

any felony defined in s. 800.04 against a victim

younger than 16 years of ag e, or any felony defined

in chapter 794 against a victim younger than 18

years of age, by a public officer or employee through

the use or attempted use of power, rights,

privileges, duties, or position of his or her public

office or employment position.

6 3. The record in this case is void of evidence that Petitioner violated any

of the specified offenses set forth in subparagraphs 1. through 5. or 7. of

section 112.3173(2)(e). If Bohnenblust is to be subjected to the forfeiture of

his pension, his offense must be found to meet the conditions of the Ñcatch - allÒ

category set forth in subparagraph 6. of section 112.3173(2)(e). Jenne v. DepÔt

of Mgmt. Servs., Div. of Ret. , 36 So. 3d 738, 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Sim c ox

v. City of Hollywood Police Officers Ô Ret. Sys ., 988 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 4th

2008).

64. To constitute a "specified offense" under section 112.3173(2)(e)6., the

offense in question must meet all the following elements:

(a) It is a felony;

(b) It was committed by a public employee;

(c) It was do ne willfully and with intent to defraud

the public or the employee's public employer of the

right to receive the faithful performance of the

employee's duty;

(d) It was done to obtain a profit, gain or advantage

for the employee or some other person; and

(e) It was done through the use or attempted use of

the power, rights, privileges, duties, or position of

his public employment.

Bollone v. Dep't of Mgmt. Serv s., Div. of Ret. , 100 So. 3d 1276, 1280 - 81 (Fla.

1st DCA 2012).

65. Petitioner contends that he acted in good faith with his actions toward

Nicholson and concerning Ms. Sanchez and that his actions do not meet the

definition of a specified offense. However, the undersigned finds that such

assertions are misplaced. Contrary to PetitionerÔs claims, th e Findings of

Fact above demonstrate Petitioner acted willfully with intent to defraud the

public of the right to receive the faithful performance of his duties.

Specifically, Petitioner used his job duties as a police officer to attempt to

implement the M archman Act, a police power, with the intention to

circumvent JacksonÔs decision not to recommit his niece, which meets the

intent to defraud element of the statute. Furthermore, it is uncontested that

Bohnenblust was a public employee in his role of polic e officer . Therefore, the

competent evidence proved PetitionerÔs willful intent to defraud Jackson of its

right to receive the faithful performance of PetitionerÔs duties as a police

officer.

66. In Jenne , the court held that the term Ñspecified offenseÒ i s defined by

the conduct of the public official, not by the elements of the crime for which

the official was convicted . Id. at 741 Ï 43 (explaining that whether the crime

for which the former public officer was convicted qualifies as a specified

offense Ñdep ends on the way in which the crime was committedÒ) . Thus, Ñany

felony could qualify as a specified offense, so long as the remaining conditions

in the statute have been met.Ò Id . at 742.

67. As set forth in Rivera v . Board of Trustees of the City of Tampa Ôs

General Employment Retirement Fund, 189 So. 3d 207, 210 - 11 (Fla. 2d DCA

2016), the Fund has established the nexus between the offenses committed by

Petitioner and his position as a City of Miami police officer. The record

demonstrates that while Bohnenb lust tried to circumvent JacksonÔs medical

discharge decision in his capacity as a police officer by attempting to impose

the Marchman Act, he committed two felonies in which he was convicted by

a jury and adjudicated guilty. He was convicted of battery on a person

65 years of age or older pursuant to sections 784.03 and 784.08(2)(c) and false

imprisonment pursuant to section 787.02(2), for his interaction with

Nicholson on the date of the incident. Therefore, PetitionerÔs convictions

constitute a Ñconvicti onÒ for purposes of section 112.3173(2)(a) .

68. The Findings of Fact above also demonstrate PetitionerÔs personal

decision to recommit his niece by the Marchman Act after the medical facility

decided she should not be committed constitutes use of Petition erÔs police

power for his own advantage or gain. Furthermore, while Petitioner was

seeking his advantage, as stated above , Petitioner committed the two felonies

o f which he was convicted. To that end, the record evidence also shows that

Bohnenblust attempt ed to use his power, rights, privileges, duties, and

position as a police officer when he committed the felonies in an attempt to

recommit his niece contrary to JacksonÔs discharge. Accordingly, Respondent

carried its burden and demonstrated all the elemen ts set forth in Bollone to

establish Bohnenblust was convicted of the specified offense pursuant to

section 112.3173(2)(e)6. Therefore, section 112.3173(3) requires forfeiture of

PetitionerÔs rights, privileges, and retirement benefits for Petitioner's fel ony

convictions.

R ECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

R ECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the Miami Police Relief and

Pension Fund enter a final order finding that Petitioner was a public

employee conv icted of the specified offenses committed while employed with

the City of Miami pursuant to section 112.3173(2)(e)6., Florida Statutes, and

directing the forfeiture of his rights, privileges, and retirement benefits .

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 26th day of Ja nuary , 2022 , in Tallahassee, Leon

County, Florida.

S

J UNE C. M CKINNEY

Administrative Law Judge

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 26th day of January , 2022 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Anna R. Klausner Parish, Esquire Raw si Williams, Esquire

Klausner, Kaufman, Jensen & Levinson Rawsi Williams Law Group

7080 Northwest 4th Street Wells Fargo Center, Suite 200

Plantation, Florida 33317 333 Southeast Seco nd Avenue

Miami, Florida 33131

Gregg Rossman, Esquire

Rossman Legal

6840 Griffin Road

Davie, Florida 33314

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of t his Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.