21-002532 Sabrenna Chambliss vs. Duval County Public Schools Status: Closed Recommended Order on Monday, November 22, 2021.

Summary: Petitioner failed to demonstrate that her dismissal as a probationary employee was based on her disability or on her request for accommodation under the ADA.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

D IVISION OF A DMINISTRATIVE H EARINGS

S ABRENNA C HAMBLISS ,

Petitioner ,

vs. Case No. 21 - 2532

D UVAL C OUNTY P UBLIC S CHOOLS ,

Respondent .

/

R ECOMMENDED O RDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was conducted in this case on

October 15, 2021, via Zoom teleconference, before Lawrence P. Stevenson, a

duly - designated Administrative Law Judge (ÑALJÒ) of the Division of

Administrative Hearings ( Ñ DOAHÒ).

A PPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Sabrenna C. Chambliss, pro se

Apartment 405

1811 Rogero Road

Jacksonville, Florida 32211

For Respondent: Ariel Cook, Esquire

Office of the General Counsel

City of Jacksonville

Suite 480

117 West Duval S treet

Jacksonville, Florida 32244

S TATEMENT OF T HE I SSUE

The issue is whether Respondent, Duval County Public Schools

(ÑRespondentÒ or ÑSchool DistrictÒ), subjected Petitioner to discrimination on

the basis of her disability, in violation of section 760 .10, Florida Statutes. 1

P RELIMINARY S TATEMENT

On October 28, 2020, Petitioner, Sabrenna Chambliss (ÑMs. ChamblissÒ or

ÑPetitionerÒ), filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ( the

Ñ FCHR Ò ) an Employment Complaint of Discrimination against the S chool

District. The Employment Complaint of Discrimination, drafted for

Ms. Chambliss by her then - attorney, stated as follows, in relevant part:

Please be advised that this law firm represents

Ms. Sabrenna Chambliss. Ms. Chambliss

experienced issues in rea sonable accommodations,

disability discrimination, and retaliation at [Duval

County School Board]. DCSB previously employed

Ms. Chambliss from January 2020 until August 18,

2020. Ms. Chambliss was at all times an exemplary

employee. Ms. Chambliss retained our firm in

response to constructive termination from [Duval

County Public Schools]. Ms. Chambliss was a

teacher at DCPS.

On or about August 18, 2020, DCPS informed

Ms. Chambliss that DCPS could not accommodate

Ms. ChamblissÔ disability accommodation and

therefore DCPS would terminate Ms. Chambliss

and give away [her] position.

On or about October 27, 2020, DCPS notified

Ms. Chambliss that her Americans with

Disabilities Act Amendments Act application was

denied because Ms. Chambliss was already

terminate dÈ

1 Citations sh all be to Florida Statutes (2020) unless otherwise specified. Section 760.10 has

been unchanged since 1992, save for a 2015 amend ment adding pregnancy to the list of

classifications protected from discri minatory employment practices. Ch. 2015 - 68, § 6, Laws of

Fla.

On or about November 3, 2020, Ms. Chambliss

responded to DCPS that she was terminated

because GRASP Academy could not accommodate

her disabilityÈ

DCSB has unlawfully denied Ms. Chambliss

employment. DCSB denied Ms. Chambliss

employment because of disab ility reasons and then

fraudulently concealed this reason and defamed

Ms. ChamblissÔs character in the process.

DCSB has taken an astoundingly negative action

towards Ms. Chambliss, in complete contradiction

to federal and state law. Ms. Chambliss is enti tled

to equal protection under the law, whether or not

Ms. Chambliss is disabled or requires a reasonable

accommodation. Ms. Chambliss has suffered

significant duress from this false treatment from

DCSB.

Ms. Chambliss was fully qualified for the position

and could perform the position with or without a

reasonable accommodation, but she was

constructively terminated because of DCSB failure

to provide a reasonable accommodation,

discrimination, and retaliation thereof. The issue is

that DCSB cannot legally d iscriminate against an

employee based on the employeeÔs disability.

The above is a clear violation of the Florida Civil

rights Act. DCPS engaged in a pattern or practice

of failure to provide a reasonable accommodation,

discrimination, and retaliation as defined by the

laws of Florida, including Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)

for constructively discharging Ms. Chambliss

because of her disability and the medical needs

thereofÈ.

The FCHR conducted an investigation into Ms. ChamblissÔs allegations.

On July 28, 20 21, the FCHR issued a written determination that there was

no reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred.

On August 19, 2021, Ms. Chambliss timely filed a Petition for Relief with

the FCHR. Also , on August 19, 2021, the FCHR referre d the case to DOAH

for the assignment of an ALJ and the conduct of formal hearings.

The final hearing was scheduled for October 15, 2021, on which date it

was convened and completed.

At the hearing, Ms. Chambliss testified on her own behalf. Ms. Chambli ss

offered no exhibits into evidence.

The School District presented the testimony of the following School

District employees: Laura Bowes, current Executive Director for School

Improvement; Sherry Jackson, Executive Director of the Office of Equity and

Inclusion and Professional Standards; and Victoria Schultz, Assistant

Superintendent for Human Resources. The School DistrictÔs Exhibits 1

through 8 were admitted into evidence.

The one - volume Transcript of the final hearing was filed with DOAH on

Octobe r 25, 2021. Respondent timely filed its Proposed Recommended Order

on November 4, 2021. Petitioner did not file a p roposed r ecommended o rder.

F INDINGS OF F ACT

Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the

following Findings of F act are made:

1. The School District is an employer as that term is defined in section

760.02(7). It is the governing body responsible for the administration of

public schools in Duval County.

2. Ms. Chambliss is an African American female who suffers fro m Type 2

diabetes, hypertension, and asthma.

3. Ms. Chambliss was hired by the School District on November 4, 2019,

as a part - time employee through ÑProject Jumpstart,Ò a School District

training program for prospective teachers.

4. From the date of her hi ring, Ms. Chambliss was considered a

ÑprobationaryÒ employee. A Ñprobationary contractÒ is an employment

contract awarded to instructional personnel upon initial employment in a

school district. The probationary period is one school year, or 196 working

da ys. §§ 1012.01(4) and 1012.335(1)(c), Fla. Stat.

5. Section 1012.335(1)(c) , Florida Statutes, provides that a probationary

contract employee Ñmay be dismissed without cause or may resign without

breach of contract.Ò

6. After she completed the six - week Proj ect Jumpstart program,

Ms. Chambliss was assigned to Highlands Middle School.

7. At the close of the 2019 - 2020 school year, Highlands Middle School

received a grade of ÑDÒ from the Florida Department of Education. Among the

stateÔs requirements for improvi ng ÑDÒ and ÑFÒ rated schools is that only

teachers rated ÑeffectiveÒ or Ñhighly effectiveÒ may remain at those schools.

8. Ms. ChamblissÔs year - end evaluation was not ÑeffectiveÒ or Ñhighly

effective.Ò Therefore, the School District was required to move he r to a school

with no history of poor evaluations.

9. On July 1, 2020, Ms. Chambliss was reassigned to GRASP Academy, a

K - 8 school designed to address the needs of students with learning

disabilities, chiefly dyslexia, dysgraphia, and dyscalculia.

10. On August 3, 2020, the School DistrictÔs Office of Equity and

Inclusion/Professional Standards (ÑOEIPSÒ) received Ms. ChamblissÔs request

for a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ÑADAÒ). Due to her comorbidities and the danger posed by Covid - 19,

Ms. Chambliss requested that she be allowed to work from home.

11. On August 11, 2020, OEIPS sent an email to Annessia Powell, the

principal of GRASP Academy, informing her that an employee, later

identified as Ms. Chambliss, had applie d for an accommodation. OEIPS

requested that Ms. Powell provide dates and times of her availability to

attend a Skype meeting to discuss the working environment, Ms. ChamblissÔs

job responsibilities, and reasonable accommodation options. Sherry Jackson,

th e Executive Director of OEIPS, testified that such meetings are standard

practice when an employee requests an ADA accommodation.

12. Later on August 11, 2020, Ms. Powell replied to OEIPS that

Ms. Chambliss was no longer a teacher at GRASP Academy. She sta ted that

the School District had moved Ms. Chambliss out of GRASP Academy the

previous week.

13. There was disagreement as to the reason for Ms. ChamblissÔs

departure from GRASP Academy. Laura Bowes, who at the time was the

School DistrictÔs Executive Dire ctor for Human Resources (ÑHRÒ), testified to

receiving a report from Ms. Powell that Ms. Chambliss had only been at

GRASP Academy for a few hours when she told Ms. Powell that she did not

believe the school was the best setting for her. Ms. Chambliss alle gedly told

Ms. Powell that a different type of teacher would be better suited for the

needs of GRASP AcademyÔs students.

14. Ms. Chambliss testified that she had substituted at GRASP Academy

on several occasions. She liked the program at the school and bel ieved it was

a good fit for her interests and skills.

15. Ms. Chambliss testified that she had undergone surgery during the

summer. She reported to work at GRASP Academy but during her first day of

work she began to experience great pain and asked to go h ome.

Ms. Chambliss testified that her conversation with the principal was about

her request to work from home, not the suitability of the school.

16. Regardless of the reason for her departure from GRASP Academy,

Ms. Chambliss was reassigned to Landmark M iddle School. She was directed

to report for work on August 14, 2020.

17. Ms. Bowes testified that the principal of Landmark Middle School,

Dr. Cicely Tyson - White, reported that Ms. Chambliss was not coming in to

work on a consistent basis. She was failing to notify the school of her

absences. She would also come into work several hours late and say that she

had been to a doctorÔs appointment, again without notice. After listening to

Dr. Tyson - White express her frustration, Ms. Bowes told Dr. Tyson - White

th at Ms. Chambliss was still a probationary employee and as such could be

released from employment without cause.

18. Ms. Chambliss testified that she was having problems using the

School DistrictÔs automated leave request system but that she never failed to

let the school know when she needed to be absent from work.

19. Ms. Chambliss next reported for work on August 18, 2020. At that

time, Dr. Tyson - White informed Ms. Chambliss that her probationary

employment was being terminated and that another teacher wo uld be filling

her position at Landmark Middle School.

20. The School District refers all requests for reasonable accommodations

under the ADA to OEIPS for review and action. For reasons of employee

confidentiality, the School DistrictÔs HR Department is n ot given immediate

access to ADA accommodation requests.

21. Ms. Bowes, the head of HR, testified that she was unaware

Ms. Chambliss had requested a reasonable accommodation under the ADA at

the time she advised Dr. Tyson - White of her option to terminate

M s. ChamblissÔs employment without cause.

22. Ms. Chambliss is eligible to reapply for a teaching position with the

School District at any time. Both Ms. Bowes and Victoria Schultz, the current

Assistant Superintendent for HR, testified that Ms. ChamblissÔs probationary

termination would not harm her chances of obtaining a position at another

school, given that such terminations are not uncommon and that there is a

high need for teachers in the School District. Individual school principals

have the discretio n to interview and hire teachers who have gone through

probationary release. The School District would place no obstacle before

Ms. Chambliss should she pursue re - employment.

23. In a November 29, 2020, letter to Sherry Jackson, Executive Director

of OEIP S, Ms. Chambliss stated, ÑMy goal is to return to Teacher status in

the future, but due to some complications from surgery and Covid - 19, further

investigations on high risk medical conditions are presently being set up for

testing and diagnosis which will prolong my return.Ò

24. As of the date of the hearing, Ms. Chambliss had not applied for a

position with the School District since her termination .

25. In summary, Ms. Chambliss offered insufficient evidence that she was

discriminated against based on her disability. The principal who terminated

her employment was not even aware that Ms. Chambliss had requested an

accommodation. The School DistrictÔs process for establishing reasonable

accommodations might be faulted for slowness but there was no evidence that

it was used for discriminatory reasons.

26. It is noted that the School District placed great emphasis on its

discretion to terminate a probationary employeeÔs contract Ñwithout causeÒ

under section 1012.335(1)(c). The undersigned doubts this statute would

shield a school district that engaged in blatant discrimination, but such was

not the case in the instant proceeding. Ms. Chambliss offered nothing more

than her suspicions to tie her disability to the School DistrictÔs decision to

terminate her empl oyment.

27. There was no evidence that Ms. Chambliss was subjected to unlawful

retaliation.

28. Ms. Chambliss offered insufficient credible evidence disputing the non -

discriminatory reason given by the School District for its termination of her

probationar y employment.

C ONCLUSIONS OF L AW

29. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject

matter of and the parties to this proceeding. §§ 120.569, 120.57(1), and

760.11(7), Fla. Stat.

30. The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the "F lorida Civil Rights Act" or

the "FCRA"), chapter 760, prohibits discrimination in the workplace. The

FCRA is modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991,

42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq . (Title VII), so that federal case law regarding Title

VII is applicable to construe the FCRA . See Castleberry v. Edward M.

Chadbourne, Inc. , 810 So. 2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

31. Section 760.10 states the following, in relevant part:

(1) It is an unlawful employment practice for an

employer:

(a) T o discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national

ori gin, age, handicap, or marital status.

* * *

(7) It is an unlawful employment practice for an

employer, an employment agency, a joint labor -

management committee, or a labor organization to

discriminate against any person because that

person has opposed a ny practice which is an

unlawful employment practice under this section,

or because that person has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

section.

32. The School District is an "employer" as defined in section 760.02(7),

which provides the following:

(7) "Employer" means any person employing 15 or

more employees for each working day in each of

20 or more calendar weeks in the current or

preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a

person.

33. Florida courts have determined that federal case law applies to claims

arising under the Florida Civil Rights Act, and as such, the United States

Supreme Court's model for employment discrimination cases set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d

668 (1973), applies to claims arising under section 760.10, absent direct

evidence of discrimination. See Harper v. Blockbuster EntmÔt Corp. , 139 F.3d

1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998); Paraohao v. Bankers Club, Inc. , 225 F. Supp. 2d

1353, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Fla. State Univ. v. Sondel , 685 So. 2d 923, 925

n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Fla. DepÔt of Cmty. Aff. v. Bryant , 586 So. 2d 1205

(Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

34. ÑDirect evidence is Óevidence, which i f believed, proves existence of fact

in issue without inference or presumption.ÔÒ Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc. , 833

F.2d 1525, 1528 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987)( quoting BlackÔs Law Dictionary 413 (5th

ed. 1979)). In Carter v. City of Miami , 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th C ir. 1989), the

court stated:

This Court has held that not every comment

concerning a person's age presents direct evidence

of discrimination. [ Young v. Gen. Foods Corp . , 840

Young Court

made clear that remarks merely r eferring to

characteristics associated with increasing age, or

facially neutral comments from which a plaintiff

has inferred discriminatory intent, are not directly

probative of discrimination. Id . Rather, courts have

found only the most blatant remarks, w hose intent

could be nothing other than to discriminate on the

basis of age, to constitute direct evidence of

discrimination.

35. Petitioner offered no evidence that would satisfy the stringent

standard of direct evidence of discrimination.

36. Under the McDonnell analysis, in employment discrimination cases,

Petitioner has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence,

a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. If the prima facie case is

established, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut this preliminary

showing by producing evidence that the adverse action was taken for some

legitimate, non - discriminatory reason. If the employer rebuts the prima facie

case, the burden shifts back to Petitioner to show by a preponderance of the

ev idence that the employer's offered reasons for its adverse employment

decision were pretextual. See Texas DepÔt of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine , 450 U.S.

248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981).

37. In order to prove a prima facie case of unlawful employmen t

discrimination under chapter 760, Petitioner must establish that: (1) she is a

member of the protected group; (2) she was subject to adverse employment

action; (3) the School District treated similarly situated employees outside of

her protected classifi cations more favorably; and (4) Petitioner was qualified

to do the job and/or was performing her job at a level that met the employerÔs

legitimate expectations. See , e.g., Jiles v.United Parcel Serv ., Inc ., 360 Fed.

Appx. 61, 64 (11th Cir. 2010); Burke - Fow ler v. Orange Cnty , 447 F.3d 1319,

1323 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc ., 330 F.3d 1313,

1316 (11th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp ., 144 F.3d 1438, 1441

(11th Cir. 1998); McKenzie v. EAP Mgmt. Corp ., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1374 - 75

(S.D. Fla. 1999).

38. Petitioner has failed to prove a prima facie case of unlawful

employment discrimination.

39. Petitioner is an African American female who suffers from Type 2

diabetes, hypertension, and asthma, conditions that constitute Ñhand icapsÒ

and therefore make her a member of a protected group.

40. Petitioner was terminated from her position as a teacher with the

School District and was therefore subject to an adverse employment action.

41. Petitioner was not evaluated as ÑeffectiveÒ or Ñhighly effective,Ò but

there was no evidence that she was in danger of dismissal for reasons related

to her classroom performance. The principal who dismissed her did so by

invoking the Ñwithout causeÒ provision of section 1012.335(1)(c). Therefore,

base d on all the evidence, Petitioner was performing her job at a level that

met the employerÔs legitimate expectations.

42. As to the question of disparate treatment, the applicable standard was

recently revised in Lewis v. City of Union City, G eorgia . , 918 F .3d 1213, 1218

(11th Cir. 2019): Ñ[A] plaintiff asserting an intentional - discrimination claim

under McDonnell - Douglas must demonstrate that she and her proffered

comparators were Ósimilarly situated in all material aspects.ÔÒ

43. State courts in Florida h ave found that a person suffers Ñ disparate

treatment Ò in his or her employment, in violation of Title VII Ð and, by

extension, the FCRA Ð when he or she is singled out and treated less

favorably, on the basis of his or her status as a member of a protected cla ss

than other employees who are otherwise similarly situated in all relevant

respects. Johnson v. Great Expressions Dental Ctrs. of Fla. , P.A., 132 So. 3d

1174, 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Valenzuela v. Globeground N . Am . , LLC , 18

So. 3d 17, 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2 009).

44. Petitioner offered no evidence as to disparate treatment of similarly

situated employees outside of her protected classification. Discriminatory

intent may be proved by inference but a trier of fact Ñcannot infer

discrimination from thin air.Ò Li zardo v. DennyÔs, Inc . , 270 F.3d 94, 104 (2d

Cir. 2001) ( citing Norton v. Sam's Club , 145 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir.1998) ) .

Mere speculation or self - serving belief on the part of a complainant

concerning motives of a respondent is insufficient, standing alone, to

establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. See Lizardo , 270

F.3d at 104 (ÑPlaintiffs have done little more than cite to their mistreatment

and ask the court to conclude that it must have been related to their race.

This is not sufficien t.Ò). See also Norton , 145 F.3d at 120 (anti - discrimination

law Ñdoes not make employers liable for doing stupid or even wicked things; it

makes them liable for discriminating È.Ò).

45. Having failed to establish the disparate treatment element, Petitioner

has not established a prima facie case of employment discrimination. ÑFailure

to establish a prima facie case of . . . discrimination ends the inquiry.Ò Ratliff

v. State , 666 So. 2d, 1008, 1013 n.6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(citations omitted).

46. Even if Petit ioner were deemed to have submitted sufficient evidence

to show a prima face case of unlawful discrimination, credible and unrebutted

testimony by the School DistrictÔs witnesses showed that PetitionerÔs

dismissal was unrelated to her request for an ADA ac commodation. Because

of the School DistrictÔs confidentiality practices, neither the HR Department

nor the principal of Landmark Middle School was aware of PetitionerÔs

accommodation request at the time her employment was terminated. The

School District ha d the discretion to dismiss Petitioner without cause. The

only reason established on the record for the principalÔs dissatisfaction had to

do with PetitionerÔs absences from work, not her disability or her

accommodation request. Petitioner disagreed with t he allegation that she

was not providing notice of her absences but did not dispute the absences

themselves. The evidence was insufficient to show that the School DistrictÔs

reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.

47. In a proceeding under the FCRA, the court is Ñ not in the business of

adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, [the

court Ô s] sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a

challenged employment decision. Ò Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla .,

Inc. , 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999). Not everything that makes an

employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action for purposes of the FCRA.

Davis v. Town of Lake Park , 245 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2001).

48. As to PetitionerÔs retaliation clai m, the court in Blizzard v. Appliance

Direct, Inc. , 16 So. 3d 922, 926 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), described the elements of

such a claim as follows:

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

section 760.10(7), a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) that h e or she engaged in statutorily protected

activity; (2) that he or she suffered adverse

employment action and (3) that the adverse

employment action was causally related to the

protected activity. See Harper v. Blockbuster

EntmÔt Corp. , 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied 525 U.S. 1000, 119 S. Ct. 509, 142 L.Ed.2d

422 (1998). Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie

showing, the burden shifts and the defendant must

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the adverse employment action. Wells v.

Colorado Dep't of Transp. , 325 F.3d 1205, 1212

(10th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff must then respond

by demonstrating that defendant's asserted reasons

for the adverse action are pretextual. Id .

4 9 . Petitioner made no evidentiary showing that any emp loyment action

by the School District was causally related to any statutorily protected

activity she took while an employee. The School DistrictÔs OEIPS began

processing her ADA accommodation request upon receipt but was unable to

schedule an accommodation meeting before she changed schools and then

was dismissed from employment. PetitionerÔs assertion of retaliation was

unsupported by credible evidence.

50 . In conclusion, Ms. Chambliss failed to present a prima facie case of

discrimination based on disabi lity , and failed to show that her termination

from employment was in retaliation for her exercise of protected activity.

R ECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

R ECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Hum an Relations issue a

final order finding that Duval County Public Schools did not commit an

unlawful employment practice , and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in

this case.

D ONE A ND E NTERED this 22nd day of November , 2021 , in Tallahassee,

Leon Co unty, Florida.

S

L AWRENCE P. S TEVENSON

Administrative Law Judge

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 3060

(850) 488 - 9675

www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the

Division of Administrative Hearings

this 22nd day of November , 2021 .

C OPIES F URNISHED :

Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Ashley Benson Rutherford, Esquire

Florida Commission on Human Relations Office of General Counsel

Room 110 Suite 480

4075 Esplanade Way 117 West Duval Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399 - 7020 Jacksonville, Florida 32202

Ariel Cook, Esquire Sabrenna C. Chambliss

Office of General Counsel Apartment 405

City of Jacksonville 1811 Rogero Road

Suite 480 Jacksonville, Florida 32211

117 West Duval Street

Jackso nville, Florida 32244

Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel

Florida Commission on Human Relations

Room 110

4075 Esplanade Way

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

N OTICE OF R IGHT T O S UBMIT E XCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from

the date of this Recommended Order. Any ex ceptions to this Recommended

Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this

case.