83-001652RX
Gary M. Piccirillo And Douglas L. Adams vs.
Department Of Corrections
Status: Closed
DOAH Final Order on Tuesday, April 17, 1984.
DOAH Final Order on Tuesday, April 17, 1984.
1STATE OF FLORIDA
4DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
8GARY M. PICCIRILLO and )
13DOUGLAS L. ADAMS, )
17)
18Petitioners, )
20)
21vs. ) CASE NO. 83-1652RX
26)
27DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )
31)
32Respondent. )
34_________________________________)
35FINAL ORDER
37Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly
48designated Hearing Officer, William E. Williams, held a public hearing in this
60cause on August 13, 1983, at Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida.
71APPEARANCES
72For Petitioners: Gary M. Piccirillo and
78Douglas L. Adams, pro se
83Union Correctional Institution
86Post Office Box 221
90Raiford, Florida 32083
93For Respondent: William H. Ravenell, Esquire
99Assistant Attorney General
102Department of Legal Affairs
106The Captiol
108Tallahassee, Florida 32301
111Petitioners, who at the time of formal hearing in this cause were inmates
124incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution, challenged the validity of Rules
13433-11.025, 11.065, 11.075, 11.085, and 11.11, Florida Administrative Code, as
144invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. In addition, Petitioners
153challenge as an unpromulgated, and therefore invalid, rule Respondent's Policy
163and Procedure Directive 4.07.24.
167Final hearing in this cause was scheduled for August 12, 1983, by Amended
180Notice of Hearing dated July 15, 1983. At the final hearing Petitioners
192testified in their own behalf and called Glen Chambers and Kenneth Snow as their
206witnesses. Petitioners offered Petitioners' Exhibits 1 and 2, which were
216received into evidence. Respondent called Ron Jones as its only witness and
228offered Respondent's Exhibit 1, which was received into evidence.
237In the petition filed herein, Petitioners challenge the validity of
247Respondent's promulgated rules as hereinbefore described on the grounds that
257they restrict and condition the award of gain time as provided in Section
270944.275, Florida Statutes, and further argued that those rules are impermissibly
281vague allegedly due to their ". . . failure to set forth procedures [to insure]
296that inmates who earn additional gain time under statutory provisions actually
307receive [it] . . . . " Petitioners also contend that Policy and Procedure
320Directive 4.07.24 is invalid because it: improperly delegates decision-making
329authority to deny an award of additional gain time to a classification
341specialist who may arbitrarily deny such an award; restricts and conditions the
353provisions of Chapter 33-11, Florida Administrative Code; and because it ". . .
366has a practical and actual effect of a `rule' without being properly adopted . .
381. ."
383Both Petitioners and Respondent have submitted proposed findings of fact
393for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed
405findings are not included in this order, they have been specifically rejected as
418being either irrelevant to the issues in this cause or as not having been
432supported by evidence of record.
437FINDINGS OF FACT
440At all times material hereto, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at
450Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida. Respondent has stipulated
459that Petitioners have "standing" to challenge the rules and the policy and
471procedure directives which are the subject matter of this proceeding.
481The Secretary of the Department of Corrections has issued Policy and
492procedure Directive initially dated June 23, 1982, and revised July 12, 1982.
504The purpose of the directive was . . ." [t]o thoroughly explain the gain time
519program and to set forth guidance for uniform implementation department-wide on
530its face, the directive purports to be issued pursuant to the authority
542contained in Sections 944.275, 944.28, 945.21, and 775.087, Florida Statutes,
552and Chapter 33-11, Florida Administrative Code.
558The directive contains ten separate sections. The first two sections,
568entitled Authority and Purpose of Directive merely recite the aforementioned
578statutory and rule basis for issuance of the directive, and indicate that the
591purposes of the directive is to explain and facilitate implementation of the
603gain time program. The third section, entitled Definitions, simply reiterates
613in substantially similar language, the definitions of the different types of
624gain time contained in Section 944.275, Florida Statutes. Section 4 of the
636directive contains special conditions to the award of gain time, including
647disciplinary or court action, unsatisfactory institutional performances,
654corrective consultations, administrative confinement, close management, inmates'
661assignment on Death Row, inmates serving three years' mandatory sentences, and
672the like. Each of the requirements of this section of the directive is either
686identical to or drawn directly from Rule 33-11.11, Florida Administrative Code,
697or Section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The remaining six sections of the
708directive deal with eligibility for, methods for crediting and processing
718procedures for the award of basic gain time, additional gain time, work gain
731time, constructive gain time, extra gain time, and special gain time. Again,
743each of these sections reiterate requirements already contained in Rules 33-
75411.045, 33-11.055, 33-11.065, 33-11.075, 33-11.085, and 33-11.09. These
762sections of the directive do not purport to create or otherwise adversely affect
775rights of inmates in any manner which differs from the aforementioned rules.
787Under the policy and procedure directive, classification officers employed
796by the Department of Corrections serve a limited function in the award of gain
810time. With respect to basic gain time, corrections officers merely check to
822make sure that no disciplinary report has been filed against an inmate for the
836period in which gain time is being awarded. They exercise no discretion in the
850award of basic gain time. With respect to extra gain time or constructive gain
864time, the classification officer merely sits as a member of a classification
876team which determines the amount of any such award. Meritorious gain time is
889customarily instituted by the classification team as a whole, with the final
901decision-making authority resting with the agency head of the Department of
912Corrections. In each instance, classification officers have limited
920participation in the award of gain time, and may not act alone to deny inmates
935appropriate gain time awards.
939CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
9421. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the
952subject matter of, and the parties to this proceeding. Section 120.56, Florida
964Statutes.
9652. Section 945.21, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as
975follows:
976(1) The department shall promulgate
981regulations governing the administration
985of the correctional system and the operation
992of the department. In addition to specific
999subjects otherwise provided for herein, the
1005regulations of the department may relate to:
1012(c) Gain-time for good conduct of, release
1019payments to, and release transportation of
1025inmates. . . ."
10293. Section 944.275(7), Florida Statutes, provides that ". . . [t]he
1040department shall promulgate rules to implement the granting, forfeiture, and
1050restoration of gain-time."
10534. Pursuant to the authority contained in the aforementioned sections,
1063Respondent has promulgated Chapter 33-11, Florida Administrative Code. In this
1073proceeding, Petitioners have specifically challenged the validity of Rules 33-
108311.025 relating to limitation on gain time deductions; 33-11.065 relating to the
1095award of work gain time; 33-11.075 relating to the award of constructive gain
1108time; 33-11.085 relating to the award of extra gain time; and, 33-11.11
1120governing with-holding or forfeiture of gain time. Petitioners argue that each
1131of these sections ". . . restricts and conditions the award of gain time as
1146provided in Section 944.275, Florida Statutes . . .", and that each of the
1160challenged rules is ". . . vague by [their] failure to set forth procedures [to
1175insure] that inmates who earn additional gain time under statutory provisions
1186actually receive [it] . . . ." It is specifically concluded, as a matter of law,
1202that each of these contentions is without merit. Where, as here, the
1214legislature has delegated broad discretionary rulemaking authority to an agency,
"1224. . . the validity of regulations promulgated thereunder will be sustained so
1237long as they are reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation
1250and are not arbitrary or capricious. . . . " Florida Beverage Corporation v.
1263Wynne, 306 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); General Telephone Company of
1276Florida v. Florida Public Service Commission, 6 FALR 1016, 1019 (Fla. 1984).
1288Further, where an agency has responded to rulemaking incentives and has adopted
1300as rules its policy statements of general applicability,". . . [p]ermissible
1312interpretations of statute must and will be sustained, though other
1322interpretations are possible and may even preferable according to some views . .
1335. ." Here, the legislature has specifically delegated broad rulemaking authority
1346to the Department of Corrections in the award of various categories of gain
1359time. The rules adopted by the department, as challenged herein, are
1370permissible interpretations pursuant to its statutory grant of authority, and it
1381is therefore concluded, as a matter of law, that Petitioners have failed to
1394establish a record basis for invalidating the challenged rule.
14035. Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, defines the term "rule" to mean:
1414. . . each agency statement of general
1422applicability that implements, interprets,
1426or prescribes law or policy or describes
1433the organization, procedure, or practice
1438requirements of an agency and includes any
1445form which imposes any requirement or solicits
1452any information not specifically required by
1458statute or by an existing rule . . . .
1468Agency statements which meet the definition of a "rule" within the meaning of
1481Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, but have not been adopted according to the
1493rulemaking requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, are invalid.
1502Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
1514Agency statements which purport in and of themselves to create rights and
1526adversely affect others, and which are applied prospectively with the force and
1538effect of law, allowing little or no discretion in their implementation, are
1550rules and are void unless formally adopted. Florida State University v. Dann,
1562400 So.2d 1304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). However, where agency statements that have
1575not been adopted as rules simply track the language of either a statute or a
1590validly adopted rule, it is unnecessary that they be adopted pursuant to the
1603requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. See, DeDakis v. Florida Real
1614Estate Commission, 388 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In such cases, as with the
1629policy and procedure directive here attacked as an unpromulgated rule, it is not
1642the statement itself, but rather the statute and the validly promulgated rules
1654which create or otherwise affect the rights of persons subject to its
1666application. Here, the policy and procedure directive does no more than
1677reiterate the requirements of existing statutes and validly promulgated rules,
1687and was not required to be formally adopted. Accordingly, Petitioners'
1697contention that Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.24 constitutes an
1707invalid unpromulgated rule is without merit.
1713Accordingly, based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
1724Law, the relief sought by Petitioners should be, and the same is, hereby denied,
1738and the petition dismissed.
1742DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida.
1754___________________________________
1755WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS
1758Hearing Officer
1760Division of Administrative Hearings
1764Oakland Building
17662009 Apalachee Parkway
1769Tallahassee, Florida 32301
1772(904) 488-9675
1774Filed with the Clerk of the
1780Division of Administrative Hearings
1784this 17th day of April, 1984.
1790COPIES FURNISHED:
1792Gary M. Piccirillo Douglas L. Adams
1798Lake City Community Union Correctional Institution
1804Correctional Institution Post Office Box 221
1810Post Office Box 777 Raiford, Florida 32083
1817Lake City, Florida 32055
1821Carroll Webb, Executive Director
1825William H. Ravenell, Esquire Joint Administrative Procedures
1832Department of Legal Affairs Committee
1837The Capitol, LL04 120 Holland Building
1843Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
1849Liz Cloud, Chief
1852Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Bureau of Administrative Code
1861Department of Corrections Department of State
18671311 Winewood Boulevard 1802 The Capitol
1873Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Case Information
- Judge:
- WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS
- Date Filed:
- 05/27/1983
- Date Assignment:
- 05/27/1983
- Last Docket Entry:
- 04/17/1984
- Location:
- Tallahassee, Florida
- District:
- Northern
- Agency:
- Department of Corrections
- Suffix:
- RX